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ABSTRACT
In post-war Polish communist foreign policy, of three national 
interests, two —  state security and territorial security —  are 
inextricably linked to the Polish communist internationalist interest 
—  Soviet security. The third —  national prestige —  gives Polish 
communist foreign policy a degree of flexibility, but at times of 
international threat to Soviet security is also subject, to a greater 
or lesser degree, to the internationalist constraint.
The source of this internationalist/national interest fusion lies 
in the linkages created between Polish communist foreign policy and 
Soviet security during the inter-war years and the immediate post-war 
years to 1948.
From the creation of the Polish Communist Party in 1918, classic 
Luxemburg internationalism became immediately suborned to the security 
of the new Soviet state. The Polish Communist Party was seen to 
provide a crucial link between the revolutionary new state and the 
German and wider European socialist revolution. During the Polish- 
Soviet war of 1920 the internationalism of the Polish Communist Party 
was transformed into an instrumental relationship dominated by Soviet 
state security and prestige interests. The Polish Communist Party's 
reaction was to accept its organisational ‘Bolshevisation’ as a trade­
off for a greater ‘national’ profile domestically. Subsequently, the 
Polish Communist Party split between two rival orientations: a
‘national’ wing, and an ‘internationalist’ wing with Soviet security
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as its priority. In the period up to the party's dissolution in 1938, 
the security and prestige positions of the ‘national’ wing were
encompassed within the policies of the ‘internationalist’ wing via the 
policies of the Third (Communist) International.
The ‘national’ position in Polish communist foreign policy was
given a higher profile with the creation of the Polish Workers' Party 
in 1942. Patriotism became the basis on which the new party was to 
operate in war-time Poland. In its foreign policy positions the new 
party linked the domestic security of the post-war Polish state and 
its territorial security fundamentally to the issue of Soviet
security. Balancing this linkage, the party's patriotic profile 
encouraged its 'national’ elements to emphasise the Polish national 
prestige element of its policy.
The balance of internationalist and national interests present in 
Polish Workers' Party foreign policy applied also to the policy
programmes of the Polish communists organised in the Soviet Union. 
Here the ‘internationalist’ wing of the pre-war party was strongest, 
and the three elements of the Polish national interest were all 
presented with significantly greater concern shown to Soviet security 
interests.
From July 1944, the foreign policy of the new communist regime 
concerned itself in turn with state security, territorial security and 
national prestige. On the issue of state security, the 
internationalist interest dominated, with the focus of policy being to 
institutionalise and legitimise internationally the new relationship 
created between the Polish and Soviet states.
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The territorial security of the post-war Polish state had already 
been established prior to the new regime coming to power, on the basis 
of the clear Soviet security interest in the new Polish borders. Now 
the role of foreign policy became to institutionalise and legitimise 
internationally this new territorial status quo.
With the security elements of the post-war Polish national interest 
settled largely on the basis of the Polish communists' 
internationalist responsibilities, the ‘national* wing of the Polish 
Workers' Party was encouraged to give Polish national prestige a 
higher profile. Under the pressure of an increasing Western threat to 
Soviet and Polish interests in Eastern Europe, however, the Polish 
regime's balance between security and prestige became subject to the 
greater internationalist imperative. As a result, the 
‘internationalist* wing of the party was able to consolidate its power 
and Polish foreign policy was given a firmly internationalist profile.
1. INTRODUCTION
The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master 
unless he transforms strength into right 
and obedience into duty.
ROUSSEAU
For the past ten years, International Relations specialists in East 
European communist foreign policy have complained at the lack of 
comprehensive analytical research being undertaken in the field. 
Linden in 1979 wrote that there was a ‘paucity of studies whose 
purpose is a systematic, precise, carefully controlled and 
conceptually guided description of the foreign policies of the states 
of Eastern Europe’.1 The same year Mastny described the East European 
foreign policy research deficit as ‘potentially the most consequential 
of the neglected topics of inquiry’.2 According to Mastny, the deficit 
had implications for the future viability of the comparative communist 
foreign policy field, the re-assessment of which had sparked off the 
methodological debate in its East European sub-field in the first 
place.3
In 1980, Linden followed up his own previous effort to introduce 
greater conceptual rigour into the discipline with another volume, 
this time devoted solely to the case for ‘methodological pluralism*.4 
East European foreign policy research needed to be put into 
'potentially more generalizable frameworks’, Linden wrote.® Included 
in his plea was the need to utilise the case study approach and not to 
leave it solely to area studies specialists to develop. The call for a 
re-evaluation of the case-study had also been made earlier during the 
general comparative foreign policy debate. Contributing to that 
debate, Horelick had argued for a rehabilitation of the case-study 
method: case-studies were the ‘building blocks that must provide the
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essential data base for purposes of theory building or other 
generalisations about the foreign policy behaviour even of single 
states'.6 Without a general proliferation of such ‘building blocks’, 
little progress could be expected in the larger area of foreign policy 
comparison.
Analysts of Polish communist foreign policy, not surprisingly, have 
complained along the same lines. Kanet, for example, wrote that few
‘single, general volumes dealing with post-war Polish foreign policy’
were available, and that most ‘articles on Polish foreign policy tend 
to cover and update the same material’.7 Morrison had earlier made a 
parallel point:
It is rare to find anything at all written about how Polish 
foreign policy is made and executed, what the interests, 
objectives, and perceptions of Polish foreign policy makers 
really are, or what constitutes the major internal and external 
foreign policy determinants.®
Morrison then proceeded to deal with the problem he had outlined by
referring to the ‘two major and apparently conflicting interpretations
of Polish foreign policy underlying most of the popular 'journalism
about Poland as well as many of the more scholarly works on Polish-
Soviet foreign policy’ —  the ‘obedient satellite’ theory ‘which
argues that Poland is still totally subservient to the USSR in foreign
affairs’; and the, ‘independent satellite’ theory which postulates ‘a
course [since 1956] in both foreign and domestic policy that deviates
significantly from Soviet preferences’. Morrison's own operational
hypothesis was that ‘within certain absolute Soviet imposed limits',
Polish foreign policy makers since 1956 enjoy ‘considerable room...
for manouver and experimentation’, far more than had in fact been
attempted. Internal determinants were as important as external
determinants in explaining the failure to deviate more from the Soviet
line.®
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Morrison did not give any more attention to what the ‘absolute 
Soviet-imposed limits’ might be in his ‘rough and tentative outline’ 
of the internal and external determinants of Polish foreign policy. 
The ‘interests, objectives and perceptions of Polish foreign policy 
makers’ he also left to others with the comment that by discovering 
what these intangibles were, ‘some meaningful basis’ would have been 
established for assessing ‘the degree of Polish independence’.
No lack of foreign policy research exists in Poland itself. If more 
Western analysts availed themselves of this work, and the comparable 
work in the other East European states, the much lamented deficit in 
Western research might soon be overcome. Perhaps the reluctance of 
Western analysts to tap these sources can be explained by the
commitment East European foreign policy makers and analysts profess to 
the principles and practice of Marxist methodology. This is
unfortunate, since it is in these principles and this practice that 
the general theory of East European foreign policy is imbedded.
In focusing their attention on the degree to which national 
imperatives, whether domestic or external, are expressed in the
foreign policies of the East European communist states, Western
scholars inevitably commit the ‘independence’ factor to continually 
oscillate according to current or individual attitudes toward the 
‘satellite’ theory. The unchanging ideological framework within which 
these national imperatives have been so far expressed is given little 
if any attention.
The better established field of Soviet foreign policy research 
offers some clues as to why Western scholars of East European foreign 
policy have been so reluctant to venture into general theory building. 
Considerable disagreement still exists as to the influence of either 
ideology or the national interest on Soviet foreign policy. On the one
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hand are analysts who consider that the theories of scientific Marxism 
form the overwhelming impetus for Soviet foreign policy. Ra'anan, for 
example, claims to typify 'analysts of Soviet affairs [who] find their 
patience tested when asked for the n'th time just why should Soviet 
leaders be acting as they are at the moment'. In reply, he expounds 
the view that the concept of the dialectic can explain all Soviet 
foreign policy both as the framework within which the elite perceives 
the international environment, and as the imperative that motivates 
their actions. 10
At the other extreme are those who argue that Realpolltik in Soviet 
foreign policy has largely overtaken any ideological scruples, 
Zimmerman, for example, sees the ‘maintenance of Sian domestically 
through the retention of doctrinal purity internationally' as having 
been ‘consistently sacrificed to the aspiration to pursue foreign 
policy goals rationally and efficiently’.11 National interests are the 
motivating force of Soviet foreign policy for this school. Dallin 
writes that the difference between the global activities of the Soviet 
Politburo and the more limited activities of the Romanovs can be 
explained exclusively by the Soviet Union's greater military and 
economic might.12 Gerner adds some detail to this argument, explaining 
that Russian elites have always defined the foreign policy of their 
state in terms of dominance and surveillance of weak neighbours —  the 
precedent being the incorporation of the Kazan Khanate into Russia in 
1552, and of isolationist peaceful coexistence with strong empires —  
the precedent here being the relationship with Manchu China in the 
eighteenth century. 13
The school that straddles both these extremes is represented by 
Bialer for whom ideology and the national interest are ‘inseparable... 
entwined. .. blended in the minds of the people who make policy,..
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[and] cannot be separated when analyzing the elite's intentions and 
actions’.1*4 Ulam provides perhaps the best Soviet foreign policy 
history of this school, writing of the ‘unconscious Russian
nationalism’ imbedded within ‘the internationalist and socialist 
phraseology of the Bolsheviks', of the deep realism of Lenin and
Realpolitik of Stalin.16
Little disagreement exists in the work of Polish analysts as to the 
dominant element in their country's foreign policy. Their research 
adheres closely to what is called ‘the Marxist commitment of the
social sciences’.16 In his review of foreign policy literature
published in Poland since the war, Szczepahski confirms that ‘a great 
majority of writers’ in the area of Polish foreign policy ‘accepts the 
Marxist interpretation*. These writers, Szczepahski continues, 
'explicitly reject all positivist trends and ideals of “pure science” 
in their description and explanation of the essence of Polish foreign 
policy’.1-7 The ‘essence’ Szczepahski refers to, he describes as the 
‘supreme, most important aim’ of Polish foreign policy: ‘to react to
the outside world in a manner which would assure security and good 
conditions of life to the Polish nation, and promote the development 
of socialism’. This aim, he continues, has been enshrined in Article 6 
of the Polish Constitution. ‘It is characteristic’, Szczepartski added 
in a footnote, ‘that an identical aim was formulated as fundamental in 
the USSR Constitution (Art. 29, 30)’.1S
Poland's modern foreign policy is based firmly on the political 
‘turn’ made after the war by the state's new leaders. This fact is 
emphasised in all basic treatments of Polish foreign policy by 
practitioners and theorists alike.19 The evident banality in such an 
acknowledgement makes it no less critical as the basis from which to 
begin an analysis of post-war Polish foreign policy. Poland's foreign
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policy is not only concerned with maximising the nation's unchanging 
interests. National interests, of course, are the currency of 
international relations; but in the Polish case, they build on a 
political ‘turn’ in place now for forty years. How does this 'turn* 
impact on the manner in which modern Poland pursues its national 
interests through its foreign policy?
Rychlowski writes that Poland's national interests 'are 
conditioned' by ‘the interests of the main social classes and the geo­
political situation in which these interests are being realised’.20 
De-coding this statement, one is left with the assertion that Polish 
national interests are determined via the theoretical communist 
working class interest and the reality of Soviet influence in Poland. 
In his preface to the first volume of Historia dyplomacji polskiej 
(The History of Polish Diplomacy), Polish Foreign Minister Olszowski 
makes this assertion explicit: Poland's 'entire foreign policy serves 
the working peoples, and especially the working class, which has 
acknowledged the overall national interest to be its greatest 
priority’.21 So the precedence of class interests over national 
interests provides an overt linkage informing the ‘essence’ of Polish 
foreign policy.
The result has been to distance Polish policy makers and analysts 
from the mass population which considers 'great politics’ as having 
little indigenous content, and what content there is, as targeted at 
maintaining the security of the regime rather than the welfare of the 
population. Foreign policy rationalisations in book form remain 
unbought by the public at large. Instead, the general view has tended 
toward the opposite extreme, seeing in Polish foreign policy little 
more than an extension of Soviet foreign policy. According to the 
‘Experience and Future’ survey of contemporary Polish attitudes
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carried out in 1979, the Polish public saw 'a deep contradiction 
between the interests of Poland and the present configuration of 
international relations, between the interests of the outside world 
and our own national interests’. One of the respondents to the survey 
wrote: ‘The awareness of limited national sovereignty... the doctrine
expressed in the article of the Polish Constitution that treats our 
alliance and friendship with the USSR as a guaranteed political duty 
of Poland, weighs painfully (more or less so depending on people and 
circumstances) on the civic attitudes of the Poles’.22
Within this credibility gap, however, lies an area of common ground 
set firmly in Poland's historical foreign policy dilemmas. Non­
communist Poles of the Realist school accept, for example, that 
advantages can and do accrue to the contemporary national Polish state 
through its participation in the Soviet alliance's promotion of 
collective security in Europe.23 They regard the imperative of 
Poland's Primat der Aussenpolitik, which looks to the environmental 
advantages to be gained by continuing the domestic status quo, as 
perforce the Poles' political priority.2* At their most general, 
official commentators on Polish foreign policy also express the 
overarching goal of Polish foreign policy to be the political and 
territorial integrity of the state, and to provide the external 
conditions for it ‘to realize its social, economic, and cultural- 
civilizational aspirations’.2®
Polish foreign policy, then, is neither wholly ideological nor 
national, but a complex fusion of both elements. This fusion lends its 
support to the arguments of both the state officials who, with a touch 
of bravado, define the state's policy in terras of its independent 
national initiatives, and the Polish opposition and wider public who, 
in their hostility, tend to see this policy as the outcome solely of
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Soviet interests. At the same time, official analysts understand well 
the ideological interest that permeates their work, and the opposition 
and public have no choice but to acknowledge those aspects of the 
national interest that the state by nature defends. The degree to 
which this fusion is either accepted or supported depends on the 
political viewpoint of the interested party.
But in Western studies of Polish foreign policy, the interaction of 
ideological and national interests seems to have been excluded 
altogether. The few studies of any type relating to post-war Polish 
foreign policy put their emphasis instead on the limitations to Polish 
(and other East European) foreign policy imposed by the national and 
ideological interests of the Soviet Union.26 It is my belief that 
these limitations are indeed fundamental. It is also my belief that by 
viewing these limitations outside a wider Polish historical context 
they can easily become distorted; further, by viewing them outside the 
prism of the Polish policy makers' own national and ideological 
perceptions and interests their impact can often be seriously 
misplaced.
Communism in its traditional Marxist sense, as Demaitre points out, 
is 'universalistic-international', whereas an appreciation of national 
worth implies an exclusivity in cultural terms.27 Whatever the 
theoretical implications inherent in the classic understanding of 
these two concepts, their fusion became inevitable from the time that 
communism became a state strategy rather than the organisational 
inspiration of a revolutionary political party. Well before the 
Bolshevik Party took power in Russia, the existence of the national/ 
international dualism of communism had become the cause of a 
fundamental split among two of the leaders of the Second (Socialist) 
International —  Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. Under Lenin's leadership,
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the Bolshevik coup was followed very quickly by state consolidation. 
Outside the Soviet state, however, internationalism remained the 
slogan for all communist parties, now sections of a Third (Communist) 
International with its base in Moscow —  the Comintern. The ‘cardinal 
point of faith’ was that any policy that was ‘a necessity from the 
standpoint of Soviet Russia’, was also ‘a necessity from the 
standpoint of the world revolution’.20
The Polish Section of the Comintern, physically close to the 
Bolshevik leadership, was split by the obvious dichotomy in Soviet 
strategy. One wing saw national consolidation on the model of the 
Bolsheviks in Russia as the practical model to follow even if still in 
opposition. The other held to the tenets of revolutionary 
internationalism demanded by the Comintern. With the gradual 
consolidation of Stalin's power in the Soviet Politburo, this latter 
wing was consistently favoured. The strength of the Polish 
'internationalists’ lay not in their ideological integrity, however. 
Rather, they were favoured because of a possible weak link in Soviet 
security from a nationally inclined Polish Communist Party. Poland had 
lost none of its inherent geo-strategic value for the new leaders of 
the Soviet state. Just as it had been the route into Russia for the 
invading armies of Napoleon and the Kaiser, so now it was also the 
bastion of Western ‘imperialism’ and conversely, the revolutionary 
bridge between Bolshevik Russia and socialist Germany. From this 
perspective, a Polish Section of the Comintern with national interests 
as its priority would by nature be less than revolutionary and instead 
would pose a potential threat to Soviet ideological authority. With 
the increasing threat to Soviet security from the rise of the fascist 
movement in Europe, the Soviet insistence on revolutionary tactics 
among the Comintern's sections receded. In the Polish case, this did
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not result in the ‘national* leadership regaining its authority; 
leaders loyal to Stalin were instead able to further consolidate their 
power. Eventually, the Polish Section of the Comintern was done away 
with altogether.
The culmination of Stalin's brand of Realpolitik came with the 
onset of the first war involving the Soviet state under his 
leadership. Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 
1941, Stalin sought to utilise a particularly high profile Russian 
patriotism in an attempt to galvanise the country behind him. An 
expression of this was also the re-creation of the Polish party along 
patriotic lines; the Polish national interest now became the 
preoccupation of the Polish communists. At the same time, in place of 
an ‘unconscious nationalism', a very conscious internationalism came 
into play in Polish communist policies. The form of the national/ 
internationalist duality internalised in Polish communism through the 
inter-war years now showed its real value for Soviet security.
Ever since the Second World War and the ‘turn’ in Polish politics, 
the official Polish foreign policy position has been that only the 
communists, represented in the Polish United Workers' Party, are able 
to guarantee Poland's geo-political stability —  its territorial 
security in the face of a constant threat from German revanchism, and 
state security in view of the acknowledged possibility of greater 
Soviet interference. In all of Poland's post-war political crises, 
this point has been the bottom line of the domestic debate, the cut­
off point beyond which internal opposition could not go. 29 It has been 
labelled by the Polish United Workers' Party Poland's racja stanu. 
Without the communists in power, the argument goes, Poland would lose 
the guarantee that ensures the country's current position in Europe. 
In other words, the national form of the Polish state depends vitally
- l i ­
on its Ideological content. This argument results in the Polish 
communists claiming a monopoly on foreign policy realism, a tautology 
which has in turn played a crucial post-war role in defining the
communist regime's political legitimacy. 30
The issue for the analyst interested in the linkages between 
ideology and the national interest in Polish communist foreign policy 
can no longer, therefore, be the question of whether or not the 
linkage exists, in the way that the debate regarding the Soviet 
linkage has been shaped, but why does it exist and how does it 
operate.
The thesis of this analysis is that the source of the particular 
internationalist/national interest linkage operating in post-war 
Polish foreign policy lies in the linkages created between Polish 
communist foreign policy and the Soviet security interest during the 
formative years of the Polish Communist Party, and the formative years 
of the post-war Polish state. As a result of this formative 
experience, in post-war Polish communist foreign policy, of the three 
principal national interests, two —  state security and territorial 
security —  are inextricably linked to the Polish communist 
internationalist interest, ie. Soviet security. The third —  national
prestige — gives Polish communist foreign policy a degree of national 
flexibility, but at times of international threat to Soviet security 
is also subject, to a greater or lesser extent, to the 
internationalist constraint.
State security, territorial security, and national prestige are 
defined as Poland's core national interests for the purposes of this 
study. State security is an imperative second to none in a country
which for over a century disappeared from the European state system.
Unremarkably, with the re-creation of the Polish national state in
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1918, the emphasis given to the concept of 'state* by the new national 
Polish regime was overwhelming. In 1926, following a coup led by 
Marshall Pilsudski, the new military Sanacja regime made state 
'health* its goal. Poland's racja stanu was established as the 
doctrine that justified all domestic and international measures taken 
in its name. The security of the Polish political entity became one of 
the highest values of the new political order.
Even before its loss of political identity, Poland was never 
allowed to accept its territorial identity as granted. With few clear 
geographical frontiers, the country has had historically to rely on 
the internal strength of its political regime and its identification 
with outside powers to ensure its territorial security. Security was 
also commonly sought through expansion. With expansion went 
contraction, with the result that Polish foreign policy became vitally 
sensitive to any threat to the territorial status quo.
Poland's historical efforts to defend its political and 
geographical identity were matched by the country's search for a 
national identity. Polish nationality took on a new and politically 
charged significance during the period of partition from 1795 to 1918. 
This blow to the nation's prestige, fuelled by the consciousness of 
Poland's greatness in the sixteenth century, resulted in an intense 
patriotism that became the driving force of Polish nationalism. In the 
inter-war period, as result of the experience of partition, socialist 
as well as nationalist leaders understood Polish prestige to be firmly 
based on the country's national independence since only true 
independence could provide the country with a satisfactory national 
identity.
These three national interests have continued to inform the foreign 
policy of the post-war Polish state. I have already referred to the
- 13 -
role of the political and territorial security interests united in the 
contemporary version of the Polish racja stanu. I have also implied 
that Polish prestige continues to be considered in terms of an 
independent contribution to the issues of most importance to the 
country's foreign policy — European peace and security. Polish policy 
makers are understandably proud of the Polish initiatives in forums 
such as the United Nations and Conference for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe.
In general, security and prestige form the two sides of the coin of 
statecraft. They are determined in their parameters by the physical 
and national constants in a given state. But they are also influenced 
by political change, by the ideological interpretation of a given 
political regime at a give time. I have called the result of this 
interpretation process the foreign policy 'climate'. The policy 
climate commonly associates both sets of interests in order to 
legitimize the regime's ideological interest as basic to the state's 
national interests. Domestic and/or international legitimacy is sought 
in this manner. The Polish post-war regime, as I have mentioned, 
regards the security of the Polish state as synonymous with its own 
security; Poland's territorial security can only be guaranteed through 
the regime's continued viability; and Poland's prestige abroad depends 
on the community of interests in the fraternal Soviet alliance and the 
room left Poland to manouver within that alliance.
The ideological interest as it applies to Polish communist foreign 
policy is taken for the purposes of this study to be defined by the 
concept of 'internationalism*. During its period of opposition, 
internationalism formed the greatest single ideological interest of 
the Polish Communist Party's foreign policy. This opposition period 
can be split into two phases. The first phase lasting from 1918 until
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1941, when the party was illegal and proscribed, is described in 
chapters two and three. Internationalism moved in this initial period 
from a focus on the Luxemburg interpretation, through an intimate 
identification with the Bolshevik Russian Communist Party, followed by 
a political re-evaluation based on Polish national interests, and 
finally, over a period of years as described in chapter three, to an 
instrumental dependence on the Soviet party for policy and tactics.
The second phase of opposition began with the creation of the 
Polish Workers' Party in 1942, when the internationalist relationship 
created prior to the war was fused with the three core Polish national 
interests. The new party took as its raison d'§tre the national 
struggle against Germany and an internationalist, ie. Soviet option 
for national Polish politics in the period after the war. The foreign
policy of the newly created Polish Workers' Party forms the subject of
chapter four.
Polish Workers' Party foreign policy was complemented by the
policies of the Polish communists gathered in the Soviet Union, the 
subject of chapter five. Here also national interests were given a 
high profile as the Poles prepared to march with their newly formed 
army back into Poland. Like the Polish Workers' Party, these future 
Polish leaders needed to present a credible political alternative to 
the establishment foreign policies of the pre-war regime. The 
internationalist interest as seen from Moscow was being established in 
as non-provocative a manner as possible.
Chapters six, seven and eight deal in turn with state security,
territorial security and national prestige. Chapter nine returns to 
the internationalist interest. It has been possible to arrange the 
chapters in this way, since while overlapping to a certain extent, the 
national and ideological interests took on a heightened profile in
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succession.
From the creation of the Polish Committe.e of National Liberation in 
July 1944, the foreign policy priority of the new regime became 
international recognition of the relationship between regime security 
and Polish state security. The establishment of a communist regime was 
not to be an easy task considering the popular Polish understanding of 
the communist ideological interest. Crucial to the success of this 
venture, therefore, was international recognition of the way the new 
regime interpreted its security interest: Poland's right to state
security on the basis of a close alliance with the Soviet Union, a 
guarantee able to be delivered only by the Polish Committee of 
National Liberation.
State security was matched with territorial security and the 
regime's next most important foreign policy goal —  international
recognition of Poland's new borders. By the time the new regime had 
come to power Poland's borders had already been determined. From the 
regime's point of view, the process of this determination highlighted 
the practical interaction of the internationalist interest and 
national territorial interest. Once in power, this new territorial 
reality, like state security, had to be confirmed both domestically
and internationally. Toward this end, a wider political base for the
regime's territorial policies was ensured by the support of the non­
communist aligned Polish Peasant Party.
With its security enhanced, the regime began to look to its
national prestige. Here it sought the opportunity to balance the 
internationalist interest with a greater role for traditional Polish 
national independence. Poland was to find its 'own road to socialism'; 
it would trade with the West on a pragmatic basis; it would establish 
itself as an economic power to counter Germany's potential industrial
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strength; and it would play a leading role in ensuring a Slavic 
defence from future German aggression. All these goals were intended 
to give Poland a socialist voice in the post-war European state 
system, but independent nonetheless.
Domestic and external factors soon combined to undermine this 
balance. In chapter nine, the final two years of the study —  1947 and 
1948 —  are profiled. As well as their security, Polish policy makers 
were increasingly identifying the prestige of the new state with
internationalism. The interpretation process took on a highly charged 
ideological approach reminiscent of the earlier Polish Communist Party 
period of opposition. Domestically, this trend was the result of the 
communist regime's consolidation. Internationally, it was the outcome 
of the ideological hostility generated by the conflict in national 
interests between the USSR and the Western allies. The change in the 
foreign policy climate of the Polish regime is readily observable in 
the foreign policies of the Polish Workers' Party's socialist ally, 
the Polish Socialist Party, which prior to the two parties' 
amalgamation in December 1948, moved from seeking an independent 
policy role for itself to accepting unquestioningly the
internationalist commitment of the Polish Workers' Party. The climate
change is also observable in the increasing prominence of the 
'internationalist' wing of the Polish Workers' Party which oversaw 
amalgamation with the Polish Socialist Party.
Interpretation takes place not only in the private perceptions and 
policy councils of a regime's leaders. Just as importantly, 
interpretation takes place in the public eye. Only public
interpretation of national interests will generate the broad policy 
climate suitable for regime legitimization domestically and 
internationally; and only widespread public interpretation will create
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a sufficiently comprehensive policy climate for the regime to be able 
to influence the degree of popular legitimacy afforded other regimes 
and states.
Public perceptions, for the purposes of this study, are those
officially stated in order to justify policy in the public arena. They
may or may not coincide with private perceptions. Private perceptions
reveal the personal views of a given policy maker; public perceptions
reflect the public interpretation process. Public perceptions can be 
identified in policy speeches, parliamentary debates, political 
commentary and the political press. All these sources enable a 
comprehensive picture of a regime foreign policy climate to be built 
up, and of the change and/or continuity in that climate over time.
For this study I have gone to the political press of the period and 
the parliamentary protocols of the communist-aligned Polish Assembly 
from 1944 to 1946, and Polish Parliament (Sejm) for 1947 and 1948. I 
have ' also relied on collections of leaders' speeches and on 
documentary sources in later Polish publications. The best documentary 
sources publicly available are the collections contained in Archiwum 
Ruchu Robotniczego (Archive of the Workers' Movement) published by the 
Central Archives of the Polish United Workers' Party Central 
Committee, and Z P o l a  Walki (From the Battlefield) published by the 
Party Historical Department of the Central Committee. Other 
collections of documents have regularly appeared since the communist 
regime came to power. All these primary sources have been most useful 
for the period from the establishment of the Polish Workers' Party in 
1942.
For the period of Polish Communist Party opposition, I have had to 
rely rather more heavily on secondary sources.31 This period spans 
some twenty-four years as opposed to the two years of war-time
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opposltion and four years of the regime in power. It was, therefore, 
not possible to treat it as comprehensively. What I have sought to 
establish in chapters two and three is the ideological interest that 
has dominated communist foreign policy in opposition and the way this 
interest changed over time to produce the form which came to dominate 
in the immediate post-war period.
In both primary and secondary sources the issue of credibility 
arises. The Polish Peasant Party press especially was heavily censored 
during the period of its independent operation. In Polish library 
collections entire issues of these series are not available. 
Parliamentary protocols were also censored to remove remarks 
considered to be politically damaging. Collections of speeches that 
have been published are to this day not complete, and have often been 
edited to reflect the appropriate sentiments. Collections of source 
documents are also intended to contribute to the reinforcement of the 
official view of Polish foreign policy in the immediate post-war 
period.
But the situation is far from hopeless. The fact that parliamentary 
protocols or collections of documents and speeches may have been 
edited does not diminish their validity for the study proposed here. 
Unless this editing has changed the entire sense of what was said by 
the policy maker, the printed word continues to hold a valuable 
indication of the ideological interpretation given a particular 
national interest. What is at issue here is the overall policy climate 
created by public perceptions taken across the regime and across time.
Also helping to overcome the credibility issue are primary sources 
published outside Poland. Of most help here have been the Zeszyty 
Historyczne (Historical Series) published by the Literary Institute in 
Paris. Taken in tandem with the documentary evidence available in
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Poland, external primary sources give even greater weight to the 
regime's interpretation of national interests. Many of these sources, 
intended as condemnation of the ideological interest exhibited by the 
post-war regime, in fact highlight the process that is the focus of 
this study.
Secondary sources are also subject to a credibility test. It is 
clear that works published officially in Poland suffer from having to 
reflect the institutionalised foreign policy interpretation.32 But 
from the methodological viewpoint of this study, this suggests only 
that the contemporary policy climate and how it reflects the climate 
of forty years past is worthy of attention and research for its own 
sake. For my purposes, these types of sources are valuable guides as 
to the intentions and perceptions behind regime policy in the earlier 
period, often still informing Polish foreign policy to this day.
Works published unofficially in Poland and later in the West do not 
deal with Polish foreign policy as such. In taking in the early post­
war period they do, on the other hand, consider the international 
conditions surrounding the birth of the post-war regime. These works 
are often well researched and documented, and form a valuable addition 
to the history of the communist regime. Their status as unofficial 
works normally implies they have an anti-regime bias. Where this is 
the case, the position of prosecutor can be highly informative 
regarding those areas of official policy deemed unsuitable for the 
public debate.33 Western studies that focus on the early post-war 
years of the Polish communist regime provide a similar general review 
of the international situation. Other works devoted to Poland's 
international relations of this period focus normally on the Polish 
issue in the foreign policies of the great powers and take as their 
cut-off point the end of the Second World War.3A These secondary
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sources are most useful as reference sources and background material 
on the attitudes and perceptions of outside parties reacting to the 
foreign policy climate being formed within Poland. On Polish communist 
foreign policy itself, nothing substantial has been written at all. 
The following study is an attempt to rectify this large gap in 
communist foreign policy research.
Finally, a word on the use of Polish names. Where names have common 
English spellings, I have used these. Examples are Warsaw, Cracow, 
Silesia and Rosa Luxemburg. Otherwise, I have ysed the Polish spelling 
throughout.
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2. INTERNATIONALISM IN OPPOSITION
1918-1929
In the period prior to the dissolution of the Polish Communist 
Party <KPP) in 1938, the foreign policy climate generated by the 
party's policies moved from an initial position of radical
internationalism, through dependence on the Red Army, to a greater 
regard for Polish national interests, back to radicalism and finally, 
prior to its dissolution, national interests once again. The reasons 
for this development lay in the close linkages between the KPP as a 
section of the Comintern and the Russian Communist Party (RKP(b)), and 
in the particular role the Polish party played in the internationalist 
policies of the Comintern and Russian party. Following the first 
period in which national interests were given a higher profile, the 
leadership of the Polish party split between a ‘national* wing and an 
‘internationalist' wing. Throughout the later period, the
'internationalist' wing either shared power with the ‘national’ wing, 
or dominated the party outright. It entrenched in the party's foreign 
policy the tenet of internationalist duty which required all communist 
parties as Comintern sections to defend the security of the Soviet
Union. Through the various changes in Comintern policy, all having an 
immediate influence on the policy climate presented by the KPP, this 
tenet continued to dominate KPP foreign policy. The final Comintern 
change in policy prior to the KPP's dissolution saw the
’internationalist’ wing inherit the ‘national* policy climate of its 
rivals in the party leadership.
As revolutionaries in the same imperial state and united in the 
Second (Socialist) International, the Russian and Polish social- 
democratic parties had maintained intimate links for some time prior
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to the Russian Revolution. These links were symbolised by the 
internationalist theories of Rosa Luxemburg, particularly that of 
'organic incorporation'.1 The links did not loosen with the creation 
of the independent Polish state in 1918. Thanks to the Polish party's 
illegality, they remained strong throughout the inter-war period, 
perhaps stronger than any other two parties in the Comintern. Along 
with the other sections, the Polish party followed all the various 
tactical changes signalled from the Comintern, in its turn influenced 
by the factional infighting in the RKP(b) Central Committee.
After the death of Lenin, the dominant figure in the RKP(b) became 
Stalin. Stalin's concern for the internal and external security of the 
'proletarian dictatorship' heightened the attention paid to Soviet 
security in the policies of the Comintern. The effect this had on the 
Polish party, strategically vital to the security of the Soviet state, 
was to subject it to the same extreme methods being used by Stalin 
within the Soviet Union. In 1938, the KPP was declared by Stalin to be 
‘infected’ with ‘Trotskyism’ and an 'agency' of Polish and German 
military intelligence. It was dissolved and the majority of its 
leaders purged. Less than a year later, Stalin concluded a pact of 
non-aggression with Nazi Germany over the centre of Poland.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought a 
reversal in the fortunes of the Polish communists; steps were taken in 
the Soviet Union to re-create the Polish party. This time, however, it 
was not to admit to its communist motivation and would deny any 
internationalist pretensions or Comintern links. The Polish Workers' 
Party (PPR> would be instead overtly nationalist, evolutionary and 
realistic. Polish national interests would be the principal items on 
its foreign policy agenda. The PPR represented a direct continuation 
of the final period of KPP foreign policy —  the fusion of the
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'internationalist1 wing of the party with the 'national* policy 
position —  the outcome of a long period of direct Soviet influence 
and strategic interest in the Polish party.
2*1 Proletarian Internationalism
The KPP was born from the fusion of two Polish Marxist parties, the 
Social-Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (SDKPiL), and 
the revolutionary wing of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS-Lewica). 
Prior to the Russian Revolution, the German based SDKPiL Central 
Committee of Luxemburg, Leo Jogiches, Julian Marchlewski and Adolf 
Warski had maintained a position independent of both the Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks. What were called the 'splitters’, Feliks Dzieriyhski, 
Karol Radek and J6zef Unszlicht, had been much closer to Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks.2 These groups came together during the events of the 
February revolution and in the spirit of proletarian internationalism 
gave the Bolshevik's their full support. After the revolution, many of 
the SDKPiL leaders remained with the Bolsheviks, becoming high ranking 
members of the new Soviet state (Dzieriyrtski, Radek, Unszlicht, 
Marchlewski).
The PPS-Lewica, in contrast, came from the Polish Socialist Party 
(PPS) tradition of Polish independence. It was led by intellectuals 
such as Feliks Kon, Henryk Walecki and Maria Koszutska, who had 
rejected the mainstream PPS maxim of independence with socialism, and 
the insurrectionary practice of PPS leaders such as J6zef Pilsudski. 
Instead, the PPS-Lewica advocated a strategy of working through the 
bourgeois representative institutions and cooperative fronts with 
other non-Marxist parties toward a social revolution first and
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foremost. Its move toward Marxist proletarian internationalism brought
it close to the SDKPiL, but its support in the Russian Revolution went
initially to the Left Mensheviks with whom it had most in common.
In the final analysis, any policy or tactical differences between
the two parties lost their significance as the Bolshevik victory in
Russia gave them the incentive to unite in a joint struggle for a
‘dictatorship of the proletariat* in Poland.3 Their next priority was
complete internationalist support for the world's first socialist
state in its fight with counter-revolution. This was intended to be
more than a simple consolidation of the socialist regime within
Russia. Internationalist support meant working for the revolution in
Poland, for Poland to be part of the borderless international
proletarian revolution. Far more important at this stage than the
needs of any one national working class was the fight for working
class power in Europe as a whole. 4
The SDKPiL and PPS-Lewica continued to be influenced as much by
Western revolutionary theory, especially German Marxism and the
Communist Manifesto ('Workers do not have a fatherland'), as by
Russian revolutionary practice. Luxemburg did not spare the Bolsheviks
her criticism. Their revolution was fatally flawed in her view;
Bolshevik policies on the nationality, agrarian and organisational
questions, as well as the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty were all badly
determined and even worse in their execution. Similarly for the
leaders of the PPS-Lewica, Bolshevik revolutionary practice certainly
did not present the ideal model for the proletarian revolution. In
August 1918, Koszutska had this to say:
We do not accuse the Bolsheviks of the fact that they agreed to 
rule in a country in which the majority is represented by the 
peasantry, but that they have based their rule on their armed 
might without clearly seeing the dangers tied to this and have 
established terror and force as their system of government not 
only in regard to the bourgeoisie, but often also in areas where
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only the force of Ideology should have been victorious. 5 
In Moscow in October 1918, an SDKPiL delegate to a 'Conference of 
Communist Organisations and Parties of the Occupied Territories* 
(Poland, Ukraine, Bielorussia, Finland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) 
called by Stalin in his capacity as People's Commissar for Nationality 
Affairs, made the following observation: 'There cannot be direction 
from the side of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party 
since it is not competent in local affairs’. The Polish communists, he 
went on, would be coordinating their activity only with the German 
revolutionary movement (Spartacists) and with Rosa Luxemburg. The 
issue being debated was whether workers' and peasants' councils should 
be introduced into Poland. Much of the SDKPiL and PPS-Lewica opinion 
was not at all in favour of this proposal, regarding the councils as 
'Russian creations’, the result of the Russian ‘peasant revolution’ 
and not compatible with the more developed Polish and European 
conditions.6 Following the conference, however, the Polish delegates 
were given instVuctions by a group of Polish communists in Moscow to 
proceed with the councils in spite of the ‘opportunists’ from the 
Warsaw based Central Office of the SDKPiL and Central Workers' 
Committee of the PPS-Lewica. These ‘opportunists' were soon in full 
agreement with the instructions from Moscow following what they 
believed to be the outbreak of the proletarian revolution in Germany 
in November which saw the Hohenzollern monarchy overthrown with the 
help of the German workers' soviets. 7
At the Unification Congress of the two parties on 16 December 1918, 
the newly created Polish Communist Workers' Party (KPRP)13 identified 
not only ‘workers' Russia* as responsible for the Polish party's 
unique opportunity to join in the European wave of workers' revolts, 
but importantly, also revolutionary Germany, where Luxemburg was
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playing a decisive role.9 The unified party's political programme
reflected the dominance of the internationalist Luxemburg position. It
condemned the creation of a bourgeois state, disclaimed the need for
any conflict to protect the border, and rejected the concept of
national autonomy:
In the era of the international social revolution that destroys 
the foundations of capitalism, the Polish proletariat rejects 
every political solution connected with the evolution of a 
capitalistic world, solutions like autonomy, independence and 
self-determination.... National borders do not pose a problem for 
the international camp of social revolution; it bases itself on 
the principle of international working class interests, 
eliminating all national oppression and removing the basis for 
any disputes on the grounds of nationality or language.10
Principles of proletarian revolution and internationalism were
emphasised in the programme with the utmost vigour, particularly
solidarity with the Russian and German revolutions on which the new
revolutionary Polish party was counting for speedy help with its own.
Resolutions were passed during the course of the Congress declaring
the formation of 'Councils of Workers' Delegates’ which were to be
joined ‘into one great centralised organism, able to take power in
close cooperation with the proletarian governments and Workers'
Councils of other countries’.11 The KPRP, alongside the German
Communist Party (KPD) one of the first communist parties to be formed
in Europe, also took practical action in announcing its participation
in the Third (Communist) International at that time still in the
process of being organised. 1:2
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2*2 Soviet Republic
Already by the autumn of 1918, and certainly by the beginning of 
1919, Lenin regarded the KPRP's somewhat conventional Marxist views on 
the national question and revolutionary tactics as deviationist and an 
example of 'the infantile disease of leftism'. 13 From the outset Lenin
had accepted the limitations imposed on the Russian party's
ideological interests by the need to consolidate the socialist state's
security. He had argued strongly against Dzieriyrtski and Julian 
Leszczyriski (director of the Bolshevik Commissariat for Polish 
Affairs), leaders of the SDKPiL in Moscow who represented the position 
of international revolution and nothing less. In contrast, Lenin,
having understood the inevitability of the Polish nation regaining its 
independence in the absence of either Russian or German imperial power 
dictating otherwise and the need for the communist movement to 
accommodate itself to the new realities surrounding it, now advocated 
national self-determination and the possibility of the 'revolutionary 
utilization of the bourgeois parliamentary system’ through which to 
channel the aspirations of the working class.14
At the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations with Germany on 3 March 
1918, the Bolshevik delegation led by Trotsky had insisted on the need 
to create a Polish state in which the people themselves could decide 
‘what their political destiny is to be’.1s Poland was not represented 
at these negotiations, but the Bolshevik statement was very much in 
line with the international concern being shown at this time for the 
future of the Polish nation. It was a statement of intent which had no 
basis in the Bolsheviks' power to follow up their words with actions. 
It was followed in August by another declaration, issued this time by
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the Council of People's Commissars and known as the ‘Annulment of the 
So-called “Partition Treaties'” . Article three of the declaration read 
as follows:
All agreements and acts concluded by the Government of the 
former Russian Empire with the Government of the Kingdom of 
Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire referring to the 
partitions of Poland are irrevocably annulled by the present 
decree, since they are contrary to the principle of the self- 
determination of peoples and to the revolutionary legal 
conceptions of the Russian people, which recognise the 
inalienable right of the Polish nation to independence and 
unity.... 1S
After some months of Bolshevik power, the young Soviet state was 
beginning to understand the possibilities which lay in bourgeois 
diplomacy. Polish independence was rapidly becoming a very real 
possibility and the Bolshevik leaders had no wish to see a Polish 
alliance with Germany against the Soviet Union. When Polish 
independence became a reality, Chicherin, People's Commissar for 
Foreign Affairs, began an as it turned out unsuccessful exchange of 
notes with his newly installed Polish counterpart.
The gulf between Lenin's evident pragmatism and the Polish 
communists' revolutionary 61an was partially broken down by the action 
of the Comintern being established in Moscow in the first months of 
1919. More important to the development of the Polish party's foreign 
policy position at this stage, however, were the domestic difficulties 
being encountered by the KPRP. It was becoming obvious that the 
party's radical internationalist policies on Polish security and 
independence were costing it the massive support of the Polish 
proletariat. Something needed to be done to prevent the haemorrhage 
continuing.
In February 1919, the KPRP published a document setting out the 
political platform of what were now being called on the Russian soviet 
model 'Councils of Urban and Rural Workers' Delegates’. It contained
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the party's first concession to the idea of a separate Polish state 
identity: a 'Polish Soviet Republic of Urban and Rural Workers'
Delegates'. Immediately afterward the KPRP Central Committee was 
forced to pass a supplementary resolution answering criticism from the 
wider socialist membership of the Workers' Councils that the sovereign 
status of such a Polish Soviet Republic remained highly ambiguous. In 
the case of the Red Army needing to encroach on Polish territory in 
pursuit of its counter-revolutionary enemies, the supplementary 
resolution suggested, the Russian side should declare that its goals 
were not to limit Polish independence. 17
By the beginning of 1919 the Polish and Soviet armies were rapidly 
bearing down on one another and so it is difficult to say what either 
the Polish or Russian communists considered Polish territory. From 
November 1918 Polish armies had been fighting the forces of Ataman 
Petlura's West Ukrainian People's Republic for the control of eastern 
Galicia. In July 1919, having successfully occupied the area, the 
Poles came up against the Red Army advancing from the east in pursuit 
of its 'White' opponents. In the north-east, Polish troops had begun 
in January to take over the German positions which had been maintained 
in order to secure Europe from the 'red danger'. Pilsudski capitalised 
on the momentum this had created to personally lead a spring campaign 
into Lithuania and Bielorussia, occupying the city of Wilno in April. 
This brought him into direct conflict with the Red Army, beginning the 
undeclared Polish-Soviet war. 10 Lenin had earlier in March sued for 
peace with Poland, saying that the Soviet Union did not want to wage 
war over territorial boundaries, and that it was time to finish with 
the stereotype of a Great-Russian being only an oppressor. But within 
Poland the uprisings in Wielkopolska and Silesia, and the campaign in 
the east, had made the matter of Poland's borders a critical issue for
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the new national Polish regime, one which seemingly demanded a 
military solution.
Domestically, no credible political party, revolutionary or 
otherwise, could in this situation afford to ignore the issue of
Polish independence, or as the KPRP had been advocating, suborn the 
security of the Polish state to the greater interests of the class 
revolution. A great deal of ill feeling had been directed at the KPRP 
over its internationalist commitment, and the party now began making 
it all the more obvious to its members and the working class in 
general that what it proposed would be a bona fide national Polish 
state albeit Soviet. In April, in preparation for a proposed 
conference of all the Workers' Councils, the KPRP published a 
resolution in which it emphasised that its proposed Polish Soviet 
Republic would be fully independent. Immediately following the Polish 
workers' revolution, the republic's foreign policy would be to
establish alliances with other socialist republics, namely Soviet 
Russia and Soviet Ukraine. These alliances would help defend the 
Polish revolution against the reaction of ‘international imperialism'; 
they were also to provide for mutual economic and planning assistance 
for the reconstruction of the Polish economy along progressive 
socialist principles. 19
As the wave of revolts in Europe lost its momentum and died down
altogether, what was left was the Soviet state, not able to abolish
itself, but instead, in the face of the threat to its revolutionary 
gains from within and without, having to strengthen its central power. 
The theoretical revolutionary imperative of proletarian 
internationalism now became the very practical imperative of support 
for the world's first socialist state. Pilsudski's attempt to take 
advantage of the weakness of the new Soviet state strengthened this
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imperative and cast the KPRP into the front line of the struggle with 
'counter-revolution*. It was in these conditions of acute threat to
the security of the Soviet state that the Comintern institutionalised 
the internationalist obligation of its members. At the Comintern's
Second Congress in July and August 1920, point fourteen of the 
'Conditions of admission to the Communist International* stipulated as 
follows:
Every party that wishes to join the Communist International is 
obliged to give unconditional support to any Soviet republic in 
its struggle against counter-revolutionary forces. Communist 
parties must carry on unambiguous propaganda to prevent the
dispatch of munitions transports to the enemies of the Soviet 
republics; they must also carry on propaganda by every means,
legal or illegal, among the troops sent to strangle workers' 
republics. 20
To indicate their allegiance to the Comintern, all its members changed 
their names to include the qualification 'Section of Comintern*. What 
had been a natural instinct for Polish or any other European 
communists, to work to protect the successful Russian revolution from 
reactionary forces, now became a regulation governing communist 
membership; commitment to Soviet security was established as the test 
of revolutionary internationalism, and the Polish communists found 
themselves subject to the greatest pressures.
For Polish communists, the commitment to an active participation in 
the fight against counter-revolution was deepened immensely by their 
appreciation of Poland's geographic position and the use to which this 
position was to be put in the plans of the Western capitalist 
powers.21 It was further deepened by their proximity to the Soviet 
leaders themselves. As mentioned, many leading members of the KPRP 
were at the same time active members of the Russian party; many also 
served in the Bolshevik and Comintern administrations; others were 
directly employed by the Bolshevik security serice led by Dzieriyriski, 
the Cheka. In direct contrast to the assertion of Marx that ‘a worker
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had no fatherland’, the Intimate contact with everyday Bolshevik 
activity created among these Polish communists the perception of the 
new Soviet state as the ’fatherland* of the international, proletariat, 
and a model for building socialism in the other countries of Europe.22 
Internationalism on this basis no longer turned on the Polish party's 
own role in instigating and leading a successful proletarian 
revolution, but more practically, on an ’aggressive and enduring 
brothership in arms with revolutionary Russia’. 23
Within Poland, the KPRP undertook a campaign of industrial sabotage 
and organised strikes to weaken the Polish military effort. It led
demonstrations against the sending of arras and ammunition to the front
and encouraged desertion among Polish soldiers.24 The party's solid 
support for the rapidly approaching Red Army alienated much of its 
less committed constituency, however, and this together with a 
heightened campaign of anti-communist repression by the Polish police 
rendered its efforts largely ineffective.
More effective were the Polish communists within the ranks of the 
Red Army itself. Considerable efforts was made by the Red Army 
political leadership to recruit Poles into the political sections of 
Russian combat units engaged on the front. These cadres were to 
provide for a smooth transition of power from the Soviet military
authorities into Polish communist hands.25 Polish cadres in the Cheka 
were also massively expanded and brought to the front to work in the 
Red Army's ‘Special Departments’. Finally, on 19 July 1920, in
anticipation of an imminent victory and occupation of Warsaw, the 
Bolshevik leadership put itself in direct control over the situation 
in Poland by replacing the ineffective KPRP leadership organs with a 
‘Polish Bureau’ of the RKP(b) Central Committee, with Dzieriyrtski as 
its Chairman. According to a Soviet historian, the KPRP was recreated
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as ‘an organ of the Russian Communist Party Cbolsheviks) for work 
among the Polish population’.20 On July 30, with the Red Army
preparing to lay seige to Warsaw, the Polish Bureau was turned into 
the Provisional Committee of Revolutionary Poland, with Marchlewski 
now as Chairman, Dzieriyhski, Kon and Unszlicht as Committee members. 
Announcing in Bialystok that it was taking control of the Polish state 
which it declared to be the Polish Soviet Socialist Republic, the
Committee published a Manifesto to the Polish people, announcing that 
peace could only be attained by an agreement between socialist Russia 
and socialist Poland. 27
It had been initially hoped by the KPRP in Poland that the
victories of the Red Army over Pilsudski's forces in the Ukraine would 
spark off the proletarian revolution in Poland. When this did not 
happen, and the KPRP found it lacked the power to carry out a 
revolutionary putsch on its own, its leadership concluded that the 
only way they would see a socialist Poland was for the Red Army to 
occupy the country.20 The commitment to the survival of the Soviet 
state now took on a new dimension. Its survival was needed not only 
for its own sake, but also for the military power to ensure the very 
success in Poland of what was still being called the proletarian 
revolution. Parallel to the establishment of Soviet security as the 
test of internationalist commitment, came the realisation within at
least a section of the KPRP that more important than their own 
organisational strength to the success of the class revolution in 
Poland was the new found military power of the Soviet state.
The Bolshevik position had also been to expect a revolution in 
Poland as the outcome of the over-extension of Pilsudski's forces in 
the Ukraine. Trotsky, People's Commissar for War, in his theses ‘On 
the Polish Front and our Tasks’ accepted by the Bolshevik
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Revolutionary War Council on April 30, wrote that ‘the gentry and 
bourgeoisie of Poland will be rounded up by the Polish proletariat who 
will then proceed to turn their country into a socialist republic*. 23 
And in May, the Comintern Executive Committee <ECCI) wrote that the 
Soviet government had been ‘firmly convinced that the Polish workers, 
allies of the Russian proletariat, would sooner or later take power 
into their own hands*.30 When the KPRP proved ineffective as a 
revolutionary organisation and failed to capitalise on its 
opportunity, Lenin, opposed by Trotsky and Radek, decided that the Red 
Army should follow up the Polish retreat and provoke not only the 
Polish revolution but also the revolution in Germany. Poland, Radek 
wrote in May, would be turned from being a ‘wall protecting Europe 
from Russia Cinto] a bridge between Russia and Germany*.31
In the event, Pilsudski on August 16 counterattacked the Red Army 
positions under Warsaw, his armies swollen by a flood of patriotic 
volunteers, and began another Polish offensive to the east. In the 
wake of the Red Army retreat, the Polish police carried out a series 
of harsh repressions paralising still further the activities of the 
KPRP membership. The general atmosphere was one where communists or 
anyone else presenting a class analysis of the war was seen as a 
national traitor.32
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2*3 Independence and Internationalism
In the next few years, the KPRP underwent a dramatic change in 
policy and tactics. A new realism was forced on the party leaders by 
the devastating outcome of the Polish-Soviet war. The KPRP's positions 
on Polish independence and its attitudes to the type of 
internationalist commitment fostered under the conditions of the war, 
both needed clarification. The bourgeois Polish state had not fallen 
under the spell of the Red Army's advance and surrendered its power to 
the progressive proletarian revolution. Indeed, the reverse had 
happened. Its reactionary character had been strengthened by the 
Polish military success. In the aftermath of the war, the KPRP's 
critical reliance on the Red Army and the Bolshevik Central Committee 
for the success of its Polish revolution left it defenceless from 
internal and external criticism as to the strength of its character. 
If this was to be overcome, an effort needed to be made to provide the 
party with a greater degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the Russian party, 
particularly relating to the KPRP's own domestic tactics. In early 
February 1921 the KPRP announced it would contest future Sejm 
elections under the name 'Union of the Urban and Rural Proletariat’.33 
Having failed to initiate its own KPRP led revolution, and now without 
the power of the Red Army behind it, the KPRP would attempt to win 
communist representation in the bourgeois state's own democratic 
institutions.
The new mood in the KPRP reflected a much wider realignment of 
policy across the international communist movement. The Kronstadt 
rebellion, Lenin's New Economic Policy, the ‘March Action' in Germany, 
all contributed to what Trotsky called at the Comintern's Third World
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Congress in June/July 1921 the move from ‘post-war revolutionary 
ferment’ to ‘winning the masses using the united front’, and 
‘organising the masses on a programme of transitional demands'.34 The 
debate within Poland on the lessons to be learnt from the KPRP’s lack 
of success in either its classic internationalist policies or their 
Red Army based variant, was matched by the debate at the Comintern 
Third Congress on the defeat of the German revolution. Little 
disagreement existed as to the fact that like the Polish party, the 
German communists had clearly been too weak to carry through a 
successful revolution on their own. In this light, Lenin decided on a 
compromise. No longer could the International’s longer term interests 
be undermined in heroic but futile gestures. What was needed was a 
wider proletarian alliance, a tactical accommodation with other left 
groups in a ‘united front’ against the bourgeoisie.35
For the KPRP, the implications of this tactical policy change were 
to be far reaching. In the following eighteen months, two competing 
interpretations of the ‘united front’ were established. Radek, Trotsky 
and the pragmatic section of the German Communist Party <KPD) 
leadership advocated a ‘united front from above’, a formal political 
alliance with socialist parties, unifying the working class and 
enabling the communists to work to their own advantage from within an 
immediately strengthened political position. An opposing view was 
represented by Zinoviev, General Secretary of the ECCI, Stalin, and 
the German communist radical left. This group would have no truck with 
the ‘treacherous social-democratic leaders' and instead, wanted to 
organise directly among the working masses themselves, a ‘united front 
from below’.36 For its part the KPRP, under its own newly installed 
pragmatic leadership, lent its wholehearted support to the ‘united 
front from above’ position, setting it on a collision course with
-39-
Stalin and Zinoviev.
The same split in the Russian party was operating in another
debate, that on the issue of war-time and post-war internationalism.
Opening the Fourth Comintern World Congress, Zinoviev remarked that:
It is obvious that the [Comintern] Executive must “interfere” in 
the affairs of practically every party.... Representatives of the 
Executive attended practically every important congress and gave 
them ideological direction.37
And not only ‘ideological direction’ but also tactical direction. In
its resolution on the Versailles Peace Treaty of 5 December 1922, the
ECCI observed that the central European states had ‘sunk to being
colonies of English and French capital. . . . Poland, which was given
large territories with a non-Polish population, is France's furthest
outpost, a caricature of French imperialism’. The ECCI then issued its
instructions: ‘The communist parties in Poland, Czechoslovakia and the
other vassal states of France have the duty of combining the fight
against their own bourgeoisie with the fight against French
imperialism’. 3e
For his part, Bukharin worried that the relationship between the 
Comintern's sections and the centre was becoming too mechanical. The 
old revolutionary Sian had been already lost. 'Nine-tenths of the 
significance of the Fourth Congress consisted in this, that it 
“interfered” in the affairs of the national sections’, Bukharin told 
the RKP(b) Central Committee in April 1923. ‘The chief defects in the 
national parties were a deficient degree of internationalism, a lack 
of tactical flexibility and a shortage of skilled cadres’.33 In other 
words, the national parties were becoming reliant on the Soviet centre 
for their guidance; they had lost their intellectual self-sufficiency.
Bukharin's position on internationalism corresponded exactly with 
that of the dominant group in the KPRP. Three leaders had been at the 
forefront of the KPRP's new realist policies and the party's ‘united
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front from above* with the PPS. These were the so-called ‘three W's*, 
the leaders of what would become known as the ‘national* wing of the 
party: Warski, Walecki and Koszutska. Warski came from the Luxemburg 
tradition, Walecki and Koszutska were both formerly of the PPS-Lewica. 
All three leaders had been dismayed by the damage wrought to the 
KPRP's domestic support by both the Luxemburgist version of radical 
internationalism and the instrumental internationalism of the Polish- 
Soviet war years now being represented by Zinoviev and Stalin. Just 
how far the new leadership had gone in its analysis of what the 
situation required was revealed in Warski's programmatic speech to the 
KPRP's Second Congress in September 1923 at Bolshevo, near Moscow. 
Once the party had become conscious of the sources of the Polish 
revolution in the conditions internal to the country and was able to 
tap into these sources, then, Warski told his audience which included 
Zinoviev, ‘we do not need to look for and wait for others, or to seek 
help from outside forces'.40
The new leadership's efforts to cut the KPRP's links with Luxemburg 
internationalism were fully supported by Zinoviev. The Polish party 
was to be given a firm ‘Bolshevik foundation*.41 *Bolshevisation’ 
meant accepting the Bolshevik position on the organisational and 
agrarian questions. It also meant putting the party on a firmly 
national (self-determination) footing. It was in this light that 
Warski, Walecki and Koszutska wrote their party* s new political 
programme, making a complete revision of the previous policy on state 
and independence. The new programme stressed the ‘vital interest* to 
the proletariat of Polish national independence.42 In the course of 
the Congress debate, Warski suggested it would be necessary for the 
KPRP to publicly announce its categorical support for the independence 
of the Polish nation. Zinoviev spoke in support of the proposal.43
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In the main Congress document entitled ‘For Our Freedom and Yours', 
the three leaders wrote: ‘Bourgeois governments in Poland present a
mortal danger to its independence. Only a victorious revolution can 
give the Polish nation permanent state independence’ and a socialist 
Poland within its ethnic borders, free of its ethnic minorities. 
Ethnic minorites currently within Poland would be encouraged to create 
their own national workers' republics, expressed in the Congress 
formula: ‘the right of nations to self-determination even to the
extent of cecession’. After a successful proletarian revolution, 
Poland's eastern minorities, incorporated into the Polish state
following the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet war, would under this 
formula be reunited with their populations in the Ukrainian and 
Bielorussian Soviet Republics. 44
‘For Our Freedom and Yours’ was to provide one of the firmest 
planks of the Polish communists' foreign policy up to and following 
the Second World War. It originated in the first Congress following
the Polish-Soviet war, and was drawn up by the relatively pragmatic
‘national’ leadership group. It was regarded by these leaders as a 
measured response to the eastward expansion of the Polish state which, 
being bourgeois, was also ‘imperialist’. An independent Polish
workers' republic would not limit the sovereignty of the other 
workers' republics around it, just as it expected these republics to 
respect Poland's independence. But without the creation of a community 
of European socialist states, this sort of scenario was considered 
totally unattainable.
Autumn 1923 saw another wave of revolutionary unrest in Germany, 
Bulgaria46 and in Poland itself. These were optimistic days for 
Zinoviev, the Comintern and the KPRP. Between revolutionary Germany 
and revolutionary Russia, bourgeois Poland would have no future. But
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so too the converse. The greatest fear for the KPRP leaders was a 
defeat of the German revolution and a continuation of the imperialist 
threat to the Soviet state. Not only Polish national independence 
would in this situation be threatened, but also the Polish party's 
independence as the Russian party saw to its own security via the 
auspices of the Comintern sections. In the language of the Second KPRP 
Congress: 'The only guarantee of Poland's independence is the victory 
of the revolution in Europe and the alliance of worker/peasant Poland 
with its neighbouring fraternal republics'. The Congress Manifesto 
called for Poland's independent existence to be based on a fraternal 
alliance of 'Free Workers/Peasants' Republics’.'46 Later in the 
Congress the position changed to a ‘Worker/Peasant United States of 
Europe' in which Poland would at last find an ‘unshakeable foundation 
for its independence’.
The dilemma arising from the fusion of the KPRP's internationalist 
hopes and the national realities surrounding it showed up clearly in 
the party's policies regarding the German minorities in Poland. In 
strengthening its position on Polish national independence, the KPRP 
sought to create a larger national Polish constituency for its 
revolutionary goals. At the same time, it could not afford to ignore 
the revolutionary, potential of the social ferment spreading through 
Germany and the implications this held for the Polish revolution and 
position of the Polish party. The Polish uprising in Upper Silesia was 
branded by the Second Congress as imperialist as opposed to the 
revolutionary tendencies of the German masses; calls were even made to 
support the German minorities in Gdahsk, Silesia and the Poznart 
regions. In line with the KPRP's policy on ethnic minorities, Congress 
resolutions demanded ‘full freedom for the development of the national 
German population'. ■4Q In encouraging the Germans to demand their own
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national rights, the KPRP sought to undermine the bourgeois Polish 
state's internal security and add to the revolutionary unrest of the 
German masses in both Poland and Germany proper. But following over a 
century of German repression of the Polish population of these lands, 
the Congress resolution earned the KPRP few new supporters.
Nor was there to be either a Polish or a German proletarian 
revolution in 1923. Warski, Walecki and Koszutska had been 
enthusiastically following Lenin's and the Comintern's policy of 
presenting a united front with the PPS. On this basis, the party's 
Warsaw Committee had acceeded to the socialist call to call off 
several Polish workers' strikes in the longer term interests of a 
continuing united front. This 'mistake*, and the fact that the KPRP 
had made no move to widen the Cracow workers' and soldiers' rebellion 
of November 6, were used against the pro-Radek and Trotsky KPRP 
leadership by Stalin and Zinoviev. The KPRP's ‘mistakes*, the parallel 
defeat of the KPD led by the 'opportunistic* Heinrich Brandler, and 
the incapacitation and then death of Lenin in January 1924, combined 
to once again render the KPRP vulnerable to direct Soviet 
interference. On this occasion the outcome of the interference saw the 
strategic value of the Polish party for Soviet security 
institutionalised, in the patron-client relationship that came to 
dominate the internationalist relationship between the two parties for 
the next three decades.
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2*4 Bolshevisation
Even before Lenin's death, the dispute in the Russian party between 
the 'Bolshevik triumvirate’ of Stalin, Zinoviev and Kamenev on the one 
hand and the 'opportunistic opposition' of Trotsky and Radek on the 
other, had already spilled over into the Comintern. The violence of 
the RKP<b> Central Committee majority's attacks on Trotsky worried the 
leaderships of the Polish, German and French parties, closer to 
Trotsky and Radek in their 'united front from above’ tactics. For the 
Comintern's larger sections, the issue now became whether their 
tactical independence could be maintained in the face of the onslaught 
on their supporters in the Russian party. Trotsky's and Radek's demise 
potentially meant a Comintern volte-face in which the gains made in 
communist influence in the period following the Polish-Soviet war were 
in danger of being undermined. Should the Comintern policy change, so 
too the leadership of the various sections would have to be changed, 
and in such a scenario the Comintern would be in danger of losing its 
internationalist vitality and becoming a sterile Russian party tool. 
It was not only a question of the ideological direction of the 
Comintern but also of the organisational basis on which the further 
consolidation of the international movement was to be made.
The sort of behaviour now being exhibited by the majority in the 
RKP(b) Central Committee cast doubt on the feasibility of the KPRP 
leadership's trade off in accommodating its strategy to the Bolshevik 
model. By accepting the Bolshevik position on the nationality, 
agrarian and party organisation questions, the KPRP leadership 
expected in return to be left free to determine its own domestic 
tactics within the Comintern's overall policy. The KPRP leadership
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were worried enough to make their views known in no uncertain terms to 
the Russian Central Committee. So too, in one way or another, did the 
Central Committees of the French and German parties. None of these 
protests were intended as support for Trotsky's specific policies. 
Trotsky's criticisms of the bureaucratisation of the Russian party and 
the degeneration of the revolution into consolidationist statism were 
not of themselves the reason for the Polish party's support. More 
important was the vitality of the communist idea throughout the 
international movement, and the principle of tactical flexibility.
On 23 December 1923, the KPRP Central Committee sent a letter to 
the Russian Central Committee criticising the methods being used in 
the dispute with Trotsky. They warned against the harm being done to 
the Comintern and appealed for the Bolsheviks to settle their 
differences in a manner worthy of c o m m u n i s ts.Stalin's reply did 
nothing to cool the Polish Central Committee's enthusiasm. In January, 
immediately prior to Lenin's death, Edward Pr6chniak, KPRP 
representative to the ECCI, issued a note with the following 
observation:
From the time that Lenin, the greatest and most authoritative 
leader of the international proletariat, no longer takes part in 
the leadership of the Communist International, from the time that 
the authority of Trotsky, acknowledged by the world's 
revolutionary proletariat as its leader, is cast into doubt by 
the Russian Central Committee, a danger arises that the authority 
of the leadership of the Communist International may be shaken.50
Zinoviev and Stalin did not take kindly to this type of criticism,
seen as a personal affront on their own abilities. It was also
understood to be a part of an orchestrated attack in support of
Trotsky and Radek.51 As such, the Polish and other 'right' leaderships
now became the target of the same accusation directed previously at
Trotsky —  that of ‘opportunism*.
In the January note to the ECCI cited above, the KPRP Central 
Committee also had the following to say:
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We consider the accusation of opportunism directed against Radek, 
one of the worthiest leaders of the Communist International, as 
being not only untrue but also harmful to the greatest degree for 
the authority of all of the leaders of the [Comintern] Executive 
Committee. We do not see any basis for this accusation since even 
though the question as to who was victorious in Germany in 
October [19323 bears great weight, nonetheless it is certain that 
none of the sides came to any tactically opportunistic 
conclusions. 52
In Poland, the ‘three W’ leadership prevented any news of the discord 
in the Comintern, RKP(b) Central Committee and within their own 
Central Committee reaching their membership. This, and the fact that 
they continued to receive support from Radek until his ejection from 
the Soviet Central Committee in May, meant that they were able to 
maintain their majority in the KPRP Central Committee up until the 
Fifth Comintern World Congress of June/July 1924, the so-called
'Bolshevisation Congress’.
The German question continued to dominate in the Fifth Congress
discussion. But intimately connected to the German question was the 
role of the KPRP in contributing to the fiasco surrounding the 
‘revolutionary year of 1923’. By the time of the Congress, the ‘three 
W’ leadership had been completely isolated within the Comintern. It 
remained the last bastion of the ‘opportunist deviation’ still in 
power. After some days of discussion, the Congress Political 
Commission issued a resolution in which it supported the KPRP's Second 
Congress move toward ‘Bolshevisation’, but criticised the leadership 
for its lack of ‘fundamental revolutionary activity* and its support 
for the ‘opportunist’ factions in the Russian and German parties. It
established a Polish Commission to resolve the issue, chaired by
Stalin, with Molotov as his deputy. 63
On the type of internationalist relationship to be encouraged 
within the Comintern, the debate in the Polish Commission turned on 
two points of view. One saw the KPRP needing to retain its independent
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voice, the other considered the Polish party to be subordinate to the 
security interests of the Soviet state and the authority of the 
Russian party. Warski, Walecki, Koszutska and Prdchniak, with some 
support from other Polish delegates, pointed to the danger of treating 
the Polish leadership as instrumentally as had been the case with the 
German and French parties: the Polish party was a complex organism
made up of many different regional, national and political traditions; 
it had never been supported by the old-guard SDKPiL which had remained 
with the Bolsheviks in Moscow, and most of its most seasoned cadres 
were now languishing in Polish jails; a leadership change with little 
input from the wider membership could irrevocably distance the party 
from its mass constituency and even split it into its constituent 
parts; in other words, mechanical changes would do more harm than good 
to the interests of the revolution in Poland. BA
Equally detrimental, in the eyes of the ‘national’ leaders, were 
the strictures being placed on intra and inter-party debate by the 
latter-day equivalent of the type of internationalist relationship 
functioning during the Polish-Soviet war. Provoked on the third and 
final day of the Commission debate by an uncompromising analysis 
presented by Stalin, Koszutska gave eloquent witness to this position. 
No ‘single infallible, correct, non-opportunistic method’ existed for 
the RKP(b) to overcome the dissent of its younger members grouped 
around Trotsky, Koszutska exclaimed. Trotsky enjoyed a 'capital of 
enormous popularity’ which would be squandered if the Russian party 
continued to create a climate of ‘permanent battle, constant tension 
and bitterness’ in its highest organs. Not Trotsky, but this climate 
heightened the danger to the Russian party and ‘created points of 
concentration* for internal opposition to the party line, Trotsky 
needed to be accommodated into the party discussion and not excluded 
from it. Koszutska continued:
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... there can be no talk here of some sort of single infallible, 
unquestionably obliging method or principle the infringement of 
which is opportunism.. . . ss ... if everyone one by one is 
discredited in this way, then at a decisive moment the 
proletariat might lack people with experience and who enjoy the 
trust of the masses, and the leadership of the revolution might 
enter the hands of “seasonal” leaders, careerists and stirrers.se
Zinoviev had told the KPRP leadership some time ago, Koszutska
remarked, that the Russians would ‘break your bones’ if the Poles ever
went against their fraternal comrades. This highlighted the fact that
KPRP conflict with the Russian party was far more dangerous than
conflict with any other section. Poland occupied a particularly
sensitive position for the defence of the Soviet state because of the
intense anti-Bolshevik feeling generated by the Polish bourgeois
leaders. In such a situation, there could be no talk of a victory or
defeat in any Polish-Russian party conflict. Polish communists would
always instruct their working class to follow the Russian lead. But
because of this, the Russian party had a special privilege with regard
to the Polish party, and the KPRP had a special responsibility in
return. There were already too many broken bones in the Comintern,
Koszutska complained. What she feared most was that because of the
Russian party's special privilege, the greatest danger to it would not
be the type of people who would be liable to have their bones broken
for reasons similar to those that the Polish leadership now faced, but
people who did not have any bones at all! It would be dangerous for
the enormous moral authority of the Russian party to be abused, for it
to deny the right to independent thought, Koszutska concluded.
The opposing point of view was represented in the Polish delegation 
by Leszczyhski and L. Doraski. 'The Polish Communist Party had to cease 
being a barrier between Russian Leninism and the West’ , Leszczyhski 
told the Polish Commission. His pitch referred directly to the 
internal division in the Russian party where the counterpoint to
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‘ Trotskyism’ was the ‘Leninism’ of the ‘triumvirate* and Central 
Committee majority. Leszczyrtski was implying that the KPRP leaders
could no longer hold themselves aloof from the changes which were 
infusing the Comintern. ‘Bolshevisation* needed to be implemented in 
the KPRP*s foreign policies as well as domestically, and the pragmatic 
Polish leadership could no longer ‘pretend’ to occupy a special 
position in the Comintern.se Molotov put the issue more bluntly: the
Polish party line will be the Comintern line. SSI
Stalin made no bones of what was at the heart of the issue: ‘The
“Russian affair” has a decisive meaning for the entire revolutionary 
movement, in the West as in the East*. This was so since the 
‘opposition’ in the internal Russian debate had sought to weaken 
through ‘opportunism’ the Russian party, which being the ruling party 
implied weakening the power of the Russian Soviet state. Any weakening 
in Soviet power would weaken the world revolutionary movement. The 
fortunes of Soviet power were, therefore, of vital interest to the
KPRP as they were to every one of the Comintern's sections. The 
December resolution of the KPRP in support of Trotsky made the Polish 
leadership an ‘affiliate’ of the Soviet ‘opposition’. ‘Sad, but a 
fact’, concluded Stalin. After the ‘Russian affair', the ‘German 
affair* was the most important. This was so since of all the European 
countries Germany was closest to revolution, and a victorious 
revolution in Germany was the guarantee of the revolution's victory in 
all of Europe. The revolution would begin in Germany and only Germany 
could take this initiative upon itself. Here again the KPRP leaders 
had ‘sadly’ erred. They were ‘affiliated’ to the ‘opportunistic 
opposition* in the KPD. These facts needed to be put right. The Polish
party needed to be ‘rebuilt* so that its every step and every action
led to the revolution.60
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The ‘wedge* which had been driven between the Soviet and German 
parties was to be eliminated, the Polish Commission* s letter to the 
Polish membership read. For the success of the revolution ‘tight 
cooperation* between the Polish, German and Soviet parties was 
essential. In this way the KPRP could again be one of the ‘leading 
sections of the revolution*.61 The purpose of this letter was not to 
initiate a wide discussion from which changes would come in the KPRP 
leadership, as had been the position of Warski, Walecki and Koszutska. 
These changes had already been decided upon in the Polish Commission's 
resolution. Stalin's ‘rebuilding* resulted in the KPRP*s Central 
Committee being dismissed and its Politburo and Organisational Bureau 
fused into a single body of five members called the ‘Provisional 
Central Committee* or ‘Fivesome*. The Provisional Central Committee 
was to call an extraordinary KPRP congress as soon as possible, and 
direct the party until a new Central Committee and Politburo could be 
established. 62
At its Extraordinary Third Congress of January and February 1925 at 
Minsk, the KPRP was given by the Comintern the task of ‘sanctioning 
the existing status quo’ and completing the 'Bolshevisation' of the 
Polish party.63 The Congress launched an attack on the members of the 
‘rightist deviation’ in the previous Central Committee, aiming the 
accusations mainly at what was seen to be an independence-minded 
school among the ex-PPS-Lewica members of the KPRP. No mention was 
made in Congress resolutions of an independent socialist or Soviet 
Republic. In his speech to the Congress, Zinoviev made plain that the 
threat to the security of the Soviet state was now even greater: as
Soviet Russia continued to strengthen, so too did the threat of war 
with Poland and the other bourgeois states. But ‘Poland belongs to 
those countries in which we cannot afford a defeat*, the Comintern
-51-
General Secretary told the Congress. Thanks to its position as *a 
bridge joining us with Germany and Europe*;, the revolutionary struggle 
had to be won in Poland from the outset.6"1 To better reflect its 
unqualified solidarity with the internationalist centre, the Congress 
changed the party's name to the Communist Party of Poland —  Section 
of the Communist International <KPP).
But Domski, Leszczyrtski, Zofia Unszlicht and the new ‘ultraleftist* 
leadership which the Third Congress had brought to power were 
themselves soon to be judged unsuitable for the role the Comintern 
envisaged for the Polish party. Having eliminated the right from the 
Central Committee, the radical left began not only implementing its 
own ‘united front from below’ programme of violent revolution, 
encouraging violence and terror as the way toward radicalising the 
masses. They also began promoting their tactics within the Comintern, 
avoiding any conflict with the Russian party, but criticising less 
militant parties for their lack of revolutionary courage. By the 
summer of 1925 the Comintern had reconvened its Polish Commission to 
review the situation. The new ‘ultraleftist* KPP leadership was judged 
to have gone too far in its policies for violent revolution in Poland. 
The 'ultraleftists* were accused of having alienated the KPP from the 
Polish proletariat, and of lessening the party's scope for action in 
the future. As for the Comintern, the KPP was this time deemed to have 
attempted to create an 'ultraleft fraction’ under its leadership.65 
Polish criticism of other sections could not be tolerated; the Polish 
comrades had again strayed too far.
Stalin's 1925 bloc with Bukharin and Rykov saw him following a 
'rightist line’ in the re-named All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) 
(VKP(b>) and Comintern. In the Polish party, Warski and Koszutska 
supported the ‘rightest line* and were thus reinstated to the KPP
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leadership, replacing Domski and Zofia Unszlicht who openly supported 
Zinoviev. Leszczyhski, who opposed the Zinoviev ‘opposition’, remained 
in the KPP leadership leaving a situation where both the two wings of 
the Polish party shared power in the Central Committee and Politburo. 
Deutscher adds further detail to this picture with the comment that 
while Warski and Koszutska supported the ‘rightest line’ they remained 
ideologically closer to Bukharin, even if completely loyal to Stalin. 
Leszczyriski, on the other hand, became the leader of the ‘Stalinist* 
nucleus within the Polish Central Committee. 66
2*5 Soviet Security
In the following years, the KPP leadership became increasingly 
fragmented and subject to direct policy oversight from the Comintern 
centre. On the domestic front, the ‘Bolshevisation* of the KPP 
continued, with the goal being to completely root out the KPP's 
internationalist ‘Luxemburg heritage* and purge the party of its 
‘Trotskyist* tendencies. KPP foreign policy followed the Comintern 
lead, with the notion of Polish proletarian state independence now 
encouraged as a measure against the increasing power of international 
capitalism in Poland. At the same time, the intra-Bolshevik power 
struggle continued to intimately influence policy and practice within 
the KPP leadership, making it ever more compliant and insecure. In 
contrast to the ‘ultraleftist’ exclusion of state independence as a 
virtue to be encouraged by the revolutionary Polish party, the 
‘rightist line* of Stalin and Bukharin soon helped to put independence 
back on the KPP's foreign policy agenda.
Considerable dismay was expressed at the KPP's Fourth National
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Conference held in Moscow in November 1925 over the growing pro- 
British stance of official Polish foreign policy and the ever greater 
Polish economic dependence on Britain. The fact that on an official 
level Polish-Soviet diplomacy was making some progress toward an 
accommodation was regarded as a tactic in the Polish government's 
cynical game with the Western powers. Far more significant for the 
Polish communists was the continuing power of the large group of 
implacably anti-Soviet Pilsudski supporters occupying positions of 
influence in the government, military and diplomatic service, and 
intent on sabotaging any Polish move to draw closer to the Soviet 
Union. The assumption among Conference delegates, reflecting the 
current Soviet understanding, was that British economic involvement in 
Poland was part of a deliberate policy to strengthen the ‘imperialist’ 
wall around the Soviet Union and undermine the impact of the 
revolutionary forces in Poland and Germany.67 The KPP leadership's 
response to this threat was to raise the issue of Polish national 
independence, to complain that the capitalist ‘imperialism’ being 
encouraged by the Polish government put Polish national independence 
at risk. In the language of the Conference resolutions, this 
government policy was a direct threat to the role an independent 
Polish state would have in the future international workers' 
revolution. The KPP, it was recognised, needed to 'take a step forward 
and stand clearly and decisively on the bedrock of an independent 
Poland’. 60
This U-turn in the KPP's official platform back to the position of 
the KPRP's Second Congress required a re-definition of what was meant 
by ‘an independent Poland’. In line with the Leninist ‘thesis of 
imperialism’ and the threat posed by international capitalism in 
Poland, a majority of delegates saw Polish independence as freedom
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frora economic dependence on capitalist countries. Others emphasised
their traditional opposition to any defence of an independent
bourgeois s t a t e . A  formula was finally settled on, recognising
defence of Polish national independence as conditional on this being
understood only in a revolutionary sense:
A worker, a communist... cannot stand on the position of defence 
of his capitalist fatherland, cannot seperate the matter of 
independence from the matter of revolution. For the KPP there can 
be no defence of Polish independence without proletarian 
revolution and a worker-peasant government, just as there cannot 
be a revolution which would not secure and consolidate the state 
independence of the Polish nation. . .. Only this approach to the 
issue of Poland's independence by the KPP will be... understood 
by those workers and peasants who up till now saw in us. . . the 
enemies of whatever type of Polish independence.70
It was hoped that the positive stand on independence would aid the
KPP's broad 'united front’ work among the socialist aligned workers. 71
But the KPP continued to be the only political group in Poland to
qualify what other political parties took as an almost sacred maxim. 72
Following Pilsudski's May 1926 coup d ’6tat, during which the KPP
Central Committee issued a series of statements exhorting the working
class to support the General against his ‘fascist’ opponents,73 the
KPP leadership went through a series of traumatic post-mortems
splitting it into two implacably opposed factions and again exposing
it to the criticism of the Soviet party. Initially, the Soviet
reaction to the Polish events remained muted as the Soviet party and
Comintern focused first on their own differences. Stalin and Bukharin
were engaged in a dogmatic battle with the ‘Leningrad’ or 'New Party
Opposition’, accused of failing to appreciate the value of 'alliances
with the middle strata’ , ie. the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie. In
the Comintern, any sign of scepticism toward 'alliances with the
middle strata’ had been stigmatised as ‘Trotskyism’ and
'ultraleftist’, thus encouraging the KPP's tactical support for the
Pilsudski coup.7A On this basis in July, immediately after the
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Pilsudski coup, the ‘New Party Opposition’ charged Stalin with the 
responsibility for the Polish Central Committee's ‘mistake’. Trotsky,
aiming his criticism at Stalin, also wrote that ‘one of the reasons 
why the Polish communist leaders (like the Germans) were unequal to 
their task was that they were constantly being changed, and sudden 
changes in the situation found them inexperienced and unprepared’.7® 
But the Soviet Central Committee majority again followed Stalin's 
lead. The end of this next phase of manouvering came in October 1926
when Trotsky and Kamenev both lost their places in the Central
Committee. A month later Zinoviev was replaced as ECCI General
Secretary by Bukharin.76
In the KPP debate on the ‘May error’, Bukharin tended to support 
the ‘majority’ position of Warski and Koszutska and under his 
leadership the Comintern endeavoured to bring about a bloodless 
compromise between the two factions.7"7 Leszczyhski and the ‘minority’ 
faction put their hopes on Stalin.761 Stalin, under pressure from the 
USSR's domestic economic crisis, now began to revise his policy toward 
the peasantry and to prepare for its collectivisation, bringing him 
into sharp, although as yet unpublicised, opposition to Bukharin. 
Nothing could be resolved in the KPP crisis while the Soviet Central 
Committee did not agree to a single policy line. Instead, the KPP 
division began to spread down to the party cells threatening a 
complete split between the two rival political groups. In May 1927, 
under express instructions from Bukharin to try to heal the rift, the 
KPP held its Fourth Congress at Peterhof near Leningrad. It turned 
into a marathon affair lasting four months and with no firm outcome. 
As a result, the dispute over the 'May error’ went on to dominate the 
Comintern's Sixth World Congress in July 1928.
'Had we not intervened there would now have been two Polish
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parties’, Bukharin told the Sixth Congress delegates in his opening 
speech.73 But the success Bukharin claimed in mediating the Polish 
crisis to a successful conclusion was largely superficial. The ECCI's 
lack of confidence that the Polish rift had been fully healed was 
clearly stated in the Congress ‘Theses on the International 
Situation’:
In view of the special importance of the Polish party and the 
great responsibility resting on it in the event of war, the Sixth 
Congress categorically demands the cessation of the fractional 
struggle and instructs the ECCI to take on its behalf all the 
necessary measures. ...00
No heed was paid to the ECCI demand. The ‘minority’ faction now 
found themselves with the full support of Stalin who, in contrast to 
Bukharin, was beginning to call for a radical left turn in Comintern 
policy in preparation for the perceived forthcoming revolutionary 
crisis in the West.01 The ‘cessation’ of this episode of bitter 
leadership wrangling within the KPP came only some months later with 
the defeat of the ‘rightist deviation’ in the Soviet party and the 
removal of Bukharin from the Comintern. In February 1929, a motion 
sponsored by Stalin recommending Bukharin’s removal for ‘opportunism’ 
was accepted by the ECCI; and in April, following the publication of 
an 'open letter* from the ECCI, Warski, Koszutska and the rest of the 
‘majority’ faction were expelled from the KPP Central Committee. The 
letter branded the ‘majority’ leaders as ‘even more dangerous enemies 
than the fascists’ due to their underestimating the weakness of 
capitalist stabilisation in Poland and the counter-revolutionary role 
of the reformist parties, and their support for the illusion that the 
Polish socialists would fight fascism.0:2 At the KPP's Central 
Committee Plenum in June, the ‘minority’ faction led by Leszczyhski 
took over the leadership with the novelty that now for the first time 
the Comintern was to provide direct ‘assistance’ to its Polish section
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through the inclusion into its Central Committee of two ‘Comintern 
advisers’ both close to Stalin —  Dimitri Manuilski and Otto
Kuusinen.33
At the KPP's grass roots, the sectarianism which had resulted from
the five and a half years of leadership division now continued to
thrive regardless of the direct oversight of the Comintern's
’advisers’. On foreign policy, however, there had never been any major
dispute. Indeed, at the marathon Fourth KPP Congress the only
resolution on which there had been no fundamental disagreement was on
foreign policy. After identifying the causes of the May coup as lying
in Poland's international as well as domestic situation, this
resolution continued:
A result of the growing British-Soviet antagonism has been an 
increase in the special significance of Poland for Britain. 
Britain has also been interested in a Polish-German settlement 
which would free Poland's hands in a war with the USSR. The 
weakened position of France, revealed with particular clarity at 
Locarno... has made French protection Cof Poland] less valuable.
In these conditions, the resolution stated, Poland had turned to
Britain instead of France for help in overcoming its internal economic
crisis. Britain as a condition for aiding Poland required a change of
regime as the previous government had failed to successfully carry out
its role as ‘the military vanguard in the anti-Soviet front*.34 The
resolution reflected the firm belief in Moscow at the time, provoked
among other things by the fact that the British government had broken
off diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union on May 27, that
Pilsudski had acted with the support, if not under the instructions
of, the British Foreign Office, and that war was indeed likely either
with China or the West or both. as In another policy document entitled
‘The Party's Main Tasks’, it was stated that ‘the most important task
of the party is at this moment to fight against the preparations for
war with the Soviet Union. The entire activity of the party should be
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committed to this task*.33
Through the following years, the KPP continued to see as its 
foreign policy priority and principal internationalist duty the 
defence of the Soviet Union. At its Central Committee Plenum in June 
1929, for example, while the Western world was facing an economic 
downturn of catastrophic proportions and the Soviet Union in contrast 
had entered a period of unprecedented growth, the KPP called for a 
widened peace campaign to counter-act the threat of ‘imperialist war’. 
So long as capitalist states existed, the Plenum noted, so too did the 
threat of aggression against the world's first socialist state.37
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3. INTERNATIONALISM IN OPPOSITION
1929-1941
Prior to 1929, the Polish party had seen its organisational 
integrity weakened and its ideological authority undermined. Divisions 
amongst the Bolshevik leadership had been faithfully reflected, but 
while these divisions remained, the Polish Section could at least 
engage in serious debate. Bukharin's defeat was followed by an effort 
on Stalin's part to consolidate his influence throughout the Comintern 
and eliminate all *Bukharinist’ influence. In the ECCI, Manuilski and 
Kuusinen became the leading figures, and in Poland, Leszczyriski, Saul 
Amsterdam and the rest of the 'minority* leadership not only tied 
their policies as closely to Stalin's lead as possible, but also began 
imitating the Soviet leader's methods, continuing the fight against 
Warski and Koszutska and creating in the Polish party all of the 
characteristics of what Deutscher called the ‘Stalinist inner-party 
regime* . 1
3*1 'Class Against Class’
In ideological terms, Bukharin's defeat heralded the introduction 
of 'class against class’ or 'third period’ policies into the 
Comintern. 'Class against class’ was a reaction to the failure of the 
‘united front*. It held that the rise of fascism and growing economic 
crisis in the capitalist world was evidence of an imminent 
revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism. In order to win 
the struggle for power, the communist movement had to go onto the 
offensive. But the offensive should not be aimed so much against the
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fascist movements as against the socialist left, since the greatest 
danger to the communist victory were the nationally-minded social- 
democratic ‘splitters* of the proletariat, labelled ‘social-fascists*. 
There could be no compromise with the socialist parties.
The KPP introduced the ‘class against class* policy into its 
programme at the June 1929 Central Committee Plenum, announcing that 
‘the PPS presents the greatest danger'for the communist movement’, and 
that the socialists were in the ‘service of fascism’.2 The Plenum also 
applied this formula to the Peasant Party (SL) which was henceforth 
labelled ‘peasant-fascist*. In its practical impact on domestic 
policy, the ‘class against class* line vitually repeated the earlier 
period of ‘ultraleftism*, with much the same negative results.
But the Polish party's ‘crucially important position* and ‘great 
responsibility’ in this ‘third period' of revolutionary struggle gave 
particular significance to its foreign policy which took on an 
aggressive new forward approach. In a bid to increase the 
revolutionary unrest caused by the economic catastrophe into which 
Germany had fallen and the rise of the Nazi movement, the KPP began a 
campaign of provocation. The party leadership spared little thought 
for the state of its own domestic political health, concentrating its 
energies instead on disrupting the 'imperialist* status quo. The KPP 
should fight the anti-German campaign of the entire nationalist, 
bourgeois and social-fascist press, the Central Committee resolved in 
April 1931. It would fight also the growing repression of the German 
minority in Poland. 3 At the party's Fifth Congress in August the same 
year, the slogan of ‘self-determination to the extent of cecession* 
was extended by the KPP leadership to include the German population of 
the western and northern Polish border lands. Only such a radical 
step, the Congress declared, would counter German fascism and
-64-
encourage the revolutionary forces of the Polish and German nations.* 
The KPP's Sixth Congress (its last) was called barely a year later 
in October 1932 at the height of the Nazi movement's campaign in
Germany. This time, the party went even further in its German policy. 
As well as condemning the partitions of the Ukraine and Bielorussia, 
the party made clear exactly what cecessions it had in mind on the 
German border:
With regard to Upper Silesia and the Pomeranian Corridor, the
victorious Polish proletariat will anull the judgement of
imperialist treaties and will guarantee the people of these lands
the right to self-determination even to the point of breaking 
away from Poland.... With regard to Danzig, the KPP fights the 
yoke imposed by Poland and the League of Nations, fights the 
annexationist policy of Polish imperialism, and recognises the 
right of the people of Danzig, separated from Germany by force, 
to once again join with Germany. 6
Neither the Polish state's security nor its prestige were of any
importance to the KPP's leaders. There seemed to be little doubt that
under the conditions proposed by the KPP, all a revolution in Germany
could hope to achieve was to turn Poland into a small Soviet republic
with a good deal of the native population beyond its borders. In its
resolutions on the national question and Polish independence
throughout the 'class against class' phase, the KPP did little to
dispell these fears:
The Polish Soviet Republic will conclude a fraternal alliance 
with the Soviet Union and with every nation which has freed 
itself from capitalism, on the basis of a voluntary uniting and 
centralization of armed and economic forces for the fight against 
imperialism and for the building of a socialist economy on which 
is based the real independence of a proletarian state with regard 
to capitalist states.6
Among the grass roots of the KPP itself, striven as it was with
sectarianism, the position of the 'ultraleftist’ leadership was taken
to imply an* ‘integral merger of Poland into the framework of the
Soviet Union’, as Gomulka was to later complain. 7
- 65-
3*2 ‘Popular Front*
Through the ‘class against class* period, Manuilski, by now the 
most influential of the ECCI secretaries, had been slowly shifting his 
ground. As early as July 1930 he had headed an Italian Commission 
which had forced a shift away from the radical sectarianism proving so 
ineffective against the Italian fascist movement.® By 1933 this 
evolution was quickened by the Nazi victory in Germany and the 
impotence of the KPD. The situation was no different in Poland where, 
Pilsudski's increasing repression, culminating in the wholesale 
incarceration of his political opposition in the fortress of Brze6d, 
saw a parallel increase in the violence of the measures being taken 
against the communists.
Soviet foreign policy was also undergoing a tactical turn. From the 
time of the revolution, the Bolshevik leaders had been acutely aware 
of the fact that their security depended on the Western capitalist 
states remaining divided among themselves. Had they been united in 
1917 the Soviet state could not have survived. The 1922 Treaty of 
Rapallo built on this premiss in allying the new Soviet state with one 
of the Western capitalist powers, common in its animosity toward the 
other Western powers and the Versailles system, and the expansionary 
Polish state. This situation was disrupted by Hitler's non-aggression 
pact with Poland in January 1934. A new, more immediate threat to 
Soviet security now presented itself —  a German-Polish alliance aimed 
directly against the USSR. The Soviet Union had to find new partners 
for its security and for this it again looked to the West. In 1935, 
the USSR entered the League of Nations. Later that year it concluded a 
mutual assistance pact with France.
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The change in the Comintern's policy coincided with the Soviet 
rapprochement with the West. Throughout 1934, Stalin, Georgi Dimitrov, 
Manuilski and Kuusinen engaged in a bitter polemic with the 
‘ultraleftists’ of the Comintern's sections, preparing for the shift 
in policy. By October the shift had been made. The formal ratification 
of the policy change came at the Comintern's Seventh (and last) World 
Congress in August 1935.
In stark contrast to the ‘class against class’ policy, the 'popular 
front’ provided for negotiation and alliance with any political party 
which was anti-fascist, defence of democratic parliamentarianism 
before fascism, support for the League of Nations, and opposition to 
any threat to the prevailing territorial status quo. At issue here was 
‘the danger of a new world war’, as one of the Congress resolutions 
was entitled, and in such a war, Manuilski wrote, ‘the interests of 
the USSR determine the basic line of the world propletariat’; first 
among the ‘main tasks for communist parties’ was ‘the struggle for 
peace and the defence of the USSR’.3 Retreating from their 
revolutionary extremism, the Comintern's sections were being returned 
to their ‘united front’ emphasis on Soviet security in a policy 
reminiscent of the period in which the Comintern was born.
Unlike in the KPD where Walter Ulbricht replaced the * ultraleftist' 
leadership, the Comintern policy change did not bring about the usual 
shift in KPP leadership. Leszczyrtski and Amsterdam made their own U- 
turn and began to try to repair as many of the broken bridges they had 
left behind them as possible. One of the most important steps in this 
none too easy process was a revision of the party's stand on Poland's 
national interests and particularly the vital issue of Polish 
independence. The Seventh Comintern Congress had shown the road to 
follow:
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The Congress warns against adopting a disparaging attitude on the 
question of national independence and the national sentiments of 
the broad masses of the people, an attitude which renders it 
easier for fascism to develop its chauvinist campaign, and 
insists on a correct and concrete application of the Leninist- 
Stalinist national policy. While communists are irreconcilable 
opponents, on principle, of bourgeois nationalism of every 
variety, they are by no means supporters of national nihilism, of 
an attitude of unconcern for the fate of their own people.10
During the remainder of 1935, the KPP launched a propaganda campaign
intended to give their new policies as high a public profile as
possible. Declarations, appeals, open letters, as well as the regular
party press were all used to publicise the party's new positive
attitude toward Polish independence, and particularly, of the threat
to that independence from German fascism and the 'adventurist' nature
of the Polish Sanacja government's pro-German foreign policy.11
In February 1936, the KPP Central Committee's Fourth Plenum
formalised the policy turn and went as far as issuing a party
Manifesto devoted to the subject of Polish independence. The Manifesto
illustrated the extent of the Polish party's recantation:
In our agitation for a people's front we have paid too little 
attention to the matter of Polish national independence. This has 
made it easier for the reactionary leaders of the Peasant Party 
to present communists in the eyes of the masses as an element 
foreign to the Polish people.... We —  communists, pupils of 
Lenin and Stalin —  recognise the right of every nation to self- 
determination and national independence; we —  communists —  
stand on the platform of independence for the Polish nation 
recognised without qualification by the Great October 
Revolution...; fighting against the military collusion of [Polish 
Foreign Minister] Beck with Hitler, our Party defends not only 
the peace, but also national independence, since the provocative 
policy of the Sanacja clique is sentencing Poland to a vassal 
dependence on hitlerite Germany....12
The KPP's aim, the Manifesto declared, was to create a free and
independent workers' homeland —  the 'Polish Socialist Soviet
Republic’.13 Soon after the Fourth Plenum, however, slogans such as
‘Polish Soviet Republic* or the ‘Soviet Republic of Workers',
Peasants' and Soldiers' Delegates’ borrowed from the Russian
Revolution began appearing less and less in the KPP's propaganda and
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internal documents. Other slogans such as ' Workers' -Peasants' Poland*, 
and finally, * People's Poland*, became more frequent.
Finally, by the time of the KPP's Fifth Plenum in February 1937,
the ‘internationalist’ leadership's official stance on Polish
independence had come full circle from the time of the ‘three W‘
leadership period. German influence on Polish diplomacy had grown
enormously, and the great Soviet fear was that Poland under its
military regime would find common ground with Germany in order to
threaten the Soviet Union in unison. The 1935 Mutual Assistance Pact
with France had been supplemented the same year with a similar Soviet
agreement with Czechoslovakia, this time conditional on France
fulfilling the same obligation. Thus for the KPP leaders, the Polish
government had a clear option:
The fight with the policy of national treason and with the 
Sanacja regime giving Poland away in a pact with Hitler, the
fight for peace, for joining Poland to the agreement of peaceful 
states created by France, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union, is 
today the most effective means for the defence of Poland's
independence from its one and only enemy —  hitlerite Germany.1“1
No mention was made of the right of the western Ukraine and
Bielorussia to ‘self-determination to the extent of secession'.
Instead, the Plenum satisfied itself with talking only of 'equal
rights for all national minorities’.15
The KPP leadership under the patronage of Stalin had taken the 
party's foreign policy from a position of extreme, even suicidal 
radical internationalism, to a position in 1937 where the KPP
officially recognised diplomatic means for overcoming the danger to 
the security of the bourgeois Polish state. Warski had taken this line 
earlier in a debate in the Sejm on the implications for Poland of the 
Locarno Treaty. He had called then for an official Polish alliance 
with the Soviet Union as the only way to balance the new threat from 
Germany. A Polish-Soviet alliance would provide greater security for
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both countries, he had argued.16 Warski and his ‘right deviationist* 
colleagues had by this time been ejected from the KPP and ECCI and had 
gone missing in the Soviet Union. A few months later the rest of the 
KPP leadership were to endure the same fate. But the foreign policy
which the KPP had been following in its twilight years was to prove
more durable than the party leadership itself.
3*3 Dissolution
An analysis of the development of the ‘national' and 
‘internationalist' tendencies in Polish foreign policy would not be 
complete without some attention being payed to the processes and
reasons for the KPP‘s dissolution. It is not known what lay behind 
Stalin's decision to eliminate the KPP. A lack of hard sources means 
that any attempt to explain Stalin's motivation can only be
circumstantial. The theory most popular among ex-KPP members is that 
he had anticipated the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and wanted 
to remove any obstacles to another Soviet-German rapprochement, 17 The 
Polish party may have been eliminated on the same basis as its 
leadership had been taken over in July 1920 by a section of the 
Bolshevik Central Committee. Certainly the trend in the KPP's foreign 
policies would not weigh against this hypothesis.
By the time the 'popular front' policies began to be implemented in 
the KPP's foreign policy, the ‘national' leadership of the party had 
been drastically relegated. Its grass-roots continued, however, to be 
active. The subsequent development in the foreign policies of the 
‘internationalist’ wing saw the party leadership assuming many of the 
foreign policy positions previously associated with the ‘national’
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leadership, doing nothing to discourage the activity of the ‘national* 
grass-roots which could at last claim to represent a foreign policy 
that addressed the realities of the time.
But crucially, it was also a foreign policy born from the tactical 
flexibility exhibited by the Comintern and more especially Stalin, a 
flexibility matched with a strategic intransigence.1® The security of 
the Soviet state, its territorial security, and its prestige, were 
strategic goals which could not be forfeited. These were the interests 
which Stalin embodied, the interests of the 'dictatorship of the 
proletariat* .which the Soviet leader was still in the process of 
building inside the Soviet Union. Outside the territorial control of 
the Soviet regime, the tactical flexibility which Stalin had exhibited 
in his domestic rivalry with the other Bolshevik leaders became the 
norm for the policies of the various Comintern sections. This 
flexibility had been especially apparent in the foreign policy U-turn 
of the Polish leadership.
Whether Leszczyhski and Saul Amsterdam as leaders of the KPP would 
have remained faithful to Stalin through the critical events of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and Soviet invasion of the summer of 1939 is a 
matter of speculation. 19 The severity of the accusations and sentence 
carried out on the KPP would suggest that Stalin felt a particular 
animosity toward the KPP. In his capacity as head of the Bolshevik 
Commissariat for Nationality Affairs, Stalin had been close to the 
‘Polish question* since before the creation of the KPRP. During the 
time of the KPRP* s ‘ Bolshevisation*, he had also taken a special 
interest, seeing in the Polish party's Luxemburg heritage the Polish 
'variety of Trotskyism* with which he was engaged in a pitched 
battle.ao The Luxemburg threat lost none of its immediacy in the 
following years. At the time Stalin began setting about his
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‘revolution from above* in the Soviet Union, strengthening the Soviet 
‘dictatorship of the proletariat* in order to build ‘socialism in one 
country*, the Polish party's by then largely incurable sectarianism 
continued to prompt the Soviet leader's public disparagement. 
Immediately prior to the KPP's Sixth Congress in October 1930, at the 
height of the KPP's ‘class against class' campaign, Stalin made a 
well-known public contribution to the Polish debate in a letter to the 
editors of Proletarskaia Revolutsia in which he sharply criticised 
Luxemburg's contribution to revolutionary theory, linking it 
ideologically to ‘Trotskyism’.21 The Sixth Congress, needless to say, 
became a forum for much anti-Trotsky polemic. At the same time, 
Leszczyhski and Amsterdam kept up their campaign of vilification 
against the 'rightist deviation*, the leaders who had defied Stalin as 
long ago as 1923.
1933 saw a violent increase in political repression inside the 
Soviet Union as Stalin began implementing his collectivisation. Along 
with many Ukrainian communists, KPP leaders with links to the western 
Ukraine were also arrested and executed.22 The official explanation 
for this action was given in the Comintern journal Kommunisticheskii 
Internatsional in June 1935: groups in the Bielorussian and Ukrainian 
sections of the KPP had 'fallen victim to the pressure of local 
counter-revolutionary nationalism’.23 A year earlier, at the time of 
the Comintern policy change to the ‘popular front', even wider ranging 
accusations had been published in Kommunisticheskii Internatsional by 
a member of the KPP leadership. In its March 1934 issue, Bronkowski 
wrote that 'strong traces of bourgeois nationalism’ remained in the 
Polish party; there were members of the KPP who believed that Poland 
was not an ‘imperialist* state but bore a semi-colonial character. 
Bronkowski referred also to the presence in the KPP of ‘police
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agents*, a certain Sochacki, arrested and shot in Moscow in 1932.24
The violence in the Soviet Union took a new turn in 1936. At the 
time of the second trial of Kamenev and Zinoviev (the first had taken 
place in 1935), at which they were found guilty and afterwards 
executed, the members of the KPP ‘rightist deviation’, including all 
the communist deputies to the Sejm, were removed from their positions 
and sent into the Soviet Union where in most cases contact with them 
was lost. The assumption at the time among the rest of the party was 
that they had been guilty of disagreeing with Stalin or Manuilski, of 
defending Trotsky or later Bukharin.25 Leszczyriski1 s view was more 
self-interested. He had had his internal opposition eliminated, an 
opposition which had never been ‘Stalinist’, which had instead seen 
its interests rooted in old Polish communist traditions and prestige. 
Leszczyhski set out his position in an article in Kommunisticheskii 
Internatsional published in April 1936. The KPP had been penetrated by 
the agents of Pilsudski, he wrote, referring to the PPS-Lewica 
tradition in the party: ‘The plan of the Pilsudski clique was to gain
possession of the communist party organisationally and politically, to 
drive it to a position of national communism, to create a political 
current in it hostile to the Comintern, and at the right moment, in 
the event of war, to stab it in the back’.26
Whether or not these accusations were actually true is less 
important for our purposes than the perception among the ‘Stalinist’ 
KPP leadership that they were true.27 In the light of Stalin’s 
historic concern for the viability of the Polish party as a bridge 
between the Soviet state and the German and wider European revolution, 
and taking into consideration the atmosphere of ideological and 
physical repression prevailing within the Soviet Union as well as the 
international tension outside it, the existence of a section of the
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KPP ‘bridge’ which had at least the potential to resist the conformity 
of the Comintern would have been sufficient to lead to its removal. 
But this does not explain the wholesale dissolution of the KPP.
Leszczyrtski concluded his April 1936 article with a reference to 
the way in which ’the sectarian attitude of superciliousness towards 
national sentiments helped the enemies of the people for a long time 
to present the communist party as a force which was alien to the 
Polish people’.2® Here he was addressing the parallel danger which 
faced the KPP. Although the ‘national communists* had been eliminated, 
the party could not fall back into its old sectarian habits. These 
were far too close to the Luxemburg tradition and as such anathema to 
Stalin and the Soviet leadership. Instead, Leszczyhski, Bronkowski and 
Amsterdam tried to keep the KPP as faithful to Stalin as it could 
possibly have been, questioning none of the treason accusations and 
death sentences, increasing in their frequency since 1932. The 
position was that any verdict coming from Moscow had to be justified 
in some way even if it did sound unlikely.2® This loyalty did not, 
however, endear the Polish leaders to Stalin.
By the spring of 1937 the entire KPP organisation was being accused 
by Stalin's Chief Prosecutor, Andrei Vyshinsky, of ‘Trotskyist’ 
subversion, of being an ‘agency’ of Polish and German military 
intelligence. The Vyshinsky allegations resulted in the entire KPP 
Politburo, Central Committee and Secretariat being called to Moscow to 
face the charges of treason. Those already there, members of the 
Polish section of the ECCI, were the first to suffer the consequences. 
Leszczyrtski and Bronkowski, both members of the ECCI, disappeared in 
spring 1938. The rest of the remaining leadership followed soon 
after.30 None of these people were ever seen again. The only Central 
Committee member to survive in Poland was Alfred Lampe, languishing in
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a Polish jail.31. The ECCI followed Vyshinsky in accusing its Polish 
section of being under the control of 'Trotskyist, Polish military and 
German military agents'. The only solution, the ECCI said, was for the 
‘agents’ to be liquidated and the section temporarily dissolved.32 
Later in 1938, in a move reminiscent of the accusations aimed at the 
KPRP leadership in 1924 and 1925, the ECCI added to its list of 
accusations, charging the KPP with consciously acting to isolate
itself from the masses, not allowing the normalisation of Polish-
Soviet relations, and compromising the idea of revolution among the 
Polish proletariat.33 From raid-1938 no references in the Comintern 
press were made again to the KPP. 34
The wholesale dissolution of the Polish party must be seen in the 
context of the KPP’s extreme instrumentalism and Stalin’s domestic and 
foreign policies. During the ‘Great Terror’ in the Soviet Union 
between 1936 and 1938, over a million VKP(b) members had fallen victim 
to Stalin's domestic consolidation. 3S Parallel to this, in his foreign
policy, the Soviet leader now put more faith in his ability to
manipulate the diplomatic cut and thrust of inter-state relations, and 
accordingly, demoted the Comintern as an element contributing to the 
unity of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the distrust of the Western 
powers. Its headquarters was moved from the centre to the outskirts of 
Moscow and its organisation was almost entirely assimilated into the 
VKP<b) Central Committee, with policies, finances and personnel 
becoming the responsibility of the appropriate Soviet department. The 
Central Committee Polish section was given over to the wife of Felix 
Dzier2yhski, Zofia, and their son, Jan.3*5 Not only the Polish members 
disappeared from the Comintern's staff. Many of its Estonian, Latvian, 
Finnish, Hungarian and Jugoslavian members were also removed, 
including the ‘ ultraleftist’ Bela Kun and many of the staf f of the
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Comintern's Lenin School. 37
In demoting the Comintern Stalin also demoted the traditional role 
played by its Polish section. In 1937 there seemed little need for a 
revolutionary bridge between the Soviet state and the German 
revolution when instead of revolution in Germany the firm belief among 
the Soviet leadership was that Hitler would start a war somewhere in 
Europe, and most likely against the Soviet Union. The KPP had 
reflected this fear in its constant reiteration of the need to defend 
the Soviet Union against the interventionary war which threated it.30 
At the same time, in its foreign policy the KPP had been transformed 
from a revolutionary party into a submissive ‘Stalinist* creation, a 
more or less mainstream left pressure group criticising state foreign 
policy from the point of view of the realities of state diplomacy; and 
at this it was demonstratively ineffective. While there remained 
considerable doubt as to the KPP's usefulness, matched by some doubt 
as to the party's integrity, Stalin's need for another obstacle to his 
European diplomacy dwindled rapidly. From the Polish communists' point 
of view, the party's dissolution became the ultimate reminder of the 
priority of the ‘Russian and German Affairs', the greatest test of the 
Soviet party's moral authority and of their own internationalist 
responsibilities.
The actual dissolving of the KPP was less simple than the 
elimination of its leading organs. Few KPP members in Poland believed 
that Stalin could have resorted to such a step and instead treated the 
talk of dissolution as a Polish government provocation.33 A 
provisional leadership was independently created and the party 
continued functioning. This was no satisfactory solution for the 
Soviet leadership. Several trusted ex-KPP members fighting in the 
D^browski International Brigade in the Spanish Civil War were brought
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to Paris by the ECCI; others were brought from Poland. From here they
were instructed to return to Poland and inform the membership of the
party that it could no longer function as a communist organisation.
Resistance to this message continued, however, even after the
provisional leadership had capitulated and sent instructions to
dissolve the organisation down to its local cells. Faced with an
impasse, and against the express instructions of the ECCI that nothing
be committed to paper, the Paris messengers decided in August 1938 to
issue a statement:
...anyone disobeying [the Comintern's] decision and not 
abandoning the party organisation will be treated as an enemy spy 
and a police agent...;
...anyone organising a party outside the Comintern will be
treated as an agent provocateur,AO
The warning spelt the end of any formal Polish communist party
continuing to exist. Informally, communists continued to function in
the expectation that the Polish party might at some stage be
reconstituted by the Comintern.
3*4 Interregnum
After the dissolution o f .the KPP, Polish communists operating in 
Paris and Moscow under the aegis of the Comintern continued directly 
along the same foreign policy path set for the KPP in its final years. 
There was no break in continuity; the Polish communists' 
internationalist responsibilities continued to be presented under the 
rubric of their previous national profile. In Moscow, the albeit
downgraded Polish section in the Soviet Central Committee continued to 
operate under the direction of Zofia and Jan Dzieriyrtski; while in 
Paris, many of the remaining Polish communists recently fighting in
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the international brigades in Spain joined their leaders in charge of
completing the final dissolution of the old KPP and together with the
Comintern representative Bogdanov established what was known as the
‘Initiative Group*. In January, the group began publishing a gazette,
the Biuletyn Informacyjny (Information Bulletin) in which they set out
their foreign policy programme.4-1 In the first issue of Biuletyn
Informacyjny, the group published a policy statement entitled: ‘Where
is Poland Heading’:
In the war against the Soviet Union, which is the main aim of 
hitlerism, other non-socialist nations will also fall. They will 
fall without a doubt if they don't in good time come out to 
defend their independence, if they don't in their own time
decisively come out against the danger of the Tuetonic disease.
In this war, if we are not able to confront it with a wall of
united, free nations before it even begins, we will all become
the slaves of Hitler, who wants to... destroy the freedom and 
fortune of socialist peoples.-*2
The interests of Soviet diplomacy in the Polish communist propaganda
were immediately apparent.
The threat posed by the Anti-Comintern Pact (which Hungary had 
joined in February 1939) had been increased by the Munich Agreement of 
29 September 1938. Here was confirmation of the Soviet suspicion that 
the Western allies were not serious in their intention of preventing 
German aggression against the Soviet Union. The ‘wall of united, free 
nations' to be created ‘in good time’ reflected the difficulties being 
encountered in the Soviet Union's diplomacy with France and Britain, 
both of which were reluctant to involve the Soviet Union in their 
policy decisions, and whose diplomatic efforts to offset the German 
threat the Soviet leaders regarded as less than satisfactory. Prior to 
April 1939, the option which Soviet diplomacy had been consistently 
favouring since 1935 was an alliance of common security with the 
Western powers against the German aggressor and against the threat of 
a Polish-German military pact. With the change in the German attitude
- 78-
toward Poland, however, the British and French guarantees for Poland 
without Soviet participation and finally, Hitler's anulling of the 
January 1934 Polish-German non-aggression pact, a second Soviet option 
came into play. Should the war be an 'imperialist' war between the 
Western states and Germany, Molotov had suggested in November 1938, 
then the Soviet Union would not involve itself. The door to a Soviet- 
German rapprochement had been left open. It was an opportunity which 
Hitler took up in July and August 1939.
The Soviet leadership did not immediately commit itself to the 
German option. Its doors for the time being also remained open to 
Western collective security. On 16 May 1939, a decision was made by 
the ECCI to call together Zofia Dzierlihska and several other Polish 
communists resident in the Soviet capital in an effort to formulate an 
official Polish communist response to the German threat. There is some 
indication that this was an attempt to recreate the Polish party. At 
a meeting held a few days later, it was decided that 'in the current 
situation the most important, most vital task standing before the 
Polish proletariat and the whole nation —  is the defence of Poland's 
independence'. Efforts toward the creation of a common security pact 
in Europe, as well as the basing of Poland's relations with the Soviet 
Union on the principles of ‘friendship and neighbourly cooperation’ 
were stated as being the most important foreign policy tasks facing 
Poland in its present predicament. AA
The policy established at this meeting was outstripped very shortly 
by events.. Polish independence was tied to the wider considerations of 
the collective security option in Soviet foreign policy. Poland's 
participation in the Western alliance would have removed the threat 
that close Polish-German ties posed to Soviet security. In this case, 
a new Polish communist party continuing the independence policy —  if
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this is what the ECCI had intended —  might have contributed to the 
Soviet presentation of their goodwill toward the Polish authorities. 
Stalin had made much of this point in his speech to the Eighteenth
r
VKP<b) Congress on March 10. Outlining Soviet foreign policy, he had 
included in the Soviet list of policy priorities ‘peaceful, intimate 
and good neighbourly relations with all neighbour countries having a 
common border with the USSR*.
During the spring and summer of 1939, talks were being held in 
Moscow between representatives of the British, French and Soviet 
General Staffs on the details of a possible anti-German military pact. 
Part of the Soviet position in the negotiations was that the Red Army 
be given transit rights across Poland to allow a forward defence in 
the event of a German offensive through Poland. In late May the Polish 
government refused its permission. The effect of this was to delay any 
attempt to arrange a large-scale remobilisation of the Polish 
communists, if indeed this had been the original intention of the 
Moscow May meeting. As it was, with the meeting's resolution having 
been made irrelevant, it, or the fact that the meeting had at ever 
taken place, was never communicated to the communists within Poland.
The continuing Western military procrastination and firm Polish 
refusal to allow Soviet transit in the event of German aggression made 
the Soviet leaders more amenable to the German request for an 
agreement when it came. Instead of the threat of a German attack 
against the Soviet Union with the tacit support of the Western states, 
the clear implication of the Munich Agreement for the Soviet side, the 
reverse was now achieved, with a guarantee that if it finally came to 
war with Germany, the Western states would already be involved, and 
the full force of the attack would not fall on the Soviet Union.47
On August 23, Molotov**® and Ribbentrop signed the Soviet-German
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non-aggression pact. Article two of the secret protocol to this pact 
read as follows:
In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the 
areas belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of influence of 
Germany and the USSR will be bounded approximately by the line of 
the rivers Narev, Vistula and San. The questions, whether the 
interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an 
independent Polish State, and how such a State should be bounded, 
can only be definitely determined in the course of further 
political developments. In the event, both Governments will 
resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement. AS’
Poland was to be once again split, with about 80,000 square miles
falling to the Soviet Union. For the Red Army to have established a
Soviet territory reaching the Narwa, Vistula and San rivers as
stipulated in the pact, however, would have meant the possibility of
the Soviet Union coming immediately into conflict with Poland's
Western allies, something Stalin did not want. Instead of taking up
the agreed positions, Soviet troops pulled back to a line
approximating the proposed Curzon armistice line in the 1920 Polish-
Soviet war. Stalin in this way retained the argument that he was
looking after the national interests of the Bielorussian and Ukraine
peoples. This quickly became the official line of the Comintern.50
The onset of the real war also brought a change in Comintern 
policy. The 'imperialist rivalry' theory having proven correct, the
extension of the, theory called for communist parties to once again 
take the lead in the fight against social-democracy, and unite the 
working class for a revolutionary outcome to the capitalist conflict. 
In an article in Kommunisticheskii Internatsional in November, 
Dimitrov, General Secretary of the ECCI, codified this new 
‘proletarian front’ policy. Dimitrov characterised the ‘imperialist 
war' as ‘a straightforward continuation of the battle between the
capitalist powers over a new division of the world, over domination of 
the world'. The new policy was seen as a direct antecedent of the
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model established by the First World War, following which civil war 
had become the road to power for the Bolsheviks. Poland was seen as 
the state 'which the British and French imperialists had established 
as an outpost against the land of the Soviets, and by whose hand they 
wanted in 1920 to strangle the young Soviet Republic’. Dimitrov then 
explained the *Germano-Soviet Amity and Frontier Treaty’: ‘In these
conditions, the Soviet Union, pursuing its own independent policy, a 
policy dictated by the interests of socialism, which coincide with the 
interests of the working people of all lands, undertook resolute 
measures to ensure peace throughout the East of Europe’ . As the 
'impregnable fortress’ and ‘vanguard’ of socialism, Dimitrov wrote, 
the USSR called for the creation of the ‘proletarian united fighting 
front from below’ in the knowledge that its own power strengthened the 
confidence of the proletariat of all the capitalist countries.31
For the Polish communists who now found themselves on land occupied 
either by the Soviet or German authorities, the significance of the 
new Comintern policy was minimal. The KPP remained an officially 
proscribed organisation in Soviet eyes. Those communists already in 
the regions occupied by the Red Army after September 17 were treated 
as part of the potential dissident section of the population and 
deported along with the remaining ‘anti-Soviet element*; those who at 
the time of the German invasion had been in Polish jails and had fled 
eastward into the Soviet zone, were regarded with equal distrust and 
suspicion and had no influence whatsoever.5=2 The organisation of the 
newly occupied regions relied solely on Red Army commanders, Soviet 
security personnel and political workers brought in from outside.53 
The attitude toward Poles in general was one of contempt and 
suspicion, and this included the communists whose reputation was well 
remembered by the purged Soviet military and security apparatus. On
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the German side, the communists were scattered among a small number of 
organisationally and ideologically diverse groups often including 
radical peasant or socialist activists. Not until the summer of 1940, 
and the fall of France, were the communists in either the Soviet or 
German zones given any internationalist encouragement from the Soviet 
leadership.
3*5 Reconstruction
The centres of activity of those recently freed from Polish prisons 
were in Lw6w, Wilno, Bialystok and Minsk.54 From here they sent 
letters to Stalin and Dimitrov calling for a revival of the Polish 
party; the letters were left unanswered and all political activity was 
discouraged.SB Any intention the Soviet leadership had of re­
establishing the Polish party from the Initiative Group in Paris was 
for the time being abandoned and in early 1940 the leaders of the
group were brought to Moscow. The only person accepted by the Soviet 
authorities was not even a KPP member but a communist aligned member 
of the PPS, a writer and wife of the Ukrainian dramatist and party 
official Alexander Korniejchuk —  Wanda Wasilewska. se Wasilewska met
for the first time with Stalin in March 1940. She was then deputised
to the Supreme Soviet. Another appeal by Wasilewska and Alfred Lampe 
directly to Stalin in the autumn of 1940 brought more concrete 
results. Teams of Soviet officials representing the Comintern3,7 began 
to vet the Polish communists in the four main cities, eventually
bringing a number of them to a Comintern school at Pushkino near 
Moscow. These included Marceli Nowotko, Pawel Finder and Boleslaw 
Molojec, commander of the D^browski International Brigade in Spain and
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leader of the Paris Initiative Group. Director of the Polish section 
at the Pushkino school was Jakub Berman. In the spring of 1941 the ex- 
KPP members who had passed the vetting commissions began to be 
accepted into the VKP(b). By June, about a dozen had been accepted.se 
At the same time, regular publications issued by the communists began 
to appear in Lw<5w, the most important under the editorial direction of 
Wasilewska, Nowe Wldnokrfgi (New Horizons).
On the German side, without Comintern support and operating in an 
atmosphere of deep suspicion and fear of penetration by the Gestapo, 
the sectarianism resulting from the * national*/'internationalist* 
leadership split continued unabated. ‘Ultraleftist' internationalism 
remained tightly bound to the idea of a Polish Soviet Socialist 
Republic. ‘National' policies were much closer to the ‘national 
communism' of Warski and Koszutska.
A good example of the latter was the earliest published document 
issued by a communist-aligned group in the German zone, produced in 
February 1940 and written by ex-KPP members who had returned from the 
occupied Soviet zone. They formed the communist leadership of an 
‘anti-fascist group’ operating in Cracow known by the name of its 
underground publication People's Poland. eo The declaration began with 
the group1s principal goal of attaining a Polish Socialist Republic 
based on undisputed ethnic territories. Such a republic would be 
allied to the other ‘people's republics' of Europe, particularly with 
its Slavic neighbours. Real Polish independence could only be 
achieved, the declaration continued, by a social revolution in all the 
capitalist states; a return to Poland1s pre-war capitalist system 
would see Poland again a central European colony of one or other 
imperialist power.*51 The declaration based itself firmly on the line 
of the KPRP1s Second Congress. Poland's position in Europe led
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People'$ Poland to assume a colonial future, or at least imperfect 
independence, in any situation where socialist revolution failed to be 
comprehensive, including in its momentum all the European capitalist 
states. Without this type of comprehensive working class 
internationalism, reminiscent of Trotsky's ideological dispute with 
Stalin, Poland would again be stuck between one system in the west and 
another in the east, caught in its traditional pattern of geopolitical 
impotence. Alliance with the central European Slavic nations, in their 
new incarnations as ‘people's states’, would go some way toward 
overcoming this effect. No mention is made in the declaration of 
alliance with the Soviet Union. Instead, emphasis is placed on ‘the 
principle of national equality and self-determination’ . 6:2
In contrast, the ‘internationalist* wing of the old party continued 
to demand strict allegiance to the ‘vanguard detachment* of the 
international proletariat —  the USSR. Even here, however, the 
attitudes of the Polish communists were by no means uniform. One group 
gathered around the publication Czyn Chlopsko-Robotniczy (Peasant and 
Workers' Action), in March 1941 printed an article in which it called 
for the Polish socialist masses to support the capitalist states 
fighting against Germany, as ‘from a general point of view, a victory 
by Hitler would mean catastrophe for our civilisation and would be the 
beginning of a barbaric decline in all areas of social life*.63 
Another of the main Warsaw groups, Union of Workers' and Peasants' 
Councils, better known by the title of its publication Mlot 1 Slerp 
(Hammer and Sickle), interpreted the Comintern ‘proletarian front’ 
policy as intending to create a ‘Polish Soviet Republic* within a 
larger ‘International Soviet Republic’.6'1
Amongst all the groups, a widespread belief was that Moscow would 
take the initiative and enter the war with Germany at a decisive
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moment thereby predetermining its revolutionary outcome and heralding 
the revival of the Polish party. Hitler's invasion in June 1941 
reversed the initial prognosis but many Polish communists now saw 
their long-term hopes being fulfilled. Prior to the invasion, the 
underground publishing activity of the Polish communist groups had 
increased dramatically. Now this press was unanimous in its 
condemnation of the fascist attack against the ‘impregnable fortress 
of socialism’.
The impact of the German invasion on the programmatic positions of 
the Polish communists in the Soviet Union was almost immediate. The 
Comintern was forced to yet again change its strategy; survival now 
became far more important than the overthrow of capitalism. The 
‘proletarian front' policy was changed to the ‘broadest national 
united front', the ‘national front’ for short.6S In Lw6w, the Polish 
language newspaper of the local Ukrainian Communist Party, Czerwony 
Sztandar (The Red Banner), the day before it ceased publication, 
published an article on June 26 written by Wladyslaw Biehkowski, under 
the title: ‘There is only one road’. Later close to the ‘national*
Gomulka wing of the PPR, Biehkowski appealed to the one hundred and 
fifty year old Polish tradition of not only fighting for the nation's 
own independence , but also for the freedom of others, the ‘For Our 
Freedom and Yours’ slogan of the KPRP's resolution on the national 
question ratified at the party's Second Congress.66 Patriotism now 
became the key to the Polish communist movement's revival.
In September 1941, three Warsaw groups, including a radical 
socialist group, joined forces to create the Union of the Liberation 
Struggle (ZWW).67 One of the leading groups of its time, and with 
leaders who would soon become prominent in the PPR, the ZWW 
represented a policy of complete adherence to the new Comintern line.
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Its propaganda was based on the programmes transmitted from Moscow via 
a Polish language radio station established in August calling itself 
‘Tadeusz Ko§ciuszko', and staffed by the Moscow based Polish 
communists and radical intelligentsia. se
The most often repeated formula of the Ko£ciuszko radio station was 
the call for the onset of a partisan campaign behind German lines for 
the liberation of an independent Polish state and to aid the Red 
Army.69 The partisan struggle was to take place within a broad 
national front incorporating the socialist left with the objective of 
resurrecting an independent and democratic Poland; no mention was made 
in the radio station's propaganda or the ZWW's policies, of a Soviet 
Poland.70 On the matter of Poland's eastern borders, the ZWW press 
organ, Zwycifiymy (We Will Win), continued the policy established in 
Dimitrov's November 1939 article explaining the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact, that the pre-1939 borders had been imposed on the Soviet Union 
by Poland during the 'imperialist war1 of 1920. The changes which had 
taken place since 1939, therefore, were nothing other than the return 
of non-Polish lands to their rightful occupants. This would allow, 
Zwycifiymy continued, relations between Poland and its eastern 
neighbours to be maintained in the future on the basis of ‘free with 
free and equal with equal'.71
In December 1941, the ZWW held a conference in Warsaw at which it 
ratified a resolution calling for 'all existing groups and 
organisations of workers, peasants and intelligentsia standing on the 
basis of the carrying out of the Polish-Soviet Agreement to gather 
around the ZWW’ in a united front undisturbed by leadership ambitions. 
Total support, indeed 'adoration’, for the efforts of the Red Army was 
expressed in the resolution. Lastly, the resolution called on Britain 
and America to open a second front against Germany as soon as
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possible. 72
Polish communist support for the Soviet Union could at last claim a 
measure of legitimacy once the Polish government in London led by 
General Sikorski on 30 July signed an agreement with the Soviet 
government re-establishing diplomatic links broken following the 
Soviet entry into Poland in September 1939. Up till that time, Polish 
communists had opposed the Polish government's policy of considering 
itself at war not only with Germany, but also with the Soviet Union.
Poland's 'two enemies' had become the slogan for the mass Polish
underground with only the communists taking an actively contrary 
position.
The first article of the agreement annulled all Soviet-German 
treaties from 1939 relating to territorial changes in Poland, but a 
good deal of ambiguity remained in the light of the western Ukraine 
and Bielorussia having already been ‘democratically’ incorporated into 
the Soviet state. In response to this ambiguity, Eden refused to give 
any guarantee for Poland's future borders, signalling his tacit
understanding of the Soviet position and leaving the question open,
presumably to be decided by the course of the war. And indeed, this
was Stalin's intention also. While Soviet foreign policy worked toward 
the creation of a string of alliances strengthening the Soviet
position in the war with Germany, the Soviet leadership at the same 
time took concrete steps in anticipation of a German defeat and a new 
realignment of power in Europe.
While the negotiations with the Polish government were being
conducted in London, measures were being undertaken in the Soviet
Union to recreate a Polish communist party. In July 1941, through the 
auspices of Zofia and Jan Dzieriyhski, Dimitrov established a new 
'Initiative Group* from the Polish communists gathered in the
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Comintern's Pushkino school, prior to its transferal to Ufa. 73 As one 
Polish writer puts it, ‘their task was to be to create a new Marxist- 
Leninist party in occupied Poland*.7/4 What was meant by ‘Marxist- 
Leninist party’ soon became clear. In line with the Comintern's
‘national front’ policy, the new party was to be presented as a
patriotic organisation bringing together under communist leadership as 
many left radical groups as possible. There was to be no return to the 
sectarian profile of the old KPP, nor indeed could there be in the
light of the charges which had ended the KPP's political life.
Instead, the party took a new name intended to emphasise its links 
with the Polish working class; just as important was the need to 
distance itself from the national and international stigma attached to 
the worst Soviet abuses of the Comintern's section system. The new 
party was to be called the Polish Workers' Party (PPR).75
The leaders of the new party were three ex-KPP members: Marceli
Nowotko, ten years in Polish jails; Boleslaw Molojec; and Pawel 
Finder, an intellectual with several years of work with the Austrian 
and French communist parties. The first two attempts to fly the eleven 
members of the Initiative Group into Poland in September failed, and 
the group moved to Ufa out of reach of the German advance. On 28 
December a second flight was attempted, this time successfully. 
Another group was flown in a few days later, and a third in June 
1942.75
In establishing official relations with the Polish government in 
London, and at the same time recreating the Polish communist party and 
sending to Poland the leaders of the PPR, Stalin was operating a dual 
track Polish policy. On the one hand good official relations with the 
Western powers and the Polish government needed to be maintained for 
the sake of the anti-German war effort. These good relations would
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inevitably mean that Poland as a national state would have to be 
reconstituted at the conclusion of the war. The British and French 
had, after all, preferred to go to war with Germany with Poland as 
their ally rather than with the Soviet Union, and if their support was 
to be ensured through the years of struggle then the Polish cause 
needed to be favoured. At the same time, there was every reason why 
the Polish state to be re-created following the war should be 
particularly influenced by the policy of the ‘national front*. Only a 
government dominated by a party or parties willing to do business with 
the Soviet Union would accept the territorial changes which the Soviet 
leadership had already indicated it took almost for granted. It was 
most unlikely, on their past form, that the leaders of the Polish 
government in London would be so inclined.
In the period from July 1941 when the PPR Initiative Group was 
created, to December when the group was successfully flown to Poland, 
official relations between Poland and the Soviet Union deteriorated 
significantly. Across the Soviet Union hundreds of thousands of Poles 
began to migrate southward on the news that a Polish army was to be 
formed and an ‘amnesty* had been issued by the Supreme Soviet for all 
Poles in the USSR. 77 Administering this migration proved to be almost 
impossible. The Soviet authorities were not able to provide adequate 
records of the Poles deported into the interior of the country, and to 
complicate matters the population of the territories incorporated into 
Soviet Ukraine and Bielorussia was no longer being regarded as 
citizens of the Polish state. Many of the Polish army officers listed 
as missing by the Polish authorities had already been eliminated and 
could not be accounted for by Moscow; and to cap matters off, very 
little responsibility was accepted on the Soviet side for equipping or 
quartering the Polish soldiers forming themselves into combat units.
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Already by August 1941 relations had become brittle and only got worse 
in the following months. By November it had been decided that Sikorski 
would go to Moscow for direct talks with Stalin on the whole range of 
issues, but particularly on the subject of the Polish military 
formations whose plight was becoming desperate. Three days prior to 
his arrival the Soviet side provided some added pressure.
On November 27 in Saratov, a meeting of Polish communists was 
broadcast by Ko^ciuszko and Soviet radio. Taking part were Wasilewska, 
Stefan J^drychowski, Jerzy Putrament, Wiktor Grosz and others from the 
communist community previously gathered in Lw6w. During the course of 
the broadcast, Wasilewska and the others presented an alternative 
political programme to that represented by the London government, one 
of firm friendship and cooperation with the Soviet authorities and of 
enthusiastic participation in the war on the Soviet front. The 
speakers also foresaw the creation of an organisation representing the 
left orientation among the Polish ‘emigration’ in the USSR, in direct 
competition with the consular posts of the Polish government.713 This 
was the first time that the Polish communist group represented by 
these participants had been given such a high profile by the Soviet 
authorities. The actual creation of the left organisation mentioned 
would not come until 1943 but it was clear from this meeting that 
Stalin's official relationship with the Polish government now had an 
alternative which could be activated at any time, an alternative which 
represented the culmination of the Polish communists' internationalist 
development: their reincarnation as a political force representing the 
Polish national state.
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4. PATRIOTISM AND THE POLISH WORKERS' PARTY
From January 1942 until July 1944, the PPR established a foreign 
policy climate which sought to marry the two tendencies in its 
political heritage. It had been given a high level patriotic profile 
which encouraged the development of policies previously seen in the 
‘national* positions of the KPP; at the same time, its raison d'&tre 
was to provide for an internationalist alternative in domestic Polish 
politics, and help to establish a Soviet aligned government following 
the allied victory over Germany. The PPR's balance between these 
tendencies was to become the same as had earlier been fought for by 
the 'national* leaders of the KPRP. Organisationally, the new party 
was built along classic communist lines, with its greatest ‘national* 
input eventually to be seen in its domestic tactics. On foreign policy 
there was no question as to the internationalist priority.
PPR foreign policy had no alternative to the internationalist 
tendency. The ‘national’ position of the KPRP had been a higher 
profile concern for Polish independence and national interests, a 
reaction against the radical internationalism which identified the 
Polish proletarian revolution with a Soviet Republic and incorporation 
into the Soviet Union. Now Polish national interests had been brought 
into the post-*popular front’ internationalist mainstream and was 
taken for granted in Polish communist foreign policy. The future 
Polish state's security was to be reliant on an alliance with the 
USSR, a position the KPP had made its own prior to dissolution. 
Territorial security was now to be based on an acceptance of the 
status quo established by the USSR after 17 September 1939. And so the 
issue which the PPR saw as its earliest challenge was that of the new
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party's prestige and the credibility of the internationalist option
being offered.
4*1 Comintern and Credibility
At the beginning of 1942, the indications were that cooperation 
between the Polish government in London and the Soviet Union would 
continue at least as long as the Soviet alliance with Britain and the 
United States continued. It was important, therefore, that the
reconstituted Polish party appear homegrown, a creation of domestic 
forces, able to legitimately enter a post-war coalition ‘national
front’ government. The party was needed to create a domestic
constituency wider than the KPP had ever enjoyed and on this basis 
represent a foreign policy alternative which had no precedent in 
Polish political culture other than in the Comintern led KPP.
Herein lay the PPR's dilemma. Its credibility depended on its being 
able to present a legitimate and attractive policy programme. But the 
programme for an anti-German ‘national front’ in order to fight for a 
‘free and independent Poland' received its inspiration from the 
Comintern's policy and the ‘popular front’ position of the Paris 
Initiative Group. Its initial policies for future reform remained very 
vague in order not to alienate the wider left in the Polish 
underground, seeing the need for a socio-economic reconstruction of 
the country in essentially evolutionary and reformist terms.1 But this 
vagueness succeeded only in alienating many of the old KPP cadres, 
without overcoming the instinctual suspicion of the left socialists or 
peasant activists.
Many communists approached by the PPR leaders initially refused to
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accept the authority of the new party. This was not the programme they 
had been waiting for; the new name certainly did not reflect any 
continuity with the KPP past. Neither Nowotko, the new First 
Secretary, nor Finder, in charge of recruitment and organisation, both 
low ranking in the pre-war organisation, were at all well known within 
the old KPP community; and Molojec, in charge of organising the PPR's 
armed cadres, the People's Guard, was saddled with an odious 
reputation for his role in the final elimination of the KPP 
organisation in Poland. The PPR needed the support of the old KPP 
cadres if it was to regain its organisational strength. Reporting to 
Dimitrov in Moscow in June, Nowotko complained that 'the greatest 
difficulty is in breaking down the factional feelings, particularly 
among the former KPP members for whom everybody who is not a communist 
is an enemy'. 2
The question of whether or not the party was communist needed to be
addressed early in its career. But it needed to be addressed for
contrasting reasons. On the one hand, linkages with the Comintern were
being kept out of the public eye in support of the party's patriotic
profile and appeal to the non-communist left. On the other hand, old
communists needed to be reassured that in reality nothing had changed,
and the old internationalism had indeed been inherited by the new
creation. Privately, Nowotko, Finder, Molojec and the remainder of the
teams flown in from the Soviet Union were under no illusions regarding
the party's true nature. The balance now being cultivated between the
‘national’ and 'internationalist' tendencies in the party had been
spelt out in an internal circular prepared by the director of the
Polish section of the Comintern's school, Jakub Berman:
...the party was not called communist for the following reasons: 
<1) So the enemies would not be able to use the scarecrow of 
communism; (2) There are still numerous elements, even in the 
working class, which do not trust the communists as a result of 
past mistakes and erroneous policies of the former KPP; <3) After
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what happened [with the KPP3 the party, as was pointed out by 
Dimitrov, must earn the right to call itself communist; (4) it is 
necessary that the masses look at our party as an organisation 
closely linked with the Polish nation and its vital interests; in 
this way, the enemies will not be able to call it an agency of a 
foreign country; <5> Under this name it will be easier to attract 
to the party large masses of workers, peasants, and the 
intelligentsia, and then to organise, under the leadership of the 
party, a united national front for the struggle against the 
German-fascist occupiers.... Although our party will not be 
called communist and will not formally belong to the Comintern, 
it will be a truly revolutionary party of the Polish
proletariat.... It will conduct propaganda in the spirit of 
communism and will follow the line of the Comintern. 3
National interests were to be presented as the public face of the PPR;
internationalism would continue to inspire its soul.
In its presentation of these points for the old KPP members as well
as its new membership at the end of February, the PPR leadership gave
a broad hint that it was to be trusted to do what was best for the
communist movement in Poland. The impression made was unmistakable.
The working class had historically lead the struggle for national
liberation in Poland, the intra-party circular stated, and the new
party represented this class: ‘Its organisers, the most conscious
representatives of the working class, have taken into account in all
their dimensions the distinct political conditions in which the Polish
lands under occupation find themselves’. ‘The PPR is not a section of
the Communist International or any other international organisation*,
the circular stated unequivocally. International links had no
practical meaning at this stage of the battle and were to be left
until the enemy had been defeated, when the issue was to be
democratically decided at the party's First Congress:
The PPR stands, however, on the basis of Marxist-Leninist 
principles, which hold that total national liberation is possible 
only if together with it comes social liberation. We must 
remember about the fact that if the PPR succeeds in leading the 
working masses through the current stage of the historical fight 
for national liberation, and remains as closely as possible
linked with these masses, then without any doubt it will be 
capable of leading them also through the next stage toward a new 
Poland. A
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The leadership had no doubt at all as to what the new party
represented, and what its priorities were; but the issue of
internationalism was to be kept off the policy agenda until more 
propitious times. In claiming to lead the working classes, the party 
leadership made clear its strategic affiliation; its ‘Marxist-Leninist 
principles’ announced its ideological affiliation.’ But for all intents 
and purposes, its public profile was to remain patriotic, pitched for 
its greatest effect on the ‘national front* policy.
During its early life, PPR foreign policy tended to remain general, 
dealing with strategic goals and priorities, and always remaining
close to Soviet positions. On July 15, Nowotko even sent a message to
Dimitrov suggesting that Radio Ko^ciuszko be renamed as ‘the radio of 
the Workers' Party’.s So long as diplomatic relations between the 
Polish government in London and the USSR at least existed, the PPR 
could tie its support for the Soviet Union with that of the official 
Polish government, in effect giving its foreign policy position a 
measure of credibility it would otherwise have lacked from the outset. 
But even this measure was meagre indeed. The rest of the national 
underground continued to regard the USSR as ‘enemy number 2’ and the 
PPR as an agency of the Soviet Union.e In order to overcome this 
obstacle, the leadership of the party began a serious attempt in. the 
winter of 1942-1943 to engage the Home Army (AK), and London 
government's administrative executive in the Polish underground —  the 
Delegatura —  in direct negotiations. For its part, the Delegatura saw 
these talks as a way of uncovering the PPR's patriotic face and 
exposing the pre-war KPP clientilism which had sought the 
‘sovietisation’ of Poland,7
Once the Soviet break with the Polish government came in April 
1943, the PPR was no longer obliged to try to augment what little
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credibility it could garner from the tenuous linkage with the foreign 
policies of the Polish government. It embarked instead on a campaign 
designed to establish the party's foreign policy credibility in its 
own right, and in this it was aided by moves in Moscow for the ECCI to 
abolish itself. The PPR in its propaganda had consistently identified 
itself with what it called the ‘workers' movement’, and was now
included in the ECCI's mailing list for advice. The PPR's reply in May 
was that the ECCI's proposal was in line with the strategy of the
‘workers' movement' and the needs of the international situation, ie. 
it would contribute to the consolidation of the anti-Hitler bloc, 
being the main task of the moment. It would also make it easier for 
‘communist patriots' to create unity within the ‘workers' movement’ of 
each country and be conducive to the consolidation of ‘anti-fascist 
national fronts’.0
On June 1, the PPR published a ‘Declaration’ explaining the ECCI 
decision, and as an introduction quoted the ECCI itself: ‘...this
international, centralised, organisational form for uniting the 
workers' movement has ceased to fulfill the needs for the further
development of the communist parties of individual countries as
national workers' parties, and even stands as an obstacle to their
development’. In their comments on this decision, the PPR leaders did 
not hide their enthusiasm for the ‘national workers' party’
development. They were highly optimistic that this was not to be a 
‘five minute’ disbanding, but one which would last years, for the 
period of the war and beyond. It would encourage the creation of a 
‘national front’, since other anti-fascist, pro-Soviet groups would 
now be more willing to join with the PPR in their common policies for 
a post-war socialist Poland. After the war, a new international
organisation was to arise, one which had its base in the ‘great
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alliance between socialism and bourgeois democracy manifested in the
Anglo-American-Soviet bloc', and which would be governed by the
principles of mutual respect for differences in socio-political
systems and noninterference in internal affairs. The leaders poured
scorn on ideas for a third war current among both radical Marxists
calling for a world victory of socialism and anti-Soviet groups:
We categorically state that: 1) such a war lies neither in the
interests of a socialist state, nor in the interests of a 
bourgeois democracy, the workers' movement, or the Polish nation 
as a whole. 2) War between Britain and America, and the Soviets, 
would be a catastrophe for humanity, would lead the world to 
complete destruction and chaos, and would take us back in time a 
thousand years. For this reason such a war should never be 
allowed to come about. 9
The optimism evident in these strategic foreign policy goals was
based on the views of Stalin himself, who in an interview with
Reuter's correspondent in Moscow made many of the same points now
being repeated by the PPR. According to Stalin, the Comintern was
dissolved for the following reasons:
(a) It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that
“Moscow” allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other 
nations and to “Bolshevise” them. .. .
<b) It exposes the calumny of the adversaries of communism within 
the Labour movement to the effect that communist parties in 
various countries are allegedly acting not in the interests of 
their people but on orders from outside....
<c) It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for
uniting the progressive forces of their respective countries, 
regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp of 
national liberation.... '
<d> It facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for
uniting all freedom-loving peoples into a single international 
camp for the fight against the menace of world domination by 
Hilerism, thus clearing the way to the future organisation of a 
companionship of nations based on their equality.10
Within the PPR councils, the PPR leaders held Stalin in the highest 
esteem, referring to him as 'the host'.11 Their foreign policy relied 
for whatever credibility it had on the continuing good relations
between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, but more especially, 
on the Soviet Union's and Stalin's own claims to be ready to play a
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positive role in post-war Poland. This was the line being broadcast by 
Ko6ciuszko radio, now with its staff augmented by recent members of 
the Polish section of the Comintern. This was the Soviet alternative 
which the party was offering the Polish public, an alternative which 
had to be divorced from the internationalist excesses of the KPP's 
past for it to gain any wider credibility, which represented a new 
enlightened version of internationalism. The new Polish communist 
foreign policy promised the greatest regard for Polish national 
interests, its post-war security and prestige. But at the same time, 
it looked for its strength and influence to the Soviet Union.
4*2 The 'Internationalist* Soviet Alternative
The new party's foreign policy had one fundamental policy plank: 
support for the Red Army and for the diplomatic efforts of the Soviet 
Union in winning the war and liberating Poland. Within the 
underground, the PPR rationalised the Soviet Union's previously 
unpopular positions, and emphasised the guarantee for Polish 
independence which the Soviet Union could provide. Within the PPR 
itself, the debate on foreign policy centred on how much the party 
could rely on the Red Army and Soviet diplomacy to establish it in 
power, and how much would it have to rely on its own political 
strength. Those recently arrived from the Soviet Union had no doubt as 
to the commitment of the Soviet leadership to the new Polish party.
Almost immediately upon arriving in Poland, the Initiative Group 
released a manifesto which was to stand as the party's most important 
foreign policy declaration for the first twelve months of its 
existence. Written at the Comintern school prior to the group's first
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two abortive attempts at flying to Poland, 12 it was given the seal of 
local approval by ZWW and other Warsaw representatives at a meeting on 
5 January13 and issued by the underground press five days later.
Entitled ‘To Workers, Peasants and Intelligentsia, To All Polish
Patriots!', the document's first words established an unmistakable
continuity with the pre-war KPP position. The reason for Poland's
current plight, the declaration began, was the ‘false and treacherous’
policy of the Sanacja government. Now the nation's predicament was
that it once again found itself ‘enslaved by the eternal enemy...
modern Teutonic knights’. The document's imagery is full of bitterness
and deep anger, the stuff of much of the underground press. But its
message was unmistakable: only together with the Red Army could the
fight for a ‘free and independent Poland’ be successful. A number of
Poland's heroic independence fighters were listed, ending with the
name of Ludwik Waryhski, leader of the first Polish revolutionary
party —  the Proletariat, linking its revolutionary cause with that of
the historic Polish fight for national liberation. Poland, the
document continued, was not alone in its fight for freedom. It stood
in a common front with all Slavic nations: ‘Together with the great
Russian nation, we stand united in the holy war for the liberation of
the Slavs from Teutonic slavery’. These were Slavophile sentiments
current in Moscow which in a Polish context were less well
appreciated. In its next paragraph, the document emphasised Soviet
invincibility and the Red Army's overpowering might. At last, it
announced, the Germans had encountered the insurmountable barrier of
the Red Army's weapons:
.. . the heroic Red Army has sown the routes of the Germanic hordes 
with millions of German corpses. This is history's greatest 
battle between the world of culture and the world of 
barbarianism. The great anti-fascist coalition will be 
victorious, and will wipe accursed hitlerism from the face of the 
earth.
This battle will decide about the fate of the world. In this
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battle also, Poland's fate will be decided, our own fate.
The historic agreement between the Polish and Soviet 
governments on the common fight against the hitlerite Germans, 
creates for us Poles, new, huge possibilities. One of the 
fundamental results of this agreement is the creation of the 
Polish armed forces on the territory of the Soviet Union, 
fighting together arm in arm with the Red Army. This common fight 
together with the nations of the great Soviet Union wakens new 
hope and adds strength to the Polish nation.
It was a highly optimistic approach to the dilemmas facing the nation
and the new party. A fundamental appreciation of the opportunities
opening up for the Polish communists was apparent. Talk of 'Poland's
fate*, ‘huge possibilities’, support for ‘the heroic Red Army* which
at the time the document had been written was still reeling under the
advance of the Wehrmacht, left little doubt that the PPR had every
intention of being in the forefront of whatever possibilities did
arise. Like the meeting in Saratov, this declaration put emphasis on
the need for the Polish government in London to accept the Soviet fait
accompli in the matters dividing their two sides and to work with the
Red Army in the ‘common fight*. It also recognised that the support of
the Western powers was indispensible to the ultimate victory. But
where Poland was concerned, the message ran, the role of the Soviet
Union would be decisive; the PPR as the party which was now able to
represent that reality on the domestic Polish political stage, should
be given the support it needed to better fulfill its historic mission.
One of the greatest obstacles encountered by the PPR in its wider 
recruitment campaign was squaring its support for the Red Army with 
its patriotic emphasis on Polish ‘freedom and independence’ in the 
light of what had happened on 17 September 1939. Many communists at 
the time had been shocked by the entry of the Red Army into Poland, 
let alone socialists and peasant activists totally committed to the 
Polish defence and now being wooed into the new ‘national front’ 
party.1S This became the propaganda issue on which the PPR cut its
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teeth, first on the agenda of foreign policy questions to be answered 
for the new membership.
On February 1, the PPR issued the first mimeographed copy of its 
Central Committee newspaper, Trybuna Wolnoici (Tribune of Freedom). In 
it, an article entitled 'Order of the Moment' presented the party's 
position on the Soviet invasion of September 17. In the estimation of 
the PPR Central Committee, the USSR had entered to prevent the German 
Blitzkrieg from going further east than Lw6w, BrzeSd and Bialystok, 
into the Soviet Union itself. In fact, the article said, it was the 
Red Army which had pushed the German war machine back to the San-Bug 
line, and had achieved for the first time a German retreat from areas 
already occupied. In the absence of any Polish military power, the 
USSR had been forced to create a barrier between itself and the German 
advance. Nor could the Soviet Union have come to the aid of the Polish 
army any earlier, this possibility having been put out of the question 
by the attitude of the Polish leadership which preferred not to have 
any Soviet help. The obvious fiction created in order to justify the 
Soviet position clearly emphasised the geo-strategic effect of 
Poland's isolation between its two powerful neighbours. It was a 
position which the party only too gladly contrasted with their own 
alternative, that, of a Soviet guarantee for the integrity of the 
future Polish state and its borders: ‘the historical task of the
Polish nation and the condition for its liberation is alliance with
the Soviet Union.........the lasting nature of our independence will
depend on this alliance'. 1e
In its first year of existence, the PPR presented the case for the 
Soviet alliance largely without effect. Its first priority was to 
establish itself as an effective organisation, and here, after twelve 
months of activity, its organisational or political strength remained
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insignificant relative to the strength on the ground of the AK and 
popular acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the Delegatura.
Internally, the party went through a leadership crisis with its 
nominal ‘national* wing represented by Molojec attempting to gain 
control from the ‘internationalist’ wing led by Nowotko and Finder. 1T 
This dispute had no more effect on the party's foreign policy than the 
‘minority’/*majority' dispute had had on the positions of the Fourth 
KPP Congress in 1927. Molojec represented a ‘national’ option for the 
military cadres of the People's Guard, many of whom were not 
communists, but who had been attracted to the party by its patriotic 
slogans of active resistance to the Germans. Pressure from this 
element in the party was being put on the PPR leadership for it to 
better coordinate military activities with the AK, a move which had 
already been agreed to by Nowotko and the Central Committee. But on 28 
November, Nowotko was killed on Molojec's instructions. Facts and 
interpretations relating to these events vary, 10 but for our purposes 
there could have been no changes in the PPR's foreign policy even had 
Molojec not been executed a month later. Notwithstanding his 
‘national’ profile, Molojec represented the new party's 
internationalism as firmly as any other member of the Initiative 
Group. His role in dissolving the KPP and leadership of the Paris 
Initiative Group indicated that here the Soviet side would have 
anticipated little threat to their policies.
Worse than the internal ‘sectarianism’ for the PPR's foreign policy 
programme, was the summer 1942 German campaign on the eastern front 
which had given little cause to hope for an advantageous outcome to 
the war. But by January 1943, the tone of the PPR's foreign policy 
propaganda took on a dramatic new note of confidence. It had been 
plain to many observers, not least the PPR leadership now represented
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by a new ‘triumvirate* of Finder, Gomulka and Jdfwiak, 19 that the 
defeat suffered by the German armies under Stalingrad on January 31 
had been impending since the late autumn. Now that it had come, the 
German defeat signalled a radical change in the balance of power on 
the eastern front, and caused considerable agitation within the Polish 
government in London. The PPR leaders made the most of the 
opportunity.
On February 1, they announced that they accepted the legitimacy of 
the Polish government for the period Poland remained occupied, seeing 
it as a necessary institution for maintaining relations with allied 
states and organising the Polish armed forces abroad. But at the same 
time the leaders made clear that no longer could the authority of the 
Polish government be taken for granted. It could no longer claim to 
represent the whole of the Polish nation; only the party which 
represented the Polish working class could provide that mass unity.20 
In the context in which the PPR was operating, this assessment of its 
own importance in the Polish political scene was indicative of its 
ambitions. Its pretensions to power were not in the least concealed. 
With the change in fortunes on the eastern front, the party's raison 
d’etre came into its own; the Soviet alternative for Polish foreign 
policy was the only option being offered other than that represented 
by the Polish government, and this government was having its common 
ground with the Soviet Union rapidly reduced. In late 1942, the Soviet 
authorities closed down the entire network of Polish consular offices 
in the USSR provoking an outburst of anti-Soviet polemic from the 
London government and underground. And as the Soviet Union reduced the 
common ground with the Polish government, it expanded by implication 
the viability of the PPR. This process was not lost on the party's 
leaders.
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In its February policy document, the leadership established the 
fundamental rationalisation for the PPR's claim to power in Poland. 
The national interests of the nation required a better defence than 
that afforded them before the war. This defence now had the 
opportunity to be on the basis of a ‘natural' alliance rooted in an 
ideology 'inherently' positive toward such concepts as independence 
and democracy —  socialism. No longer could the old military regime in 
Poland claim an unchallenged right to dominate the country's political 
scene, the PPR leaders announced; it had been found wanting on the 
most elemental of Polish needs —  defence of the Poland's national 
independence. Poland had been not so much attacked by Germany as by 
fascism. The blame lay with the pre-war regime's close connections 
with fascism and a dire lack of appreciation of the nature of fascism 
as inherently antagonistic toward independence, democracy, and above 
all, socialism. The old government had therefore forfeited its mandate 
and needed to accept the legitimate alternative presented by the PPR. 
Instead, fixed in their ways, the old political parties continued to 
focus on the ideological threat to the ancien regime posed by the 
inevitable expansion of socialism throughout Europe following the 
defeat of international fascism once and for all. Regardless of this, 
henceforth, defence of Poland's national independence would be 
achieved by way of the most natural alliance a country could hope for: 
that with an empathetic and powerful neighbour —  the USSR.21
This mix of national interests and ideology was what the PPR 
regarded as Poland's ‘true national interests’. The empathy 
solidifying the future Polish-Soviet alliance could only come from an 
ideological common ground. Socialism was to be the cement in the 
relationship, since between fascist Germany and socialist Russia, 
Poland had a simple choice; and now that the military balance had
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moved toward the Soviet Union, this choice had been narrowed to leave 
only one option. Any negotiation the PPR initiated with other groups 
in pursuit of either the ‘national front* or later its own ‘democratic 
front* was conducted on this basis: support for the Soviet Union
immediately in its strategy of high profile partisan activity behind 
enemy lines, and in the future as an enduring socialist alliance. 
Unremarkably, little room was left for the non-socialist participants 
in the Polish underground. Whether or not they could accept a position 
of support for the USSR as an ally against Germany, for this support 
to imply a future socialist Polish state based on terms established by 
the Soviet Union meant their total alienation from what the PPR was 
suggesting. Indeed, it meant the alienation of the entire political 
spectrum, including the left of the PPS, eventually leaving only a PPR 
aligned left PPS splinter group.
On March 15, prior to the Soviet break with the Polish government 
and immediately after the PPR*s series of negotiations with the 
Delegatura, the PPR leaders published a short political declaration: 
‘For What Are We Fighting?*. Continuing the themes established from 
the beginning of 1943, this policy document was phrased in such a way 
as to be taken for the political platform of a party seeking to form a 
legitimate government, or the majority in such a government, following 
the successful conclusion of the war. Like the earlier party 
statements, it was optimistic in its tone and confident of the future. 
On foreign policy it called for the establishment of ‘good neighbourly 
and alliance-like relations with all European nations', and ‘a foreign 
policy based on alliance with the Soviet Union*.22
In themselves, these formulae need not have presented great 
problems for a Polish state recovering from the ravages of war with 
Germany. In the context in which the declaration was made, however,
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they took on a completely different meaning for the PPR as well as for 
the other political groups in the underground. From the Soviet point 
of view, the 'For What Are We Fighting?’ statement was too radical. 
Dimitrov was paying particular attention to the Polish issue and 
closely involving himself in the progress of the PPR. He now 
criticised the leadership for the insufficient attention they had paid 
to presenting the PPR's ‘national front’ democratic credentials in the 
declaration. His advice was that the party keep at the forefront of 
its attention the principles of a ‘free and independent Poland’, a 
policy of friendship with the Soviet Union and real democratic socio­
economic changes for the future.23 The Comintern objective was for the 
party to gain as much credibility as possible for it to use in 
entering a coalition of established ‘democratic’ parties after the 
war. This was the tactic the PPR had been following in its 
negotiations with the Delegatura. But with the break in the USSR's 
relations with the Polish government, the PPR seized on the 
opportunity to unilaterally establish its credibility and democratic 
credentials by claiming the Soviet alternative as its greatest link 
with ‘the Polish nation*.
On May 1, the PPR went onto the attack. Together with a May Day 
‘Proclamation* addressed to ‘workers, peasants, intelligentsia and all 
Polish patriots*, the party published a parallel proclamation 
addressed to the Polish nation. In this latter document, it condemned 
Poland's pre-war foreign policy, and accused the inheritors of that 
policy in London of having sold out the country in its most vital 
interest —  not defence of Polish security, but its most important 
determinant —  relations with the Soviet Union. The Sikorski 
government, the PPR announced, even if it had begun with credit, had 
fallen victim to traditional paranoia and now justified ‘its enmity
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toward the USSR by its so-called anxiety over a strong and great 
Poland. Let us not forget', the proclamation continued, ‘that these 
same arguments were used by the Sanacja camp in its anti-Soviet 
campaign and —  it lost Poland1. The PPR was now able to apply the 
same criteria to the Polish government as it had been applying and 
continued to apply in its negotiations for a ‘national front'. In the 
government's case, an immediate association was made with the KPP's 
criticism of the Sanacja policy of the .pre-war government. And in 
contrast to the isolation from the proletariat for which the KPP in 
1925 and 1938 had been so harshly condemned by the Comintern, now the 
new party enjoyed the opportunity to turn that same barb against its 
greatest rival: the government which had so incurred the displeasure
of the USSR could no longer represent the Polish nation since the 
nation, according to the proclamation, was still very much allied with 
the efforts of the USSR against Germany, and only the entrenchment of 
this alliance could lead to a ‘strong, free and independent Poland*.24
4*3 The 'National' Soviet Alternative
From the late summer of 1943, the Soviet alternative as presented 
by the PPR took on a new subtlety. With the break in Polish-Soviet 
relations, the situation became much more complicated for the PPR 
leadership. At the same time as the break, moves had been made in the 
Soviet Union to activate the alternative ‘left emigration* 
organisation and to create Polish military units directly under Red 
Army command. Through the summer, this activity picked up momentum. 
Within the country there was no wholesale turn away from the 
Delegatura and Polish government by the PPR, but within the parameters
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of the 'national front' it began to look around for other options. Its 
May Day proclamation indicated that the change was to involve a 
narrowing of these parameters to an ‘anti-fascist national front*. 
This was a slogan in use with the Jugoslavian Communist Party (KPJ). 
Its application in the Polish context meant a narrowing of the ‘wide 
national front* of the type being pursued in France or Czechoslovakia, 
to include only pro-Soviet groups.20
Eventually to become known as the ‘anti-fascist democratic front*, 
the PPR* s new policy did not meet with early success. The left PPS 
fraction, the Workers' Party of Polish Socialists (RPPS) regarded the 
PPR as a 'Soviet party’ and saw the USSR as an 'imperialist state’.20 
Other groups invited to work with the PPR were the pro-Soviet wing of 
the peasant movement, radical trade unionists, and a group of pro- 
Soviet intellectuals forming themselves at the time of the PPR's 
‘democratic front’ policy change into the Committee for National 
Initiative. All other parties continued to focus on the PPR's 
relationship with the Soviet Union and brand it with the label of 
'agent*. Nonetheless, with the increasing importance of Gomulka in the 
leadership, the Soviet alternative began to be given a more practical 
profile in the PPR*s policy platform.
In response to a decision of the major underground political 
parties to establish a representative organ, the PPR, on Gomulka's 
initiative, began to plan for the establishment of its own ‘national* 
organ. The goal here was to reinforce the party's claim to represent a 
broad domestic base.2-7 Gomulka's initiative did not generate much 
enthusiasm among the other party leadership. Already the PPR had had 
to overcome further ‘sectarianism* within its ranks as the 
unsatisfactory outcome of the talks with the AK had created a split 
between, on the one hand, the newly recruited members of the People* s
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Guard concerned with the inapplicability of ‘Leninism* and the Soviet 
political experience to Polish conditions and looking toward the 
establishment of a ‘national brand* of communism, and on the other, 
old KPP members now predominantly in leadership positions who
considered this national element 'insufficiently steeped in
proletarian internationalism’.20 Finder gave the concept no support, 
prefering to wait for Dimitrov, now in charge of the Polish section in 
the VKP(b) Central Committee, to make his position clear. At the same 
time, Boleslaw Bierut, previously a middle-ranking Comintern official, 
was sent from German occupied Minsk and immediately coopted into the 
Central Committee.20 Following the arrest of Finder and Malgorzata 
Fornalska by the Gestapo in November,30 Bierut was brought into the 
executive ‘trio* and Gomulka was chosen as First Secretary.
Even before Finder's demise, the increasing importance of Gomulka 
within the leadership group quickly made itself apparent in the new 
sophistication of the PPR's presentation of its Soviet alternative. 
Instead of focusing on the ideological significance of the Soviet 
alternative or its great power implications, Gomulka began a campaign 
designed to bring the PPR's foreign policy into the political 
mainstream. He began emphasising the same points as has earlier been 
made by Sikorski in his efforts to generate support for the Polish 
government's rapprochement with the USSR in 1941.31 Sikorski had died 
on 4 July 1943 at Gibraltar with the result that the anti-Soviet lobby 
in both the Polish government and the AK had been strengthened. The 
PPR position was that the high profile anti-Soviet position that had 
resulted from the diplomatic break in April and now Sikorski's death
threatened to weaken Poland* s positions among the allied powers and
deprive the country of political representation at the critical moment 
of liberation by the Red Army. Gomulka now sought to establish the
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PPR's credentials as a legitimate, and responsible contender to 
provide this representation. On September 1, he began his campaign 
with an article published in Trybuna Wolnodcl entitled: 'On the 
Political Thought of the Polish Democracy*.
The time had come, Gomulka wrote, for the united forces of the 
‘Polish democracy* to take independent action. He then quoted the new 
Polish Premier, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, in his inaugural address, as 
saying that Polish-Soviet relations were ‘the primary issue of our 
foreign policy*, that Polish-Soviet agreement was for both countries 
as well as for Europe as a whole, ‘a historic necessity*. The PPR, 
Gomulka wrote, agrees with this position entirely, which was why the 
party was called by the Delegatura and others 'the agents of Moscow*. 
Unofficially, however, Gomulka observed, all the organs of the Polish 
government were calling for war with the Soviet Union, and both 
official and unofficial political thought represented by all political 
parties other than the PPR, saw the USSR as the enemy. It was thus the 
PPR* s sole responsibility to take the historic step required of it, 
and oppose the policy of war with one of ‘peace, cooperation and 
neighbourly understanding*. Such ‘neighbourly understanding*, Gomulka 
concluded, was to be on the basis of ‘a recognition of the rights of 
nations to determine for themselves their own fate'.32
This last assertion had been a regular PPR slogan with regard to 
the Soviet claim to the territories it had occupied after 17 September 
1939. In Gomulka* s article, it was for the first time applied to 
Poland's future relations with the USSR. Gomulka*s influence now 
dominated in the preparation of the PPR's official political programme 
published in November. The programme set up the basis for the PPR* s 
assumption of a higher political profile and open bid for post-war 
power. It prepared the ground for the creation of the PPR's domestic
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representative organ. Three versions of the programme were produced 
for discussion among the membership —  in July/August, September, and 
October, immediately preceding the final version. Gomulka collaborated 
on the first two versions with his Central Committee colleagues 
Finder, Zenon Kliszko and Wladyslaw Kowalski. But the third version he 
wrote on his own, and after editorial changes made by the Central 
Committee this last version was published as the authoritative text.33 
With the arrest of Finder, Gomulka's influence on the style in which 
the new party's foreign policy was being presented was uncontested.
In the introduction to the programme, Gomulka established his 
communist credentials and affinity with the previous Comintern policy. 
He began with an orthodox Comintern analysis of the origins of the 
war, as having being rooted in the contradictions on which the 
production relations of the capitalist system were based. But as a 
result of the growth of huge mass movements caused by the First World 
War, the creation of an enormous new socialist state and ‘the 
degeneration of the most rotten layers of the imperialist oligarchy 
into fascism’, the war had inevitably developed into a huge historic 
battle between opposite social trends: ‘between reaction and progress,
degeneration and humanitarianism, fascism and democracy*. Victory over 
German fascism would give birth to a 'free and independent Poland', 
the slogan of the Comintern 'national front*. Out of the rubble of 
fascism, Gomulka continued, a ‘democratic people's power* would 
establish itself across Europe, and Poland needed to take its 
prominent place in this new world. The future Poland would become an 
element for peace amongst the world's nations, live in peace and 
friendship with its neighbours, and on the basis of its geographic 
position, form a bridge joining East and West in fraternal cooperation 
among the European nations.34
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Gomulka's foreign policy design coincided closely to that of the
interregnum People's Poland group, and even further back, to the
positions of the KPRP's Second Congress. The PPR leader was 
unequivocal regarding the ideological nature of the coming changes. 
The PPR was not made out to be an opportunistic political party. It 
was communist to the core and determined to make the most of its 
'objective* historical opportunity. But at the same time the coming 
changes were not to be on the basis of the KPP's internationalist 
slogan of a Polish Soviet Republic. Gomulka's concept of 'people's 
democracy’ was tied inextricably to the idea of a European wide 
‘democratic people's power*. It was a concept which turned the KPP* s 
internationalist perception of Poland as bridge between the Russian 
and German revolutions into a significantly different type of bridge: 
a bridge of ‘peace and friendship' between the USSR and Europe, 
contributing to the fraternal acceptance of the Soviet Union into the 
European family of socialist nations.
In the document's ‘resolution* on foreign policy, Gomulka wrote the 
following:
We are fighting for the complete independence and sovereignty 
of the Polish state. With the aim of guaranteeing this 
independence and sovereignty, the Polish nation, fighting at the 
side of the three allied powers -—  Britain, the USSR and the 
United States —  against the common enemy, will create with them
in the post-war period ties of alliance and cooperation and will
take part in organising the security and economic rebuilding of 
Europe.
The establishment of good neighbourly and alliance relations 
with the USSR will become an important and deciding factor 
strengthening our defences, economic potential and position in 
Europe. Similar close ties of friendship and cooperation should 
be established also with other fraternal Slavic nations. 30
Under Gomulka*s influence, the PPR's foreign policy had taken the 
form which it was to continue until the internationalist consolidation 
in 1947/1948. It was a form which had been encouraged by the 
international position and foreign policy of the USSR, and the PPR's
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search for greater credibility. Nothing in the above foreign policy 
resolution pointed to the composers of the document being communist. 
This was a position which equally well characterised the foreign 
policy of the Sikorski government, and now Gomulka and the PPR had 
taken it for their own. Gomulka's presentation of the Soviet 
alternative showed a great deal more sophistication than the policy 
statements of the PPR's first Comintern trained leaders. The emphasis 
on the internationalist commitment was toned down and in its place 
came a realistic appraisal of the war-time and post-war strategies of 
the three allied powers, of the Western powers as much as of the USSR. 
At stake was the continued unity of the great powers, of the 
favourable conditions for the development of the ‘national workers' 
party’ created by that unity. Post-war Poland would ally itself with 
the three great powers in their efforts to provide for international 
security and on this basis see to its 'important and deciding' 
relationship with the USSR. To balance this relationship it would also 
establish ‘similar close ties’ with its other neighbours.
This conception, like the earlier PPR positions in the negotiations 
with the Delegatura, could be taken either as clever camouflage, or 
indicative of a real trend in PPR policy. Gomulka had little room to 
move on the issue of Poland's post-war security links with the Soviet 
Union as it was. The internationalist relationship that had developed 
into wartime had continued the dominant elements of the pre-war 
relationship: the moral authority of the USSR and Stalin, and the
practical Soviet role in establishing and supporting the PPR. But at 
the same time, the effort to establish the PPR as a credible ‘national 
front’ participant with, or alternative to, the other main political 
parties in the underground presented Gomulka with a great opportunity. 
Gomulka was not content to sit and wait for the Red Army to liberate
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Poland. Even when it had done so, there would still be a need for the 
communists to claim an element of legitimacy for the party to be at 
all effective in maintaining its power. It was this legitimacy, based 
on a healthy dose of realism, that Gomulka began now to build.
From a rather unconvincing emphasis on the Soviet concern for 
Poland's state security and independence, the PPR under Gomulka began 
to emphasise the similarity of views held on this question by all of 
the three great powers. The limit to which the PPR leader could go was 
set by the limit of cooperation the Western allies were themselves 
prepared to countenace with the USSR. As it turned out, this limit was 
considerable indeed. Its most visible feature was not so much the 
issue of the Soviet guarantee for post-war Poland's state security, as 
the question of Poland's territorial security, and the Polish-Soviet 
border.
4*4 The Polish-Soviet Border
In December 1941, before the formal constitution of the PPR, Stalin 
had told Eden in Moscow that the western borders of the USSR were for 
him 'the main question in the war’. 3S As the party created to provide 
the USSR with an agreeable domestic Polish alternative to the hostile 
Polish government on this very issue, the PPR consistently based its 
policy on the Soviet lead. From the initial Soviet reluctance to air 
the nature of the dispute while the Polish-Soviet treaty still held 
good, to the later demands for German territory to compensate for the 
eastern lands, the PPR tracked Soviet policy and reflected it in their 
own statements.
Nothing was mentioned about the Polish-Soviet border in the PPR's
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inaugural statement of 10 January 1942. Even the Trybuna Wolno£ci 
article of 1 February 1942 explaining the Soviet invasion of 17
September 1939 avoided taking a position, mentioning only that any 
repetition of the ‘old stupidities about the invasion being "a knife 
in the back" is a knife in the back of the anti-Hitler front of the 
three great allies'.37 The urgency with which the Soviet Union
regarded its alliance with Britain and the United States at this stage 
left little room for such a divisive issue to be raised. Never again 
was the question of the Soviet invasion treated at such length in the 
PPR press. Reference to the eastern borders appeared most often in 
conjunction with articles dealing with the right of nations to self- 
determination. Throughout 1942, no mention was made at all of what the 
borders of ‘free and independent Poland’ were to be. Only in its 1942 
May Day statement did the PPR state that the ‘empty discussions 
regarding future borders will not contribute to increasing the 
authority of the Polish government’.30 Even so, within the Central 
Committee the party’s postion on the eastern border was not at issue: 
the integration of the western Ukraine and Bielorussia with their
Soviet neighbours had already been determined and was irreversible; it 
had been justified on the basis of ‘objective historical processes’
and it was no more and no less than the ‘For Our Freedom and Yours*
policy line established by the KPRP at its Second Congress in 1923.33
Even though by February 1943 the Soviet press had stepped up its
campaign of attacks over the integrity of the Polish government on the
question of Poland's border with the USSR, in its February 1943 
statement the PPR leadership refrained from copying these attacks as 
part of its effort to gain credibility through its negotiations with 
the Delegatura. The party's underground press was not so reticent.
Here the polemic was based on positions broadcast by the Kosciuszko
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radio station. In the negotiations themselves, Gomulka and the 
leadership did not commit themselves to any position, leaving the 
issue to be decided in talks between the Soviet and post-war Polish 
governments on the basis of the Atlantic Charter and the right of 
nations to self-determination.'40 This was a formula established by 
Stalin, the latter part of which had been used in the October 1939 
programme integrating eastern Poland into the Soviet Union. It was a 
formula which, not surprisingly, found little favour with the 
Delegatura negotiators, but was neither accepted by much of the PPR 
grass-roots. According to the AK intelligence service, a great deal of 
dissatisfaction was being expressed by the younger more nationally 
minded members of the PPR in their internal debates. Much of this 
dissatisfaction related to the party's implicit position on the 
eastern border and the necessity of having to accept the 1939 German- 
Soviet demarcation line as the future frontier.41
The leadership's position changed dramatically following an 
official Soviet statement issued by TASS on March 1 attacking the 
Polish government's position on the eastern border. Trying to maintain 
its soft-pedalling approach while any chance of gaining some 
credibility from the negotiations with the Delegatura remained, and at 
the same time reacting to the signal sent from Moscow, Trybuna 
Wolnogci carried simultaneously on March 15 both the ‘For What Are We 
Fighting?' statement which reiterated the ‘self-determination’ and 
‘will of the people’ line, and a stinging attack on the Polish 
government using information taken directly from the TASS statement.42
By the time of its 1943 May Day statement, the party leadership was
giving the eastern border issue its full attention:
The entire united opinion of the Polish nation considers that 
Poland must be strong and must be great.... But the Polish nation 
understands also that the freedom and strength of Poland cannot 
be based on the imprisonment of other nations.... The assertion 
that Poland without enslaving several million Ukrainians and
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Bielorussians will be a small and weak country is an insult 
thrown into the face of the Polish nation.43
In this statement also, the PPR for the first time turned its
attention to the issue of the German teritories raised by Alfred Lampe
in his seminal article ‘Poland's Place in Europe’, published in the
USSR a week earlier than the Polish-Soviet break in diplomatic
relations: ‘The campaign unleashed around the eastern lands inflames
Polish-Soviet relations and turns attention away from our western
lands where with fire and sword for generations and today, all traces
of Polishness are being burnt out*.44
From this period on, the signals being reflected in PPR policy on 
the Polish borders, and particularly the border with Germany, came as 
much from the propaganda work of the Polish communists in the Soviet 
Union as from the Soviet side itself. On the Polish-Soviet border, the 
Soviet press began presenting numerous articles on Poland's 
‘imperialistic’ ambitions to Bielorussia and the Ukraine. In return, 
the London based Polish press and underground organs within Poland 
responded with a wave of anti-Soviet polemic. PPR propaganda on the 
eastern border similarly took on a new aggressiveness.46
The border issue dominated- the foreign policy ‘resolution’ of 
Gomulka's November programmatic statement. The ‘ethnic Polish lands' 
to be returned in the west, together with the ‘self-determination’ of 
the Ukrainian and Bielorussian nations would ‘secure for us peace in 
the east and will strengthen our position in the west and on the 
Baltic’.46 Parallels were drawn by Gomulka between the ‘anti- 
Bolshevik’ feeling being generated by the polemic issuing from the 
Polish government and underground, and the wave of patriotism which 
led to the defeat of the Red Army under Warsaw in 1920. The government 
and underground would not succeed in their tactic, Gomulka assured his 
readers, since from the time the Red Army entered the eastern regions
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of old Poland in order to strengthen its defensive positions against 
the expected German onslaught, ‘the matter of the eastern lands 
entered a new phase' . 47
Much the same positions were being established by the Polish 
communists in the Soviet Union. And neither they nor the PPR were 
having any difficulty matching their pronouncements on Poland's future 
territorial security with those of the Western allies. Here also, the 
appreciation of Poland's borders having ‘entered a new phase' was 
acute. Only the Polish government continued to resist the Soviet 
pressure, insisting that any changes in Poland's pre-1939 borders 
could only be contemplated once the war had ended and a newly elected 
government had been installed. Thus, the complementary nature of 
Soviet and Western policy on this issue enabled Gomulka to present the 
PPR's inherently internationalist position not only as fundamentally 
realistic, but also its natural inheritance by right of the exclusion 
from the common allied policy of the Polish government.
4*5 National Council of the Homeland
Gomulka was paying very close attention to the positions of the 
Western powers vis-a-vis the USSR. By the winter of 1943 it had become 
clear that the Western allies would be providing their full support 
for the Soviet advance westward across Poland toward Berlin. In 
Poland, the October Moscow Conference of the three allied Foreign 
Ministers gave the PPR a considerable boost in its search for domestic 
credibility. Under the headline ‘Historic resolutions', Trybuna 
Wolnogci in November asserted that ‘ the ideological basis of the 
conference can and should become also the ideological foundation for
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socio-political change in Poland’.40 Just as the Western powers and 
the Soviet Union had agreed to lay aside their ideological differences 
and coordinate their military strategies, so too in Poland, the 
Trybuna Wolnodci message ran, cooperation in an anti-German 'national 
front* should be the goal of the underground.
Similarly with regard to the Teheran summit of the three allied 
leaders in November/December, while the details could not yet be used 
to support the PPR position on the eastern border, it was very obvious 
to the communists in Poland that the credibility of the Polish 
government had been still further undermined. In making his pitch for 
the creation of a PPR based underground representative body, Gomulka 
on December 15 released a 'manifesto* in which he wrote that ‘the race 
[for Poland] to achieve a prominent place in the world* had well and 
truly begun, and ‘at the moment when at the Polish borders stands the 
most powerful army of one of the states united in the allied bloc —  
the Red Army of the USSR’ , Poland lacked diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union. The hope of the Polish government, Gomulka continued, 
was that ‘the two enemies would bleed to death*. These hopes had been 
cancelled by the conference of the three powers at Moscow, and by the 
meeting between Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt at Teheran. 43
Gomulka's initiative to establish an organ representing the PPR's 
'democratic national front* to go some way toward providing these 
diplomatic relations, made rapid progress once the radio link with 
Moscow was broken in mid-November and Gomulka himself became First 
Secretary. Work on the political programme of what was to become known 
as the National Council of the Homeland (KRN) had already progressed 
some way before the arrests of Finder and Fornalska, and it is likely 
that some of the foreign policy work of the Polish communists in 
Moscow was incorporated at this stage. Various similarities are
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noticable between the KRN programme and the writings of Alfred Lampe. 
Still, the addition of the phrase 'of the Homeland’ is seen as an 
indication that Gomulka wanted to emphasise its home-grown position 
vis-a-vis the attempts of the Soviet based Polish communists to set up 
their own institution representing the Polish 'democratic camp’.50 
Gomulka's initiative was not at all treated sympathetically by Stalin 
and Dimitrov once communications had been re-established in the new 
year. They were evidently caught unawares by the development. But for 
the moment, without their radio link with Moscow, Gomulka had the full 
support of Bierut and the other ‘internationalist’ members of the 
party's Central Committee. Bierut was made the KRN's Chairman with 
Gomulka1 s support.
The foreign policy aspects of the KRN's Programmatic Declaration, 
ratified at its first sitting on 31 December 1943, bear all the 
hallmarks of Gomulka's pragmatic influence. On Poland's borders the 
internationalist position could not be questioned and the November 
‘For What Are We Fighting?’ position was simply confirmed. In its 
general foreign policy, the declaration reiterated the by now standard 
formula of maintaining ‘friendly and good-neighbourly relations’ with 
all nations allied against ‘Hitlerism’, seen as a necessary condition 
for Poland's strength and influence.
On more specific issues, the declaration set out three goals:
a) the quickest possible establishment of the greatest possible 
friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, on the model of 
the relations already existing between the Soviet Union and 
Czechoslovakia;
b) the inclusion of Poland as the third state for which provision 
had been made in the protocol to the treaty established in 
December 1943 between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia;
c) the consolidation of links of the greatest possible friendship 
and cooperation with the rest of the allies, and especially with 
Czechoslovakia, Britain and America. 51
Poland's post-war 'national front’ coalition was to establish its
relations with the Soviet Union on the same conditions as had in the
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very same month been negotiated between BeneS and Stalin in Moscow. 
Gomulka was responding to the opportunity presented him by Stalin to 
develop the 'friendly and good-neighbourly* formula and more 
importantly, the Soviet alternative's credibility, by establishing the 
PPR as the only party able to provide for the provision of post-war 
Polish-Soviet relations on a regular diplomatic basis. In the 
negotiation of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty, provision had been made 
for the accession of a third party to the protocol, this third party 
implicitly being Poland. Stalin was providing the institutional 
arrangements into which a Polish 'national front* coalition government 
could easily fit at the conclusion of the war, a strategy which
Gomulka's 'national' foreign policy tendencies fitted very well. 
Whether or not the decision to proceed with the KRN had been approved 
by the Soviet leadership, on the foreign policy programme established 
in the KRN's declaration there was no dissension from Moscow once 
communication had been re-established.
In contrast with the KRN declaration, Bierut's speech at the
inaugural KRN meeting on behalf of the PPR (Gomulka did not attend)
bore all the hallmarks of the party's internationalist tradition. Most
certainly the greatest single international action to return Poland
its freedom, Bierut reminded his audience of fourteen,62 was the
'invanquishable offensive* of the Red Army in the east. From the very
beginning of its existence, Bierut continued, the position of the PPR
had been characterised by the fact that the party had understood what
the role of the Soviet Union in the war and in the post-war world
would be, and had based its actions on this understanding. As a
result, one of the PPR's major domestic action programmes would be:
...the announcing clearly and openly of the position that 
Poland's foreign policy must be based on alliance and sincere 
friendship with all the countries allied in the fight with
fascism, and in the first instance on alliance and friendship
with the USSR as a state which has not only taken the leading
-126-
position in the present war, but which will, in the nature of 
things, also take a leading role in the rebuilding of the post­
war world. Above all, this state is our direct neighbour with 
whom friendly cooperation is a condition for our economic 
development and at the same time a condition for the lasting 
nature of our independent existence.53
This would be the PPR line in the KRN, Bierut concluded. It was a line
Gomulka fully supported, but which he applied with a great deal more
consideration for domestic Polish conditions. As well as appreciating
the possibilities of the Red Army's advance on Poland, from January
1944 operating west of the pre-1939 Polish-Soviet border, Gomulka was
prepared to interpret Stalin's international policies quite literally,
applying them as best he could to the national Polish setting.
In January, with radio communication still not having been re­
established, Gomulka sent the KRN programme and resolutions ratified 
at its first sitting to Moscow, along with a letter to the Polish 
communists gathered in Moscow explaining the party's position with 
regard to the creation of the KRN and describing the political 
situation within Poland. In general, Gomulka wrote, relations with the 
Soviet Union, along with the every day fact of German mass terror, had 
become the most important issue in Polish life. On the one hand he 
estimated that attitudes toward the Soviet Union were getting 
progressively more positive, that the population was waiting for 
liberation from the east and not from the west. The Moscow and Teheran 
conferences had had a major positive influence in this regard. On the 
other hand, Gomulka wrote, negative attitudes toward the USSR were 
still very strong even among the working class. The Delegatura had 
become more sophisticated in its attacks on the Soviet Union so as not 
to be identified with the ultra-nationalist ‘fascist’ groups already 
alienated from the mass working class.64
In the KRN programme the PPR leadership had indicated that from its 
inception it had accepted the task of converting its own appreciation
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of the Soviet position in the war into mass appreciation. Now Gomulka 
was writing that this goal was in fact being successfully achieved by 
the diplomatic strategy of the USSR as seen in the Moscow and Teheran 
conferences, its military strategy, and by the PPR itself through its 
internal activity. This was an important assertion. It sought to 
justify the tactics of the PPR leadership as being part and parcel of 
wider Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, much work remained to 
be done among the working class, and this work needed to be at least 
as sophisticated as that of the main opposition to PPR influence —  
the government's Delegatura.
As has already been mentioned, Gomulka's attempts to choreograph 
the PPR's official foreign policies according to the pattern 
established by the Soviet Union were not discouraged. What did create 
concern in Moscow was his tactical turn away from what had previously 
been the Comintern's ‘national front’ policy, toward a national Polish 
solution to the problem of the PPR's restricted influence and 
credibility. After Teheran, Stalin could not rule out a future 
rapprochement with the Polish government should it accede to his 
demands that it reorganise on a pro-Soviet basis. Gomulka, on the 
other hand, considered the Polish government completely discredited, 
and was intent on preparing a rationalisation for the PPR's entry into 
a post-war coalition. There was little dispute in Moscow that, as had 
been provided for under the ‘national front’ policy, domestic Polish 
matters would be left for domestic Polish elements to dominate. 
However, the KRN membership was considered far too limited and the PPR 
policy of the ‘democratic front’ was branded as 'sectarian'. Instead 
of a ‘democratic front', it was suggested that the PPR continue a 
‘wide national front’ policy, toning down its more radical domestic 
goals and concealing any aspirations to national power. The Soviet
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authorities regarded the KRN as a political representation, and not 
the ‘embryo’ of a future government as was intended by Gomulka. 55
As a result, Gomulka changed tack and now began efforts to widen 
the ‘democratic’ profile of the KRN's membership. In this he was none 
too successful. His main efforts were directed firstly at a coalition 
of small syndicalist, anarchist and radical socialist groups including 
the main group of left socialists, the RPPS,66 operating under the 
title of the Central People's Committee, and secondly, at the 
mainstream Peasant Party. In the course of these discussions, one 
proposition put forward by the Central People's Committee was for the 
KRN to join with it in forming a ‘united opposition’ together with the 
mainstream underground Council of National Unity. This proposal was 
rejected from Moscow, but Gomulka insisted on continuing with his 
efforts to come to some arrangement with the Central People's 
Committee, even to the extent of on June 18 being ready to resign from 
the name KRN and merge with the organisation he had previously branded 
as ‘Trotskyist’. By this stage, the only difference in policy Gomulka 
saw between the KRN and the Central People's Committee was regarding 
the Polish-Soviet border, with the Central People's Committee 
insisting that the issue be addressed only after the war had been 
concluded. 67
At the same time in Moscow, Stalin finally announced that he could 
not recognise the Polish government ‘in its current composition’, and 
with the impending arrival of the Red Army at the Curzon Line, now 
recognised the KRN as a new element in his diplomacy with the Western 
powers. By his tactical faithfulness to what he saw as being the 
USSR's international policy line, Gomulka was now left stranded in a 
highly compromising position, entirely exposed to the attacks of his 
'internationalist' colleagues.
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By May 1944, the internationalist pressure on the PPR's Central 
Committee had split it into two distict factions led respectively by 
Gomulka and Bierut. In a letter to the editorial board of Archiwum 
Ruchu Robotniczego in 1977, Gomulka defended his spring 1944 policy of 
trying to broaden the ‘democratic’ membership of the KRN. He had been 
guided by two speeches made by Churchill in the Commons, in February 
and May, encouraging the Polish government to renew its relations with 
the USSR. Should this have happened, he had wanted the PPR to be in 
the strongest possible position to take its place as a legitimate 
coalition partner in a post war ‘national front’ government. The point 
of view held by the ‘Stalinist’ faction within the Central Committee, 
Gomulka wrote, was that he had not appreciated the ‘possibilities’ 
that the liberation of Poland by the Red Army would create for the 
PPR. These possibilities were such that the party would be able to 
solve the problem of the government in Poland in any way it wanted to. 
Bierut and Jolwiak had further accused Gomulka of not appreciating the 
strength of the PPR, which, in the new conditions created by the 
liberation of Poland by the Red Army, would itself become the object 
of advances from other parties trying to establish cooperation with it 
and the KRN. 60
On June 10, unbeknown to Gomulka, Bierut sent a letter to Dimitrov, 
accusing the PPR First Secretary of exhibiting ‘dictatorial urges’, of 
pursuing a ‘zig-zag’ policy line from ‘sectarianism to extreme 
opportunism’, of ‘dogmatism and ultraleft ism’, ‘right and nationalist 
tendencies’, of reluctance to send representatives of the PPR Central 
Committee to Moscow, and finally, of forming a group under his 
leadership which was prepared to tie itself with one of the pro-London 
groups.63
In his literal interpretation of Soviet explanations for the
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dissolution of the Comintern and the creation of 'national workers' 
parties', Gomulka had seen the logical continuation of the PPR's 
creation as a patriotic communist party. His tactical flexibility had 
always based itself on this understanding: the PPR needed to provide a 
national alternative to the dilemma presented by the communist 
heritage in Poland. But this heritage had deeper roots than simply an 
ideological alternative to capitalism. The real alternative that 
Polish communism had always represented was the Soviet alternative; 
Gomulka and the PPR had recognised this in the party's policies for 
Poland's future state and territorial security. Gomulka's ‘national’ 
communism could provide no new answer to these issues. He instead 
sought to maintain the PPR's ‘national/patriotic’ position as the 
dominant option for Soviet policy as against the increasing influence 
of the Polish communists in the USSR by following the tactical turns 
in Soviet international policy as closely as possible. As it turned 
out, he was left out of step and exposed to the harsh criticism of the 
traditional ‘internationalists’ by nature closer to Soviet strategic 
interests in Poland and less impressed with their tactical 
manifestations.
The PPR leadership was virtually paralised by the extent of the 
split within its Central Committee and as in the period of the 
‘ majority*/‘minority' split in the KPP, it was left to the Soviet 
leadership to resolve the impasse. On June 23, the Red Army began its 
offensive toward the Bug river and the 1939 German-Soviet demarcation 
line. Stalin had little other choice but to rely on the KRN in its 
current composition as the domestic representative body from which the 
Polish version of the ‘national front’ government was to be formed. 
Notwithstanding Bierut's letter of June 10, as the main instigator of 
the KRN and representative of the patriotic voice of the PPR, Gomulka
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con t i nued to represent the principal elements of Soviet policy in 
Poland. But the balance of communist power within Poland was about to 
shift decisively away from Gomulka and the 'national* PPR. With the 
entry of the Red Army came also the Moscow based Polish communists. 
Their views of the 'sectarian* PPR were to ensure that the expanded 
party leadership would in future maintain the proper balance between 
its ‘national* and ‘internationalist’ wings. From July 1944, the new 
party Politburo was made up of five members: three from Moscow, two
from the PPR —  Gomulka and Bierut.
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5. POLISH COMMUNISTS IN THE SOVIET UNION
Gomulka's efforts in Poland to implement what seemed to be a
flexible Soviet policy line were complemented by the theoretical work 
of the Polish communists in the Soviet Union. The fact that those in
the USSR were physically closer to the Soviet leadership did not mean
that their domestic policies were any more uniform than the options 
being debated among the PPR. If anything, the 'national* and 
'international' options among the Soviet based communists were
defended with even greater vigour, something the PPR, in conditions of 
conspiracy and terror, could ill afford. That the debate on domestic 
tactics at all took place in the USSR or Poland was entirely due to 
Stalin's personal flexibility in his Polish policy. The Polish 
communists in the Soviet Union were not discouraged from presenting a 
patriotic profile similar to the PPR; instead, they were positively 
encouraged. Those who favoured waiting on the Red Army to provide the 
solution to the communist dilemma in Poland was afforded short shrift 
by Molotov and Stalin.1
Proximity to the Soviet centre did mean, on the other hand, that 
however far the debate on domestic tactics ventured, unlike with the 
'national' PPR, it remained entirely within the bounds of the 
internationalist relationship created through the previous decade, and 
the Comintern's 'national front' policy. And just as with the PPR and 
earlier the KPP, the debate on domestic tactics among the Soviet based 
communists had little impact on the axioms of Polish communist 
foreign, axioms entrenched by the KPP's internationalist past and now 
continually reinforced by Soviet war strategy. The greatest contrast 
with the past was that the common German foe, and emphasis given to 
cooperation with the Western allies in this strategy, now afforded
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Polish communist foreign policy a degree of political realism and 
thence international legitimacy it had previously sorely lacked.
Immediately following the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, 
Stalin's Polish policy turned from giving active encouragement to 
Polish communist activity in the USSR, to seeking an accommodation 
with the Polish government in London. Earlier, following the German 
occupation of Rumania in October 1940, a group of fifteen Polish 
officers, including Colonel Zygmunt Berling, had been gathered by 
Lavrenti Beria and quartered at Malakhovka near Moscow, with the task 
of establishing the feasibility of organising a future Polish army 
division along Red Army lines.2 Once the Polish-Soviet agreement had 
been negotiated and agreement granted for General Wladyslaw Anders to 
build a regular Polish army, this alternative military centre was 
eliminated. At the same time, the Initiative Group at the Pushkino 
school was given a much lower profile, and several of the Polish 
communists with Soviet party cards were assigned to the Red Army as 
political officers. In Lwow, Nowe Widnokrggi was closed down. 3
Through the spring and summer of 1942, the marked improvement in 
the position of the Red Army brought an increase in Soviet pressure on 
the Polish government and its independent armed forces in the USSR. In 
March, the numbers of the Polish army under General Anders acceptable 
to the Soviet side was limited to 44,000 men, leaving 30,000 recruits 
without supplies. Taking up the British offer of help, and following 
on the suggestion made to him by Sikorski in December 1941, Stalin 
agreed that these 30,000 men be evacuated to the British Middle East. 
Three months later he agreed to the remainder of the Polish army going 
the same way. By August 30, all three Polish divisions had been 
evacuated. At the same time, the Soviet authorities began to limit the 
activity of the Polish consulates and refugee centres across the USSR,
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accusing them of espionage in their efforts to locate the numerous 
Poles still being detained.
The activity of the Polish communists was reactivated on May 5 with 
the relaunching of Nowe Widnokrfgi, this time in Kuibyshev, where the 
Soviet government had relocated from Moscow in December 1941.4 From 
the periodical presenting cultural and social items it had earlier 
been, it was now turned into 'the political tribunal of the 
progressive, anti-fascist Polish emigration*.s No political 
organisation was established alongside the new newspaper, but the line 
taken was consistent and coherent, and overtly hostile toward the 
Polish government's representatives in the USSR. Chief editor was 
again Wasilewska, but the real organiser and editor became Alfred 
Lampe. e
Nowe Widnokrggi was consciously modelled on the patriotic stance of 
the newly established PPR in Poland and Ko£ciuszko radio station 
operating from Ufa under the guidance of the Comintern.7 It saw its 
primary strategic task as the propagation of the idea that since 
Poland could realistically only be liberated from German occupation by 
the Soviet Union, the responsibility for this liberty would then 
continue to rest with the USSR for the forseeable future. Its 
immediate goal was to generate active support for the Red Army: 
'Poland's place in Western Europe will not so much be decided by its 
participation in the suffering, as by its participation in the 
victory’, Lampe wrote in the first edition of the new newspaper.® The 
need of the moment, therefore, was for all Poles to take up the 
partisan struggle against the Germans on the eastern front and fight 
alongside their greatest ally for a victory and strong position in 
Europe.
Official Polish-Soviet relations were further dramatically worsened
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by a Soviet note to the Polish government on 16 January 1943, 
confirming that all inhabitants of the territories occupied by the 
USSR after 17 September 1939 would continue to be regarded as Soviet, 
and not Polish, citizens. Soon afterward, the Soviet military position 
was given a dramatic boost with the February 2 German capitulation 
under Stalingrad. Twelve days later, at a personal meeting with 
Stalin, Berling was given the go-ahead to prepare for the creation of 
another Polish army, this time fighting under the integral command of 
the Red Army.3 At the same time, the organisation which had been 
heralded at the November 1941 Saratov broadcast, was also to be 
finally established. It was named the Union of Polish Patriots in the 
USSR (ZPP), with the intention being to group together socialists, 
peasant activists and left intellectuals of every hue in a patriotic 
‘wide national front* movement. A weekly, Wolna Polska (Free Poland), 
was created to serve as the ZPP press organ with Wasilewska again as 
editor, and Lampe her deputy.
The first edition of Wolna Polska was published on March 1, on the 
same day as TASS published its communiqud attacking the Polish 
government position on the Polish-Soviet border. Wolna Polska put its 
message simply. The new Polish organisation wanted to draw the 
appropriate conclusions from the terrible lesson of history that had 
been the national defeat of 1939: fear of the Soviet Union had pushed 
the pre-war Polish government toward cooperation with Germany when in 
fact only alliance with the Soviet Union could have prevented the 
‘victorious development of Hitlerism in Germany and the European 
catastrophe* . 1 °
Through the spring and summer of 1943, Wolna Polska and Nowe 
Widnokrggi formulated the principal ideological and political 
positions of the ZPP, with the former covering current political
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issues (from June 1943 its editor was Jerzy Borejsza), and the latter 
becoming the ideological/theoretical organ of the new movement. But if 
the ZPP recruited from the entire range of ‘patriotic elements’ in the 
USSR, the content of its press organs remained firmly under communist 
control and was relayed to the PPR via Ko§ciuszko radio. 11 As well as 
Wasilewska and Lampe, other contributors included Roman Werfel, Hilary 
Mine, Stefan Wierblowski and Wlodzimierz Sokorski.12
5*1 Alfred Lampe
By far and away the dominant influence on the development of the 
ZPP's foreign policy positions was Alfred Lampe. Already in the summer 
of 1941, immediately after the outbreak of the German-Soviet conflict, 
Lampe had been approached by the editors of the VKP(b) theoretical 
organ Bolshevik for an article on Poland.13 Not able to publish it due 
to the downgrading of the Polish communist option by Stalin, he 
continued to work on the article, and in the summer of 1942 attempted 
to have it published in Nowe Widnokrpgi. After consulting with the 
deputy head of the Soviet Information Bureau, he was again told that 
though the article was fine, it was still too early to air its 
proposals. 14 This was the article published with several minor changes 
under the psuedonym of Andrzej Marek in Wolna Polska on 16 April 1943. 
In it, Lampe presented what would become the definitive statement of 
ZPP and later Polish communist foreign policy. It was the statement of 
an old KPP leader, one who had seen the extremes to which the 
internationalist relationship could go, and who, in his deliberations, 
had also come to understood the value of the security and prestige 
interests for the Polish national state. His ability to marry these
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two sets of interests in the climate of patriotism that had been 
generated by the war, established his theoretical preeminance in the 
Polish communist community in the USSR.
In the April 16 article, Lampe for the first time addressed the 
question of the post-war Polish state's western borders. This was the 
third and final element of the foreign policy triad —  a premiss and 
two conclusions —  he had been developing in his articles in Nowe 
Widnokrpgi and Wolna Polska since May 1942. Lampe took the PPR foreign 
policy goals of justifying the Soviet alternative and the new Polish- 
Soviet border, and gave them the best of all possible rationalisations 
—  the premiss that Poland should never again be threatened by a 
rampant Germany. Polish foreign policy on this basis had two necessary 
goals to fulfill: to provide the conditions to ensure a powerful and
totally committed Soviet ally; and to match this alliance with one 
involving other states lying to the east of Germany, basing the common 
security of this alliance system on the carrying out of suitable 
territorial changes in the geography of post-war Germany.
Lampe's foreign policy articles from between May 1942 and August 
1943 were published in 1944 as a compilation under the same title as 
his groundbreaking ‘Poland's place in Europe* article. The volume was 
to become the standard work for Poland's ‘new’ post-war foreign 
policy.
In Lampe's conception, like the Polish gentry, Germany had built 
it's power on conquests to the east. So much so, that the German claim 
to great power status had always implicitly implied the negation of 
Poland's right to its independent existence. This implication had been 
made explicit with the onset of the war. Yet pre-war Polish 
governments had not only negotiated with Germany, they had made quite 
plain their attempts to placate Hitler, balancing him off against
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Western promises of support, and the greater threat of Bolshevik
expansion from the east. Lampe makes the point that the existence of
an independent Poland had from the time of Field Marshall Hindenburg
been seen as one of the greatest threats to German security. This
failed to give rise to its converse: an appreciation on the part of
Polish leaders that there existed no greater danger than German
imperialism, and the enthroning of this position as one of the axioms
of Polish foreign policy. 1S
The fight to change Polish foreign policy's official blindness to
the extremity of the threat from Germany once and for all, and the
more immediate fight for liberation from German occupation, in Lampe*s
mind, could not be separated from the fight for an 'anti-fascist
democracy' and an 'anti-fascist democratic foreign policy’ —  a
socialist Poland. The option Poland had to face had not changed over
time. It was determined by the country's geographical position: in the
modern world, Poland had to seek support from either fascist Germany
or the Soviet Union. The choice was clearer than it had ever been.
Lampe's understanding of the pre-war Polish regime, was of a system
conditioning Poles to treat the Soviet Union with contempt and fear:
. . . reactionary Polish ruling circles never based the existence 
of the Polish state on a democratic foreign policy; they fostered 
the closest relations with ultra-reactionary Hungary, not less 
with backward Rumania, orientating themselves on fascist Rome and 
Hitler's Berlin, endeavouring at the same time to inculcate into 
the Polish nation a reluctance for Europe's progressive and 
democratic forces, particularly for the Soviet Union. 16
This process had been highly destructive for Polish security. From the
time Polish independence had became possible as a result of the
Russian revolution, the Soviet Union had been intent on facilitating
this Polish aspiration, Lampe wrote. The USSR's main priority had been
the preservation of peace in Europe and securing the possibility of
building socialism domestically. In contrast to Polish foreign
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policy, the USSR had conducted a foreign policy designed to thwart an
intrinsically hostile fascism and its aggressive intent on the Soviet
Union's western borders. 17
Poland had conducted a foreign policy based on a fixation with the
past and grandiose dreams of the nation's rightful place as a major
power in central Europe. Reality, according to Lampe, had been vastly
at odds with these dreams:
As a result of the selfishness and narrow-mindedness of the 
Polish gentry of the 17th and 18th centuries, as a result of the 
partitions and policies of the partitioning powers in the 19th 
century, as a result of the destruction during the war of 1914- 
1918, independent Poland began as a poor state, backward in its 
economy and therefore weak politically. This backwardness was not 
put right by the twenty years of independence, something which 
everybody except for the Poles were aware of. . . . One can conclude 
from this that what Poland needed then, and needs now, is a 
policy guaranteeing it a long term peace and the possibility of 
unthreatened and unhindered, development. 1,3
Such a policy could only be put into place by the Polish communists
and their goal of social and political 'real democracy’, Lampe wrote.
The communists were to initiate an ‘unchangeable course’ based on a
lasting alliance with the Soviet Union. This course could be the only
real guarantee for Polish independence. ‘Democratic Poland' would
never again allow the mistakes of Polish foreign policy from the
period between November 1918 and September 1939; the future communist
government would not 'speculate on the tactics of foreign
imperialisms'; it would not ‘balance itself on the antagonisms among
great powers'; it would never again base its existence on the
'unsteady balance of incompatible powers in Europe'.13 Instead, it
would anchor itself firmly to one great power, the closest
geographically, and the closest to the principles of what would be the
new Polish government.
Lampe developed the linkage between ‘democratic Poland' and the
Soviet alternative further in another context, this time not intended
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for widespread publication. In the summer of 1943, at the same time as 
the PPR was re-defining its political strategy within Poland following 
the break in official Polish-Soviet relations and the Delegatura's 
rejection of cooperation, the debate on domestic tactics among the ZPP 
leadership centred around the idea of creating a representative organ 
able to form the nucleus of the new communist government following the 
entry into Poland of the Red Army. Lampe's attitude on this issue, 
formulated in a document written in August known as ‘The Lampe 
Theses’ , was not known outside a very small group of ZPP communist 
leaders. :2° His thesis was that a new programme of social development 
needed to be introduced into post-war Poland, one neither beholden to 
the processes of liberal-capitalist development nor to the road taken 
by Russia since 1917.21 This did not at all mean that the communists 
should share their control with other radical elements in a ‘national 
front’ neither Soviet aligned nor capitalist. Only the communists 
would be in a position to choose the new social development programme, 
since the Soviet Union for all its readiness to see Poland differing 
in a socio-political sense, could not allow a Poland to exist after 
the war which conducted a foreign policy unfriendly toward it.22
Only the communists could guarantee a Polish state not 
intrinsically anti-Soviet. With the exception of the communists, Lampe 
wrote, all Polish political tendencies had been and remained anti- 
Soviet. If they had no tradition of anti-Sovietism, then they played 
an anti-Soviet role in a systemic sense. Lampe cited Czechoslovakia as 
an example where the Soviet Union was prepared to allow an alternative 
socio-political conception to develop in a neighbouring country. But 
an attitude toward the USSR such as existed in Czechoslovakia had 
never existed in Poland; and it could not exist. Even should attitudes 
radically change as a result of the liberation of the country by the
-144-
Red Army, and even should a capitalist government be created which
based itself on cooperation with the Soviet Union, such a situation
would, by nature, be shortlived. The return of the anti-Soviet
emigration to Poland from the West and those deported into the Soviet
Union, the matter of the eastern border, and the dependence of the
Polish economy on foreign trade and credits, would all push the
country back into the orbit of the ‘great-capitalist Western
orientation’ and strengthen anti-Soviet tendencies.23
These reactionary tendencies could not be allowed, Lampe reasoned,
even more-so since after the war Poland would not be alone in its new
intermediate ‘democratic’ form. The second foreign policy goal which
was to ensure long-term security was for Poland to join in a powerful
alliance of ‘democratic’ states together with the Soviet Union,
forming a barrier to Germany's eastward expansion. The first line of
defence in this barrier would lie with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and
the strategic boundary on the Oder River:
Just like the Soviet Union, we are interested in the point that 
to the east of the Oder River no enemy military force will ever 
be able to find an invasion base against whichever of the eastern 
European nations. . . . Preventing another German invasion is a 
matter of life and death. This is also the measure of our 
friendship with the Soviet Union. -2*
Already at this stage, immediately prior to the break in official
Polish-Soviet relations, Lampe was confident that the Polish
communists would secure the full support of Soviet diplomacy in the
international negotiations needed to settle the German-Polish border
issue. This proposal should also receive, he insisted, the approval of
the great Western democracies, Britain and the United States, ‘as one
of the guarantees of peace in this part of the world’.-23
But Poland had also to deserve these territories; she had to fight
for them and occupy them herself:
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Our participation in the fight with hitlerism, the creative function 
of the reborn Polish state in the post-war system of European 
states, the extent of our reach in terms of population, will 
establish Poland's place in Europe, and will be the starting 
point for determining the territorial shape of our state.36
Poland had to go forward, not back. The issue of what would be
Poland's new borders lay in the west, not in the east, where 'the
ordinary restitution of the pre-September 1939 borders is not in our
interest, nor would it serve the matter of our independence or peace
in Europe'. 27
Poland's old eastern border no longer existed for Lampe. It had 
been a border established at a time when the USSR had been severely 
weakened by civil war and foreign intervention. It had served a state 
which had been ‘a bastion of imperialism against the Soviet Union'; 
the new Poland would not allow itself to be forced into the role of a 
‘barbed wire fence' surrounding the Soviet Union. Efforts to have this 
border reinstated were attempts to reinstate Poland's fatal weakness 
and repeat the same mistakes of Poland's eastern policy all over 
again. 23
There was no preordained truth for which Poland had to establish 
itself as Europe's defender from Russia, Lampe wrote, and there was 
one very good reason why Poland and Europe needed to be open to the 
presence of the Soviet Union. ‘The borders of the re-born Polish state 
must be demarcated differently to the pre-war borders, just as Poland 
will be different with regard to its internal character as to its 
international role’.23 Internally Poland would be 'democratic'; 
externally, Lampe saw Poland as the guardian of European peace. But 
this peace could not be organised without the participation of the 
Soviet Union. The Soviet Union would not only guarantee the new 
Poland's security and independence; it would also ensure European 
peace, and as such the closest cooperation with it would be in
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Europe's as well as Poland's interest: 'This salutory role the USSR
will be able to perform all the-better, the closer our cooperation
with it' .30
Lampe's theoretical synthesis was vetted by the Soviet authorities 
and undoubtedly refected the hopes of the other European communist 
leaders gathered with the Comintern at Ufa. But where the strength of 
Lampe's analysis lay was in his ability to take the Soviet and 
Comintern positions, and explore the advantages for the Polish state 
inherent in them (few of the disadvantages were ever reviewed). These 
advantages revolved around Poland's future security and prestige, its 
national interests. ‘Democratic Poland's' national interests were to 
be internally integrated and internationally guaranteed; European 
peace and the integrity of Polish borders would be synonymous. Since 
‘democratic Poland’ and the Soviet Union shared a common interest in 
security from German eastward expansion, they could not also share a
border that was the source of friction. The new eastern border was
therefore to become ‘a transmission belt’ between the two states. It 
would be the 'source of strength and not weakness of the Polish 
state’.31 The same applied to Poland's other neighbours. Border 
disputes were to be settled on the basis of common interests.
This was the, theme Lampe continued in the ZPP's programmatic 
‘Ideological Declaration' ratified at its First Congress in June 1943. 
The strengthening of Polish-Soviet and Polish-Czechoslovak relations 
were to be the new organisation's foremost foreign policy goals. The 
ZPP would work ‘so that between Poland and Czechoslovakia arguments 
and disputes would end once and for all’, and political and economic 
cooperation would become a reality, From this position Poland could 
confidently look forward to establishing itself on the Baltic and Oder 
as the border in the interest of all the Slavic nations, defending
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themselves from the threat of a renewed German invasion: ‘...secured
from the east and south by the strong support of our allies, we will 
be able to take on ourselves the burden of the common responsibility 
for establishing the guard for peace on the Oder’. 32 This last slogan 
continues to be used by the Polish government to this day.
The importance of Lampe's work for the foreign policy of the new 
Polish communist state cannot be overestimated. He was the ‘oldest and 
most experienced communist in the organising committee of the ZPP',33 
a member (even if in prison) of the pre-1938 KPP Politburo and Central 
Committee Secretariat. His theoretical work had its greatest impact 
among the ZPP Presidium and other Moscow based Polish communists 
engaged at that time in developing Poland's post-war policy positions. 
As regards the policy of a ‘wide national front of the Polish 
emigration in the Soviet Union*, represented by the ZPP, Lampe was 
often considered to be cynical, promoting the slogan on its tactical 
merits and little else. This resulted in considerable disagreement 
among the ZPP leadership, and especially between Lampe and Wasilewska, 
who also considered Lampe to be coveting her position as leader of the 
Polish communists in the Soviet Union and principal liaison with 
Stalin.3* Had he not died from a heart attack on 10 December 1943, 
Lampe would have undoubtedly continued on to dominate the development 
of ‘democratic Poland's’ foreign policy climate.
- 1.48 -
5*2 Other Policy 'Theses’
As it was, other communist leaders came to dominate this climate 
instead. Those on the ‘national’ side of the leadership of the post­
war Polish communist state had no hesitation in using Lampe's national 
interest formulations in their own speeches, Gomulka foremost among 
them. But neither did those on the ‘internationalist* side. Lampe's 
synthesis satisfied the priorities of both sides; at the same time, it 
did little to narrow the differences between them. The 'national 
front’ policy had been deliberately established as a means of creating 
a broad church grouping on the left of the political spectrum. It was 
not intended to discourage the introduction of national imperatives 
into the policies of the European communist parties. In the summer and 
autumn of 1943, the PPR under Gomulka began to proceed down this 
'national* road. In the USSR, much the same phenomenon took place 
among the communist leaders of the new Polish army division 
established in May under the patronage of a ZPP Special Commission 
staffed by Wasilewska, Lampe, Mine and J^drychowski. The division's 
commanding officer was Colonel Berling, promoted by Stalin to General 
for the occasion. Just as Gomulka's ‘national’ policies showed 
significant variations on the original PPR design brought from the 
USSR by the Initiative Group leaders, so too, for much the same 
‘national* reasons, did the initial policies put forward by the new 
communist military leaders.
In order to create a cohesive fighting force able to fight for a 
'new, democratic Poland', the new Polish division was given a 
patriotic Polish character, symbolised by its designation as the 
Tadeusz Ko6ciuszko Division. Its military officers were largely Red
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Army staff, while its Polish officer corps was made up of a large 
number of Polish communists assigned to the division's 'political- 
educational* sections. Apart from the communists involved with the ZPP 
organisation, the majority of ex-KPP members found themselves within 
* this newly created 'educational' apparatus, and it was from here that 
the first differences in opinion on the nature of the changes coming 
to Poland emerged.
The main task of the Koiciuszko Division's educational section was 
to ‘build from the beginning many beliefs and attitudes, mainly in 
areas such as attitudes toward the socialist Soviet state and Russian 
nation, toward the democratic changes due to take place in Poland as 
well as a new way of looking at the history of the fatherland’.33 But 
it also was important that the division present a coherent political 
and economic programme for its soldiers, so many of whom had been 
displaced from their homes in eastern Poland by the Soviet authorities 
in 1939 and 1940. The ZPP ideological declaration did not fulfill this 
purpose. On the 'internationalist' side, it was seen by the communists 
within the educational apparatus as not going far enough in pointing 
toward a radical change in post-war Poland away from the capitalist 
system. On the ‘national’ side, it was considered by those who found 
themselves close to the military leadership as being imprecise and 
impractical. 36
The first attempt at a programme specifically aimed at the new 
political melting-pot within the Ko£ciuszko Division was undertaken at 
the same time as Lampe was preparing his ‘Theses' and only a few 
months after the division had been created. It was issued under the 
name of the division's ‘educational’ second-in-command and ex-KPP 
member, Jakob Prawin. But what was commonly called ‘Theses no. 1’ was 
understood to have been the initiative of Berling*s ‘political’ deputy
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and ex-KPP member Wlodzimierz Sokorski, and indeed, of Berling 
himself. The Prawin programme was given the title of the March 1943 
PPR release: ‘For What Are We Fighting?’.
Prawin's programme postulated the creation in post-war Poland of a 
political system known as ‘organised democracy’: ‘political life will
be directed by one political camp, whose expression will be a strong 
government’. Both pre-war fascism, and pre-war political fragmentation 
(‘pseudo-democracy’) would be eliminated, in effect a form of left 
wing Sanacja. Prawin avoided using the phrase ‘working class’ and 
instead talked of ‘the whole nation’. The Soviet Union, ‘our enduring 
ally’, he wrote, would support Poland in its ‘independent state 
existence’, and secure it from any future threat from Germany. In the 
west, the Germans had to have their ‘barbs' removed, with the ‘age-old 
Polish lands up to the Oder and Baltic joined to Poland’ . In the east, 
just as Poland ‘demanded political independence for itself’, so it had 
to respect the same right with regard to its ‘related’ neighbours. 
Finally, Poland had considerable trading potential, situated as it was 
on ‘the cross-roads between east and west, north and south’.37
Not suprisingly, Prawin's programme generated a great deal of sharp 
criticism from within ZPP and army circles. Much of it concerned the 
fact that he had , ignored the existence within Poland of the PPR and 
wanted to present the division as ‘the only organised political force* 
to have any power following the liberation of Poland. Prawin was 
branded a 'careerist*, and ‘foreign to our movement’. Lampe wrote that 
the fact that the programme was at all published was 'very sad’ . 30
On foreign policy, Prawin had payed lip service to the Soviet 
alternative and the new borders in the west. He had also emphasised 
the prestige goal which Poland 'demanded*—  independence. It was an 
emphasis designed to appeal to the ranks of patriotic soldiers finding
-151-
themselves in the Polish division. As such, it was an emphasis 
continued in the next programme produced, this time by communists 
counting themselves part of the ‘internationalist' mainstream.
The next programme was written at the end of October in the course
of the debate on ‘Theses no. 1' by two political officers in what was
now the Polish Army Corps, Roman Zambrowski and Hilary Mine. Addressed
to the Presidium of the ZPP, it suggested the creation of a strong
political centre which would unite the ‘democratic movement' in both
the Soviet Union and Poland under one leadership in the most vital
days before Poland's liberation by the Red Army. Unlike the Prawin
programme, the Zambrowski/Mine programme, referred to as ‘Theses
no. 2’, owed much more to the theoretical work of Lampe and came much
closer to the general discussion within the ZPP in both its
aspirations and its terminology:
We are a democratic-independence movement. We are fighting for an 
independent, strong and democratic Poland. Polish independence, 
Polish strength and Polish democracy are joined for us
inextricably. We know . . . that Poland will not be independent and
strong, so long as Poland is not democratic.33
At the beginning of May, Stalin had announced in an interview with the
Moscow correspondent for The Times that in breaking diplomatic
relations with the Polish government, he had no intention in seeing
Poland after the , war anything other than ‘strong and independent’.
Since then, this slogan had been incorporated into the ZPP lexicon,
figuring prominently in Lampe's foreign policy writing.
Reading the Zambrowski/Mine programme further, it soon becomes 
clear that the authors had taken the Prawin programme, with its 
emphasis on attracting non-communist patriotic support for the ZPP and 
Polish Army Corps, and added a ‘democratic* dimension. In its general 
outline it was also similar to the original PPR Initiative Group 
programme. It identified with the national insurrectionary tradition
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and stated its goals as being 'wide political democracy, wide economic 
democracy, democratic peaceful foreign policy’.*0 Prawin's theme of a 
strong government was continued, this time for the purpose of 
implementing a ‘long-term foreign policy' and carrying out a wide 
programme of social reform. On the other hand, ‘totalist temptations’ 
and attempts at ‘exclusiveness and dictatorship’ were condemned in a 
direct attack on the authors of ‘Theses no.1’. Trade with east, west, 
north and south, became instead cooperation with the ‘huge economic 
organism’ of the Soviet Union .
The immediate impression one has on reading the foreign policy 
section of the Zambrowski/Minc programme, is of how far the Polish 
communists had come from the days of the internationalist KPP. 
Included in it is a clear statement of the worth of national 
independence, not even qualified by the standard ‘democratic’ 
rhetoric:
Foreign policy must ensure a lasting and essential, and not only 
formal, independence for Poland. Externally, Poland cannot be a 
tool of foreign interests, cannot perform as whoever's satellite, 
but must determine its policies by its own, and not foreign 
interests. Externally, Poland must move on its own roads, must 
achieve transformations with its own Polish methods relevant to 
the traditions and aspirations of the nation, must not submit to 
whoever's dictates. Poland's alliances must be based on the links 
Polish interests have with the interests of the states allied to 
it and on unlimited respect for the principles of independence.*1
The attitudes expressed in this statement bore eloquent witness to the
impact Stalin's diplomatic views on the Polish question were having on
the Polish communists. Lampe's thesis of a new programme of social
development for Poland neither liberal-capitalist nor Bolshevik, had
been echoed in the Prawin programme and was now being extended further
in the foreign policy field than anything Lampe had been prepared to
commit to paper. The attitudes being expressed here appeared, as a
result, rather cynical in their design.
The Zambrowski/Minc programme went on to take the Soviet line and
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Lampe's work to their programmatic conclusions. Poland was to become 
the bastion of peace in central and eastern Europe. But the only way 
to ensure that this came about was for Poland to guarantee the 
security of its eastern backyard; the opportunity to do this had 
arisen with Stalin's support for a 'strong and independent Poland' on 
the one hand, and the elimination of the political forces which had 
traditionally pushed Poland into eastward expansion on the other. The 
deep common interest on which a future Polish-Soviet alliance would be 
built was the need to defend against future German aggression; and to 
make such aggression still less likely East Prussia would be 
eliminated, removing Germany's most imperialist bastion, at the same 
time giving Poland wide access to the Baltic. With the country's new 
western borders incorporating the ‘age-old* Polish lands of Silesia 
and Warmia, Poland would stand guard on the Oder, ‘vigilantly looking 
westward’ . Slavic Poland would ally itself with Slavic Czechoslovakia, 
and as with the dispute over the eastern border, the Polish- 
Czechoslovak border dispute would be solved on the basis of ‘the self- 
determination of nations’ .
Last but not least came a declaration of intent with regard to the
Western allies, echoing the Soviet diplomatic line, and later to form
a post-war Polish foreign policy standard:
Poland's foreign policy will endeavour simultaneously to maintain 
sincere relations with Britain, the United States and France, and 
will participate in the great task of maintaining and expanding 
the international cooperation and solidarity of nations united by 
... the fight with hitlerite Germany.*2
The Zambrowski/Minc programme was not intended for release as an 
official document. Like the Prawin document, it was meant for limited 
internal discussion. But unlike the Prawin document which had shown 
the effect of many hours of discussions with non-communist Ko£ciuszko 
Division soldiers, Zambrowski and Mine intended their work to meet the
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specific needs of the communist community. They considered themselves 
sufficiently authoritative to recommend such measures as eliminating 
all propaganda contrary to the principle of parliamentary democracy, 
particularly 'monoparty accents’, emphasising a positive attitude 
toward private enterprise, and discarding rural collectivisation as a 
political option.*3 While their efforts did not escape the criticism 
of Lampe and the ZPP leadership, an indication of the general 
acceptability of the programme might be the various personnel changes 
brought about in the late autumn of 1943. In October, Zambrowski 
succeeded Prawin as head of the now reorganised political-educational 
section of the Ko§ciuszko Division, while a month later, Sokorski was 
transferred out of the army and brought to Moscow to the ZPP head 
office.** At the same time, the position of the communists within the 
army political apparatus was strengthened, and moves were made to 
consolidate this control throughout the ZPP organisation. The 
initiative for these changes came from Lampe and communists gathered 
within the ZPP Presidium who had come to the conclusion that some sort 
of overall coordinating body was needed to maintain a stricter central 
control over the activity of the Polish communists in the army and 
ZPP, and to tie this activity more intimately with that of the PPR in 
Poland.
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5*3 Polish National Committee
In his August 'Theses’ proposals, Lampe had written about the 
‘ideological chaos’ the Soviet based Polish communists found 
themselves in: their ‘narrow practicism [and] lack of perspectives
which all too often equate with a lack of principles and covers many 
different views, from the false course of socialist revolution and 
dictatorship of the proletariat to a slipping into liberal-bourgeois 
positions’.*5 He doubted whether the PPR would constitute a power 
notwithstanding the optimistic reports being received from Poland. 
Lampe's reasoning shows the essential realism of the man: the PPR had 
not existed in Poland in the decisive years of 1938-1942; even as the 
direct continuator of the KPP, the PPR had only been created after the 
outbreak of the Soviet-German war; it was still subject to its 
traditional ‘sectarianism’ and lacked ‘great ideas and outstanding 
activists' . *e
Lampe also condidered that the external intervention of the USSR on
the Polish communists' behalf in the form of the Red Army
‘liberation’, would have an enormously negative effect on the power of
the PPR since the massive domestic opposition such intervention would
inevitably create would require even greater and more permanent Soviet
intervention well into the future. Nor was the international climate
after the war likely to offer any comfort to the communists:
Taking into consideration the fact that the overall European 
situation will not make revolution a current issue, and also that 
the Polish situation does not contain any elements which would 
push toward solutions on the pattern of the conclusion of the 
last war, there must be a new outcome to the war, a new 
perspective for development. The slogans of democracy and 
liberalism do not constitute a great dynamic force in Poland. In 
our ranks, and even more so beyond our ranks, [these slogans] are 
treated as something temporary and do not awaken enthusiasm in 
anybody. *r
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Lampe's answer to the dilemma he had exposed was to advocate the 
introduction of ‘new great ideological currents'. These would bring 
the population together in a common effort to rebuild the country on 
the basis of its own ‘developmental road’. There would be no ‘aping of 
patterns from the West or from the East'. Instead, all large scale 
industry would be nationalised and rural reform carried out, while at 
the same time private ownership would be upheld and encouraged as a 
way of proving that ‘the revolutionary road had been rejected'.*13
But nowhere did Lampe state clearly how, without the help of the 
Red Army, the communists were to establish themselves in a position of 
power and authority where they could prove anything to anybody, let 
alone implement the new Polish ‘developmental road’. Prawin had talked 
of the need for a ‘strong government’, but nothing more substantial 
than that. It was left to Zambrowski and Mine to suggest more concrete 
measures. In their programme, they included a final section entitled 
‘Tactical Lines’.
The Zambrowski/Minc analysis of domestic tactics was none too 
dissimilar to that of Gomulka, suggesting that indeed Gomulka’s 
initiative to form the ‘democratic national front’ and KRN in Poland 
was an attempt to pre-empt the establishment of a similar body in the 
USSR which would in effect weaken the influence of the PPR. According 
to Zambrowski and Mine, the old political parties opposed to the 
‘democratic-independence movement’, although internally fragmented, 
still had a decisive influence on the politically active section of 
the Polish population; since, however, they remained anti-Soviet there 
could be no part for them in an alliance with the 'communist camp’ 
(ZPP, Polish armed forces in the USSR, PPR and People's Guard). On 
this basis there was little possibility of creating a broad political 
coalition in Poland similar to those already operating in France (the
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French Liberation Committee) or Italy (the Coordinating Committee). 
The ‘communist camp* clearly did not constitute a majority in the
nation; on the other hand, three factors gave it a chance to become a 
mass political movement: its 'heroic fight with the invader within
Poland’; its economic and political reform programme; and its armed 
forces. None of these, it was understood, would enable the camp to 
attain power in the first place; but they would be crucial to the
'future successful development’ of ‘democratic Poland' after the 
‘communist camp’ had gained its power.
Like the Lampe 'Theses’, nowhere was it stated how this power was 
to be attained. Once it had been attained, a Provisional Government
would be established to carry out the economic and political reforms
which were to legitimise the ‘camp's’ programme de facto. In 
preparation for this move, Zambrowski and Mine wrote, the ‘camp’ had 
to strengthen its political activity, and create a National Committee 
which would gather economic data for the coming reform and prepare the 
administrative personnel of the future 'ruling apparatus’. The most 
immediate task of the National Committee, according to the 
Zambrowski/Minc programme, was to establish a common leadership for 
both the Polish army in the Soviet Union and the communist partisans 
within Poland, giving these latter as much help as possible.*3
Zambrowski's and Mine's proposals began to be realised in December 
1943. At this time the offensive of the Red Army together with the 
outcome of the October Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow and the 
allied leaders' Conference in Teheran in the last days of November had 
added significantly to the diplomatic impetus Stalin was able to gain 
for his own security policies in eastern Europe. The Polish communists 
could not but be optimistic about the success of their policies in the 
near future.
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On December 24, Stalin met with several of the figures involved 
with the ZPP, including Andrzej Witos from the Peasant Party and 
Boleslaw Drobner of the pre-war PPS. The Soviet leader made it clear 
that any move to * communize’ Poland would be too risky; land reform 
should distribute rural land among the peasants rather than creating 
state communes, and the majority of large scale industries should 
remain privately owned. He also, according to The Times correspondent 
in Moscow, indicated to the participants that the time was ripe for 
the creation of an alternative power centre, an ‘embryo* of a 
government within which leaders from the Polish communities in the 
Soviet Union, Britain and America could cooperate.50 In Teheran, 
Stalin had been able to gain the agreement of his Western allies to 
bring pressure to bear on the anti-Soviet members of the Polish 
government. Now he moved to heighten the ‘unfriendly’ profile of the 
Polish government, weaken further its position with the Western 
allies, and prepare for yet another fait accompli in Poland.
The Organising Commission of what was being called the Polish
National Committee (PKN) sat for the first time the day after this
meeting with Stalin. Wasilewska took the Chair with Berman acting as 
rapporteur. It was envisaged that the PKN would consist of seven to 
nine representatives from the ZPP, five representatives from within 
Poland to be recommended by Berman, two representatives of the Polish 
emigration in America, two from London, 51 and one from the Middle 
East.52 Oskar Lange, professor of economics at Chicago University, one 
of the suggested representatives of the American emigration, was
recommended to take charge of the foreign affairs portfolio.53
At the second meeting of the Commission, the PKN programmatic
declaration was discussed. Drobner, not happy with Lampe's 
‘journalistic’ draft, presented his own programme, far more specific
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with regard to the actual means by which power was to be attained in 
Poland: a 'Provisional People's Government1 was to be created to
oversee the creation of a people's militia in ‘every liberated town 
and every village’. Drobner's foreign policy section, however, relied 
heavily on the Lampe draft. Drobner's declaration was distributed to 
all the commission members but work on Lampe's draft carried on as the 
definitive PKN programme.5*
Lampe had begun work on the PKN programme in late November, several 
weeks prior to his death. In the course of the Organising Commission's 
meetings, his draft was extensively revised and finally accepted on 4 
January 1944.55 The aim of this revision was to implement Stalin's 
advice and give the programme a broadly Polish national character, 
avoiding formulations which could be identified as purely communist. 
Under the sub-heading ‘Democratic and peaceful foreign policy', the 
editors retained many of Lampe's original formulations, refining them 
into an integrated programmatic and less polemical form. Ideas set out 
in Lampe's ‘Poland's place in Europe’ series of articles, as well as 
in his ‘Theses’ work, featured prominently. But as with that work, in 
both Lampe's original PKN programme and in the revised edition the 
question of how the communists would achieve their power was once 
again avoided; the war would simply be won by the Soviet Union, and 
‘Poland must win the peace’ which was to follow. This was Lampe's all- 
encompassing policy goal, the first statment of his original and the 
revised version's foreign policy programme. 55
The PKN's foreign policy was to be essentially realist, parallel to 
its pragmatic domestic policies. It was to cater above all to Poland's 
security interest: ‘The matter of securing [Poland's] national
existence before the possibility of a new threat from German 
imperialism is the most important issue of Poland's policy’, Lampe
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wrote. The editors added that history taught that Poland's expansion
eastward simply weakened the Polish state and encouraged German
expansion in the same direction. Rather than consolidating Polish
power on Polish lands, the trend had been to invade other nations in
the east and leave the nation weakened and unprotected in its western
regions. Such had been the result of the Treaty of Riga (a Berman
formulation). Now, the editors wrote, the experience of this last war
had taught that the only way to defend Poland from German expansion
was to build a ‘great Slavic dam', a slogan also used by Lampe; its
basis, and the basis of Poland's foreign policy, would be a Polish-
Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance. To the east, the editors wrote, ‘a turn’
in Poland's relations with Lithuania, Bielorussia and the Ukraine was
necessary (another Berman formulation); these relations should be
established on the basis of mutual interests. The eastern border
needed to be turned into a transmission mechanism and not a barrier,
Lampe declared, and cooperation between the Polish armed forces in the
Soviet Union and the Red Army should be transformed after the war into
‘lasting alliance and neighbourly cooperation’. 57
Polish foreign policy should consolidate the best possible
political, economic and cultural relations with Britain and the United
States, and support the rebuilding of France on the basis of its
traditional links with Poland, Lampe wrote. Drobner and Wasilewska
added all the 'anti-Hitler democracies of the world’ to this list.
Poland's geographical strength needed to be consolidated on the
territories taken from Germany, while its future prosperity and power
depended on this altered political and geographical status quo in
East-Central Europe being legitimised by the international community:
We want to defend the dearly bought peace in accordance with the 
principles established at the Moscow and Teheran Conferences, 
through the development of mutual aid in relations between 
states, through the practical implementation of the principles of 
common security and our participation in its international
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organisation. SQ
The reference to the Moscow and Teheran Conferences was added by the 
editors.
In the PKN statute accepted on January 4, provision was made for a 
PKN Presidium with the power to agree to international agreements 
involving Poland. Any agreements which affected the borders of the new 
Polish state would need to be ratified by the future Polish 
parliament. 53
The work done on the PKN programme was not made redundant by 
Stalin's later move to recognise the KRN in Poland as the body 
representing the Polish ‘democratic camp*. Polish communists in Moscow 
continued to embody the executive interests of this ‘camp*. In this 
capacity, the PKN programme went on to provide the basis for the 
manifesto of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN) in 
July 1944.
By December 1943, the detail of a comprehensive Polish communist 
foreign policy platform had become quite distinct. These positions had 
been continuously broadcast into Poland, hence the obvious parallels 
between the PKN and KRN programmes. Many of the formulations first 
appearing in the PKN programme or in Lampe's earlier articles were 
later extensively used by Gomulka and other Polish communist leaders 
in their own speeches and foreign policy publications.
On December 20 an article was published in Nowe Widnokrfgi 
presenting posthumously what was intended to be seen as the 
culmination of Lampe's work. It was entitled ‘Poland's place in the 
world*. The article set out what was seen as the favourable external 
conditions in which ‘democratic Poland* could now expect to be 
recognised by the Western powers and greater international community. 
These conditions included the political climate established by the
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Moscow and Teheran conferences; the treaty between Czechoslovakia and 
the Soviet Union signed on 12 December 1943 with its protocol 
forseeing the possibility of a third neighbouring state being 
eventually included;60 and the recognition by the United States, 
British and Soviet governments of Tito's Jugoslavian National 
Liberation Committee. These conditions all contributed to what the 
article called ‘the premises of the new system in Europe: the unity of 
Slavic democracy within a system of common security'.61
5*4 Central Bureau of Polish Communists
In the PKN conception, the PPR were relegated to one of a number of 
elements of the ‘democratic camp’ indicating that there was some doubt 
as to the utility of the new ‘Marxist-Leninist' party. From the middle 
of November no contact had been had with the PPR, and the news that 
Finder and Fornalska had been arrested led Dimitrov and the Polish 
communist leaders in Moscow to believe that in fact the PPR Central 
Committee no longer existed.62 This situation exacerbated the dilemma 
in which the Moscow based Polish communists now found themselves. At 
the same time as the USSR's international diplomacy was beginning to 
bear fruit, no organisation existed in the Soviet Union which 
represented the interests of the communists alone. Furthermore, the 
ideological fragmentation within the ranks of the ex-KPP members had 
to be overcome, since the Polish armed forces in the Soviet Union were 
continuing to expand and the ZPP was reaching ever wider centres of 
displaced Polish people. And now the PKN was to continue the ‘national 
front’ character of the old Comintern policy. This policy had always 
been predicated on the ‘front’ remaining under the control of the
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communists, something that could not be guaranteed in these 
conditions. Most importantly, every day the Red Army was drawing 
closer to the pre-1939 borders of German occupied Poland.
By the end of December, Dimitrov, now director of the External 
Information section of the Soviet Central Committee, and Manuilski, 
overseeing Polish policy for the Central Committee, called together a 
series of meetings of the communists within the ZPP and Polish Army 
Corps. In the course of these meetings it was decided to create the 
Central Bureau of Polish Communists (CBKP). On 10 January 1944, 
Berman, Mine and Wierblowski presented the constitutional document of 
the new communist organisation to Molotov.63
Knowledge of the existence of the Bureau was limited even among the 
Moscow Polish communist community since only communists 'entirely 
worthy of trust’, and not necessarily ex-members of the KPP 
(Wasilewska), were deemed fit for membership.6* Its organisation 
resembled the Political Bureau of a conventional communist party.
The CBKP consisted of seven members all of whom worked closely with 
Dimitrov and Manuilski: Aleksander Zawadzki, Chairman, and in charge
of liaison with the Soviet Central Committee, was also responsible 
with Karol £wierczewski (General Walter of the Spanish International 
Brigades) for the, political apparatus of the Polish armed forces in 
the Soviet Union; Berman was in charge of internal Polish affairs and 
with Stanislaw Radkiewicz, the Bureau's rapporteur, responsible for 
the new organisation's administration; Wasilewska oversaw the activity 
of the ZPP; Mine was given the task of producing the various social 
and economic projects to be implemented in Poland; and Wierblowski was 
in charge of the CBKP's propaganda through the ZPP and Ko£ciuszko 
radio station.65 Zambrowski also took part in the Bureau' s first 
meeting on February 2.
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The CBKP was created officially as the ‘external organisation of 
the PPR on the territory of the USSR’, to ensure close cooperation 
with domestic communists especially on the Polish territories 
liberated by the Red Army. It has been suggested, however, that 
members of the Bureau intended it to be the controlling body 
particularly with regard to the PPR.66 Gomulka himself suspected it to 
have been intended as a substitute Central Committee for the one which 
had been presumably destroyed by the Gestapo.67 The first contact 
between the two groups came in January 1944 when Leon Kasman arrived 
in eastern Poland with instructions from Dimitrov to make contact with 
the presumably leaderless PPR and People's Army organisation. Kasman 
was met with a considerable degree of hostility and mistrust from the 
Polish based communists, personified in the leader of the People's 
Army in the Lublin region, Mieczyslaw Moczar.6S This situation did 
nothing to alleviate the confusion among the PPR Central Committee as 
to the intentions of Dimitrov and Stalin. It soon became evident from 
the correspondence between the two centres that the CBKP regarded the 
leadership of the PPR as rather inept in dealing with the 
sophisticated problems of the USSR's international political strategy 
as they related to Poland. The Bureau considered the ‘naive’ and 
‘young’ PPR leadership ‘impatient’, *avant guardist’ and ‘brash*;63 
and if the CBKP was intended as the ‘external organisation of the 
PPR’, it did not even deign to inform the PPR leadership of its 
existence. Gomulka only learned of the Bureau's existence when he met 
with its members in Lublin in July 1944. His letters, and from 
February 1944 radio messages, were addressed to Dimitrov who relayed 
the information on to the CBKP. Dimitrov then acted as the conduit in 
the opposite direction, referring to the CBKP only as ‘circles 
connected to the ZPP*.70 ■
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On hearing from Kasman of the existence of the PPR Central 
Committee now headed by Gomulka (about whom not a great deal was 
known) and the creation of the KRN, Dimitrov immediately demanded that 
the KRN Manifesto be transmitted by Morse to Moscow.71 The result of 
this development was two-fold: the PKN was downgraded; and the PPR
began to come under strong pressure from Moscow to bring what were 
perceived to be its compromising radical KRN proposals for domestic 
reform in Poland into line with the policies established by 
Zambrowski, Mine and the PKN. Eligibility for entry into the ‘national 
front’ coalition government, still the favoured Soviet option, 
required a broad domestic policy approach.
In foreign policy, Gomulka's brand of activism with its emphasis on 
Polish security and prestige came close to the PKN approach and was 
not directly criticised. But the contrast with the line of the Soviet 
based Polish communists, now that Lampe no longer dominated, was quite 
significant. Being closer to the mechanisms of Soviet power, and now 
more than ever intimately aware of their reliance on this power, the 
Soviet based Polish communists began again to rationalise this 
reliance in a similar if rather more sophisticated manner to that of 
the original PPR Initiative Group leaders. Writing in February 1944, 
Jerzy Borejsza developed this theme in Nowe Widnokrfgi: * The 
development of foreign policy must be based on a familiarity with the 
real balance of international power’. Poland had as its eastern 
neighbour ‘the most powerful great power in today's world’, but ‘this 
does not make us uneasy*. Fortunately, this ‘great power bases its 
policies on deeply democratic principles’, and since 1918 ‘has always 
had a consistent line toward Poland’. Stalin, Borejsza continued, had 
clearly stated ‘that he would like to see Poland as a strong and 
independent state*.72 ■
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The Soviet leadership continued to favour the Moscow centre of 
Polish communist activity, while at the same time officially 
supporting the domestic communist elements in Poland. From March, the 
CBKP officially recognised the primacy of the PPR as the successor to 
the KPP, but continued its dispute with the ‘brash* PPR leadership. 
Little active support for the PPR was forthcoming. In one despatch to 
Poland, Dimitrov stated that there would be no more arms supplies for 
the People’s Army until such time as a PPR/KRN delegation came to 
Moscow and explained their position.73 While waiting for this 
delegation, the PKN proposals were postponed and the efforts of the 
CBKP to create a PKN type executive to take power in the wake of the 
Red Army advance were kept on the back-burner.7* With the arrival in 
May of the requested delegation led by Marian Spychalski, previously 
of the KPP and ZWW and now a member of the PPR Central Committee and 
head of the People's Army intelligence service, and Edward 0s6bka- 
Morawski, leader of the RPPS fraction in the KRN, the KRN option was 
confirmed in Moscow. So too were the CBKP's domestic proposals.
5*5 Polish Committee of National Liberation
On June 22 at a reception in the Kremlin for the PPR/KRN 
delegation, Stalin told those present that the time for creating a 
Polish administration based on the KRN was drawing near. The Red Army, 
Stalin said, would soon be crossing the Bug River, and the Poles 
should prepare themselves for assuming the responsibility of 
administering these 'liberated* lands.75 Meeting two days later, the 
ZPP executive passed a resolution finally recognising the primacy of 
the KRN, and accepting the KRN's authority to establish a provisional
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government.'7'5 The KRN was now being-made preeminent in an effort to 
give domestic Polish elements a higher international profile and 
prepare for the creation of an executive body intended to represent 
these domestic elements. In the first days of July, a second KRN 
delegation led by the commander of the People's Army, General 
2ymierski and including two members of the PPR aligned peasant group 
in the KRN, were brought to Moscow by the Soviet air force. Following 
the arrival of this second delegation, a series of meetings were held 
between all the KRN delegates and the executive of the ZPP.
On July 15, Wasilewska, Chairwoman of the ZPP Presidium, and 
0s6bka-Morawski, Vice-President of the KRN, sent a letter written by 
the CBKP's Polish affairs specialist, Jakub Berman, to Stalin, 
recommending the immediate creation of a provisional Polish government 
as the executive organ of the KRN ‘legislature’. Berman's letter 
asserted that the political situation within Poland had matured 
sufficiently for the creation of a communist based administration, 
since no other national representative organ existed. This fact, 
Berman wrote, was being exploited by rival elements both within Poland 
and outside, who were putting forward the possibility of a Russian 
occupation. The creation of such an administration, the letter said, 
would quicken the, disintegration of opposition forces in Poland, and 
bring about the consolidation of communist power. 77
In talks with General 2ymierski that same day, Stalin made it plain 
he was favourably disposed to the proposition contained in the Berman 
letter, but of the opinion that the administration created by the KRN 
should not yet be called a government. Instead, in consideration for 
allied sensitivities, Stalin suggested that it carry the title of 
‘National Liberation Committee’.'70 Two days later on July 17, the KRN 
delegates met with Stalin and agreed it was imperative a National
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Liberation Committee be formed. In the light of the most recent 
developments on the eastern front, the matter of an administration 
over the soon to be liberated areas west of the Curzon Line needed to 
be rapidly settled.
At a special meeting the next day of an expanded ZPP Presidium, 
including all the KRN delegates and members of the CBKP, a committee 
of three, 0s6bka-Morawski, Witos and Berman, was chosen to determine 
the list of candidates for the new administration. Its name had been 
changed and it was now being called the 'KRN Delegatura for the 
Liberated Territories' , a clear challenge to the authority of the 
Polish government's Delegatura in the rest of Poland.73
During this meeting, Berman and the CBKP decided on sending a 
letter to the PPR in Poland, advising the Central Committee of the 
creation of the KRN Delegatura and of the PPR's obligations in this 
regard. Two conditions were stipulated for the PPR if it was to 
successfully fulfill its task of providing the organisation on the 
ground in support of the new administration. Firstly, the policy of 
the ‘national front', even though it had been delayed, now needed to 
be implemeted consistently. The 'national front’ could only be created 
by inducing fundamental changes in the old parties, and toward this 
end, a ‘series , of concessions and compromises’ were needed, 
'introducing disunity into the camp of the [bourgeois] enemy without 
at the same time resigning from basic principles’, and 'establishing a 
suitable exit position for the future’. The second condition was for 
the PPR to conduct the sorts of domestic and foreign policies which 
would contribute to the maintenance of the unity of the three great 
powers in 'the spirit of Teheran’. Any moves which might establish 
Poland as a 'bone of contention* among the 'Teheran states’ would, 
without doubt, be ‘contrary to the goals of the Soviet Union*, and the
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' KRN as the basis of power would be left hanging*. Examples of
policies with this disruptive potential and which would be subject to 
the ‘concessions and compromises' necessary to strengthen the 
'national front’, were nationalisation, rural reform and the slogan of 
* People's Poland’. eo
At a meeting the next day with Stalin, Molotov and General Zhukov, 
NKWD adviser on Poland, the list of KRN Delegatura members was
presented to Stalin, at which stage he gave his final approval for its
creation. On July 20, the same day as the Red Army crossed the Bug
River, the KRN Delegatura began its activity. It held three meetings 
and also met at different times with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister 
Vyshinsky, Molotov and Stalin.01
The third meeting dealt with the manifesto for what was now again 
being referred to as the Polish National Liberation Committee (PKWN). 
Immediately before this third meeting, Molotov had approached the
participants with the proposal that they change their title.
‘Delegatura* was evidently too modest, where the title ‘National
Liberation Committee’ would put the Polish administration on an equal 
footing with other such committees in France and Yugoslavia, Stalin's 
original conception. At a meeting later in the evening, Stalin
suggested Lublin as the temporary seat of the Liberation Committee and 
gave the go-ahead for the immediate release of the manifesto. It was 
published in Poland on July 22. 0:2
The basis for the PKWN Manifesto became the previously prepared PKN 
programme, now given greater declaratory style. Lampe's argumentation 
was cut down considerably. Gone were his rather imprecise references 
to a foreign policy for the winning of the peace after the war. Gone 
also were the sensitive references to the Riga Treaty of 1921 and the 
previous Polish-Soviet borders as being contrary to Poland's national
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interests. Following on from the call to support the Red Army entering 
Poland, the PKWN Manifesto provided for:
* the ‘return* to Poland of the ‘old Polish lands’ of Pomerania, 
Lower Silesia and East Prussia, wide access to the Baltic and a 
Polish-German border on the Oder;
* the creation of a ‘great Slavic dam* based on an alliance between 
Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, to prevent any further 
eastward German imperialism, this alliance being the cornerstone of 
the PKWN*s foreign policy;
* an historic turn in Poland's eastern policies, from conflict to 
cooperation with the Soviet Union and its nations, determined by 
mutual interest and recognition of the right of the Ukrainian, 
Bielorussian and Lithuanian Soviet states to their ethnic lands as 
the basis for a settlement of the eastern border question;
* deepened friendship and alliance with Great Britain and the 
United States as a result of the mutual wartime experience, with 
France on the basis of tradition, and cooperation with all 
democratic states;
* a declaration to the effect that the new Polish foreign policy 
would be democratic and based on the principles of common security;
* a demand for war reparations from Germany.
The manifesto effectively combined all the previous PPR and ZPP
formulae into a single platform of policies, with a simple message:
the new administration wanted to be seen to be a conventional
government, the continuator of a realistic and pragmatic foreign
policy based firmly on national interests. It counted on its foreign 
policy to provide international legitimacy in the same way as its 
domestic policies were designed to be as least offensive to the Polish 
population as possible. The foundation of the new Soviet alternative
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in Poland would be not simply alliance with the Soviet Union but
rather 'common security*, and more specifically, a Slavic alliance, a 
three way tie between Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, 
with a conventional external security focus —  defence against 
Germany. Poland's new foreign policy would be 'democratic'; the
‘turn’ in its eastern policies was labeled ‘historic’, but Poland's 
western policies would continue ‘on the basis of tradition and 
cooperation’. Here was a mix of new and old, revolutionary and 
establishment ideas which were brought together to give the new
administration the firmest possible base from which to begin its 
international activity.
But the mainstay of this base continued to be the military and
diplomatic power of the USSR. The mix of old and new was a mix of
national interest with the internationalist interest, and in the 
conditions in which the PKWN was created the internationalist interest 
inevitably remained paramount. Created as part of the Soviet 
leadership's Polish policy, the Polish National Liberation Committee 
could now look forward to the internal security of the Polish state it 
was to establish being inextricably linked to that of the Soviet 
state. This linkage applied just as firmly to the question of the new 
Poland's territorial security. The policy issue of the eastern borders 
had been settled some time previously by the KPRP at its Second 
Congress in 1923. Since then, policy had changed little other than a 
change of tack once the Soviet Union had made good its strategic 
intentions in September 1939. After that date ZPP policy followed 
closely the signals received from Soviet diplomacy.
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5*6 Soviet Diplomacy and the Polish Borders
The ZPP had been under no illusions as to the ease with which the 
border changes in the east would be accepted by the Polish population: 
‘We cannot allow these borders to be forced upon us', Lampe had 
written in his April 1943 article. The new eastern borders needed to 
be 'proclaimed' by the Poles, and ‘accepted willingly’.04 Soviet 
policy was to work toward establishing a Polish post-war government 
which could undertake this role on the USSR's behalf. Both the Polish 
communists' task, and that of Soviet security policy, were
immeasurably helped by the positive attitudes taken in this regard by 
the two Western powers, Britain and the United States. Faced with a 
common enemy, the Soviet goal of securing its new western borders
seemed essentially realistic to the Western allies.
The ZPP, unlike the PPR, did not attempt to explain away the events
of September 1939. Instead, their policy was to take the new
territorial situation as given, and to explain why it needed to be the 
way the Soviet Union wanted it in terms of Poland's national 
interests. 35 Lampe's publicity work formed the bedrock of this policy. 
But the fact that Lampe was rationalising the Polish communist 
position from the standpoint of Polish national interests made the 
position no less reliant on signals from the Soviet leadership. Nine 
days after ‘Poland's place in Europe’ was published, the Soviet Union 
broke diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London; ten 
days after that, Stalin told the correspondent of The Times that he 
‘unquestionably’ wanted to see Poland 'strong and independent’. 
Whether or not Stalin had already made this view known to Wasilewska 
and Lampe or any other of the Polish communists in Moscow, after this
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date, Polish strength and Polish independence became the repeated 
slogans of ZPP propaganda.
As Lampe had written, the old eastern border of Poland ‘no longer 
existed* . It had been incorporated into the Ukrainian and Bielorussian 
Soviet Republics. No mention was made in his article, however, of what 
was to be the new eastern border. It was left to the reader to assume 
that this would be the German-Soviet demarcation line of 1939. In all 
the propaganda and publicity given this issue by the ZPP, the border 
line was never clarified. The ZPP ideological declaration, for 
example, stated only that ‘we demand not one inch of Ukrainian, 
Bielorussian or Lithuanian soil for ourselves’. 137 No signal had yet 
been given by Stalin on the precise nature of the eastern border in 
the way that the Oder and Baltic had been indicated in the west and 
north. The PKN programme in December 1943 simply said that 'a turn’ in 
Poland’s relations with Lithuania, Bielorussia and Ukraine was needed, 
nothing more. As a result, the task of the communist educational 
officers in the Polish army in the Soviet Union was made all the more 
difficult. That Poland's eastern border had to change was one matter; 
that it had to be the Soviet-German demarcation line of September 1939 
meant something altogether different for the soldiers who had been 
directly affected by the events surrounding that demarcation.
In the months immediately following the allied leaders' summit at 
Teheran, the ZPP increased its press coverage of issues relating to 
the border question. It was a period of intense political activity not 
only for the Polish communists in Moscow with the creation of the PKN 
and moves toward the establishment of the CBKP, but also for the PPR 
and its own creation of the KRN. The source of all this activity was 
the imminent arrival of the Red Army at the borders which it had 
already once crossed in 1939, with all that this implied for the
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settlement of the border issue. It was important that the ZPP present 
its policies as comprehensively as possible to prepare the ground for 
the alternative territorial conception to be accepted by the Polish 
population under the new communist administration. It also had to try 
to offset the personal feelings of the soldiers of the Polish armed 
forces under Soviet command, now returning to the regions from which 
they had been deported in 1939. The tenor of the argumentation 
presented in the press changed from a traditional internationalist 
emphasis on the general question of ethnicity and self-determination, 
to one of arguing the specific merits of the strategic benefits to be 
gained by Poland.00 On New Year* s Eve 1943, Wolna Polska carried a
lead article calling for ‘the liquidation of border disputes once and 
for all and the subordination of sentiments, even personal interests, 
to the matter of the future of the country’.03
On January 3, the Red Army crossed the old 1939 border. The ZPP 
celebrated this event with a lengthy article in Wolna Polska referring 
only to the anticipated western borders of Poland as part of the 
obligation all the allied powers had of ensuring that Poland was fully 
compensated for the injustices brought on her by Germany. Poland's
right, Leon Chwistek wrote, was to be guaranteed lasting security in 
borders which included Poland's ‘centuries old land’, in borders which 
were justified historically, economically and strategically. But above 
all, justice had to be done on moral grounds: the ‘criminal theft of
these lands’ from Poland had to be rectified.30
Soviet support for the ZPP's propaganda campaign on the Polish 
borders came soon into the new year. On January 5, a declaration by 
the Polish government was issued on the occasion of the Red Army 
crossing into pre-war Poland. It called for the USSR to respect Polish 
sovereignty and the rights and interests of the Polish Republic's
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citizens in the liberated areas.31 This brought an angry reaction from 
Stalin who had expected Churchill to have a greater impact on the 
official Polish position after the British leader's conciliatory 
assertions at Teheran. The January 5 statement was no Polish 
concession to British pressure. Just the reverse. It restated the 
Polish government's position ‘as the only legal steward and spokesman 
of the Polish nation recognised by Poles at home and abroad, as well 
as by the Allied and Free Governments'.3:2 Stalin understood that he 
could not rely on the British to do his work for him. His reaction was 
to publicise the Soviet position on the Polish borders, naming the 
Curzon Line, and linking this to the cause of allied unity, leaving 
little doubt in the process as to the as yet unpublicised position of 
the British and American leaders on the issue. The ZPP and PPR both 
immediately reacted to this signal, the former intensifying its 
educational work among the soldiers of the Polish army in the USSR, 
the latter giving the Soviet policy a stamp of approval by way of a 
KRN resolution. The Polish communists were at last able to go further 
in their press treatment of the eastern border than their previous 
generalities.
The Soviet response to the Polish government declaration merits a 
brief review. On January 11, the American ambassador, Averill 
Harriman, was summoned to the Kremlin to receive the declaration from 
Molotov who hoped it ‘would be found to conform to the spirit of the 
conversations at Teheran with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill’.33 It set out, Molotov said, to correct a number of 
assertions in the Polish document, among other things, on the Polish- 
Soviet border: ‘As is known, the Soviet Constitution established the
Soviet-Polish border in accordance with the will of the population of 
the Western Ukraine and Western Bielorussia, expressed in a plebiscite
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which was carried out on a wide democratic basis in 1939* . In this 
way, the declaration stated, the injustice of the Riga Treaty imposed 
on the Soviet Union in 1921 was rectified. After talking of the 
‘reliable basis for a solid and permanent friendship* between Poland 
and her eastern neighbours, the declaration mentions the ZPP and 
Polish Army Corps formed by the ZPP which was fighting alongside the 
Red Army in the liberation of Poland. In the next line we read: ‘There 
opens up at present the possibility of the regeneration of Poland as a 
strong and independent state*, and that ‘Poland must be reborn not by 
means of the seizure of Ukrainian and Bielorussian lands, but through 
the restoration to Poland of lands which belonged to her from time 
immemorial and which were wrested from Poland by the Germans’.-'4
This phraseology, very close to the ZPP's own statements, provided 
a clear reaffirmation of the role intended for the Polish communists 
in Moscow: Poland's 'regeneration' and ‘rebirth’ could not take place
without eliminating the political as well as territorial baggage of 
the past. The ZPP reacted with satisfaction to this public show of 
support. And in Poland, informed of the Soviet statement by way of 
TASS and Ko6ciuszko radio, the KRN at its second sitting on January 
20, passed a resolution supporting the Soviet position as ‘objectively 
correct’.35
On January 15, in a lengthy article by Jerzy Borejsza, now editor 
of Nowe Widnokrggi, the case for the new Polish eastern border was 
put. Restating the position announced in the Soviet statement, 
Borejsza integrated the new, more specific policy into what had 
already been written on the issue. He sought to justify the Soviet 
territorial fait accompli on the grounds of de facto legality, 
emphasising the flexibility which the Soviet position seemingly 
displayed. 30 A week later, Hilary Mine, now considered the ZPP* s (and
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CBKP's) foremost economic spokesman, published an article outlining 
the economic benefits for the Polish state from being physically 
shifted to the west. Mine's case was based on the argument that such a 
shift would enable Poland to move from an agricultural base to an 
industrial base, thereby creating the potential for Poland to become a 
major force in East-Central Europe. 37
At the same time as Churchill and the Soviet ambassador to the 
Polish government, Victor Lebiediev, increased their pressure on the 
government to accept the Soviet terms ;—  the acceptance of the Curzon 
Line and the removal of four anti-Soviet members of the Polish cabinet
—  without success, ZPP foreign policy was being developed further,
and on the issue of the future Polish-Soviet border in particular. In 
May, Nowe Widnokrggi published a lengthy article presenting a history 
of the pre-war border, its basis in the political nature of the inter­
war Polish regime, and the need for it to change.30 By June 1944 the 
Red Army had recaptured virtually the entire expanse of territory lost 
to it in the German invasion and was preparing to enter territory 
recognised as Polish.
In this situation, the way was clear for the communists in Moscow 
to push their alternative policies. In his July 15 letter to Stalin 
recommending the creation of a provisional Polish government, Berman 
wrote that not only would such a body quicken the consolidation of 
communist power in Poland, it would also make it possible for Polish- 
Soviet relations to be brought back into the realm of inter­
governmental diplomacy, and enable an international agreement on the 
Polish-Soviet border to be signed:
The most urgent task is the acceptance by the Provisional Polish 
Government of the Curzon Line as the basis on which to settle the 
border between Poland and the Soviet Union, and also as the
demarcation line between the Soviet and Polish administrations.33
Soon afterward, at the July 20 meeting with Stalin, Molotov and the
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General Zhukov, Stalin set out the priority goal of the new Polish 
administration:
As soon as it is made public that the [KRN] Delegatura has 
organised itself, an agreement will be reached between it and the 
Soviet Union regarding the demarcation line with the Soviet 
administration and the Polish administration. 100
Preparatory talks on this agreement began on the same day as 
Stalin's instruction were received. A KRN Delegatura sub-committee 
established at the first of the meetings on July 20, dealt 
specifically with this issue, staying in constant touch with Molotov 
and the Soviet military authorities. As well as establishing the 
demarcation line, the agreement was to regulate the status of the Red 
Army on Polish soil. The details, therefore, depended very much on the 
operational requirements of the Soviet military. The earlier December 
1943 agreement reached between Benes and Stalin provided the model 
from which the Delegatura sub-committee now proceeded. On July 23, 
after the creation of what was now the Polish Committee of National 
Liberation had been announced by Moscow radio, the now official 
negotiations between the PKWN and Soviet government on the subject of 
the Polish-Soviet demarcation line began in earnest. Stalin, Molotov 
and Zhukov conducted the Soviet brief personally.
The PKWN position continued the traditional Polish communist policy 
of an ‘ethnographic’ border running along the Curzon Line, now with 
agreement from the Soviet side that adjustments were to be made where 
possible to the benefit of Poland. The Soviet negotiating position was 
that the entire eastern Polish border was a crucial element in Soviet 
strategic defence considerations. Concessions would, however, be 
allowed where these considerations were not pressing. So, for example, 
concessions were made to the Poles in the Bialowieska Forest (with 
0s6bka-Morawski threatening to resign as Chairman of the PKWN if these 
were not made) and in the south-east near Suwalki. Taking advantage of
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this seeming flexibility in the Soviet position, the PKWN negotiators 
went on to ‘postulate' the inclusion of the whole of East Prussia into 
Poland.101 On this issue the sides finally settled on the ‘Teheran 
formula’ with Stalin reiterating the need for a Soviet clear water 
northern port in Kdnigsberg. 102
The negotiations did little to change what had already been decided
in the Soviet interest. The Polish side satisfied themselves with the
small gains given at the behest of Stalin, while on the major issues 
of the oil fields in south-eastern Galicia they made very little
impact. On the other hand, within the little room to raanouver granted 
them by the Soviet position, the Polish side did stress its interest, 
even if unsuccessfully, in gaining as much territory as possible. 
Drobner wrote in his memoirs of the 'heated defence’ of the Polish 
position. 103
Where the PKWN negotiators saw their major quid pro quo was on the 
position of Poland's western borders. 0s6bka-Morawski wrote in his 
memoirs that the PKWN position was very much to ‘resign from the lands 
in the east’, and to direct every effort into gaining the western
territories from Germany. 104 Most of the western territories had 
already been gained for Poland through the agreement of the allied 
leaders at Teheran. The line of the Oder River had been well 
established in ZPP foreign policy and there was no reason to believe 
that the Soviet side would change its position on this important 
question. What had not yet been decided was to what extent the Oder 
would be a wholly Polish river what would be the Polish-German border 
in Upper Silesia. On this question the PKWN negotiators sought their 
greatest success.
In their discussions on the issue of Poland's western borders, the 
allied leaders had consistently opted for a line running from the
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Baltic along the Oder to its junction with the Neisse River, then
along the eastern Neisse to the Czechoslovak border, thereby leaving a 
large area of Silesia still within Germany. It was now suggested by 
the PKWN that the border run along the western Neisse, bringing the 
entire Silesian area into Poland. This suggestion had first been made 
at the July 15 meeting with Stalin who, being ‘convinced of the
rightness' of the Polish case, undertook to take up the matter with 
the rest of the Soviet leadership. 105 On the second day of the
negotiations, the PKWN representatives put the case for the Oder-
western Neisse line, arguing that this would shorten the Polish-German 
border to the greatest possible extent. The Soviet side immediately 
accepted the argument and wrote a guarantee of support for this PKWN
position at future international negotiations on the German borders
into the final agreement. This immediate Soviet approval, according to 
Wlodzimierz Kowalski, counted as an ‘unusually significant political 
and diplomatic success’ for the PKWN delegation.105 It was undoubtedly 
a success in terms of the use to which the PKWN negotiators had put 
their special relationship with the Soviet leadership. The new Polish- 
German border, the PKWN had argued, would strengthen new Poland's 
political and economic interests. So too, this argument assumed, would 
it strengthen Soviet security interests.
On July 26, the 'Agreement between the USSR and the Polish
Committee of National Liberation’ which was publicly signed did not 
include the agreement on the Polish borders. The signing ceremony was 
restricted to the administrative arrangements relating to the active 
military presence of the Red Army on Polish territory.1°7 Immediately 
afterward, however, Molotov made plain that some sort of agreement 
demarcating the extent of this administrative arrangement had been
reached. The Red Army had reached the ‘State border’ between Poland
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and the Soviet Union, he declared. Poland was now regarded by the USSR 
as a ‘sovereign, friendly and Allied State*. 1013
Churchill and Roosevelt had been insistent on the need for post-war 
Poland to be friendly toward the USSR in the interests of continuing 
allied cooperation and goodwill. It was from this position that they 
had been prepared to countenance the Soviet demands both for changes 
in the make-up of the Polish cabinet, and for greater security on the 
western Soviet border. For the two Western leaders, the issue of 
Poland's border with the USSR had been settled at Teheran. After the 
creation of the PKWN, it became the compositional aspect of the new 
‘friendly’ Polish administration which loomed largest, and even here, 
the ‘friendly’ administration established in Moscow began to receive 
their tacit support.
The efforts of the Polish communists to match their policy 
positions with those of the USSR were now paying off. The Soviet 
alternative which they represented, in the conditions of the war 
against Germany, contained an essential realism: there was no other
alternative. The PKWN leaders were later able to argue that no valid 
alternative to the Polish-Soviet border agreement they had negotiated 
had presented itself; nor, in the circumstances, could they have been 
reasonably expected to do anything other than to tie Poland to a 
security guarantee provided by the USSR as one of the principal 
members of the anti-German alliance and immediate neighbour of the 
Polish state. That this security guarantee contained a fundamental 
political commitment increased the viability of the ‘friendly’ new 
administration in the short term war strategies of the Western allies.
But the Polish communists had no intention of being only a short­
term phenomenon. Once in power, the ‘national front’ dominated
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domestic politics; in their foreign policies, the Polish communists 
began entrenching their political commitment to the USSR.
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6. LEGITIMIZING ‘NEW’ STATE SECURITY
The manner of realism shown by the Polish communists in 
establishing the PKWN owed as much to the tactical oversight of the 
Soviet leadership as to the Poles' own ideological instincts. The 
internationalist obligation in the conditions of the war after the 
German invasion placed control of the Polish communist movement firmly 
with Stalin and the remnants of the Comintern leadership, now shown to 
have been justified in the decisions of 1938 and 1943 to put greater 
reliance on Soviet diplomacy and less on Comintern solidarity. 
Stalin's war goals in Poland could now claim the support of the 
Western allies, where prior to the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop 
Pact these allies had been none too forthcoming in their pressure on a 
rather more anti-Soviet Polish regime. For the Polish communists, both 
from the PPR and KRN, and the CBKP and ZPP, joined in an executive 
formed as an element of the Soviet diplomatic effort, there could be 
little fear of once again being deserted by their Soviet ally. The 
PKWN owed far more to integral Soviet guidance than the KPP had ever 
owed; even its socialist and peasant activist members remained firmly 
under the influence of Soviet presence and power. Where the KPP, 
subject in its latter years to direct Comintern oversight, had 
remained ineffective and ideologically split, the PKWN, because of its 
non-communist appeal and its complete affinity with the Soviet 
diplomatic line, had the potential to be greatly more effective. 
Gomulka's brand of pragmatic ‘national’ communism fitted these needs 
very well.
The first goal of Soviet policy in Poland was to establish the 
security of its western border. Stalin's internationalist demands on 
the Polish communists were to provide the sort of administration which
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would rationalise this Soviet goal in terms of Poland's own security 
needs. Polish state security and Polish territorial security were to 
be fully catered for by the PKWN and presented as a legitimate element 
of the communist state's national interests. The traditional debate 
among the communists on the definition of state independence did not 
intrude on these fundamental policy goals. Only later, once the 
security goal had been achieved, would the conflict between the 
‘national* and ‘internationalist* interpretations of state 
independence again come to dominate policy. On neither wing of the 
expanded PPR was there any dispute as to the urgency of the security 
goal, and the integral place of this security to Soviet policy goals.
It was state rather than territorial security that became the 
overriding goal of Polish communist foreign policy once the PKWN had 
been installed in power in Lublin in July 1944. The equivalence 
between state and regime security was largely undisguised as the 
‘democratic’ regime sought to consolidate its newly received power. 
And in the conditions of the German retreat and Soviet advance across 
Poland, Poland's historical Primat der Aussenpolitik took on renewed 
force. The PKWN, a body with a limited natural domestic constituency, 
sought its authority through a foreign policy explanation of security 
—  the linkage between its brand of political realism and the Soviet 
alternative it offered. The most straightforward means of enhancing 
the new regime's security —  the international legitimacy which Soviet 
diplomacy could provide -—  was also the only realistic road toward 
ensuring the security of the ‘democratic* Polish state. This 
internationalist interpretation of the state security interest remains 
a foundation of the Polish communist state's authority to the present 
day.
The first step in this foreign policy process was the practical
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matter of establishing the mechanisms of policy; the next step was to 
give the new Polish-Soviet relationship an official basis; and the 
third step was to gain Western recognition by relying on a Soviet 
policy of total diplomatic support.
6*1 Policy Mechanisms
Very little indeed has been published in Poland on the actual 
creation of the PKWN's foreign policy administration.1 The following 
brief section is not intended to fill any gaps in this research. 
Rather, its theme is the continuity and practice of the traditional 
internationalist relationship in the earliest days of what had now 
become state Polish communist foreign policy.
With the arrival in Poland of the Red Army, along with the PKWN 
came the remainder of the previously secret Central Bureau of Polish 
Communists. All its members were immediately coopted into the PPR 
Central Committee, expanding this body to some eighteen members, 
approximately half of whom were the recent arrivals. In Moscow, the 
CBKP had succeeded in marrying the two domestic PPR approaches —  
Bierut's faith in Soviet power and Gomulka's tactical pragmatism. The 
PKWN Manifesto reflected the Moscow based communists' intention of 
wanting to appear realistic and conventional. At the same time, this 
policy took for granted the fact that the PKWN programme would only 
need to be accepted by the Polish population and international opinion 
de facto. It was to be implemented regardless of the opposition, and 
legitimised post facto by the institutions of the new state set up 
under PPR superintendence.
For this reason Gomulka was kept on as PPR First Secretary
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notwit h st anding the accusations made by Bierut and criticisms of the 
CBKP. His organisational and communication skills were highly valued 
and considered most necessary for the party's success in the new 
Poland. Bierut's loyalty to the USSR meant his views were 
instinctively close to those of the CBKP. As Chairman of the KRN, 
Bierut had the potential to play a preeminent state role in the new 
Poland. This was recognised early on. Officially Bierut maintained his 
distance from the PPR (in January 1945 during a KRN sitting, Bierut 
declared: ‘I am not tied to any party or political group'). This did
not prevent both him and Gomulka entering the new Politburo as members
of the wartime PPR. Jakub Berman, Hilary Mine and Aleksander Zawadzki 
were coopted from the CBKP giving this group clear superiority in the 
highest party body.
The Polish Committee of National Liberation was met with a great 
deal of hostility by the Polish government's Delegatura and wider 
population. Its leading members were little known and its political
programme created distrust for its over-optimistic domestic policy 
goals. Only three PPR members headed resorts in the PKWN, all of them 
ex-KPP members and recently arrived from the USSR: Stanislaw
Radkiewicz began his long career in charge of Polish internal 
security, Stanislaw Skrzeszewski was in charge of the education 
resort, and Stefan J^drychowski became director of the information and 
propaganda resort. The intention was for the party to maintain a low 
profile and pursue its ‘national front* policies by encouraging non­
communist support for the coalition executive.
At the PPR's first meeting in Lublin on August 5, Gomulka stressed 
that the party would not be keeping to the forms of communism, that it 
was not able in the circumstances to take a classic revolutionary path 
to power. The PPR, he announced, would be sharing its power and
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responsibilities with other parties and in this way work toward 
winning the support of the majority of the population. At the same 
time the PPR leader reminded his listeners that Poland needed to ‘live 
in good relations with the Soviet Union* if it wanted to be ‘strong 
and democratic’.2 This PPR strategy was not original. It was being 
applied by communist parties across eastern Europe. At a meeting in 
early October with a group of PPR leaders in Moscow, Stalin made the
point that the PKWN was not to apply revolutionary techniques, but was
to proceed softly for fear of their very lives once the Red Army had
advanced further to the west and left the Polish communists to
consolidate their own power. 3
While still in Moscow, the PKWN had based its organisation on the 
administrative apparatus set up for the Union of Polish Patriots. In 
Poland from July 28, it was cast onto its own resources and for the 
first month proceeded in a rather disorganised ad hoc manner.4 The 
original discussions in Moscow establishing the PKWN had forseen the 
appointment of Oskar Lange as director of the foreign affairs resort, 
continuing the position of the earlier discontinued PKN discussions. 
Stalin took up this matter with Roosevelt as late as 9 August 1944, 
and three days later received a negative reply. As an American 
citizen, Lange was obliged to obtain the authority of the United 
States government for his return to Poland. The US government, the 
President wrote, wanted to have nothing to do with providing personnel 
for the foreign affairs section of the Polish Liberation Committee 
which it did not recognise.5 0s6bka-Morawski, socialist leader of the 
PKWN, instead took on the foreign affairs portfolio himself. Berman 
was his deputy. In total, the PKWN foreign affairs resort at the 
outset consisted of six members: 0s6bka-Morawski, Berman, a principal 
representative, secretary and two executive officers. Its expansion
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followed the gradual increase in the Committee's international 
contacts so that by the end of 1944 it could boast a staff of around 
fifteen.5
On August 2 the PKWN was advised from Moscow that an official 
exchange of representatives was required. The Committee met 
immediately and without a great deal of discussion assigned the 
position to Wincenty Rzymowski, leader of the small Democratic Party 
participant in the ‘national front’ coalition. Rzymowski objected to 
his appointment among other things on the grounds of his poor health, 
and nine days later his place was taken by a person better known to 
the Soviet leadership, J§drychowski.7
The Moscow post came to play a crucial role in this earliest stage 
of Polish communist foreign policy. For some months it remained the 
Liberation Committee's sole foreign post. It formed, in effect, an 
'affiliate' of the office in Lublin and later Warsaw, rather than a 
subordinate organ.3 Nearly all of the PKWN's diplomacy was being 
directed through Moscow. Its initial contacts with Western governments 
were through their embassies in the Soviet capital. The Moscow post 
was also the base from which delegations from Lublin and then Warsaw 
could discuss policy with their Soviet counterparts.
Such discussions took place frequently at the highest level. Issues 
such as the status of the Red Army as an occupying power in Poland, 
war reparations from East Prussia, the creation of further Polish 
military units in the USSR, were all of sufficient importance to 
require the presence of Bierut, Osdbka-Morawski and 2ymierski, now 
Commandei— in-Chief of the Polish Army, in Moscow. These talks would be 
not only with Molotov or Vyshinsky, but often also with Stalin. As 
related by Osdbka-Morawski, Stalin 'was personally interested and 
himself decided on many details in the area of Soviet cooperation with
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Poland' . ® .
On their return to Poland, the PKWN leaders rarely left the detail 
of such discussions to the executive authority of their subordinates. 
They themselves would see to the implementation of the Soviet 
'advice*. The Committee's various resorts were not yet very large and 
relied a great deal on the presence of Soviet personnel for their 
wider effectiveness; but the frequency of the high level contact with 
Moscow made it unnecessary for any Soviet ‘adviser* to be directly 
appointed to the PKWN foreign affairs resort.
Berman, while deputy to Osobka-Morawski, dominated the policy
process. His presence spoke of the weight attached to the direct
Soviet input into Polish foreign policy and the control the Polish
communists wanted to retain over that policy. His was a role long ago
established in the USSR, as instructor of the new Polish communist
cadres and go-between for the Soviet party leadership. Now he was
installed as the prime mover behind the new Polish foreign policy. As
one observer recalls it:
Jakub Berman was the principal figure in the foreign affairs 
resort. . . . Lasting days and nights at the telephone connected 
directly with the Kremlin [he] was a meticulous executor of 
instructions received without even a margin of interpretation in 
the Polish interest. 10
Berman's attitudes were not too far distant at this early stage to 
those of Gomulka. It was essential for the security of the new regime 
that this ‘cooperation’ with the USSR be institutionalised as quickly 
as possible. This could best be achieved from the Polish side by 
staffing the administration with PPR members, people who would accept 
the new reality and work with it, explaining their decisions with 
reference to the greater Polish 'democratic* interest. It was in this 
sense that Gomulka made the following remarks at a Lublin party 
conference in November 1944:
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The battle for democratic Poland is today above all a battle for 
the state apparatus. . . . All the leading positions in the state 
administrative apparatus, all the units of the nation1s armed 
forces, also the judiciary, must be filled with people tied with 
all their fibre to the Polish democratic camp, who think in the 
same categories as the democratic government. 11
For Gomulka, Berman and the leaders of the Liberation Committee,
everything could be justified in the fight for their new ‘national
front’ regime to be established and secured. 12 Without the aid of the
Red Army or the Soviet ‘advisers', particularly in the security
services, this goal could not have been so quickly achieved.
In public the argument was reversed. Rather than the Red Army and 
Soviet security forces helping the Polish communists come to power, it 
was the new Polish authorities who were preventing the Red Army 
implementing an even worse alternative. This was Gomulka1 s ‘national’ 
communist perspective, the alternative to the traditional spectre of
communism in Poland as leading inevitably to a Polish Soviet Republic
and integral incorporation into the USSR. But the definitive 
declaration of this position was made not by Gomulka in Poland, but by 
Bierut and Wasilewska in Moscow.
On August 7, a Polish government delegation led by Mikolajczyk met 
with representatives of the PKWN in an attempt to narrow their 
differences. It was far better for the Poles to retain their own
control over internal affairs during the period of liberation than it 
was for the Red Army to come in as an occupying army, Wasilewska
advised the London delegation: 'The Soviet authorities will not be
interfering with our internal affairs’, she concluded. On the second 
day of talks, she continued in much the same vein: if a ‘democratic’
system was established in Poland, if the Soviet government saw that 
there was no activity against it in Poland, then certain concessions 
were sure to be gained at a later stage. 13 Bierut added his more 
equivocal support to the ‘national’ position:
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We are not Soviet agents. We do not want to sovietise Poland. All 
we want is a democratic Poland and the destruction of the 
reactionaries. 14
Most important for both he and Wasilewska was that the entry of the 
Red Army into Poland be on the basis of international norms, 
specifically, an agreement negotiated between sovereign governments.
6*2 Institutionalising Polish-Soviet Relations
Externally, the PKWN was not presented as a formal government; its 
form remained that of a National Liberation Committee willing to 
accept other political groups as partners toward the goal of forming a 
coalition government in the future. The impression being created was 
that the Polish state would be represented by a wider domestic 
constituency in its institutions than only the communists and their 
allies.
But there was little concern on the part of the PPR or PKWN leaders 
that the international diplomacy of the USSR would allow a fundamental 
reorganisation of the political institutions now being installed. In 
its formal recognition of the PKWN on August 1, the Soviet side had 
stressed the new authorities' nature as a provisional national 
liberation committee; the reality was that the Soviet leadership had 
already recognised the PKWN as a de facto government in its agreement 
on administrative demarcation signed, on July 26. The statements made 
by Molotov recognising the advance of the Red Army onto the territory 
of an allied state served to confirm this status. 1®
The Soviet side went further still. On August 2, the PKWN was 
advised of the appointment of General Bulganin, member of the VKP(b) 
Central Committee, as Soviet representative to the PKWN. At the same
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time the Kremlin removed the right of the Polish government in London 
to be represented in the USSR by the Australian Embassy. Bulganin was 
received two days later at Lublin airport with full state ceremonial. 
At the same time Soviet tactics with regard to the Warsaw Uprising 
made it plain that talk of a wider popular political concensus would 
be limited to Soviet aligned groups. In September, Bulganin chose the 
congress of the PPR aligned Peasant Party to make the point that the
PKWN could count on the Soviet government to support it against its
enemies, particularly those in London. The USSR, he said, trusted the
PKWN completely. There was no question of it ever losing that 
support. 1-7 Nothing in Stalin's public statements or in his private 
assurances to the PKWN leadership gave any reason to contradict this 
understanding. Soviet diplomatic actions added further to the PPR and 
PKWN leaders' confidence. Soviet diplomacy in Moscow and in the West 
worked wholeheartedly for the recognition of the PKWN, and in the 
absence of their own facilities the Liberation Committee made use of 
the Soviet Foreign Service network as often as it was made available.
In return, the PKWN began the creation of the new" foreign policy 
climate within Poland, the perceptual institutionalisation of the 
Soviet alternative. The old enmity traditionally shown by the Poles 
toward their eastern neighbours was to be changed to an enduring 
friendship. 0s6bka-Morawski announced the new policy in one of his
first speeches as leader of the PKWN. Speaking in Lublin on August 27, 
he sought to define the change in terms of the difference made by the 
regime in power:
If through whole centuries there has not been agreement between 
the Poles and the nations of the Soviet Union, then the reason 
did not lie in objective conditions, nor in the explanation that 
the fraternal Slavic nations cannot find a common language with 
which to come to an agreement. The fault for this lack of 
agreement lay solely on the side of the imperialist governments, 
not with our nations.10
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Over the next few months, this theme was repeated many times by the 
PKWN Office of Information and Propaganda directed by J^drychowski, at 
the same time acting as Polish representative to the Kremlin. 19 From 
September 1944, this office was given ‘foreign propaganda’ as one of 
its reponsibilities by the Central Committee. Until the expansion of 
the new administration's international contacts from the summer of 
1945, ‘foreign propaganda’ came to mean a campaign for re-aligning the 
common Polish perception of the USSR from traditional foe to new-found 
f riend.20
Externally, institutionalising the intense Soviet political support 
was important for more immediate reasons. If wider international 
recognition for the new Polish authorities was to be gained, it had to 
be on the basis of mutuality. For the PKWN this meant being seen as 
more than an apendage of Soviet power in Poland. The Committee's 
leaders were concerned with projecting their image as competent 
representatives of Polish national interests. Therefore, they needed 
to establish a footing with the USSR which would allow them a 
distinctly Polish voice in international affairs while at the same 
time taking for granted the political responsibilities of communist 
internationalism.
Polish-Soviet relations had already been taken some distance down
this road by the administrative agreement of July 26. Its publicity
value for the Polish side lay in its close relation to the agreement
reached between the Czechoslovak government in London and the USSR in
December 1943. 0s6bka-Morawski was to later write in his memoirs:
As was known, the Czechoslovak government under the presidency of 
BeneS was based in London. The contents of the Czechoslovak- 
Soviet agreement were endorsed by the Western powers; therefore 
there was no conflict with their understanding of the conditions 
of cooperation between allied countries. This meant that nobody 
could accuse us of establishing an agreement which would hamper 
the recognition of the PKWN by the Western powers as the 
provisional Polish government. If an analogical agreement with 
the Czechoslovak government located at that time still in London
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did not collide with the interests of the Western powers, then 
with regard to Poland the issue was the same and there could not 
be any talk of a one-sided agreement targeted against the 
interests and policies of the Western powers in this part of 
Europe. 21
The Czechoslovak treaty provided for administration to be taken over 
by the local Czechoslovak authorities immediately the Red Army had 
freed the area from German occupation. Osdbka-Morawski saw it as 
essential that the new Polish authorities be accorded equally positive 
terms in practice as well as theory.
From the internationalist point of view, the July 26 agreement set 
up the mechanisms for preparing the conversion of Poland from a 
bourgeois enemy into a ‘democratic* ally. Supreme power on Polish 
territory for the duration of the war was vested in Stalin as Soviet 
Commander-in-Chief, while the PKWN was given sole responsibility for 
establishing civil administration within the country. Article 7 
rendered the Polish civilian population subject to Polish military law 
and executive regulation, with article 8 subordinating the Polish 
military to the Soviet Commander-in-Chief as long as active military 
operations continued. In the immediate zone of such operations, 
offences against Soviet troops by Polish civilians were made directly 
subject to the authority of the Soviet Commander-in-Chief.22
The July 26 agreement created a psuedo-legal status for the anti- 
Home Army operations of the regular Red Array and NKWD troops. Since 
February 1944 and the onset of the ‘Tempest* operations of the AK in 
eastern Poland, the Soviet military had been systematically disarming 
AK units, imprisoning their officers, enlisting the soldiers in the 
Polish Army Corp under Red Army command, or simply allowing them to 
disperse. Along with the AK, members of the Delegatura administration 
were also arrested, leaving the way clear for the return of the Soviet 
officials in office prior to June 1941. These methods continued after
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July 1944 into the areas deemed by the demarcation agreement to be 
under the administration of the PKWN.
But the agreement's official status, as suggested by 0s6bka- 
Morawski, relied to a large extent on the acknowledgement of the 
legitimacy of the PKWN-Soviet relationship by the Western allies. This 
acknowledgement the allies were unwilling to give. While the Committee 
had not yet been transformed into a government, it remained difficult 
for the PKWN to generate anything other than sympathy from even the 
most pragmatic Western governments. The Western allies were finding it 
exceedingly difficult to countenance the idea of exchanging 
recognition of the Polish government in London, notwithstanding its 
political intransigence, with that of an unknown liberation committee.
In fact, the agreement's status owed more to the success of Stalin 
and the Soviet leadership in executing their their policy of fait 
accompli in Poland, presenting the Western allies with little option 
but to accept the Soviet endorsed status quo. The Soviet side had not 
deemed it wise to confront the Western allies with the border 
agreement settled at the same time as the administrative demarcation. 
Its publication would have jeopardised Churchill's efforts to extract 
concessions from the Polish government in London on Stalin's behalf. 
The ratification of this protocol came only (if almost immediately) 
after the new Polish government had been recognised by the Western 
powers in July 1945.
In contrast to 0s6bka-Morawski's concern for Western sensibilities, 
the primary role of the USSR in determining the facts on the ground 
presented few difficulties for the Polish communists. The wide powers 
deeded the PKWN were testimony to the unspoken intention incorporated 
in the administrative agreement that as soon as the international 
situation permitted, the Committee would be formally transformed into
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a fully fledged government with the recognition of the USSR. Indeed, 
Gomulka and other communist leaders were already referring to
themselves as ‘the government’.
Towards the end of 1944, the international situation had developed 
sufficiently in the Soviet favour for the change to be made. Both
Churchill and Roosevelt (re-elected for a fourth term) had given clear
indications of their support for the position of the PKWN on the 
question of the Polish-Soviet borders, the issue most at odds with the 
policies of the Polish government in London. On December 15, Tomasz 
Arciszewski, Mikolajczyk's successor as Premier in London, and 
Churchill, both held press conferences where they expressed 
diametrically opposed views on this issue. 23 The Western allies were 
less prepared to accept the Soviet leader's demands over the 
composition of the new Polish administration. But with the military 
situation in Europe stablilising, the need for Stalin to continue
appeasing his Western allies was diminishing. Little progress had been 
made in Moscow in discussions between Stalin and Churchill, and 
between representatives of the Polish government and members of the 
PKWN. The Soviet side, as a result, was left with the clear 
alternative of 'upping the ante’, and proceeded to consolidate still 
further the diplomatic position of the Polish communists.
In reply to a message from Roosevelt on December 20 requesting that 
the Soviet government refrain from recognising the ‘Lublin Committee 
as the Polish government’ , Stalin replied seven days later that he 
could no longer delay in recognising the change since ‘the Soviet 
Union is interested more than any other state in strengthening 
Poland's socialist and democratic rights’ . 2/t Stalin also issued 
another message to the Western media insisting that he wished to see 
Poland ‘strong and independent’, and with allies not only in its
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eastern neighbours, but also with the great powers of the West —  
France, Great Britain and the United States. 25
At the same time, the PKWN information and propaganda resort began 
its first full-scale propaganda campaign. Its goal was to generate the 
impression of overwhelming public support for the move from National 
Liberation Committee to Provisional Government. Unlike what was 
labelled as the ‘secret and undemocratic’ policies leading to the 
September 1939 defeat, the new Polish foreign policy was to be open 
and ‘democratic’: the PKWN's policies were in agreement with the will 
and interests of the nation, 0s6bka-Morawski wrote in December. 26 From 
the beginning of December the PPR and its aligned press reported daily 
on the surge of meetings and mass rallies across Poland. The communist 
and socialist press printed calls of support from various political 
and social groups, and statements from individuals backing the change. 
The change in form, according to the PPR, was necessary above all for 
foreign policy reasons: ‘Our society, our nation, understands that
■Poland's international position needs to be strengthened....’ The new 
administration in Poland needed to be able to put its demands 
regarding Germany and the new western borders not only as the ‘factual 
government, but also as the formal government’.2,7
As the formal government, it could also proceed to finally, and 
legitimately, institutionalise Poland's new foreign policy. On 2 
January 1945, the second day of the KRN sitting which formally changed 
the title of the administration to Provisional Government, 0s6bka- 
Morawski, now Premier and Foreign Minister, announced that following 
the precedent set by the PKWN, the new government would be ‘directing 
Poland's foreign policy onto new tracks’.263
The decisive character of these ‘new tracks’ became apparent later 
that day. 0s6bka-Morawski officially informed the Soviet government of
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the creation of the Polish Provisional Government and proposed that 
diplomatic relations be established with a formal exchange of 
ambassadors. The symbolism contained in the speed and diplomatic 
precision with which the new government now sought to establish its 
relations with the Soviet Union suggested a deeper reality. Three days 
later, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet replied that in the 
interests of maintaining and strengthening relations with ‘democratic 
Poland', it recognised the new government and appointed Victor 
Lebiediev ambassador to Poland. After Bulganin's return to Moscow on 
20, November 1944, Lebiediev had already been made the Soviet 
representative to the PKWN. This Soviet move added further symbolic 
meaning to the ‘new tracks’ policy. From the Polish side, Bierut, now 
officially President of the KRN, appointed Zygmunt Modzelewski, 
formerly of the KPP and ZPP, to replace J^drychowski as Polish 
ambassador in Moscow. 23
Two weeks later, the first foreign policy move of the new 
Provisional Government was to send a delegation to Moscow for general 
discussions on Polish-Soviet relations. Unlike the less formal visits 
of Bierut, Berman and other PKWN leaders, this visit was given wide 
publicity and touted as the logical result of the new government's 
excellent relations with its eastern neighbour. In the course of the 
visit, it was announced, the Polish side had taken the opportunity to 
express its willingness to establish a Polish-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, on the model of the earlier December 1943 Czechoslovak- 
Soviet treaty and more recent December 1944 French-Soviet treaty. It 
was agreed that negotiations toward this goal would be conducted 
through normal diplomatic channels. 30
Evident here was the desire of the Polish side to be seen as (and 
the willingness of the Soviet side to show) a bone fide government
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acting according to established procedures of international discourse. 
It was important for both sides that the Polish authorities now, more 
than ever, present a professional image. Plans for the next allied 
summit to be held in the Soviet Crimea were well advanced, and Stalin 
would be putting the Polish case on the basis of what the new
administration had already achieved in its domestic and foreign 
policies. Indeed, it had achieved a considerable amount.
During the course of the Yalta summit in February 1945, the PPR
held a Central Committee Plenum in newly liberated Warsaw, to which 
were also invited around 150 regional First Secretaries and party 
administrators. This was an important meeting, at which the ground 
rules for the implementation of the rural reform and nationalisation 
programme were to be established. It also dwelt for some time on
foreign policy. The timing of the Plenum shows the confidence with 
which the party was now treating its domestic and international 
policies. Domestically, there would be no turning back from the course 
set out by the PKWN; internationally, Soviet diplomatic strength could 
be relied on to put the Polish communist case.
The PPR was setting its sight on the future. The party was dominant
in setting the agenda for Poland's foreign policy, Gomulka declared.
It could be proud, of this fact, and needed to entrench this position
for the long-term good of the country and of the party. This was so,
since the PPR was the only political party in Poland with a tradition
of representing ‘sincere and friendly Polish cooperation with the
Soviet Union' . Every other Polish political tradition was opposed to
the PPR tradition:
And since the issue of friendly relations between Poland and the 
Soviet Union has been and is the corner stone of a correct Polish 
foreign policy, so the traditions of which the PPR is the heir 
have become a factor conducive to our taking a foremost role in 
the democratic front in Poland.31
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Friendly relations with the USSR were most importantly justified in 
terms of the security guarantee provided by Soviet power against 
another German invasion. Friendly relations were also the strategic 
goal established by the Western allies, determined to secure long-term
peace in Europe. On this basis the PPR were not to be disappointed by
the outcome of the Crimean Conference. The Soviet leaders showed yet 
again their ability to deliver on their promises of international 
support.
One last important step remained for the ‘new tracks’ of Polish 
foreign policy to be fully institutionalised. From the time that the 
Provisional Government had been recognised by the Soviet government, 
another propaganda campaign had been launched, this time to create the 
impression of public support for the signing of a Polish-Soviet Treaty 
of Friendship. In the weeks following the conclusion of the Yalta 
summit, this press campaign intensified. Gomulka contributed to the 
array of articles under a headline which ran: ‘Eternal friendship and
eternal alliance with the USSR the only guarantee of our independence 
and the foundation for international peace’, In the article, he called 
for an alliance of all the Slavic states which would form ‘the most 
enduring basis for peace among all the nations of ther world’.32
On the day after the Jugoslav-Soviet treaty had been signed in 
Moscow on April 13, the press again reported a series of meetings 
across the country demanding a similar treaty for Poland. 33 And for 
the next week a highly charged media atmosphere was maintained up to
and beyond the day the Polish leadership signed their own treaty in
Moscow. 3,4 The Polish delegation had arrived in Moscow on April 19, but 
the press first reported its presence two days later, the day the 
signing ceremony took place. On this day, April 21, the PPR Central 
Committee newspaper G2os Ludu (Voice of the People) was issued with a
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banner headline that ran: ‘The entire country demands a pact of
friendship and cooperation with the USSR as the basic principle of our 
security1.36 In the next days, the PPR newspaper reported an 
apparently spontaneous outburst of joy over the new accord: ‘Polish
society heartily greets the pact of friendship and cooperation with 
the USSR’; ‘The country manifests its joy’; and ‘Entire Poland greets 
[the treaty] with joy’.36
Whether this campaign was intended to impress in the Soviet capital 
and abroad, or meant for the domestic audience, it served to highlight 
the lengths the PPR was prepared to go in order to show its own
enthusiasm for Poland's ‘new track’ foreign policy. None of the 
principal Polish foreign policy makers were at all experienced in the 
mechanisms of government; their primary qualification was their 
willingness to accept the new reality and work within its
parameters.3"7 In preparing for the final step of committing Poland to
an alliance with the old enemy, the PPR and government leaders
doubtless looked to the propaganda campaign for their own reassurance. 
These were arguments designed not for their appeal to the reason of 
the wider Polish population. Rather, they were to create a certain 
perceptual momentum, an emotive foreign policy climate that would seem 
to leave little doubt, if only due to the vigour of the argument, that 
the treaty with the USSR was in the Polish national interest.
Modzelewski had steered the Polish brief in the Moscow discussions 
through the previous two months, and on the arrival of Bierut and 
Osdbka-Morawski there was little if any negotiating left to do. The 
form of the treaty was based on those already agreed to between the 
USSR and its other allies. Its content applied to the specific nature 
of the new Polish-Soviet relationship.
The intentions of the contracting parties were made clear in the
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treaty preamble. The two parties wanted to ‘consumate the radical turn 
in the history of Soviet-Polish relations toward friendly, allied 
collaboration', and facilitate ‘the further consolidation of relations 
between the Soviet Union and contiguous Poland'. As its focal point, 
the treaty took the ‘complete and final victory’ over Germany, and 
provided for the two parties to ‘render each other military and other 
assistance in this struggle’. Following the victory, the parties would 
'take jointly all the measures at their disposal in order to eliminate 
every threat of a repetition of aggression on the part of Germany or 
any other State which would unite with Germany directly or in any 
other form’. Collaboration between the two countries would be ‘in 
conformity with the principles of mutual respect for their 
independence and sovereignty as well as non-intervention in the 
internal•affairs of the other state* . 3,3
Poland was part of the ‘dam’ he was building against Germany, 
Stalin declared at the signing ceremony. Poland, especially, provided 
a crucial foundation stone for this dam. Casting his mind back to his 
time as Commissar in the Bolshevik administration, Stalin reminded his 
audience that twice in the last twenty-five to thirty years Germany 
had been able to utilise Poland as the launching point for an attack 
on the Soviet Union. This had been possible as previous Polish 
governments had refused to establish allied relations with the USSR. 
No longer would this be the case: 'The meaning of this treaty relies
on the fact that it liquidates the old, disastrous policy of playing 
Germany off against the USSR'. The new Polish government was a 
guarantee to the Soviet Union that no longer would Poland jeopardise 
Soviet security by attempting to balance between the two great 
European powers. 3S>
From the Polish communist point of view, the treaty provided the
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new government with a diplomatic boost at a time when the lack of an 
invitation to the inaugural San Francisco United Nations Conference 
had undermined its international prestige somewhat. It also served to 
strengthen the Provisional Government's position with regard to the 
Yalta sponsored Committee of Three negotiations going on in Moscow to 
resolve the question of the future expanded composition of the Polish 
government. But above all, the Polish-Soviet treaty cemented into 
place the 'new track’ Polish foreign policy, the momentous turn from 
conflict to ‘friendly, allied cooperation’. The cement was provided by 
the common ‘vital interests of the Soviet and Polish peoples’ in their 
defence before Germany. Polish security on this issue was Soviet 
security and vice versa. This ‘vital interest’ effectively gave notice 
that any international or domestic moves against the new political 
status quo in Poland were doomed to failure.
The Soviet successes at Yalta and the signing of the Polish-Soviet 
treaty not surprisingly gave the PKWN leaders a welcome feeling of 
their own success. They treated these international events as 
justification of their attitude that reliance on Soviet strength and 
diplomatic support was the only realistic policy for the new Polish 
state. The PPR, particularly, considered its role as the party in 
power to have been vindicated. In the words of one of the party's 
foreign policy spokesmen: ‘The PPR from the first moments appreciated
in full the role of the Soviet Union in these great historical 
struggles’.AO
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6*3 Western Recognition and Soviet Diplomacy
It was in working for the Polish administration's international 
recognition that Soviet diplomatic support most shined. Only with the 
recognition of the Western allies could the status quo embodied in the 
agreements reached between the USSR and new Polish authorities be 
understood to have valid international force. The three allies 
together were to determine the shape of the post-war settlement, and 
Stalin was concerned to establish the territorial gains resulting from 
the Red Army's advance westward as integral to that settlement. Soon 
after the arrival of the PKWN in Lublin, Mine made it clear that the 
building of socialism was to be postponed in the interests of having 
the ‘government's’ policies recognised not only by the Soviet Union 
but also by Britain and America: ‘...any other policy would not be
accepted by Russia' . 41
It was entirely due to the pressure brought to bear by Soviet 
diplomacy that the new Polish administration could boast any wider 
international recognition at all. Soon after the constitution of the 
PKWN, it became plain to the PKWN leaders that they would not be able 
to take the support of the Western allies for granted. On 25 July 
1944, notes had been sent by Osdbka-Morawski to the Moscow embassies 
of Britain, the United States, Czechoslovakia, France and Jugoslavia, 
informing them of the creation of the Polish Liberation Committee. 
Neither the British nor the Americans replied to the Polish message. 
The French and Czechoslovak representatives acknowledged the note and 
congratulated the Committee on the liberation of part of Poland. And 
in a personal reply from the Jugoslavian leader, Tito congratulated 
the Committee leaders and indicated that he would be prepared to
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recognise the Polish Liberation Committee in the future. 42
While not avoiding further approaches to Britain43 or other 
capitalist states (for example Sweden in October), it was clear to the 
new Polish authorities that the greatest sympathy could be expected 
from other governments or authorities in a similar political situation 
to themselves.
In the negotiations leading toward the establishment of a French- 
Soviet treaty, the Soviet side late in the discussions tied its final 
agreement to French recognition of the PKWN. Stalin made it plain that 
he was motivated by a wish to see Poland a firm Soviet ally, and 
recognised as such by the Western powers. France needed to understand 
'how fundamentally interested Russia is in the Polish issue’, Stalin 
told de Gaulle:
We cannot agree to a Poland which will at one time move against 
Moscow and another time against Germany. We want a Poland toward 
which its allies can feel real sympathy, as well as one which is 
decidedly anti-German. This would not be possible with the London 
government. It represents the soul of anti-Russianism which has 
always existed in Poland. On the other hand, we could come to an 
understanding with another Poland, one great, powerful, friendly 
toward France and the Soviet Union because it would be 
democratic. 44
De Gaulle resisted the Soviet pressure and continued to refuse to 
recognise the PKWN on the grounds that he lacked information regarding 
the situation within Poland, needed to take into consideration the 
British and American positions, and continued to recognise the Polish 
government in London. But faced with an altered Soviet position that 
reduced full recognition to a provisional exchange of representatives 
with the PKWN, de Gaulle finally agreed to the Soviet proposal. His 
relations with the Polish government in London could in this way 
continue to be maintained.46 Following the change in status of the 
Polish authorities from Liberation Committee to Provisional 
Government, no change was made to the status of the French
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representative in Poland, however. Stalin no longer had a lever with 
which to influence the French, and de Gaulle was not yet prepared to 
be seen to be out of step with the Western allies.
The Soviet leadership did have the necessary levers to convince the 
Czechoslovak and Jugoslavian governments of the need to officially 
recognise the Polish Provisional Government. The Czechoslovak position 
was that recognition could only come once the Polish side had made its 
position clear on the matter of the Polish-Czechoslovak border, and 
the disputed territory of Silesian Zaolzia in particular. This hardly 
satisfied the Soviet side which was able to call upon the firm 
obligation entered into by Bene§ at the time the Czechoslovak-Soviet 
treaty had been agreed to, that Czechoslovakia would recognise the 
Polish government immediately following the same action by the Soviet 
Union. The Czechoslovak authorities yielded. On 30 January 1945 they 
became the second government after the USSR to recognise the Polish 
Provisional Government. Jugoslavia became the third on March 30. The 
Jugoslavian recognition followed three months of negotiations in 
Moscow with Modzelewski, and a good deal of Soviet participation.46 No 
other countries followed the Czechoslovak and Jugoslav example.
Little immediate impression was made on this situation by the 
Crimean Conference in February. But for the Polish side, the fact that 
the Yalta talks were to include the Polish question was in itself a 
significant success. Soviet recognition of the Provisional Government 
had created another fait accompli position forcing the Western allies 
to debate the Polish issue on Soviet terms.47 Stalin's goals going 
into the Conference were consistent with his previous strategy over 
Poland: to strengthen the Provisional Government's domestic position
and make it possible for the Western allies to legitimise this 
position with their official recognition. 4,3 He succeeded admirably. He
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had informed Bierut and Osdbka-Morawski earlier in Moscow of his 
intentions, and was able to assure them that there would be no changes 
at all in his policy. 43
Nor did the outcome of the Conference require any changes in the 
PPR's policies. The statement of the three leaders at the conclusion 
of the Conference referred to ‘a strong, free, independent and 
democratic Poland’. These same words were in common use by the PPR 
press. In pursuing its ’democratic national front’ policy, the PPR
also accepted that the Provisional Government was less ‘broadly based’ 
than was possible, and since ‘the recent liberation of western Poland’ 
should be 'reorganised on a broader democratic basis with the
inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles 
abroad’. This Stalin had for some time been consistently working 
toward in his diplomacy with the Western allies; little, if any,
Western influence, pushing the previous Soviet position on 
reorganisation into unchartered territory, was visible in this 
Conference statement.
Having effectively achieved his purpose, there could be little
doubt that Stalin went on to agree to include the reference to free 
elections (‘This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall 
be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as 
possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot’) in the 
knowledge that these could never undo what had already been put in 
place in Poland. No mention was made in the statement of the Polish 
government in London; by implication, the allied leaders were content 
to see the reorganisation start from the 'Lublin Poles’ rather than 
London. On this basis, Western recognition was only a matter of time. 
Indeed explicitly so. Once the reorganisation had taken place and a 
Polish Provisional Government of National Unity created, the Western
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allies declared their intentions of establishing full diplomatic 
relations with this government.60
At a L6d£ conference of the PPR on February 18, Gomulka termed the 
results of the Crimean Conference ‘a big success for our party and the 
party line for a broad democratic front*.61 The negotiations to 
determine the non-communist aligned individuals to be invited to 
participate with the Provisional Government in forming the new 
Provisional Government of National Unity, were treated by the PPR as 
the continuation of previous negotiations between Mikolajczyk and PKWN 
in August and October 1944. The difference for the PPR was that these 
next negotiations were now within the framework of an agreement in 
principle largely on the PPR's own (and Soviet) terms.62 Throughout 
the discussions of the Committee of Three set up by the allied leaders 
to discuss the issue, from February to June 1945, Molotov remained in 
direct contact with the Provisional Government authorities, advising 
them of the conduct of the negotiations and the positions of the 
British and American ambassadors. Most importantly, Molotov provided 
the opportunity for his Polish counterparts to verify the credentials 
of the individuals suggested by the British and Americans for 
positions in the new Polish Government of National Unity. 63
Officially, the leadership of the Provisional Government could 
afford to be highly optimistic as to the outcome of the international 
talks to determine the future of the Polish administration. In his 
keynote speech to the seventh sitting of the KRN at the beginning of 
May, Osdbka-Morawski commented on what the Provisional Government saw 
as being its foreign policy success's so far:
* the recognition of the Provisional Government, and with it the 
‘democratic camp and its political programme’, by Poland's allies 
in the east and west;
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* the agreement reached by the three great powers at Yalta which 
accepted the legitimacy of the Provisional Government in Warsaw 
demanded by the majority of Polish people, and rejected the Polish 
government in London;
$ Poland's acceptance at the United Nations, being a recognition of 
the country's 'material and moral' weight in matters of European 
peace and security;
* the Polish-Soviet treaty.64
The Premier's enthusiasm for his government's foreign policy record 
ran somewhat ahead of the facts. Yalta could, of course, be counted as 
a resounding foreign policy success, but the Yalta decisions had yet 
to be implemented. The only countries marginally west of Poland to 
have formally announced their recognition of the Provisional 
Government had been Jugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Italy had been
persuaded from following this course by the British, and the Western
allies of the Soviet Union were in no way inclined to pre-empt the 
agreement reached on this issue at Yalta for the reason that 'the
democratic camp and its political programme' had had so little
competition in contributing to its own success.
On April 12, President Roosevelt's death brought Harry Truman to 
office. Immediately the tone of the exchanges between the Western 
allies and the Soviet Union over the Moscow negotiations for a new 
Polish Government of National Unity grew sharper. Should there be no 
understanding in this matter on terms amenable to the Western 
partners, the new US President informed Stalin, then the unity of the 
three allies and their cooperation in the future would be seriously 
set back.ss
The Soviet response was to increase its diplomatic activity on 
behalf of the Provisional Government. The first and most important
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move was the signing of the Polish-Soviet treaty, a powerful symbol of
Soviet support. Another area of activity was with regard to the
inaugural United Nations Conference to be held in San Francisco in
April. Poland was not included on the list of states invited on 5
March by the four powers, Britain, the United States, China and the
Soviet Union. Although the Polish government in London had signed the
United Nations Declaration on 1 January 1942, Britain and the United
States no longer considered this government to be representative; yet
the Polish government in Warsaw was clearly no more representative.
Only a government arising from the reorganisation negotiations in
Moscow would be recognised by the Western powers and until such time
Poland could not be represented at the UN Conference. This Western
position met with an official Polish protest:
The fact that the commission created at the Crimean Conference 
for consultations regarding Poland has not yet concluded its work 
can form neither the basis for ommitting Poland nor an obstacle 
to inviting the Government of the Republic to San Francisco.... 56
This note, sent on March 22, made little impact on the Western powers
and China, just as at the time the invitations had been discussed
among the inviting powers, the Soviet Union's argument that Poland
should be included since the Provisional Government held real power
throughout the country and had the support of the population, had also
been dismissed. 67
Osdbka-Morawski's official optimism also contrasted with the 
assessment being made at this time within the PPR leadership. At the 
same time as difficulties were beginning to be encountered with the 
Western attitude to the new Polish reality, within the PPR, groups 
opposing the official policy line were beginning to coalesce under the 
pressure of the growing wave of domestic antagonism and violence 
sweeping the country in the wake of the Red Army's advance. Old guard 
members of the KPP and young radical PPR activists branded the
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‘national front' policy of political alliance with other political 
groups, either communist aligned such as the PPS or independent as was 
being proposed by the negotiations going on in Moscow, as collusionist 
on the grounds that it underestimated the PPR's true strength within 
Poland. At the other extreme was the appearance of 'opportunistic 
tendencies, ideological irresolutness and a lack of resistance toward 
foreign, often clerical influences, ignoring class criteria and 
obfuscating the ideological face of the PPR’. sa
!Gomulka's preoccupation at this time was with the consolidation of 
the PPR* s domestic power. From the outset, however, domestic 
consolidation and the international environment had been inextricably 
intertwined, and PPR leader's attitudes to the regime/state security 
issue differed not at all from the position of the CBKP dominated 
Politburo. The Politburo now felt it had to provide an analysis which 
showed the correctness of its pragmatic policy line, an analysis which 
like the party's early war-time propaganda, would appeal to both wings 
of the PPR at the same time.
The forum chosen for the presentation of these arguments was the 
PPR's Central Committee Plenum in May. A week prior to the Plenum, on 
May 12, the city of Berlin had capitulated to the Red Army. While the 
allied powers enjoyed their victory, in Poland the PPR leadership now 
for the first time expressed its concern that all was not well with 
the international system. Confidence in the victory of the Soviet 
Union over fascism now turned to an appreciation of the difficulties 
arising as the great powers of world capitalism came to terms with the 
new found strength of European communism. 'Democracy' had won over 
fascism, the Plenum Resolution on Political Affairs stated, and now 
had the opportunity to establish international relations on the basis 
of ‘mutual trust and understanding’. Unfortunately, 'democracy' was
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being undermined by 'the forces of reactionary tendencies’. This did 
not mean that different social systems could not coexist with each 
other. On the contrary. For the sake of an enduring world peace and 
the development of ‘democracy’ within Poland it was imperative that 
the three great powers did coexist. Such coexistence would, the 
resolution pointed out, ‘hamper and delay backward and reactionary 
elements active within the group of allied nations’. The resolution 
continued:
In connection with the end of the war in Europe, these elements 
are activating themselves toward the goal of reinstating the 
bankrupt Munich policies, aimed against the growing wave of the 
democratic movement in the world, and the Soviet Union. Acting 
often under the mask of guaranteeing democratic rights to other 
nations, these elements are working to halt the process of 
removing from power the reactionary forces of various countries, 
towards splitting the unity of the bloc of allied states by 
isolating the Soviet Union, and as a result —  against all 
realistic premises and dominant tendencies amongst the allied 
nations —  they are speculating on the unleashing of a third 
world war, that is, a war against the Soviet Union. 63
The ideological backlash resulting from the end of the war in 
Europe in the PPR's view was due to ‘objective’ forces and as such 
unavoidable. What was important was that the process could be dampened 
by the forces of reason still very active among the Western allies. 
Even though the war against Germany had ended, the three great allies 
could not afford to fall out of each others' graces. Peace in Europe 
relied on their cooperation and while this situation continued Western 
reaction could only ‘speculate’. Worrying for the PPR, however, was 
what would happen once the post-war unifying power of the common 
German foe had ceased to be effective. Particularly worrying were the 
intimate connections between the wider international reactionary 
forces and what was being called the 'Polish Reaction’ led by the 
Polish government in London:
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This theory of a third world war is especially propagated by 
the Polish Reaction as a provocation with which to undermine the 
Provisional Government which sees its alliance with the world's 
democratic forces and especially its friendship and cooperation 
with the Soviet Union as the cornerstone of the security and 
independence of Poland. The dispute within the Soviet-British- 
American commission set up by the Crimean Conference for looking 
into the membership of the Provisional Government is a result of. 
the work of the Polish Reaction and supporting them the forces of 
reaction in other countries which would like to strengthen their 
own positions with the help of the Polish Reaction.
An objective analysis of the situation leads to the conclusion 
that the policy of reactionary and anti-Soviet elements tying 
their hopes to a third war, is unreal. All allied nations are 
aiming to organise a lasting peace, not a new war. An expression 
of this is above all the massive increase in the democratic
forces of all countries, expressed in elections to self-governing 
and parliamentary bodies, the deep sympathy which the world's 
democratic masses feel toward the Soviet Union in thanks for its 
decisive participation in defeating Germany, as well as the 
policy of cooperation of all democratic parties with the 
communist and workers' parties in countries freed from German 
occupation. 60
Indeed, the PPR leadership was reading the international situation
very well. The diplomatic support they were receiving from the Soviet 
Union enabled an analysis based on a position of strength vis-a-vis 
their external enemies. Any talk of a third war, designed to sow the 
seeds of doubt as to the permanence of the Provisional Government's 
power, could be refuted by reference to the clear American and British 
wish not to disturb great power relations, in part signalled by the 
Yalta statement and the Western allies' intention to respect
predominant Soviet influence in Poland.
Furthermore, it was a fact that much of Europe was experiencing a 
surge of antipathy toward the defeated fascist and fellow-travelling 
regimes of intei— war European politics. This antipathy was manifested 
in a political swing toward the left all over the continent.
Domestically, the PPR could associate its power and policies with 
those of a dozen other social-democratic, socialist or communist 
parties in power or close to power in Europe. The final assertion in 
the extract quoted above refers to the cooperation accorded the
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communist parties in these countries by other anti-fascist parties. 
This lent an air of European respectability to the PPR's ‘democratic 
national front* policies, the ability to associate the changes taking 
place in Poland with changes or projected changes in such countries as 
France, Denmark, Belgium or Italy.
On the one hand, the Plenum analysis was pitched at the radical 
wing of the party, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the PPR to 
continue to dominate the domestic and foreign policy agenda with its 
‘democratic’ goals. On the other, it identified the policies of the 
pragmatic CBKP dominated Politburo with the ‘democratic forces of all 
countries’ and above all the Soviet Union. In ‘aiming to organise a 
lasting peace*, the allied powers could not allow continuing 
disturbances in Poland. Superimposed on this hard geopolitical fact 
was the immediate reality of the Polish-Soviet treaty and the real 
diplomatic support being received from the Soviet leadership. In such 
circumstances, there was little doubt that the PPR could rely on the 
Soviet Union to prevent any concrete external threat to the new 
regime, and by the same token, any internal threat as well.
The final step toward international recognition involved acceeding 
to the wishes of the three great powers at the Yalta summit and 
agreeing to the, formation of a Polish Provisional Government of 
National Unity. This the PPR Politburo had every intention of 
proceeding with, but on their own terms, and the terms of the Soviet 
government. There could be no compromising in the foreign policy goals 
of the new regime. The negotiations in Moscow among Provisional 
Government and independent Polish representatives, from June 17 to 21, 
were conducted on the principles established in the policy programme 
first presented by the PKWN, then continued by the Provisional 
Government. This was to be an agreement between parties which had
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already accepted the political status quo; policy was not in 
question.®1
Increasing the pressure on the independent representatives 
dramatically was the Soviet decision to bring to trial sixteen 
principal leaders of the Polish Home Army and Delegatura arrested in 
March 1945 for anti-Red Army activity. Several of these men had been 
among those suggested by the British and American sides in the 
Committee of Three talks as prime candidates for participation in the 
new Government of National Unity. Their trial in Moscow from June 18 
to 21, ran simultaneously with the Polish negotiations. It was a clear 
signal not only to the participants in the Moscow discussions, but 
also to the Western allies, that if anything was open to negotiation, 
it was only the composition of the new government to be recognised, 
not its policies.
From the PPR point of view even this flexibility was limited. The
Polish communists were not about to relinquish the power they had
successfully built up in the new administration. Gomulka made this
very clear in a memorable speech delivered to the independent
representatives at the beginning of their talks:
Do not get upset that we are only offering you places in the 
government which we will decide are possible. We are after all 
the hosts. . . .. The power we have achieved we will never return. . . . 
We will not give back this power in order to ensure that Poland 
does not meet the new defeat which threatens it in the false 
political line which the reaction is attempting to force on the 
nation. . . . You can shout that the nation is bleeding, that the 
NKWD rules Poland, but this will not turn us from our path. 62
Mikolajczyk countered the dominant communist position by playing on
the PPR and Soviet wish for the Polish political status quo to be
recognised by the United States and Britain. The final agreement
reached between the parties, gave Mikolajczyk's Peasant Party equal
one third representation in diplomatic and consular positions abroad
as well as in national government organs. It was the best arrangement
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the ex-Premier could hope to achieve.
The foreign policy of the new Polish Provisional Government of
National Unity, as established in what was called the Moscow
Agreement, continued unchanged the pragmatic line of the PKWN and the
Provisional Government:
Friendship, cooperation and alliance with democratic states, 
especially with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France and the 
United States; Poland will be an active member of the Slavic and 
anti-German front, and will work for an alliance with 
Czechoslovakia; Poland will take part in the work of the United 
Nations; Poland's western borders should be determined as soon as 
possible. ®3
Ambassadors Clark-Kerr and Harriman confirmed that the Government of 
National Unity would be recognised by Britain and the United States as 
soon as it was constituted.
On June 28, with all the participants in the Moscow negotiations 
now in Poland, Bierut announced the formal establishment of the 
Provisional Government of National Unity. 0s6bka-Morawski, referred to 
by Stalin at a function given in honour of the new Government of 
National Unity as a non-communist ‘symbol of the new people who have 
found themselves in Poland and have come to an agreement with the new 
people in Russia',®4- retained his position as Premier. Mikolajczyk and 
Gomulka, leaders of two implacably opposed political parties, became 
joint Deputy-Premiers. Rzymowski, another non-communist 'symbol', 
continued in the post of Foreign Minister he had inherited from 
0s6bka-Morawski in April 1945. The next day, the new government was 
recognised by France and Sweden, a week later by the United States and 
Britain. In the following weeks most of the rest of Europe followed 
suit, the exceptions being Spain and Ireland which continued to 
recognise the Polish government in London.®s
Western recognition set the seal on the new 'democratic' regime's 
domestic security: its physical power in Poland had been established;
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its relationship with the Soviet Union had been effectively
institutionalised; and both these facts had been legitimised by the
recognition of the Western allies. Polish communist foreign policy
moved into a new phase.
On July 21, at the eighth session of the KRN, for the first time
with the participation of political figures from outside the
'democratic national front', 0s6bka-Morawski set the tone for the new
phase. The Government of National Unity, he said, greeted with
enormous enthusiasm by the entire Polish nation, had had this
legitimacy reflected in the speed with which it had also been
recognised internationally. Poland in this way found itself back in
its 'deserved place in the family of free nations of the world*. But
the recognition by the great powers of Poland1 s government needed now
to be matched by their recognition of its need for secure borders:
One of the conditions for European and world peace is a strong 
and independent Poland. And one of the roads to a strong and 
independent Poland is the quickest possible settlement of our 
justified western borders on the western Neisse, Oder with 
Szczecin and the Baltic, as well as a sound and justified foreign 
p o l i c y . ■
The 'sound and justified foreign policy’ to tyhich territorial security 
was to be matched in order to provide for a 'strong and independent 
Poland’, was defined by the Premier as alliance and close cooperation 
with all of Poland's neighbours and other states in whose interest lay 
a common defence before German imperialism. The overriding goal of 
this foreign policy, therefore, was Poland's state security; and the 
fundamental element in this foreign policy was to remain the Polish 
treaty with the Soviet Union: ‘We will consistently strive to see that
this historic turn in Soviet-Polish relations is deeply understood by 
our entire nation.. . in the interest of our mutual security and the 
consolidation of Poland's independence’.®'7
This was the realism that suffused the policy makers of Poland's
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nouveau regime. This reasoning had brought them to power and was the 
guarantee for the success of their ambitions in the future. Poland's 
territorial security had been notoriously unstable over the past 
centuries. Its national prestige had waxed and waned with the power of 
its neighbouring states. Now a situation had arisen which enabled the 
Polish state to be secured closely to the great power of the Soviet 
Union. As long as this great power remained, the Polish leaders who 
had helped achieve this new relationship could look ahead into the 
future with confidence. Poland's territorial security could now be 
secured on the same basis; and the new Polish state's prestige would 
to be inextricably linked to the great prestige of Soviet world power. 
The power of the new Polish leadership was vested in the greater power 
of the Soviet Union, and it would be through this greater power that, 
they were confident, they could achieve their foreign policy goals.
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7. TERRITORIAL SECURITY AND THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONCENSUS
‘The main question in the war' for the Soviet Union —  its western 
border —  had been settled in principle by the three allied powers at 
their first summit meeting at Teheran. This was the issue which the 
Polish communists now made their own. It was the issue on which they, 
with the aid of Soviet diplomacy, sought to split the old foreign 
policy concensus represented by the Polish politicians in London, and 
forge a new political alignment based first and foremost on
consideration for Soviet political interests. The force of the 
argument was undeniable: Poland's new territorial expanse would have
its security guaranteed by the Soviet interest in maintaining the 
favourable status quo. Appreciation of both this Soviet interest and 
the advantages accruing to Polish security as a result, became the
test of political realism on which the PPR founded its new foreign 
policy concensus.
At Yalta, the new Polish-Soviet border was given official allied 
recognition. Yalta also institutionalised the international conditions 
that brought about the final break-down of the old Polish foreign 
policy concensus. After Yalta, the Polish politicians in London were 
caught on the horns of a dilemma. They could continue to occupy the 
political stage in Poland, in which case they had to come to terms 
with the Yalta decisions; or, they could resist any accommodation with 
the new political status quo and, as a result, reduce their position 
to purely moral considerations.
Five months after Yalta, the allied summit at Potsdam brought great 
power recognition of Poland's new northern and western territories. 
Here, however, the issue of the shape of post-war Germany gave the
Western allies a direct interest in the final settlement. Potsdam
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provided the first test both for the international conditions 
underpinning the new Polish foreign policy concensus, and for that 
concensus itself.
Territorial security for Poland meant above all the ability to 
defend against German revanchisra. By being given East Prussia, 
Pomerania and Silesia by the Soviet Union, Poland was also being given 
the responsibility for dealing with the inevitable German attempts to 
win back if not their land then their pride, by making life as 
unpleasant as possible for the new masters on the Oder. Mikolajczyk 
and others of the London politicians who had accepted the new 
international conditions, understood the need for security in the west 
as well as any Polish communist leader. Thus at Potsdam, the issue of 
territorial security was established as the firmest support for the 
new common foreign policy.
Foreign policies common to both Mikolajczyk's Polish Peasant Party 
(PSL) and the PPR were soon, however, matched with' political 
priorities which placed the two political groups in direct opposition. 
Reacting to the unsubdued national imperative of the PSL, the 
internationalist response of the PPR was to highlight the unnatural 
role of the PSL in its new-found appreciation of Soviet political 
interests. For its part, the PSL could do little other than profess 
its commitment to the new territorial security status quo.
The PSL was soon coming under extreme pressure not only from the 
PPR, but from an entirely unexpected quarter —  their putative allies, 
the Western powers. In their support for Germany and criticism of the 
Polish territorial expansion westward, the Western allies left the PSL 
no room for political raanouvre. Guided by its national imperative, the 
PSL had no alternative but to harden its public commitment to the 
post-war territorial status quo. This hardening unavoidably
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exacerbated still further the contradiction between the policies of 
the new foreign policy concensus and the PSL's natural, national 
priorities, something the PPR took full advantage of.
7*1 The Soviet Security Foundation
The PKWN leaders had been acutely aware of the intimate linkage
between Poland's new borders and the issue of Soviet security:
The matter of the borders is not open to choice and we did not 
make a choice. ... If we had approached this matter categorically, 
we would have harmed ourselves. We must be a force, we must think 
about expanding the army which is impossible without the help of 
the Soviet Union. 1
This comment by Andrzej Witos, addressed at Mikolajczyk and the other
representatives of the London government in August 1944, illustrated
an argument which had particular force in the light of the ravages
being wrought in Poland by the German occupiers. Poland, regardless of
its political system, needed to be strong enough to withstand any
repetition of the German invasion of 1939. Such immediate strength
could only come from Poland's other powerful neighbour, the Soviet
Union. Another appeal to realism was put by General 2ymierski who saw
the situation quite simply:
The fact that in the present circumstances it will not be our 
side which dictates the borders, as it was in 1920, is clear and 
understandable. Other forces and values have come into being, and 
we must take account of this. . . we are in the weaker position and 
we cannot argue on the basis of sentiments. 2
A matter of fact assessment from the PPR military leader.
In explaining his position with regard to the western borders on
the second day of these discussions in Moscow, 0s6bka-Morawski
highlighted the PKWN's reliance on Soviet diplomacy. A month earlier,
the July 25 agreement on Polish borders had made this reliance
-228-
explicit. Article 4 of the border agreement established the Polish- 
German border along the Oder and Neisse rivers. It also contained the 
following assertion: 'The Soviet Government takes upon itself an
obligation to, while settling the state border between Poland and 
Germany, support the demand for this border to be settled along the 
line given above’.3 Now 0s6bka-Morawski was able to assert confidently 
that Poland's position on its western borders would not be affected by 
the activity of ‘certain circles’ in the West intending to make 
relations with the Western allies difficult; good relations with the 
Western allies could be guaranteed via the diplomatic support of the 
Soviet Union and the allied wish for continued unity.
On the borders themselves, Osobka-Morawski insisted that the PKWN 
was in no position to gain more than the Soviet Union had given it in 
the east, and had to, therefore, try for the best possible position in 
the west. It needed to do this without forfeiting either the 
allegiance of the Polish nation, or the support of the Western allies. 
But neither could the PKWN sacrifice so much in the east, and not 
secure its gains in the west. Stalin himself, said Osobka-Morawski, 
had conceded that the Soviet Union owed Poland a debt for sins 
committed against the Polish nation. In repayment of this debt, 
according to the PKWN leader, Poland would receive unequivocal and, as 
important, self-interested Soviet support for the country's new 
western borders.A
Osdbka-Morawski was not the only non-communist to rationalise the 
PKWN position in this way. Witos used an almost identical argument: ‘I
base my position on the principle that Marshall Stalin has shown an 
impressive understanding in relation to Poland, in ensuring that our 
relations are completely friendly’.3 The Soviet Union had it in its 
interest to ensure Poland was left strong enough to withstand the
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possibility of another German invasion, Osobka-Morawski told
Mikolajczyk. Stalin wanted once and for all to secure the Soviet Union
from German invasion: ‘The Russian thesis is to build a great wall of
Slavic nations, Czechoslovakia, Poland*. ®
The wall Stalin was building was to have a foundation so deep that
it could not be painlessly removed. To successfully achieve this goal,
the Soviet leader needed the understanding and agreement of the
Western allies. At Yalta, Stalin was accorded this agreement.
On 6 February 1945, at the first session of the Crimean Conference
to deal with the Polish question, according to the notes of the
American Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, Stalin began his
presentation in the following manner:
He commenced by saying that he could understand Mr Churchill's 
statement that Poland was a question of honour for Great Britain, 
but for the Russians it was a question of both honour and 
security. It was a question of honour for Russia, he pointed out, 
because Russia had many grievances against Poland and wanted to 
eliminate these grievances. It was a question of strategic 
security not only because Poland was a neighbour but also because 
Poland throughout history had been the corridor for attacks on 
Russia. Twice during the last thirty years, Stalin observed, with 
great emphasis in his voice and with a determined gesture of his 
hand, Germany had passed through this corridor as it marched on 
to Russian soil.
The USSR desired a strong, independent and democratic Poland, 
Stalin declared, to help protect the Soviet Union, since the 
Soviet armies alone could not close this corridor from the 
outside. It was not only a question of honour for the Soviets, he 
again stated, but one of absolute necessity, to have Poland
independent, strong, and democratic.7
Apparently reassured by Stalin's emphasis on wanting an independent
Poland, this pitch was allowed to pass without comment by Churchill
and Roosevelt. But Stalin's use of the word 'democratic' in tandem
with ‘independent* betrayed his deeper understanding of the Polish
issue. Only because the new Polish administration was 'democratic',
Stalin added, had 'the Soviet Government... made a great change from
the Tsarist nineteenth-century policy of suppressing and assimilating
Poland’.13 Poland was now governed by 'new people’, the Soviet leader
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remarked. The ‘old people* were attacking the Red Army's rear, and 
this was unforgivable. 3
Not surprisingly in this atmosphere of Western ‘appeasement’, as it 
was termed by the American ambassador in Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, 10 
the results of the Crimean Conference as they applied to the Polish 
borders were completely in line with PKWN and Provisional Government 
policy. If the final report issued by the three leaders on February 11 
did not specify Poland's northern and western borders, it did specify 
the eastern border (‘the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the 
Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight 
kilometres in favour of Poland*) and allude to the Teheran position on 
the border with Germany (‘Poland must receive substantial acessions of 
territory in the north and west’). Nothing had changed. The 'final 
delineation of the western frontier’ was deferred until a Peace 
Conference could be convened, and in the meantime, the newly to be 
established Polish Provisional Government of National Unity was to be 
asked for its ‘opinion*.
It was highly unlikely that the territorial policies of the new 
Government of National Unity would be much different from those of the 
Provisional Government, judging by the willingness of the Western 
allies to accept the Soviet position in principle. As well as 
officially recognising the Soviet position on its western border, 
therefore, the Crimean Conference left the Provisional Government and 
Soviet Union in a position of superiority on the question of the 
Polish-German border: the opinion of the Provisional Government, and
more importantly, the PKWN's border agreement with Stalin and Molotov, 
was soon to be put into effect by the advance of the Red Army toward 
Berlin. The July 25 PKWN-Soviet agreement guaranteed that this 
position would then be defended unreservedly by the Soviet side at the
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upcoming Peace Conference.
Soon after the Crimean Conference, the Soviet side took steps to
again strengthen the Provisional Government position. On February 20,
the State Committee for the Defence of the USSR11 decreed that all
land within the borders bounded by the agreed Polish-Soviet border in
the east and the Oder and western Neisse in the west should be
considered by the Red Army High Command to be under the administration
of the Polish Provisional Government. Supporting the Red Army's
military role, the Polish side were given the following
responsibilities:
...public security and order; the fight against German agents... 
and intelligence organs under German command; the fight against 
banditism, armed enemy activity and the harmful acts of elements 
opposing the Polish Provisional Government as well as the 
liberationary activity of the Red Army. 12
The decree coincided with a visit to Moscow of a Provisional 
Government delegation familiarising themselves with the results of the 
Yalta summit. Stalin told this delegation of the British resistance to 
the new Polish western borders, saying that in his opinion, it was the 
influence of the Polish government in London which had caused this 
resistance. 13 In contrast to Roosevelt,14- Churchill had been 
relatively firm in his opposition to Soviet policy in Poland. 
Churchill's concern was with a European continent dominated following 
the conclusion of the war and withdrawal of American troops, by the 
Soviet Union. At Yalta he made it clear that he wanted to see a fully 
sovereign Polish government. Earlier in 1944, he had tried repeatedly 
to convince Mikolajczyk to accept the Soviet terms for a Polish border 
settlement as the basis from which to work for an independent Polish 
state.
Churchill had opposed Stalin's position on the western Neisse at 
Yalta, arguing instead for the eastern Neisse on the grounds that
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Poland would find it difficult to absorb so much extra land. The whole 
question, as a result of this British opposition, was deferred for 
consideration to the Peace Conference which was to follow the German 
defeat. This deferral left the British with a bargaining lever with 
which to attempt to redress the political balance in Poland. It was 
this bargaining lever which Stalin now sought to decisively undermine.
The February 20 decree of the State Committee for the Defence of 
the USSR not only emphasised the Polish and Soviet positions on the 
western Polish border by including a concrete reference to the western 
Neisse River. Crucially, it served also to give allied legitimacy to 
the internal security role of the Provisional Government. During the 
time the Provisional Government delegation was in Moscow, the Red Army 
had moved steadily into Lower Silesia, encircling Wroclaw and laying 
seige to Poznah. According to the Soviet decree, the Red Army and NKWD 
were to be directly responsible for security within a band sixty to 
one hundred kilometres behind this front line. This left a good deal 
of Poland (including large areas of East Prussia and Pomerania) for 
the Polish administration to deal with. And while the Soviet presence 
was not at all eliminated from these areas (the official 
responsibility of the Polish administration for internal Polish 
security out of the war zone did not prevent the NKWD from luring the 
sixteen Polish underground leaders into a trap in late March), the 
decree did highlight the official responsibility with which the 
Provisional Government had now been endowed by its Soviet ally, and 
the confidence vested in it by the Soviet leadership.
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7*2 Potsdam: The Beginnings of Concensus
In the months after Yalta, the issue of the moment in Polish 
affairs became the reorganisation of the Provisional Government and 
inclusion of 'independent* members into its ranks. In Moscow, the 
pertubations surrounding the Committee of Three discussions quietened 
somewhat following the arrival of Harry Hopkins toward the end of May, 
on a special mission from President Truman. The purpose of the mission 
was to persuade Stalin to take part in yet another allied summit, this 
time on all the issues arising out of the conclusion of the war with 
Germany. Stalin, without too much trouble, agreed to the American 
proposition. At the same time, the Committee of Three agreed to call 
to Moscow the Polish representatives they had decided would discuss 
the matter of forming a Polish Provisional Government of National 
Unity.
From the beginning of the discussions among the various Polish 
representatives, it became clear that the Provisional Government side 
were looking to Mikolajczyk for further signs of his support on the 
issue of the western border. They were not to be disappointed. 
Mikolajczyk*s conversion to the foreign policy axioms of the 
Provisional Government appeared to be complete. He had come to Moscow 
with no alternative concept on the Polish borders and its territorial 
security. On being challenged by Gomulka at the first meeting of the 
Polish representatives, Mikolajczyk seemed more determined to see the 
Provisional Government position succeed than the communists 
themselves. He was a supporter of the borders being pushed as far west 
as possible, and was amazed that Szczecin was not yet under Polish 
administration (it was still in the front line zone and although a
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Polish administration was active there, it remained formally under the 
authority of the Red Army command). He stood on the position that the 
western borders should be settled even before the Peace Conference had 
been convened. 1G
But there remained considerable doubt in the minds of the 
Provisional Government leaders as to the integrity of Mikolajczyk*s 
new found support. They, still identified him strongly with the actions 
of the Polish government in London which, following Mikolajczyk's 
departure, had become even more vocal over the injustices of the 
Soviet sponsored Polish territorial settlement. For his part, Stalin 
placed little faith in Mikolajczyk's strong assurances of support. 
Stalin considered Mikolajczyk to be under the influence of Churchill 
and working closely with British policy in the great power 
negotiations. 'Check him once again', the Soviet leader told several 
of the leaders of the Provisional Government on June 27 prior to their 
return to Poland:
Agree to a resolution about the fact that you have reached an 
introductory agreement with us regarding the eastern borders and 
at the same time a resolution regarding your territorial demands 
in the west... with Mikolajczyk's participation. The Government 
should then turn to us with an official note in this regard.
We' 11 see if Mikolajczyk does not withdraw with regard to the 
British position.13
Mikolajczyk did no such thing. On July 10, in preparation for the 
allied summit due to begin in Potsdam seven days later, the new
Provisional Government of National Unity with Mikolajczyk now one of 
its Deputy-Premiers, sent a weighty memorandum to the three allied
leaders demanding that the western Polish border be based on the Oder
and western Neisse rivers. The document put forward a whole range of 
arguments based variously on moral, historical, economic and political 
criteria. A further note was sent by Bierut and 0s6bka-Morawski on the 
day prior to the Polish question being discussed at Potsdam. This
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time, the letter was short and to the point: only the Oder and western 
Neisse border line, with §winouj£cie and Szczecin on the Polish side, 
could ‘guarantee the satisfactory development of the Polish nation, 
European security and a lasting peace in the world', the note 
asserted. 17
At Potsdam, only Stalin and Molotov were prepared to support the 
Polish case. Truman prefered to defer consideration of the western 
Polish border to the Peace Conference. His principal concern was with 
leaving the territory demanded by Poland in the Soviet zone of
occupation for the purposes of establishing German reparation from 
each of the four power occupation zones agreed to at Yalta. ie
For his part, Churchill was categorical in his rejection of the 
Polish position. But unlike Truman, he wanted to decide on the future 
of the western Polish territories as soon as possible in order to
prevent the Polish administration consolidating its position in the 
regions granted them by the Soviet Union. Churchill's compromise
solution was to propose ‘the establishment of a provisional line, to 
the east of which the territory would be taken over by the Poles, as a 
part of Poland, until the final decision on this question could be
taken at the Peace Conference'.19 The provisional line Churchill had 
in mind was the Oder and eastern Neisse, with Szczecin and Wroclaw on 
the German side. This would leave a large area of Silesia and 
Pomerania in German hands for the purpose of providing the German coal 
and food which the British occupation zone would otherwise have to 
supply. 20
Not surprisingly, Stalin rejected this position saying that it was 
the Polish border, not a provisional line, which was being considered. 
In line with his July 25 agreement with the PKWN, Stalin consistently 
defended the Polish position, trading statistics with Churchill on how
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many Germans were left in the region east of the Oder. Finally, 
notwithstanding the earlier Polish memorandums to the allied leaders, 
the Soviet leader suggested that representatives of the new Polish 
Government of National Unity be invited to Potsdam to put their own 
case, following which it might be possible to come to some 
agreement.21
On July 23, the Polish delegation which included Bierut, Osdbka- 
Morawski, Mikolajczyk, Gomulka, Rzymowski and Modzelewski, along with 
their advisers, arrived in Potsdam. In the next nine days, the 
delegation met with all the three allied leaders, their foreign
ministers and their advisers, to discuss a whole range of issues
starting with the western borders and ending with Western trade and 
aid.
From the outset, Mikolajczyk was put into a privileged position by 
the Western delegations. He was aquainted personally with Churchill 
and several of the President's advisers, and he was treated by the 
Western leaders as the person in the Polish delegation who should be 
most listened to. He was able to communicate easily in English and 
made full use of this facility in his meetings with the lower level 
delegations. In his official statements, Mikolajczyk's arguments 
supported those of the rest of the delegation. He particularly
stressed the need to remove the war industry capacity Germany had in 
the resources of Silesia and the economic advantage it enjoyed by
controlling the trade route along the Oder and into the Baltic through 
Szczecin. On being asked directly by Eden why the Poles wanted their 
borders to be so far west, Mikolajczyk replied that he had previously 
frequently reminded the British government that too large ‘cuts' in 
Polish territory in the east would create a need for replacing these 
regions which had been essential for the nation's economic well-being
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wit h new territory in the west.22
For the British delegation, and particularly once Churchill and 
Eden had been replaced with Clement Attlee and Ernest Bevin, the issue 
boiled down to a trade off: guaranteed free elections in the near term 
in Poland for British support on the Polish border demands. After 
having invited Mikolajczyk to provide the Polish delegation with a 
list of questions, the answers to which would determine Britain's 
position in the final round of summit talks, Bevin was finally 
satisfied by a series of vague assurances given by Bierut that the 
elections would be universal, secret, direct, proportional and on the 
basis of one person one vote, and that the term of the elections 
depended on the return of the Polish armed forces in the West. Bevin 
assured the Poles that he and Attlee would support the Polish case.23
For the American side, even more-so than for the British, 
Mikolajczyk's personal influence was a major factor in the decision to 
finally back the Polish demands.24- And for his part, Stalin understood 
the significance of Mikolajczyk's presence in the Polish delegation 
and did nothing to discourage him from taking the initiative in the 
debate with the Western allies. During a function given by the Soviet 
leader for the Polish delegation on July 27, Grabski, drinking to the 
health of Molotov,, spoke of ‘the Slavic nations which no longer by way 
of the old Tsarist pan-Slavism, but by the cooperation of free, 
independent and sovereign nations, will cooperate under Stalin's 
leadership*. Stalin immediately rose to drink the health of 
Mikolajczyk, saying that Grabski had it wrong ‘on one point*. Namely, 
that ‘a Slav does not know how to submit to someone's leadership. 
Cooperation among the Slavic nations must therefore be based on full 
sovereignty and independence, and for this reason they can only 
cooperate as equals among equals, and he was not the right person to
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be leader of the Slavic nations’.23
The other Provisional Government leaders supported unreservedly the 
national interest arguments being presented by the Polish delegation. 
Bierut and Rzymowski spoke of the unfavourable population density in 
the Polish lands prior to the war and the need to distribute the Poles 
who would not be able to return to their previous homes in the east; 
of the justice of Germany giving back to Poland the lands which had 
been the basis of its eastern aggression, lands which had once been 
Polish; of the border being the shortest possible and therefore the 
most rational strategically. Within Poland, however, the PPR was 
presenting the national interest case in a rather more political 
manner.
7*3 Political Priorities and the Common Foreign Policy
In an article published by Glos Ludu to coincide with the opening 
of the Potsdam summit, Roman Werfel presented the philosophy 
underlying the party's foreign policy principles. Werfel made three 
points. The first was that Poland's new foreign policy meant returning 
Poland to the Baltic shore, and fighting for access to the mineral 
riches of Silesia. Lampe had first put this argument in his famous 
article on Poland's place in Europe, and since then it had become 
fundamental to the Polish post-war settlement. As a national interest 
argument it had particular force, highlighted by Mikolajczyk's 
presentation at Potsdam. But it also had powerful political 
connotations, as Werfel strove to point out.
Poland's geographical position gave it few options for conducting 
an expansionist foreign policy, Werfel wrote. Either the state spread
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east, traditionally the policy of the ‘great age’ of Polish history, 
and the power of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth identified with 
the Jagiellonian monarchs, or it had endeavoured to protect its 
western territories, as it had done prior to the Commonwealth under 
the Piast dynasty. Eastward expansion had meant coming into conflict 
consecutively with the Grand Duchy of Moscow, the Tsarist Russian 
Empire, and during the Second Polish Republic, the Soviet Union. This 
had been the Polish nobles' own Drang nach Osten, making the most of 
the open and sparsely populated territory of western Bielorussia and 
the Ukraine to establish their huge estates using non-Polish serfs for 
labour. Prior to the 1917 revolution, the estates and their owners had 
been left untounched. Only with the advent of Soviet communism had the 
Polish estate owners been disenfranchised. The result was to earn the 
Soviet Union the undying hatred of the Polish nobility. The foreign 
policy of the pre-war Sanacja government, wrote Werfel, revolved 
around protecting these eastern estates from the threat of 
‘communisation’ .
Re-focusing Poland's foreign policy away from the ill-fated 
expansion toward the east would no longer be in the interests of the 
noblility as in the Piast period, but in the interests of the working 
class. This was Werfel's second point: Poland would be able to at last 
reach a state of high industrialisation based on the economic 
potential of Silesia and the huge Soviet market, eliminating worker 
unemployment and rural hunger by giving all Polish peasants their own 
land. Poland's future was as an economic power in Europe, boasting a 
working class as powerful as any in Europe but for the Soviet Union. 
Poland would become one of the most important European workers' states 
in a post-war Europe orientated toward the left.
Werfel's third point was that the Polish alliance with the Soviet
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Union had been ‘dictated by the Polish racja stanu, by a sober 
estimation of historical necessity, and the practical reality of post­
war Europe’. The ‘practical reality’ of post-war Europe was the new 
dominance of ‘democratic* regimes on the continent and the new found 
international power of the Soviet Union; Poland's racja stanu was the 
fact that only Polish 'democracy* could guarantee the Soviet Union the 
security it sought on the terms it had established; on this basis, the 
PPR's ‘sober estimation’ of these facts leading to the institution of 
Poland's new foreign policy needed to be understood not in terms of 
political self-interest, but as having had the interests of the modern 
nation at heart. 23
The ‘practical reality’ in which Mikolajczyk and other political 
leaders who were intending to present an internal opposition to the 
communist regime now found themselves, gave them very little room to 
manouver on issues of foreign policy. In terms of the Polish national 
interest, alliance with the Soviet Union had to be a given. Just as 
there had been no choice in this matter for the PKWN politicians, 
there was no choice for those politicians who had since joined the
Government of National Unity on the basis of the Moscow Agreement. 
Their accession to this agreement meant a firm appreciation of the
realities of the new post-war geo-strategic situation, and a decision 
to work within these realities. After Potsdam this was particularly 
the case with Poland's new western borders and the problem of 
containing German revanchism. The difference Mikolajczyk sought to 
bring to his PSL foreign policy was to speak constantly of non­
interference in Poland's internal affairs and to tie the Soviet 
alliance very closely with alliance to the Western powers.
On 22 August, the PSL was formally legalised by the KRN, but not
until October was it able to begin publishing its own political press,
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this despite, or because of, the fact that it was rapidly becoming a
mass political party rivalling the PPR in membership numbers. 27
The first PSL newspaper to begin publishing was the weekly Chlopski
Sztandar (Peasants' Banner). Its first page carried a statement
announcing the change of name from Peasant Party to Polish Peasant
Party. This was in order to distinguish between the party of
Mikolajczyk which had been active in the Polish government in London
and Delegatura, and that of the PPR ally and long-time participant in
the KRN. The statement continued with an outline of the party's policy
programme. On foreign policy it had this to say:
...freeing Poland would have been impossible without the huge 
sacrifices and magnificent victories of the Red Army and Western 
Democracies. This fact, as well as the decisions of the Crimean 
Conference, has created new foundations for Poland's 
international policy, in line, for that matter, with the 
programmatic points of our old Peasant Party which always 
demanded the basing of this policy on one side on sincere 
agreement and alliance with our great eastern neighbour, the 
Soviet Union, as well as on the close cooperation of the Slavic 
Nations, and from the other side, on alliance and friendship with 
the democratic Western states, Britain, France and the United 
States of America. 2,3
The party had decided to join the discussions in Moscow, the statement
explained, in order to defend 'the most vital Polish interests’ which
were being threatened by the existence of two alternative Polish
governments. Poland, as a result, might well have been absent at the
forums which were ‘resolving the most important matters regarding the
future international organisation of peace and security’. The result
of the Moscow discussions had been an agreement to work for the
‘earliest possible free and unfettered elections’. The statement
continued as follows:
In line with the decisions of the Crimean Conference, the 
settlement of Poland's eastern borders has been consolidated by 
the treaty agreed to with the Soviet Union regarding friendship, 
cooperation and alliance, as well as regarding a mutual respect 
for the sovereignty of, and non-interference in, the internal 
affairs of each state.29
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The authors of the statement were optimistic that the Yalta settlement 
would remove once and for all the ‘centuries old disputes and mistrust 
between us and the nations of the Soviet Union' . Poland could once 
again be really great and strong particularly since the declaration by 
the three powers guaranteed Poland freedom and independence. And 
finally; ‘In alliance with the Soviet Union as well as with the 
Western democracies, we want to create once and for all an unshakeable 
rampart against German imperialism. . . . ’ The statement was signed by 
Wincenty Witos, President of the party's Presidium, by the members of 
the Presidium, and by the members of the PSL Executive Committee. 30
The PSL's ‘practical reality’ was being presented here rather 
differently to that of Werfel and the PPR. Territorial security was 
the key to both parties' perception of that reality. But in the PSL's 
case, the reality of alliance with the Soviet Union was strongly 
qualified by the guarantees of Polish independence incorporated in the 
agreements establishing and consolidating the alliance.
The first of these guarantees was to be the balancing influence of 
the Western powers. The cement which could properly bind Poland and 
the Soviet Union together in a mutually dependent relationship of 
equals was the threat of renewed German aggression. It had been German 
aggression which had changed the face of Europe, which had brought 
about the alliance among the three great powers, and had changed the 
face of Polish politics. But it was the three powers together at Yalta 
that had achieved this latter result. Unlike the PPR emphasis on the 
power of the Red Army and role of the Soviet Union alone in liberating 
Poland, the PSL never lost sight of Britain, France and the United 
States. The defence against Germany needed to be not only based on 
Polish alliance with the Soviet Union and the other Slavic states. As 
Mikolajczyk put it in another article in the same first issue:
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By a straight calculation, when from the other side France, 
Britain and America will be ensuring that the German hydra is not 
reborn, and we together with Russia will be ensuring the same in 
the east... we will secure peace for ourselves and for others for 
ever.31
The second guarantee of independence was written into the Polish-
Soviet treaty of 21 April. Here the PSL showed that it was intent on
using the assurances given by Stalin in its own domestic battle with
the PPR. Mikolajczyk appeared publicly optimistic that the Soviet
Union would honour the obligations it had entered into. He missed few 
occasions to comment on these assurances. Polish-Soviet relations had 
to be based on ‘state sovereignty and mutual noninterference in 
internal affairs’, he wrote in this first issue of Chlopski Sztandar. 
Supporting this official position, Mikolajczyk wrote, was the good 
will among the highest ranks of the Soviet leadership. The Soviet 
Union needed to accept that ‘cooperation and friendship between Poland 
and the Soviet Union cannot rest on one or two parties in power, but 
on the widest possible social support’, he continued. ^  The PSL held 
this wide support, therefore the PSL could provide the influence among 
the Polish peasantry and wider public to ensure that the ‘new track’ 
in Polish foreign policy was understood and supported. This was the 
offer to the Soviet Union implicit in Mikolajczyk's position: Soviet
non-interference in return for the PSL delivering mass popular 
understanding and support for the ‘practical reality’ of Poland's new 
foreign policy concensus.
The third guarantee of independence for Poland identified by the 
PSL was the explicit promise of the three great powers together. These 
powers had created the Yalta settlement amongst themselves, and it was 
their bounden duty to keep to their word. The PSL leaders trusted not 
so much in the promises of the Soviet Union, but in those of the 
Western powers, and the effect these would hopefully have on keeping
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the Soviet Union to its word.
Mikolajczyk's strategy relied on the East-West political balance to 
underwrite the PSL's domestic campaign for political pluralism and 
peasant power in Poland. So long as there was cooperation among the 
three great powers, Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, 
the East-West balance served to ensure that Germany could not threaten 
Poland's territorial interests. A common allied voice on Germany meant 
Germany's continued subjagation; the Soviet Union would allow no other 
alternative. Continued unity would, therefore, afford the PSL greater 
room for domestic manouver outside the common foreign policy.
For its part, the PPR from the birth of the Government of National 
Unity set about trying to destroy the PSL's foreign policy 
credibility. The ‘new tracks' foreign policy concensus created in the 
Moscow Agreement and Potsdam negotiations was made hostage to the 
PPR's goal of consolidating its domestic power. It was obvious to the 
communists, able to extrapolate from their own political patronage, 
that the PSL's commitment to the unity of the great powers was pitched 
for its greatest effect on the PSL's domestic political priorities. 
This the PPR translated in the public arena into accusations that the 
PSL was not at all sincere in its expressions of support for the 
Polish-Soviet alliance and defence from German revanchism. In this way 
also, the PPR tackled head-on the trade-off Mikolajczyk had posed for 
the Soviet Union. The PSL had begun its public campaign to support the 
new foreign policy concensus by examining openly all the disputes and 
antagonisms which had arisen between the two states, not only in 
history, but more importantly, in the most recent past . According to 
Glos Ludu, however, this PSL exercise amounted to the worst type of 
‘Jesuit prevarication'.33 The PPR's equivalent campaign for 
‘strengthening Polish-Soviet friendship' had been continued through
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the government's propaganda ministry since the signing of the Polish- 
Soviet treaty.34
In the article which set off this round of polemic, Gazeta Ludowa 
(The People's Newspaper), the PSL daily, made the point that Poland 
was physically weak and needed to rely on its policies rather than its 
power for its security. Its policies could be successful, the daily 
explained, since fortunately for Poland the United Nations was to 
guarantee all nations freedom and security. Poland needed to tie its 
policies closely to this ‘great task'. One of the policies it had 
already instituted in this direction was the ‘important milestone’ 
which was the Polish-Soviet alliance. This alliance was a ‘historical 
necessity* , but it was not enough. Friendship was needed as well as 
alliance, and friendship was harder to attain. Herein lay the greatest 
difficulty in Polish-Soviet relations. Particularly so since it was 
the friendship of nations that counted, not that of individuals or 
parties. The statements of the PPR suggesting that it held a monopoly 
on good relations with the Soviet Union were not good enough either 
for Poland or the Soviet Union.
The Gazeta Ludowa article then addressed itself to the Soviet Union
directly: Poland could not trade off its desire to end the ‘tragic
dance of many centuries between the enmity of Russia and the enmity of
Germany and once and for all establish peace... on the eastern border
so as to win the historic battle on the western border', in return for
its sovereignty and independence. A sovereign state needed to be able
to conduct independent policies; and policies which were in line with
the interests of an allied power did not mean ‘silence’:
Of course, for all of this the goodwill of Russia is needed. It 
is necessary for her to speak with us on a platform of moral 
equality; that she leaves us always freedom of action and freedom 
to organise the building of our system; that —  through actions 
—  she tries as quickly as possible to create an atmosphere of 
trust. 3S
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In conclusion the article asserted: ‘Only on the background of Cthe
Soviet] alliance will the alliances with our Western allies, Great 
Britain, France and the United States [sic], take on particular 
value*.35 What this ‘particular value* implied depended on the 
position of the reader. For the PSL, it meant a better defence against 
Germany and greater political receptiveness to Western political 
ideas. Jan Dec writing in Chlopski Sztandar, for example, explained 
that the ‘Western complex’ with which the PSL was being labelled by 
the PPR, was nothing for which the party needed to be ashamed. The 
PSL, like Poland, was intimately, even spiritually linked with Europe, 
and it wanted to maintain these links. Furthermore, the party wanted 
to recognise and encourage the introduction into Polish political life 
of the best the West had to offer, not uncritically, but so that 
Polish democracy was the best it could possibly be. One such example 
was that of Churchill and the Conservative Party's departure from 
office following their election defeat. This principle was fundamental 
to any understanding of democracy, Dec wrote. 37
But to the PPR, ‘particular value' meant something completely 
different. These were all examples of ‘weathered models', of old 
thinking, of political categories which the PPR had embarked on 
destroying. ‘Democracy’ for the PPR could only be understood in terms 
of its class connotations;33 the PSL represented the type of class 
interests which the PPR by its nature was committed to destroying.
The PPR view of the PSL strategy of calling for close alliance with 
the Western states was limited, therefore, to a strict political 
interpretation. No account was taken of the PSL desire to strengthen 
the Polish defence against Germany. For the PPR, the territorial 
guarantee of the Soviet Union sufficed in this regard. The communists 
accused the PSL of a lack of patriotism, of misunderstanding the true
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Polish interest in the post-war world —  the interest which saw the 
alliance with the Soviet Union as the priority above all other 
priorities. It was on this interest that Poland's independent state 
existence counted, not on the balancing effect of the Western powers, 
or for that matter, the noninterference of Soviet ‘advisers'. 
Balancing harked back to the policies of the pre-war Polish regime 
with its pretensions of grandeur and a pivotal role as the Western 
bastion of anti-communism.
In the PPR's eyes, the PSL call for Western alliance stemmed from 
the PSL's domestic need for concrete Western political support. In 
July, Edward Ochab had announced in the KRN that ‘the PPR caucus would 
like to emphasise with particular force that we see our national 
aspirations only being able to be realised in the course of the tough 
battle that awaits us with the remains of the Polish reaction'. 331 The 
PSL had been categorised by the PPR as reactionary from the outset. 
Now the PSL was seen to be calling for the help of Western reactionary 
forces, the forces which the PPR had always been conscious of and 
against which it relied on the international power of the Soviet 
Union.
At a meeting of the PPR's Warsaw membership in October 1945, 
Gomulka set the tone for the ‘battle for Poland', as the article 
reporting his speech was entitled. The ‘Western complex', Gomulka 
advised his members, was the result of anti-Soviet propaganda and 
attitudes from the inter-war period. The spirit of Munich was afoot 
abroad, he said, and the ‘old and trampled' anti-Comintern idea of a 
‘Western bloc’ was being revived. Supporters of the ‘Western 
orientation’ wanted to tie Poland's foreign and domestic policies with 
the concept of the Western bloc, to sow the seeds of Western democracy 
in Polish soil. The goal of this strategy, according to Gomulka, was
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to use the principles of Western democracy to clear the way for the 
return to power of reactionary forces. *° There could be no compromises 
with the PSL on these terms. Nor was there.
The PSL insisted that the PPR had it all wrong. They had no 
intention of reintroducing Western capitalism into Poland; they had no 
desire for blocs of any kind. Poland could never find itself in a bloc 
directed against the Soviet Union. This would be suicidal.41 The PSL 
prided itself on its solid realism. Their's was more a holding 
strategy, to bring Poland through to better times when the country 
could use the best both East and West had to offer. For the moment, 
the Red Army was placed far to the west in Europe, and Poland's racja 
stanu dictated that only ‘hard reality' could be the policy of the 
moment.
In late September 1945, the PPR Central Committee together with its 
PPS ally proposed the formation of an election bloc made up of all the 
legal political parties in Poland. Elections in re-born Poland, 
Gomulka told his party members a month later, would be ‘democracy's 
great act of battle with the reaction’.'13 At the party Congress in 
December, Gomulka made this the principal issue of his key-note 
speech. Together, the legal parties would be able to manifest their 
support for a democratic republic: ‘...as a result of the election
campaign, Poland would stand with both its feet on the firm and 
already well-trodden democratic road onto which it set out on 22 July 
1944' . 44
Through January and February 1946, discussions between the PSL on 
the one hand, and PPR and PPS on the other, continued with little 
result. Maintaining the domestic political status quo was not the PSL 
intention, as it was the PPR's. The PSL had too much to lose, the PPR 
too much to gain. By late February, Gomulka was openly linking the PSL
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with the armed underground ‘reaction’ active in Poland.
In March, the PPR with its political allies made a final attempt to 
bring the PSL into a common election bloc. As reported in the PSL 
press, the election bloc proposed by the PPR would ensure the 
continuation of the principles of the PKWN manifesto; it would 
strengthen Poland's external position; and it would enable the PSL to 
sever its links with the underground political opposition which was 
creating hatred of the Soviet Union. Bloc foreign policies would be 
five-fold: territorial security; opposition to any international
attempts to rebuild Germany; the unshakeable principle of Polish- 
Soviet alliance; alliance with the other Slavic nations; alliance with 
France, and friendship and cooperation with Britain and the United 
States. The PSL, in response to these PPR proposals, complained that 
the government was eliminating its members from the diplomatic service 
even though there were absolutely no differences in the two parties' 
foreign policies. It rejected the PPR proposal.'13
It was a fact that there were no differences in foreign policy. 
This was particularly the case with regard to the new western borders, 
and ‘recovered territories’ east of the Oder and western Neisse 
rivers. What was different was the emphasis placed on the implications 
of the different Polish alliances, with the Soviet Union, with France, 
with Britain, and the relationship with the United States. The PSL 
looked to the West for its natural support in the same way as the PPR 
looked eastward. On Germany, the Soviet Union's support for the 
position of its Polish client had already been proven. The PSL, on the 
other hand, could not expect the same uncompromising backing from the 
British or Americans. The fact that this linkage even existed brought 
upon the PSL the full weight of the PPR's negative propaganda; and 
once Western policies drew back from their support of the post-war
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territorial settlement in east-central Europe, the PSL was left 
entirely exposed.
The PPR treated the issue of the ‘recovered territories’ as its 
first opportunity to show the party's virility as a national Polish 
force acting on the international stage. Symbolising its priority, a 
Ministry of the Recovered Territories was created with Gomulka himself 
as Minister.
Gomulka made it plain he would brook no compromises when it came to 
the ‘recovered territories’. His main task he saw as being the speedy 
integration of the Silesian, Pomeranian and East Prussian economies 
into a united Polish economy. A principal argument of the British at 
Potsdam against the Soviet proposal to incorporate these territories 
into Poland, had been that Poland had no means of exploiting the lands 
economically, and that the German population would never be replaced. 
Gomulka had no illusions regarding the international significance of 
proving these claims wrong.
In his first speech to the KRN as Minister on 31 December 1945, the
PPR leader anticipated later British and American efforts to undermine
the European position of the Soviet Union via their questioning of the
Polish right to the new western lands. This, he warned, would be
unacceptable to Poland:
Anyone who attempts to cast doubt on the right of Poland to its 
current western borders, anyone who conducts policies designed to 
weaken our borders attacks Poland's most vital interests, weakens 
the permanence of peace in Europe and in the world, and cannot be 
treated by us as anything other than an enemy of Poland and an 
enemy of peace. 46
Poland's power and position in the world was not strong enough to 
counter those who would like to push back the border on the Oder and 
Neisse rivers, Gomulka continued. The country needed powerful and 
influential allies, and one such ally was the Soviet Union. Without 
Soviet help at Potsdam, the conference would not have made the
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decision it did on Poland's western border. ^  At the same time, 
government propaganda began to increase its efforts to identify the 
new territories as having been 'recovered', as having been 
historically part of the Polish ‘motherland*.
The PSL was no less categoric on the issue of the western border 
and Germany. Speaking to a PSL rally in December, Mikolajczyk did not 
equivocate:
...we must not be cut off from the mouth of the Oder. Szczecin 
must remain Polish for ever. I am telling you this today, in 
order that it is not thought in the world that perhaps this is 
the will of Soviet Russia dictated to us, as some people want it 
to be presented, or [that this policy] is only in the programme 
of one party. 4,3
In the PSL's January 1946 Congress resolutions on foreign policy, the 
new western border was described as 'a final and just demarcation 
returning ancient Polish regions robbed from us in the past*. On 
Germany, PSL foreign policy pulled no punches. Germany needed to have 
its ‘excessively exuberant' standard of living, based on war-time 
exploitation, lowered to its ‘normal level* in relation to that of its 
neighbours, and the possibilities for future economic penetration 
eliminated. At the same time, those states most destroyed by Germany 
needed to have their standards of living quickly raised in order to 
‘strengthen their resistance' and ‘consolidate their independence from 
Germany*. German society needed to be carefully ‘re-educated*, and the 
‘militarist German soul completely morally disarmed'.43
Unfortunately, the new political balance in Europe the PSL hoped to 
encourage with its German policy was rapidly becoming to be seen in 
the West not as an element of a wider Polish foreign policy concensus, 
but as a function of a Soviet sponsored policy intended to leave the 
Soviet Union as the dominant power in Europe. And when it was 
confronted with a Western policy which appeared to directly challenge 
this by now conventional Polish wisdom, the PSL were left stranded on
-252-
a contradictory policy platform which on the one hand called for close 
relations with Britain and the United States, and on the other for a 
totally subordinated Germany.
7*4 Western Pressure
On March 5, Churchill, in the presence of President Truman, gave 
his ‘iron curtain' speech in Fulton, Missouri. Of most importance to 
us here were the references he made to Soviet encouragment for the
Polish communist government to expand its control over a huge area of 
Germany, and to expell millions of Germans from their homes. Within 
Poland the reaction was immediate: the PPR and PPS organised official
demonstrations against the ‘British provocation', while rumours of 
war, of large scale Soviet troop movements, and of general
mobilisation swept the country. Official Polish protests at the
accusations made in the speech were several days later strongly 
supported by the Soviet Union. Pravda called Churchill a ‘warmonger’, 
while Izvestia considered his speech a threat to European and world 
peace. Stalin himself joined the fray to take issue with Churchill's 
‘lack of tact’. How could the Soviet desire to prevent another
situation like that which had developed prior to the outbreak of war, 
by ensuring that governments surrounding the Soviet Union were 
friendly to it, be called by Churchill ‘a tendency toward expansion', 
the Soviet leader complained. so
The PSL was optimistic that Churchill did not represent the 
policies of the British government, that his speech had not reflected 
the realities of the international situation which the British 
authorities were intimately aware of. The speech would certainly not
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contribute to the harmonious cooperation of the three great powers on
which PSL hopes for the future were based, a party press editorial
exclaimed.51. The PSL could not afford to compromise on its German
policy. It hoped that the Western states, like the Soviet Union, also
would not compromise. Wladyslaw Kiernik, PSL Minister of Education in
the Government of National Unity, put the case in the following way:
Among Poles there can be different opinions concerning how to 
best organise Poland domestically, how to make her satisfied, 
strong, free and independent; but as to our relations with
Germany and our rights to the old Piast borders, there is not, in 
Poland, any difference in opinion. In this matter we form one 
solid bloc, a bloc harder than rock, a bloc not of one or other 
parties, but of the entire nation. ... 5:2
Germany should not hope that Churchill's ‘unfriendly' speech would
drive a wedge between the Slavic nations, and particularly between
Poland and the Soviet Union. Not only would these countries all
continue their policies as before, but so too, Kiernik insisted, would
the United States, France and Britain, which had not gone to war with
Germany in order to see a new round of German conquest begin
immediately afterward. 53
As time passed, however, it became increasingly obvious that these
hopes would have to be adjusted and brought into line with the reality
of an increasingly tense international situation. The political
differences between the Soviet Union and the Western powers were
sourced precisely in the most sensitive area of Poland's foreign
policy. The PSL needed to make a decision where it stood, a decision
not made any easier by the PPR pressure being constantly applied.
For the PPR, the growing international discord confirmed the
party's class analysis of the international situation, and its
implications for Poland's domestic politics. Regardless of the PSL's
best attempts to call for .national unity on the German question, the
PPR continued to place Mikolajczyk's party, the domestic underground
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and international ‘reaction* , all in the same political bloc. Calling 
for party unity over Polish foreign policy in the KRN in April, PSL 
deputy W6jcik was heartily booed by the PPR and PPR aligned Peasant 
Party deputies.54 There was a great difference in PPR and PSL foreign 
policies, PPR deputy Biehkowski retorted. The PPR was conducting a 
‘positive and creative’ foreign policy, while the PSL was playing the 
role of ‘agent’ of the forces which attacked Poland and defended 
Germany. The PSL was ‘on the corner of that which is commonly called 
treachery', Biehkowski railed, and ‘the smoke screen of talk about
friendship with the Soviet Union will not help’.33 The Churchill
speech yet again confirmed the truth that those who were for Germany, 
were against Poland, and against the whole of Slavdom, Ochab 
concluded. 3S
Having unsuccessfully concluded their negotiations with the PSL for 
a one ticket election bloc, it had been decided within the PPR 
leadership that a referendum should be called for June 30. More time 
was needed before an election could be held. The PPR was not at all 
confident over its ability to take a majority of the votes with the 
PSL becoming increasingly popular and active in its opposition. 
Economic conditions had not yet stabilised, and a huge number of Poles 
were still on the move, from the west to their old homes in the east, 
or from the east to new homes in the west. It was felt that a massive 
demonstration of public support for the PPR bloc's policies was needed 
to stimulate its chances in an election ballot. Such a demonstration
would also serve to counter the gains in popularity being made by the
domestic and international opposition groups, becoming ever more 
pointed in their protests over the consolidation of communist power in 
Poland. The referendum proposal was presented by the PPR bloc as an
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exercise in pre-election democracy.
Three issues were to be addressed in the referendum: constitutional 
reform, economic reform, and Poland's new western borders. All the 
questions were phrased in such a way as to make them difficult for the 
PSL to oppose. Question three asked whether the voter supported the 
consolidation of the Polish state's western borders on the Baltic, the 
Oder and western Neisse rivers. Belying the booes in the KRN, the 
PPR's primary objective in posing this last question was to 
demonstrate Polish unity on the issue of Poland's territorial 
integrity, and to isolate the domestic ‘reaction’ which still insisted 
on returning the Polish land taken by the Soviet Union to Poland and 
German land to Germany. In the light of the growing criticism coming 
from Western leaders, and the upcoming Paris Peace Conference which 
was to settle the issue once and for all, this was seen as a crucial 
step providing an extra-electoral mandate for the government's foreign 
policy position. 57
The PPR's sustained propaganda pressure, together with the 
international criticism of men such as Churchill, Bevin and Senator 
Vandenberg, forced the PSL into taking an unambiguous stand on the 
western border and Poland's territorial security. This it did on May 
27, at a meeting of the party's Executive Council.
It could not condone talk of an East-West conflict, the Executive 
Council resolution began; only in the unity of the three great powers 
and the development of the United Nations was there hope for the world 
and for Poland. But for Poland, the basic principle of foreign policy 
could only be alliance with the Soviet Union. Only such an alliance 
provided Poland with the security it needed from renewed German 
aggression. The council ‘most energetically' protested against the 
doubts being expressed by ‘certain foreign elements' regarding
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Poland's ‘holy rights’ to its new territories. For Poland, ‘the German 
problem’ was the main problem, and would be finally settled only after 
relations among the three great powers had clarified. ‘The German 
problem* was basically dependent on Russian-British relations since 
between them, Britain and Soviet Union had divided the political, 
geographic and spiritual heart of Germany.
British policy in Germany ‘threatened our most vital interests’, 
the PSL Executive Council stated bluntly. Britain was conducting its 
classic balance of power policies on the continent, and in its modern 
variant had decided to use Germany to balance Soviet power in Europe. 
The problem with this policy was that Poland was between the powers 
which Britain intended balancing. In any German-Soviet war, Poland 
would again be the battlefield, and the first task of a freed Germany 
would be the revision of its eastern borders. Poland did not have a 
choice between Britain or the Soviet Union the way some people in 
London seemed to think., the Executive Council complained. The Western 
choice was between Germany and the Soviet Union, and was therefore no 
choice for Poland. In the future, the German threat would be greater 
than ever before in Polish history. The new western Polish border was 
‘no joke*. It focused Germany's attention on Poland and in this 
Germany would have only one goal: to destroy Poland. Every friend of
Germany was an enemy of Poland since ‘Poland could only have one 
foreign policy —  against Germany, and only one alliance —  against 
Germany’ . 5e
The PSL were beginning to sound very much like the PPR with their 
uncompromising polemic. But the PSL did not match this rebuke for the 
British government with an accompanying change in the party's overall 
political strategy. In the pre-referendum propaganda battle, at the 
same time as the party organs pressed the harder Executive Committee
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line on the western territories and Polish-Soviet alliance, articles 
continued to stress that the Polish-Soviet alliance had to be on the 
basis of ‘free with free’, and that Polish-Soviet friendship relied on 
the support of the entire nation and not one small group. 53
The referendum campaign also encouraged the PPR to press its 
foreign policy priorities: a vote for the consolidation of the western 
borders was a vote for the foreign policy of the government, Gomulka 
now told his listeners. Everyone who sincerely wanted the new western 
lands to be fully integrated into the Polish state had to support the 
government in its foreign policy, and had to support the bloc of 
parties which supported the government in this work. Such a person 
‘must be a sincere and wholehearted supporter of Polish-Soviet 
friendship and alliance’, since without this alliance Poland would not 
be in a position to defend itself for long against a reborn German 
eastward imperialism.60
Without this alliance, Gomulka's message ran, Poland would also not 
be in a position to offset the political and economic aid given 
Germany by the West which would lead to the rebirth of this 
imperialism. It was becoming obvious to all concerned that Germany was 
the prize which the West was playing for. Churchill's speech in March 
had been nothing if not a pitch designed to heighten the awareness of 
the West of the importance of wooing Germany as the bastion against 
Soviet influence in east-central Europe. For the PPR, then, the 
alliance with the Soviet Union was needed not only to protect Poland's 
new territories from German revanchism, but more importantly for the 
party's immediate future, from the threat of Western encroachment on 
East European communist power itself, that power being guaranteed by 
the presence of the Red Army.
The PPR's main propaganda weapon in its attempts to offset this
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threat was to dangle the spectre of September 1939 before the eyes of 
the Polish public. As Gomulka put it, the person who worked to split 
Poland from the Soviet Union was working to weaken Poland's western 
border; and the person who cast doubt on the legitimacy of that border 
was encouraging German imperialists to new aggression against 
Poland. 61 On the day of the referendum, Gomulka expanded this theme to 
include not only the third question on foreign policy, but also the 
previous two. Under a banner headline in Glos Ludu which read: ‘The
three questions of the referendum consist of one whole; the person who 
votes "no” is helping the Germans against Poland', Gomulka wrote that 
the new borders were the work of the Polish working class: no land
owners or capitalists would protect these borders; nor would the 
senate, which was a synonem for capitalist power.6:2 As it turned out, 
according to the official results, almost one million people voted 
against question three, with areas such as Lower and Upper Silesia, 
and the former East Prussian lands returning a higher than average 
negative vote for all three question.63
Gomulka's acute concern over the large negative vote reflected the 
growing international pressure being put on Poland's new western 
border and the steady increase in Western support for defeated 
Germany. Many German politicians had gained heart from Churchill's 
Fulton speech. The opportunities to use the disagreements among the 
great powers for their own interests gave these German leaders hope 
for the future. And as one of the major sticking points between the 
Soviet Union and the Western powers, Poland drew a good deal of their 
attention. In the following weeks, the debate in the German and 
Western press focused on Poland's new role as Soviet satellite. A 
common suggestion being made was that the Soviet Union in its 
negotiations with the Western allies over Germany could quickly change
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its position on the new Polish-German border with the Poles having 
little say in the matter. Uneqivocal Soviet denials that this was the 
case made no difference. British and American spokesmen continued to 
question the finality of the Polish-German border as a way of keeping 
the pressure on the Soviet Union over Germany.
The crunch came on September 6 with a speech in Stuttgart by US
t
Secretary of State James Byrnes. His statement was intended as a reply 
to a Soviet policy statement made by Molotov in Paris in July, 
opposing the Western attempts to reopen the issue of Germany* s eastern 
border. The Byrnes speech marked the onset of a new phase in American 
policy in Europe. Two points were made very clear: US troops would be 
staying in Europe so long as the armies of the other allies also 
remained; and Germany was to be rebuilt as soon as possible. Both 
points were directed squarely against Soviet policy in eastern Europe. 
Poland, along with the other states of eastern Europe, was caught on 
the middle.
Stuttgart confirmed the ideological prognoses of the PPR leaders: 
‘reaction’ was inbuilt into the Western capitalist system. It was 
spreading from groups close to the Western governments into the 
governments themselves, and was now visible at the highest levels. The 
consolidation of the communist system in Poland could not rely on the 
aid and support of the capitalist West. Glos Ludu on September 7 
replied to Byrnes's speech with confidence. It changed nothing, the 
newspaper said. There would be no discussion on the recovered 
territories. Poland was an independent state; as such, America could 
dictate its will in the Phillipines or in Hawaii, but it could not do 
so in Poland.64 At a mass rally organised by the PPR and PPS the next 
day, Gomulka continued in the same vein: Germany had been able to be
victorious over Poland so often in the past because Poland had been
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backward and weak. Now, thanks to the alliance and friendship with the 
Soviet Union, Poland was more powerful than it had ever been. The 
borders had been set in Potsdam and had been cemented by the close to 
four million Poles who had resettled there; the situation was 
irrevocable. Furthermore, these borders were more than Polish; they 
were now the western borders of Slavdom.
For Gomulka, the most important objective in the heightened Western 
propaganda campaign against the Polish borders was not to sow the 
seeds of a new war which might result in a territorial realignment as 
was being widely rumoured by the anti-communist underground. He had 
earlier concluded that it was intended rather to destabilise domestic 
conditions in the new ‘people’s democratic’ states. In this it was 
succeeding. The Byrnes speech had caused panic among the settlers in 
the new western territories and a good deal of animosity toward the 
United States. Poland would reach the appropriate conclusion from this 
Western objective, announced Gomulka. In foreign policy terms this 
would mean ‘greater Polish reliance on its sincere and real friends... 
above all the Soviet Union with Generalissimus Stalin at its head’.65
Bierut, in opening the eleventh session of the KRN on September 20,
approached the issue from the point of view of a statesman protecting
the interests of a small power against the bullying of two imperial
powers: Britain had as much to answer for as America; it was Britain,
after all, which was providing the more open support for Mikolajczyk
and the PSL. It was only right that Poland was recompensated by the
great powers for the land it had ceded in the east with land
historically Polish in the west. It seemed that imperial powers
thought it quite all right not to respect the rights of smaller
powers, Bierut complained:
Historical experience should teach in a convincing way that 
changes in the borders of states have always presented the most 
difficult and most tragic problem in the international relations
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as in the domestic relations of a state which is subject to these
changes.........if certain politicians think that these sorts of
changes can be rethought and altered at will according to the 
occasion or on the basis of whatever different opinion, there 
remains nothing more to be said except that they are deeply and 
fatally wrong. 66
Mikolajczyk's response to Byrnes's speech was to roundly condemn 
this new violation of Poland's right to territorial inviolability. For 
Poland the recovered territories were a matter of 'life or death'. He 
went on to phrase his reproach in a way he hoped would be 
understandable: 'Unless the great powers want a new revolutionary
upheaval in the Polish organism, they will recognise Poland's border 
on the Oder and Neisse as inviolable*.37 But there was still a note of 
hope in the PSL reaction: ‘Despite the unpleasant reflections which
Minister Byrnes' s speech awakens in us, we look with trust to the 
future’, wrote Czeslaw Wycech.
Far too much was yet at stake among the great powers, and, while 
Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union continued negotiating 
over the future of Europe, over the peace agreements with Germany's 
wartime allies, there was still hope for the PSL. At the same time as 
its policy initiatives began to show the effect of the Western 
bruising, 6,3 the PSL continued to insist that the Western allies should 
not be rejected, but rather encouraged to understand that a secure 
defence against Germany required alliances on both its eastern and 
western borders. 70
But time was quickly running out for the PSL. Its foreign policies, 
hostage to the PPR's domestic ambitions, had never been allowed to 
rest easy in the ‘democratic* Polish state’s foreign policy concensus. 
In response to the PPR’s bitter accusations of their reactionary 
intent, PSL policy makers continued to straddle the ever widening 
chasm between Western support and the Soviet commitment to Polish 
territorial security. Their other option of politically joining with
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the PPR threatened to leave the party bereft of its independent 
identity and entirely subject to the internationalist obligations 
which the PPR took for granted. This the PSL could never accept. Its 
foremost political goal governing all its foreign and domestic 
policies, was Poland's right to an ‘independent sovereign existence'. 
It never ceased to remind the PPR that at the basis of Poland's equal 
relations with the Soviet Union should be a free choice of democratic 
system best suited to the particular national characteristics of both 
Poland and the Soviet Union. 7,1
The PPR were in no mood to listen. Prior to the January 1947 
election, the widespread PSL organisation was ruthlessly repressed and 
many of its parliamentary candidates imprisoned. The election outcome, 
as a result, was never in any doubt. A massive 380 seats was won for 
the PPR bloc, in the new Sejm, and only 27 for the PSL. 73 From this 
point onward, the PSL was no longer able to have any influence in the 
domestic foreign policy debate.
In foreign policy terms, there was little immediate change as a 
result of the PSL defeat. The consensus which had characterised Polish 
foreign policy from the creation of the Provisional Government of 
National Unity continued to dominate as it had previously. The 
elimination of the PSL did, on the other hand, remove a valuable 
balancing voice from the domestic debate. Without the PSL to provide a 
legitimate home for the constituency naturally sympathetic to the 
government's pragmatic foreign policies, these policies were deprived 
of an essential source of continuity. The responsibility for Polish 
foreign policy was now left entirely with the PPR, with the result 
that it was not long before the conflict between pragmatic policy and 
the PPR's ideological raison d'etre was being exacerbated in direct
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proportion to the growing international tension between the Soviet 
Union and the Western allies.
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8. NATIONAL PRESTIGE: IDEOLOGY VS PRAGMATISM
In responding to the foreign policy demands placed on them, 
Poland's communist policy makers found themselves in much the same 
uncomfortable position as the PSL. On the one hand, their role as the 
nation's new masters made them acutely conscious of their 
responsibility for representing the nation's ambitions abroad. On the 
other, they were equally aware of their ideological responsibilities. 
Where the PSL had sought to marry its commitment to a Western 
orientated policy platform with the reality of Soviet influence in 
Poland, PPR foreign policy matched an internationalist commitment to 
Soviet security with a need to pursue active, and unambiguously Polish 
policies toward the Western states. Soon after this match began to be 
implemented as the country's new foreign policy concensus, the 
division between the party's 'national' and 'internationalist' wings 
once again became publicly noticable.
For men like Gomulka, the match between the internationalist 
commitment to Soviet security and Poland's need for Western trade and 
aid was symbolised in the relationship between Poland's security 
interests and its national prestige. This relationship had been formed 
from the configuration of historical, political and geographical 
elements that had brought the PPR to power and given it the character 
it had. Security was fixed and non-negotiable; prestige was rather 
more intangible. Polish prestige provided the ‘democratic’ state with 
room to manouver, where its security allowed none at all. As long as 
the unity of the great powers held firm, there was no reason why 
Poland should not look westward as well as east to fulfill its 
ambitions. These ambitions could hardly threaten Soviet security; and 
indeed, while the Soviet leadership sought to ensure its own security
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through continuing good relations with its war-time allies, Poland's 
own self-interested efforts could only complement this cause rather 
than damage it.
Gomulka's focus on the pragmatic possibilities inherent in the 
post-war international environment was throughout this period 
paralleled by a more subdued but readily apparent current in the PPR. 
Led by Bierut and Berman, the 'internationalist* wing of the party had 
no qualms in providing Polish national prestige with an exclusively 
ideological interpretation. For these PPR leaders, Polish prestige was 
part and parcel of the country's new ideological incarnation, an 
ideological rationale for Poland's new physical and political position 
in Europe. But so long as the Soviet Union encouraged the external 
focus westward, this current remained muted.
The first signs of public opposition to Western policies came from 
Gomulka, and not from the ‘internationalist* wing. The PPR leader had 
invested a great deal of his own high profile credibility in the 
West's continued opposition to the restoration of Germany. When 
Western attitudes sympathetic toward defeated Germany began to 
translate into concrete policy actions, Gomulka's public dismay 
heralded a process of re-assessment in the party which only later came 
to receive the full support of the Soviet Union. Right through this 
period of re-assessment, lasting until the summer of 1947, Gomulka and 
the PPR continued to call for trade with the West. But by the early 
autumn, when Soviet and Polish assessments of the international 
situation had converged, Polish national prestige henceforth took on 
an unremitting eastward focus.
-268-
8*1 Open Door to the West
It would be wrong to assume that Gomulka and his supporters 
represented an explicit foreign policy opposition to the 
'internationalist* current in the PPR. While the Soviet Union sought 
policy advantages from the continuing good relations with the Western 
allies, Poland's communist policy makers could guiltlessly set out to 
build the 'democratic* state's prestige on both ideological and 
pragmatic grounds. Gomulka, along with the rest of the PPR leadership, 
knew exactly where ‘democratic’ Poland's place was in Europe. At the 
same time, the practical opportunities to make the most of this 
position had never been better. Gomulka's strength as party leader was 
his sensitivity to a wider domestic consituency than the communists 
could naturally command. It was with the encouragement of the rest of 
the PPR leadership, therefore, that Gomulka undertook to bring the 
rest of the nation to accept this largely pragmatic policy concensus 
—  on the PPR's terms, not those of the PSL.
Still, the contrast between the two orientations remained. Bierut 
cast himself as shepherd of the nation's prestige in consciously 
ideological terms: 'An increase in the importance of democratic Poland
in the new system of European relations is one of the conditions of a 
lasting peace in Europe* , he told the KRN on the day the PKWN was 
transformed into the Provisional Government.1 In Bierut's conception, 
Poland was to occupy point position in the European alliance against 
Germany; as Germany regained its strength, so too Poland would need to 
increase in importance and power to prevent a repeat of the German 
aggression. Bierut's 'new system of European relations’ was one where 
the Soviet Union was no longer consigned to enforced isolation, but
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where it was able instead to have a determining influence in European 
affairs. Bierut's ambition was for Poland to become the Soviet Union's 
number one ally in this new European system.
Such a role required accepting the Soviet Union as ethnic and 
ideological patron of Poland. Poland's natural inclinations in this 
direction had, according to Bierut, been artificially stymied by the 
pre-war ideologically anti-Soviet governments; with this unnatural 
barrier no longer present, Poland would be able to at last play out 
its destiny as an important state in central Europe. Poland in its 
post-war guise would be only slightly more modest in its aspirations 
to those of the pre-war republic with its pretensions to great-power 
status in Europe. Poland under communist rule would be more sensitive 
to geo-political realities, Bierut made clear. Pre-war governments had 
had their tragic misperceptions of these realities proven in the 
defeat of September 1939. Notwithstanding this tragic event, prestige 
was Poland's by right: the nation's destiny had been determined by its 
location. Now it was up to the population and its leaders to make full 
use of the opportunity presented by the outcome of the war. s
In contrast, Gomulka sought to reassure the Polish population that 
the communists had no intention of cutting Poland off from its past 
close relations with Western Europe, or of 'communising’ the country 
Soviet style. At a speech he gave at a Warsaw rally celebrating the 
creation of the Provisional Government of National Unity, the PPR 
leader declared that Poland had much to gain from the example of the 
Western states, as well as from the Soviet Union: Poland 'can become a 
nation really free and really great only then when we will be able to 
learn from other nations and states their best characteristics and at 
the same time lose our own worst national characteristics’ . From 
America, Poland could learn how to work; from Britain, Poland could
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learn thrift and a care for state and national interests; and from the 
Soviet Union, Poland could learn patriotism and love of one's 
country. 3
At the same time, Gomulka, like Bierut, understood that Poland's
position as potentially a great European power was linked
fundamentally to Germany, to ensuring that Germany would never again
occupy a dominant position in central Europe. Poland would now benefit
at Germany's expense. Germany, which had in the past dominated
politically and economically in central Europe, had been crushed by
the allies. Poland, on the other hand, had been shifted bodily
westward, even further into the European heartland. Potsdam and the
official recognition of Poland's new borders had immensely
strengthened Poland's international position, Gomulka wrote
optimistically in Glos Ludxi.
We have every reason to believe that very soon we will become a 
great economic and political power in Europe.... Poland has the 
greatest potential power in central Europe; its shifting must 
have a serious influence on the development of political and 
economic relations in Europe, and even in the world.*
Everything that contributed to a weakened Germany, wrote Gomulka,
contributed to a lasting international peace, and as a logical
extension, to a powerful Poland. And notwithstanding the PPR's
unremitting criticism of the PSL on this very same point, Poland,
according to Gomulka, needed to be sure of its defence against a new
German threat by maintaining and improving its good relations with the
Western allies as well as with the Soviet Union. 3
In his Central Committee report to the PPR's First Congress in
December 1945, Gomulka left no doubt as to the major Polish foreign
policy pre-occupation:
What threatens us, and in perspective the only threat, is the 
German danger. . . . Various ideas of a Western bloc most certainly 
would not remain indifferent both for Germany and regarding 
Germany. There is no need to prove what danger for Poland, for
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peace in Europe, is hidden in these sorts of ideas.6 
Talk of a Western bloc to counterbalance the encroachment of Soviet 
power into east-central Europe, was seen by the PPR leadership as an 
attempt to return to the pre-war days of building a Western bastion 
against communism. Of most immediate threat was the use such a bloc 
could make of Germany. Germany would, in effect, be granted Poland's 
pre-war mantle of bulkward against communism; it would gain favoured 
status within the Western bloc and would need to be re-armed, 
constituting an immediate threat to Polish security.
The PPR under Gomulka's guidance had no wish to exile Poland to a 
political 'Eastern Europe' behind a Soviet-Slavic shield: ‘...shutting
ourselves off from the countries of the West would be contrary to our 
interests’, Deputy Foreign Minister Modzelewski announced soon after 
the PPR Congress had ended.7 In his report to the Congress, Gomulka 
had emphasised Poland's commitment to the Soviet Union and friendship 
with the other Slavic countries. But at the same time, he had also 
stressed Poland's openness to Western input, to ‘peace, agreement and 
friendship’ with the great powers of the West. In Polish communist 
perceptions, Poland had been given the opportunity to enter on its 
‘new track’ foreign policy as an inevitability of history dictated by 
the social forces unleashed by German and European fascism; the Polish 
alliance with the Soviet Union was therefore a historical as much as 
an ideological necessity. But the last thing intended by Polish 
foreign policy at this stage after the war was for ‘democratic’ 
Poland's new relationship with the Soviet Union to become an obstacle 
to good Polish relations with the West. In terms of trade and aid, 
Poland relied heavily on these good relations to see it through the 
reconstruction programme getting under way in the country. On the 
domestic political front, Gomulka’s priority was the consolidation of
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communist power, and here the PPR leader certainly had premonitions as 
to the likely response of domestic and international ‘reaction* to 
this intention. But in foreign policy, the most important priority was 
to finally put an end to the German danger and to build a strong 
Polish state, and an important part of this goal depended on the 
cooperation of the Western allies.
Stalin had often assured the Polish leaders that they had the full 
cooperation of the Soviet Union in this goal: ‘Germany needs only
twenty years to regain its power and threaten a new war*, the Soviet 
leader had warned.13 For this reason the USSR continued to make unity 
among the three great powers a priority goal of its own foreign 
policy. Unity was also a way of ensuring if only tacit Western 
approval for the consolidation of Soviet influence in east-central 
Europe. But within the framework of this larger Soviet policy, the PPR 
was not reticent in making the most of the green light showing from 
Moscow. The party's efforts to build on the Soviet grand strategy were 
definitely self-interested to the extent that they sought greater room 
for manouver for the future, for a Poland established as a regional 
leader within the Slavic alliance network, serving as bridge between 
the Soviet Union and a politically progressive Western Europe. This 
was to be in the future. For.the present, Gomulka's characteristically 
independent policies, were put into stark relief by those advocated by 
the hardline ‘internationalist' group of Central Committee communists 
led by Berman.
Berman's contribution to the PPR Congress debate on Gomulka's 
Central Committee report, the only one to put its emphasis on foreign 
policy, was published by Glos Ludu three days before the end of the 
Congress proceedings. Its centre-piece was a programme listing four 
points differing from the official Central Committee report- less in 
form than in content:
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1. relentless action against all attempts to reactivate German 
imperialism;
2. fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union as the guarantee of 
Polish independence, the bedrock of the development of democracy 
and antifascist forces in Europe and in the whole world, the 
inexhaustable source and hope for all progressive forces of all 
humanity;
3. cooperation with all those European countries which represent 
people's democracy; finally:
4. support for all efforts aiming to strengthen the Anglo-Soviet- 
American alliance, and on this basis shaping the friendship with 
the Anglo-Saxon democracies. 9
Unlike Gomulka, Berman had little regard for popular attitudes or for
the unprecedented possibilities of Poland's international situation.
While he did ensure that his programme fitted the list of Polish
foreign policy priorities by dealing in turn with the same issues as
the Central Committee report, Berman's approach was aggressively
ideological; politically, he sought a far more intimate identification
with Soviet foreign policy than did Gomulka.
Berman's reaction to Gomulka's treatment of the danger of the ideas 
being discussed in the West was to point out that the struggle against 
German aggression was a class struggle and would continue so long as 
Germany retained its pre-war imperialist/capitalist character. Where 
Gomulka made it plain he sought Soviet friendship and alliance as a 
guarantee for Poland's national security, Berman couched his counter­
policy in uncompromising internationalist language. And rather than 
accept any attempt to broaden Poland's international appeal, Berman's 
answer was to have Poland deal only with other communist states as a 
guarantee of Poland's commitment to Soviet leadership in what Berman 
saw not so much as a Slavic bloc, but a communist bloc. His last point 
bears this analysis out: Poland's relations with the West needed to be 
based on a total commitment to Soviet foreign policy in its goal of 
maintaining the anti-Hitler alliance and Soviet dominance in east- 
central Europe as the consequence of that alliance. No room was left 
in this policy programme for any national Polish self-interest.
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The Congress result was never in any doubt, however. Gomulka's
‘national’ communists were able to hold sway and have ‘the validity 
and correctness' of their views as represented by the Central
Committee report confirmed in the final ideological-political
resolution. 10
In an interesting parallel to the trade-off between mass support 
for the new foreign policy concensus and Soviet respect for Polish
sovereignty postulated by the PSL in their domestic campaign,
Gomulka's quid pro quo for supporting a relatively less ideological
‘national’ foreign policy, was to assure the Soviet Union of his, and
the PPR's intentions of carrying out a revolution in the Polish
population's popular attitudes toward its traditional eastern enemy. 
In a list of twelve ‘principal tasks’ set out for the party in the 
Central Committee report, the first half of task eleven, the only task 
dealing directly with foreign policy issues, was to ‘deepen within the 
Polish nation an appreciation of the new friendship and alliance with 
the Soviet Union which is synonymous with strengthened security for 
the Polish borders- and peace in Europe’, Presented as being integral 
to Poland's foreign policy, this was reassurance for the Soviet Union 
that whatever the policies of the Gomulka led Polish communist state, 
there would never, be any attempt to threaten Soviet interests now or 
in the future. The guarantee would be a population which had accepted 
wholeheartedly the new direction of state policy and acceeded readily 
to the propaganda of the new regime. The second part of this party 
task was to 'carry out friendly and alliance like policies toward all 
states friendly with Poland, particularly toward the Slavic and 
Western nations’.11 Yet again, Gomulka seemed to be reaffirming his 
intention of supporting a refreshingly open foreign policy. •
These signals to the West not to limit the little room Poland had
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to raanouver by supporting Germany in any measures threatening Poland's 
right to secure borders, had little effect on Western policy makers. 
To men like Bevin, Gomulka was nothing if not the archetypal communist 
leader, propagandising about good relations with the West while at the 
same time proceeding rapidly to 'communize' Poland. Not surprisingly, 
Gomulka took strong issue with the British Foreign Minister when, in a 
speech to the Commons, he had called Poland a police state. 
Categorically denying this allegation, and remarking that British 
democracy in India was hardly better, Gomulka called for the British 
to be honest in their attitudes toward Poland, to look at Poland 
through clear rather than coloured glasses.12
PPR claims to be conducting an independent foreign policy were 
strongly put by Zenon Kliszko in the KRN in April. Kliszko expressed 
the PPR's official support for Poland's diplomatic effort. Of 
particular note for Kliszko was the heightened and successful activity 
of Polish diplomacy in securing a treaty with Jugoslavia in March, in 
the continuing negotiations with France,13 in securing Britain's 
announcement of the demobilisation of the Polish armed forces abroad, 
and in maintaining a high profile action in the UN against Franco's 
Spain. All these initiatives pointed to Poland's growing participation 
in world affairs. The only rule for Polish actions, Kliszko declared, 
was the Polish national interest and world peace.1A
In the eyes of Poland's leaders, it was not the practical efforts 
of the 'democratic' regime to ensure its domestic security, or the 
Soviet guarantee to provide for Poland's territorial security that was 
undermining Poland's good relations with the West; the fault lay with 
the poor showing of the West itself, and its ideological distrust of 
the new Polish regime. In a speech given as part of the referendum 
campaign in May 1946, Gomulka made much of this point. While the
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Germans were receiving hundreds of thousands of tons of grain from the
UN relief agency UNRRA, the Italians likewise, and Greece with a much
smaller population had been allocated around 500,000 tons, Poland was
being sent a meagre 70,000 tons. The obvious conclusion was that in
Greece and Italy where elections were imminent, the voters needed to
be kept happy. “In Poland the strategy seemed to be to increase the
hardship prior to elections. Gomulka ended this reference to Western
inequity with a proverb: ‘real friends are recognised in need' . 15
In contrast to the anti-PSL rhetoric of the referendum propaganda
campaign, in their foreign policy the PPR and government were not at
all looking to break with the West. Quite the contrary. But nor did
the PPR intend compromising on its domestic policy. The party's June
Central Committee Plenum issued the following statement:
Polish foreign policy, based on alliance and sincere friendship 
with the Soviet Union, on solidarity with the Slavic nations, and 
with its goal the tightening of its relations with all nations, 
in the first instance with France, Great Britain and the United 
States, on the basis of sovereignty and mutual respect for 
national interests, is inextricably tied with the domestic policy 
of people's democracy, with the policies of reform and social 
reconstruction.16
If Britain and the United States continued criticising Poland's 
domestic policies, it would be difficult for Poland to maintain the 
good relations it desired, the Plenum noted. The closer Western 
governments drew to the line of 'international reaction’, the closer 
they identified with the domestic enemies of the PPR and this was 
unforgivable. Polish pride could not allow a double standard of such 
magnitude; PPR ideological resoluteness was unshakeable.
At the same time, the PPR leadership continued to keep its bridges 
to the West well supported. Following the massive Soviet exploitation 
of the lands ‘recovered’ by Poland up to at least August 1945, the 
proportion of Polish trade with the Soviet Union had decreased 
substantially. Poland's demand for heavy equipment and raw materials
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needed in the country's reconstruction could not be met by the Soviet 
Union which, under the post-war programme announced by Stalin in 
February, was intensifying its own economic reconstruction. As a 
result, Western markets were by 1947 providing over 60% of Polish 
needs.17
The importance of these Western trade links had been consistently
emphasised by Osdbka-Morawski in all of his KRN speeches since the
establishment of the Government of National Unity. In late July 1945,
his pitch was full of enthusiasm and pride:
Our natural alliances give us a perspective for economic 
cooperation leading to a rapid reconstruction of the country, 
increasing Polish wealth and power. . . . Poland is entering the 
world arena not only as a newly reborn organism and important 
political factor, but also as a serious partner in economic 
cooperation....1e
By December 1945, an element of defensiveness had entered his
delivery. Poland, 0s<5bka-Morawski asserted, stood on the position that
there was a need to develop economic cooperation with ‘leading
countries’, above all with the United States. This would enable Poland
to take advantage of American experience and resources for the
reconstruction of Polish industry, agriculture and communication. But
the Premier could no longer afford to ignore the ideological
consequences of Poland's ‘natural alliances’:
Poland reckons that by joining economic cooperation with other 
countries, with care for its own economic and political 
independence and sovereignty, it will best contribute to the 
inculcation of principles of international cooperation serving 
the issue of peace advocated as well by the United States.13
‘Economic and political independence and sovereignty’ were becoming 
sensitive issues for the PPR. Trade with the West inevitably meant 
dealing with the capitalist cartels and trusts of communist folk-lore. 
Men like Berman had no wish for this trade to develop to any great 
extent, and their influence on policy was becoming greater the more 
the West was seen to be undermining Poland's territorial and regime
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security. Evident in 0s6bka-Morawski' s delivery was the advantage 
which the government and pragmatic side of the PPR wished to gain by 
their Western policy: if the United States, the most powerful
capitalist state, cooperated with Poland while at the same time 
respecting Poland's economic and political sovereignty, then the 
capitalist/reactionary threat to the gains of socialism in Poland 
would be lessened. Instead, economic cooperation with America would 
help strengthen the new Polish socialist economy, and the position of 
the PPR in the Polish state.
As the year 1946 progressed, this position became increasingly 
unsustainable. Western governments had no wish to support what they 
saw as a grand strategy to entrench Soviet control in the centre of 
Europe. Trying to keep the door to the West, left open by the Soviet 
Union, as far ajar as possible, the Polish government was not finding 
this an easy task. Building on pre-war and wartime empathetic Polish 
relations with the West, the new government frequently found itself up 
against the continued influence of the earlier Polish representatives 
in Western capitals. Particularly with Britain, matters were 
complicated by the continued presence in London of many members of the 
still constituted, although no longer recognised internationally, 
Polish government in London.
Parallel to the growing Western hostility being felt by Polish 
foreign policy makers, the Soviet Union was making it obvious who had 
Poland's best interests at heart. In May 1946, a top level Polish 
delegation was again in Moscow for the concluding stages of a series 
of negotiations. The most important of these was stated to be the 
settling of Polish debts arising from the maintenance of the Polish 
army in the Soviet Union during the war. Also at issue were Soviet 
debts to Poland for costs borne by the PKWN and Provisional Government
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during the presence of the Red Array in Poland. In what was clearly a 
move designed to contrast with the British attitude over costs 
incurred by the Polish Government in London and Polish armed forces in 
Britain, for which the Provisional Government of National Unity was 
deemed responsible by the British Foreign Office, the Soviet and 
Polish delegations agreed to anull both sets of debts. The rest of the 
negotiations were concluded on equally favourable terms for the Polish 
side. Soviet supplies of arms and ammunition were assured for the 
Polish army until such time as the Polish military industry could 
supply these itself; an open credit line from the Soviet gold reserve 
was agreed upon —  contrasting with Poland’s difficulties in receiving 
back its own gold reserves held in Britain; and massive supplies of 
Soviet grain were promised —  in contrast with the UNRRA' s decision to 
cut back still further its grain shipments to Poland. Talks were held 
and successfully concluded on matters of repatriation, on mutual trade 
and on the return to Poland of the Ossolineum Library, the Panorama 
Raclawicka and other cultural treasures left in Lwow. 20
On the return of the delegation to Poland, the PPR leaders and 
their press made much of the goodwill of the Soviet . Union toward 
Poland. In his interview for the press, Gomulka saw fit to emphasise 
the economic benefits to be gained from Poland's relationship with the 
Soviet Union. Economics and politics were inextricably linked in this 
relationship: economic cooperation between the two neighbours flowed
from the interest each took in the welfare and power of the other, 
threatened as they were by a common danger, Gomulka warned. 21
8*2 Poland's ‘Own Road'
On 2 December 1946, after a period in which frictions between the 
security interests of the Soviet Union and Western powers in southern 
and eastern Europe had been steadily building up a head of steam, 
Gomulka made a speech in which he addressed directly the accusations 
made by Western statesmen. The accusation which went deepest, 
doubtless because it was closest to the truth, was that the Soviet 
Union had delivered the eastern German territories to Poland in order 
to weaken Germany, strengthen its own position in central Europe, and 
consign Poland to a fundamental dependence on the Soviet Union for its 
territorial and regime security. Just the opposite, declared Gomulka. 
The overwhelming aim of the domestic and foreign policies of the PPR 
and its 'democratic bloc’ was to deliver Poland from its historic 
dependence on one or other great power, and create instead an 
independent, sovereign and powerful Polish Republic. This aim could 
not be compromised. The 'recovered territories’ were intrinsic to this 
aim, and an essential part of Poland’s ability to go it alone in 
Europe. If men like Byrnes and Bevin could question Poland's new 
western borders when they themselves had taken part in setting these 
borders, then in international relations the name of the game was 
still predominantly 'the naked rule of force’; and without the western 
territories, Poland would be as it was before the war —  weak and 
defenceless, dependent on the help of others:
A state which does not have possibilities to develop based on 
its own strength, which is condemned to relying on the constant 
help of others, can never be sovereign. It is a vassal of that 
state which gives it help even if formally it is independent. 
Relations between such states are similar to the relations 
between a lord and his loyal servant. And the development of a 
vassal state is dependent only on the needs of its protector.
Such a vassal independence in which all the external forms of 
national freedom might be present, but which about the
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development of the nation, the power of the state and its 
economic life, foreigners actually decide, is not worth much. 22
At the same time, Poland could not afford to take any risks in its 
new European incarnation. The memories of the war were too fresh and 
the inbuilt ideological threat to the power of the new communist 
regime from ‘imperialist reaction' could not be met without powerful 
support:
The Polish nation cannot have two political orientations —  
east and west. Poland's racja stanu should decide about Poland's 
political orientation. In line with this racja the Polish nation 
can have only one political orientation, one which secures the 
inviolablity of the current borders of the Polish state. Just as 
we cannot have an orientation on Germany as an ally of Poland, 
nor can the political thought of the Polish nation orientate 
itself on those who support the German dreams of revenge for 
defeat by questioning our western borders.23
Those who supported these ‘dreams' of territorial revanchism, were the
same sources who supported the equally dreamlike goal of ideological
revanchism in East Europe. The fact that these two threats coincided
over the international dispute regarding Poland's western borders made
Poland's new position especially certain. Poland, Gomulka continued in
a later speech, presented a very important link in the chain of
'democratic states'. Poland, indeed, occupied one of the strategic
positions on which the decisive victory in the world ‘battle of
reaction with democracy* relied:
The Polish positions find themselves in the hands of democracy; 
they should be, however, strengthened, better fortified, so that 
the enemy will never be able to have access to them.2'1
The PPR's endeavours to provide for Western trade and aid based on an
appreciation of the West's pragmatism, were beginning to become
subject to the greater political imperatives inherent in Poland's
post-war racja stanu.
For all this, Gomulka did not lose his enthusiasm for continued 
good relations with the West. Just as the Western states wanted good 
relations with Poland on their terms, so he wanted relations with the
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West on his terms. What was at stake was the presence and influence of 
Poland as a communist state, secure in its domestic power, yet a 
legitimate partner in a world where the Soviet Union would be treated 
by the Western allies with the same regard as they had for each other. 
The Western states needed to come to terms with the post-war greater 
Soviet power. So also did they need to consign Germany to economic 
servitude in retribution for its sins. That the Western powers had no 
intention of doing any of these things made Gomulka no less committed 
to continuing his search for the most practical basis on which to 
build his country's national prestige.
The foreign policy statement made by Jozef Cyrankiewicz, the new 
socialist Premier, to the freshly constituted Sejm in February 1947, 
was upbeat and positive. Not surprisingly, the peace accords with 
Germany were of overwhelming importance. For Poland, these accords 
needed to be in line with the position made clear in the past, a
position very close to that of the Soviet Union. The West had already
signalled its intentions of opposing this position. In New York on 
December 2, Bevin and Byrnes had signed an agreement joining the 
British and American zones of occupation in Germany, creating 
'Bizonia'. The ground ahead looked very rocky indeed. But the Polish 
government was not discouraged. International peace was its objective. 
Peace meant time for it to consolidate its power and rebuild Poland
from the destruction left by the war. Cyrankiewicz's speech was
conciliatory. Now was not the time to break with the West. Even if the 
involvement of Britain and the United States in Poland's domestic 
affairs during the election campaign had been less than warranted, 
this was now all in the past. 26 This attitude was given the full 
support of the PPR: 'The need to maintain world peace and the need for
economic cooperation dictates our relations with the Western states
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and with all peace loving nations', Biehkowski reminded the PPR 
dominated Sejm. 26
As well as the hope that the Western world understood Europe's 
desperate need for peace, there was another consideration underlying 
Gomulka's confidence in the PPR's ability to overcome the ideological 
divide and coexist with the West on the basis of trade: the party
which had from its earliest days based its claim to be nationally 
representative on its patriotic profile, believed in its own power. 
Already at the PPR's First Congress, Gomulka had announced that the 
fact that the Soviet Union had made it easier for ‘truly democratic 
forces’ to take over the administration did not mean that the USSR 
should then continue to dictate its will in Poland. There was no 
theoretical or practical model which was good for all the new 
‘people's democracies’, Gomulka had insisted. Each needed to be left 
to settle its own affairs on the road to socialism. 27
It was to offset the linkage between domestic and international 
‘reaction’ that the power of the Soviet Union and the other Slavic 
‘democratic’ states was critically needed. And now that the PSL, the 
main internal threat, had been defeated and the international linkage 
vitally weakened, Gomulka, Bierikowski, Kliszko and other ‘national’ 
PPR leaders felt confident enough to make more of Poland's own foreign 
policy path. Within the limits set by political good sense and Western 
pressure, the PPR headed by Gomulka intended to make its own mark in 
the international arena, not simply as a ‘vassal’ of the Soviet Union.
At the turn of 1947, Gomulka made this the centre of his argument 
in an article published in the first edition of the party's new 
monthly theoretical journal, Nowe Drogi (New Roads). Poland was not 
about to be ‘sovietised’ under the leadership of the PPR, Gomulka once 
more assured his readers. There were three good reasons why not: the
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Russian revolution had been a bloody affair —  in Poland it had been 
peaceful; Russia needed to go through the stage of 'dictatorship of 
the proletariat’ —  in Poland this had not been necessary; the Russian 
soviets had combined legislature with executive —  Poland was and 
would continue to be a parliamentary democracy. Why the difference? 
Because in 1917 ‘world capital* had been immensely stronger than it 
was at the end of the Second World War thanks to the strength of the 
‘democratic forces' within their own countries. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Union was helping Poland economically. This did not mean Poland 
would go the way of the Soviet Union economically. It did mean that 
Poland was being given the chance to go on its ‘own road towards 
socialism* without the pressures to which Russia had been subjected, 
and which had resulted in the Soviet Union being organised the way it 
was. Gomulka made plain he intended to lead the PPR and Poland along 
that 'own road to socialism'.2"3
This communist optimism fed through into Poland's foreign 
relations. Negotiations for a Polish-French treaty had continued 
through 1946 and in the first months of 1947, Modzelewski, now Polish 
Foreign Minister, was able to present a series of Polish concessions 
which brought the matter to an imminent conclusion. 2:3 The Polish- 
French relationship was accepted in Poland as proof of the success 
possible in maintaining good relations with the Western states. The 
basis of this success, it was acknowledged, was the interest Poland 
and France had in common in securing themselves from German 
aggression. No such common interest existed with Britain or the United 
States. The Anglo-Saxons, in contrast to the French, were understood 
not to have been as scarred by the German aggression and not as 
sensitive to the possibility of it ever happening again.
With Czechoslovakia also, relations underwent a dramatic turn for
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the better. After August 1945 little political will had existed on 
either side for any dramatic move to attempt to overcome the impasse 
which had developed over the territorial dispute in Silesian Zaolzia. 
Instead a propaganda war had been sparked off with both sides alleging 
the misconduct of the other.30 The success of the Czechoslovakian 
communists in the May 1946 elections brought a swift and wholesale 
change in the situation, and by March 1947, thanks to the mediatory 
roles of Stalin and Tito, Poland and Czechoslovakia were approaching 
many foreign policy positions from a united standpoint. On March 10, 
Poland and Czechoslovakia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual 
Assistance, written along the same lines as those already in force 
between both countries and the Soviet Union and Jugoslavia; Germany 
was the focus of their mutual defence.31
In February, having been briefed by Stalin and Molotov on the 
intended Soviet position on the German Peace Treaty to be taken during 
the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers scheduled to begin in 
March, the new Polish Premier and his delegation agreed that the two 
sides' common interests continued to be reflected in an identity of 
views. On other issues, Modzelewski characterised the two states' 
foreign policies as ‘similar, but not identical’.32 Polish foreign 
policy makers did not see themselves as following blindly in the 
Soviet Union's footsteps. This was a point of Polish pride. 
Perceptions abroad of Poland's ‘satellite’ foreign policy were not 
shared by the communists directing that policy. From the Polish 
communist point of view, what was deemed ‘satellite’ was a common 
interest with the Soviet Union in security; balancing this common 
interest were other independent prestige interests which the Polish 
communists wanted the chance to develop.
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Gomulka and the ‘national’ PPR leaders understood that Polish 
prestige required more than simply paying lip service to the idea of 
Poland's sovereignty. Independent action had to be taken to show that 
this sovereignty really existed; while there remained room to move 
between the ‘identity of interests’ with the Soviet Union, and the 
‘general interests' of trade and good relations with the West, then 
the Polish leaders intended occupying this space. Unfortunately, their 
best intentions were being swiftly undermined by the environmental 
changes taking place around them.
Caught in the throes of a domestic economic crisis brought on by 
catastrophic winter conditions, the, British government in February 
informed the US State Department that from 31 March 1947 it would no 
longer be in a position to continue its support for the anti-communist 
governments of Greece and Turkey. The American response went much 
further than simply taking up these British positions. The ideological 
divide between the Western powers and the Soviet Union could no longer 
be patched over with explanations of national security in Europe. A 
greater national interest was at stake in American perceptions: its
own international prestige as the post-war world's strongest non­
communist state. Britain's plea for aid in the Balkans symbolised its 
exit from the ranks of the great powers at the same time as its 
traditional balancing role in Europe was being decisively eroded by 
the new-found power of the Soviet Union. More importantly, this Soviet 
power with its traditional appeal to a world communist movement had 
the potential for rapid international expansion. In his March 12 
speech before Congress, Truman announced that the United States would 
be taking up the challenge issued it by international communism. The 
US ‘mission’: to give help to any country threatened by communism
either internally or externally.33
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From the time it became clear that the United States and Britain on 
the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, would be going their 
own ways over Germany, Polish spokesmen grew increasingly bitter. As 
had been reiterated time and again, the issue of who Poland would do 
business with depended on the prospective business partner's attitude 
to Germany. The same states to whom Poland had looked for the bulk of 
its Western trade and economic support were now intending to create 
from Germany the spectre which Polish foreign policy had been working 
so hard to avoid; Germany would again occupy the dominant position in 
central Europe:
At Yalta as at Potsdam, the issue of German needs was 
discussed; at both conferences, however, the idea of Poland as 
the “inspiration of the world" dominated.
One has the impression that now the Germans are beginning to 
be afforded this position.3-1
Modzelewski no longer felt obliged to keep his ideological rhetoric in
check for the sake of trade and good relations. The Anglo-Saxons had
quickly forgotten all about Hitler's attempts to eliminate the Slavs;
they were now openly supporting revisionist/reactionary German
elements:
They do this by calling on the interest of Europe, but Europe for 
them, for some unknown reason, ends somewhere on that side of the 
Elbe. They are building a peace riddled with dangers, a peace 
which is to serve all sorts of unsatiated cartels and trusts.36
The Foreign Minister expressed firm support for Molotov's response to
Truman: ‘Polish opinion solidarizes with Molotov's remarks regarding
the destruction of German militarism and basing European security on
the future German system’.36
Modzelewski had touched on an issue which had quickly come to 
dominate the international press after Truman's speech to Congress. 
Since Churchill's Fulton speech in March 1946, the ‘iron curtain’ had 
become a popular catch-phrase among journalists. Now, politicians were 
also beginning to use it with increasing frequency, talking of an
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East-West political divide. In Poland, after Churchill's speech, talk 
of a Slavic bloc had been dropped; the feeling was that Britain and 
the West should not be needlessly antagonised into reacting with a 
traditional balancing policy opposing the new Slavic power in the 
East. But the series of treaties negotiated among the new communist 
states, the most recent being the Polish-Czechoslovak treaty, had 
resurrected the notion within Poland with a vengeance —  with an 
important qualification: for the Polish leadership, the concept of a
Slavic bloc was not the same as that of a political 'East Europe’.
In reviewing the newly established Polish-Czechoslovak treaty in 
the Sejm, Modzelewski had this to say on the subject of alliance 
partners:
We, in our foreign policy, reject opportunistic methods; we look 
for allies among those states and nations that are and could be 
our natural allies, that is, that have the same interests, and if 
possible, the same methods of international cooperation.37
Modzelewski scotched talk of a political ‘East Europe’, pointing to
Poland's ongoing negotiations with France: ‘We will willingly sign any
treaty guaranteeing us peace on our western borders’. Slavdom had as
its common interest defence against a Germany which had never learnt
to live peacefully with its neighbours. The Polish treaty with France
would expand this common Slavic interest, limited so far to eastern
and southern Europe, to take in western Europe. Very soon these
negotiations were to break down as the French also came to identify
with American and British policy in Germany. But while they could,
Polish communist policy makers intended resisting the Western attempts
to push Poland into a classification they did not want for it. The
communist Poles, like the pre-war regime, saw Poland as a central
European power occupying a crucial geographic position as transmission
belt between eastern and western Europe; any consolidation of Europe
into two political halves would spell the demise of that ambition.
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Seeking to make this point as clear as possible to foreign 
observers, the socialist chairman of the Sejm Foreign Policy 
Commission made a speech the next day emphasising the unity of the 
Slavic nations in the face of the renewed German threat. This unity, 
Stanislaw Dobrowolski pointed out, did not constitute a Slavic bloc, 
but a system of bilateral treaties, 'links in a system of full common 
security based on the real teaching of history’. 30 The remaining PSL 
deputies took the same position. Their view was represented by 
Stanislaw Jagusz: ‘The third state to whose advantage it is for the
power of one or other Slavic state to be diminished, will always be 
Germany, regardless of its political system and the camouflage which 
it takes on for tactical reasons’.33
8*3 Ideological Reassessment
By May 1947, the PPR had gone onto the offensive. Gomulka led the 
attack, signalling a whole new approach to the question of Poland's 
relations with the West. Gone were the efforts to keep anti-capitalist 
rhetoric domestic and continuing to do business with the United States 
and Britain. Now, that ideology had taken over the diplomacy of the 
Anglo-Saxon powers, the ground rules set by wartime cooperation no 
longer applied. The United States had succumbed to the lobbying of
‘world reactionary circles’ and was conducting a policy overtly
hostile to the interests of the new 'democratic* states.
Poland was not about to turn the other cheek; the state's most 
sensitive interest was at stake —  its national security. The question 
of the post-war German system had been unilaterally decided on by the
Anglo-Saxons, determined to seal off their German zones from the
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principled influence of the Soviet Union. This meant that the issue of 
the Polish-German border was likely never to be afforded the finality 
of ratification by a Peace Conference. It meant that the questioning 
of the new Polish territories was likely to continue ad infinitum, or 
at least until such time as the good relations between the capitalist 
West and the new ‘people's democracies' were restored. By May 1947, 
Poland's communist leaders had little hope that this might occur in 
the forseeable future. America under the Truman Doctrine was 
continuing to maintain a huge standing army in Europe. Suddenly it 
seemed that the new Polish-German border would not simply be a line of 
security for the Slavic states from the possibility of renewed German 
aggression. Truman's 'doctrine' had heralded a new type of Anti- 
Comintern Pact; the United States, far more powerful than Hitler's 
Germany, now directly threatened this border and the entire foundation 
of Poland's communist power.
Poland had already suffered incredible devastation from the war 
just past. The majority of the population had no wish to go through 
another. Talk of a third war spread by the armed underground as a way 
of destabilising communist authority had been no more than that —  
talk. Now the possibility of another war seemed more likely than at 
any time in the past two years. In his May Day speech, Gomulka posed 
the all important question: what needed to be done to prevent another 
war? His answer came, for the first time publicly, from Marxist 
theory:
Wars will disappear from the moment when at least in the majority 
of countries the means of social production ceases to be 
privately owned by a handful of capitalists joining together in 
cartels, trusts and various corporations.-110
While cartels and trusts continued to dominate, Gomulka continued,
they stood to profit enormously from war. In the years 1940-1945,
American corporations had made a profit after tax of 52 billion
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dollars according to American Department of Trade statistics. Nor did 
these corporations suffer any damage whatsoever to their domestic 
plant as a result of the war. And now that this money was continuing 
to be reinvested in armaments, American capitalists were looking for 
an excuse to justify their expenditure. They had found it in the 
Soviet Union:
International war-mongers say that the Soviet Union threatens all 
nations and for this reason America must arm itself.... Behind 
this falsehood lurks the unsatiated appetite of American 
monopolistic capital reaching out for the world's oil resources, 
for British colonies, for Japanese and German industry, for new 
markets, for domination over the world.-11
Much worse, the defeat of Hitlerism by the forces of ‘world democracy
with the Soviet Union at their head’, had not destroyed the spirit of
fascism:
This fascist spirit yet rises above the world; it peers from 
behind the back of monopolistic finance capital, from behind 
banking-houses, banks and cartels, from behind the palaces of the 
kings of oil, coal and steel. This fascist spirit peers from the 
columns of the international reactionary press, penetrates into 
the parliamentary bodies of certain countries, hides in not one 
ministerial cabinet, accompanies and shows itself in the thoughts 
expressed by certain diplomats. 42
Poland, in contrast, had fully expunged this spirit. The January
elections had not completely rid the country of ‘reaction’, but they
had consolidated the power of the communists. The world, announced
Gomulka, could count on Poland remaining ‘democratic’ in the face of
the international onslaught.43
Gomulka's vehemence reflected the insecurity now felt by the PPR. 
It would be enough for Germany to regularly remind the world of the 
impermanence of the border between the two nations and Poland would 
never be allowed to take full advantage of its new economic and
political potential. Polish policy makers would never have peace of
mind so long as Germany retained even a perceptual right to claim what 
was once its own. That right had to be taken away. Germany had to be
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broken. Peace in Europe, the PPR leader had told the Second Industrial 
Congress of the Recovered Territories in October 1946, depended on
‘how the German state will be organised, and in what spirit the German 
nation will be brought up in'. The ‘spirit’ the PPR wanted was as
follows:
...the democratisation of Germany, the tearing out at the roots 
and complete destruction of hitlerite ideology, the destruction 
of the centuries old spirit of war, aggression and conquest in 
the German nation, the renouncement of all thoughts of revenge 
for the defeat sustained in the last war, and the liquidation of 
the base of German war industry.
‘Democratisation* would take at least twenty or thirty years, Gomulka
/
had concluded.'44 The only political force which could carry out this 
‘democratisation’ was the working class, a Nowe Drogi article now
pointed out.4*5
Polish frustration was alleviated somewhat by the official optimism 
still evident among the Soviet leadership. In June, Bierut, 
Cyrankiewicz and other Polish leaders again travelled to Moscow for a 
briefing on the increasingly difficult situation regarding Germany.
The Poles were encouraged by Stalin to maintain their dialogue with 
the Western states, especially over Germany, and now also regarding 
American economic aid for the European continent. As Cyrankiewicz put 
it in his report to the Sejm on June 16, Stalin created an atmosphere 
of friendship and understanding for the Poles’ predicament. Polish- 
Soviet friendship, Cyrankiewicz continued, was ‘filled with the living 
substance of mutual help and sincere cooperation flowing from the 
permanent, parallel and vital interests of both countries’ . The 
Premier went on to make a conciliatory speech, in which he called for 
a normalization of Polish-British and Polish-American relations, and 
the elimination of ideological strings attached to trade and aid.4e 
The Poles had clearly received the go ahead from Stalin to continue to 
maintain open lines to the United States and Britain for as long as
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possible. The Polish example was to be of a communist state which
behaved in international relations as normally as any Western state.
The American aid Stalin and the Polish delegation had been
discussing was soon being referred to in Europe and America as the
'Marshall Plan’. On June 5, in a speech given at Harvard University,
General George Marshall, Truman's new Secretary of State, had laid out
the basis of a programme designed to rebuild Europe from the ravages
of war and natural calamity. Poland was desperate for this aid.
European reconstruction was essential; but it could not involve only
one section of the continent, and not that in the greatest need.
Kliszko presented the PPR's position several days after Cyrankiewicz's
bridge-mending speech in the Sejm:
We see that the issue of cooperation in the economic 
reconstruction of Europe is currently becoming one of the main 
and most discussed matters. We consider that Poland, as one of 
the countries most destroyed by war, must study with deep 
interest the projects being discussed in this area.
We do not yet have the details of these projects, but it seems
to us that their realisation would play a positive role in the 
reconstruction of Europe on the condition that they do not become 
an instrument for the splitting of Europe into two camps, and
that they will encompass the whole of Europe including of course 
the most badly destroyed parts.
We consider that the delineation of needs in this area should 
be a matter for the European countries themselves, which would 
contribute to harmonious cooperation in the task of ensuring
universal welfare and would allow various doubts and suspicions 
to be avoided. 4-7
The communist doubts and suspicions were not unfounded. Poland's 
diplomats were hoping that whatever was being discussed in Washington, 
London and Paris, would not be based on the same premises as previous 
Western decisions on Germany. If the aid to be injected into Europe 
was to be of the magnitude press reports were having it, then this was 
a very serious matter indeed. It was either a sincere effort on the 
part of America to rebuild Europe in its entirety, or it was intended
as a tool against the interests of the Soviet Union and the newly
created 'people's democracies’. These were the only two possibilities
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for Poland's policy makers. Poland was in a good position to make use
of the aid. It could turn the American capital to advantage in carving
out for itself a larger communist role in east-central Europe.
Events were to move very quickly. Poland and the countries east of 
the 'iron curtain' were not given access to the detail of the Marshall 
Plan until it was already on the discussion table in Paris. Poland and 
Czechoslovakia accepted their invitations to attend the conference to 
discuss the plan, beginning on July 12, only to withdraw from the 
discussions almost immediately on the instructions of the Soviet 
Union. The official reasons for the change of mind were given by
Gomulka in a G2os Ludu article published ten days later on the
official anniversary of the PKWN Manifesto:
Up till now, in the course of our international economic 
relations, we have shown that we wish cooperation and that we are 
cooperating in this field with all states, not only the Soviet 
Union and people's democratic countries. Poland, however, is 
determined to categorically work against all attempts designed to 
organize an anti-Soviet bloc, just as it will never agree to any 
limitation or sale of its state sovereignty.
The attempt to isolate the Soviet Union by certain reactionary 
elements in the West, based on the exploitation of the economic
difficulties of the European countries destroyed by the Germans,
has not succeeded.
The Polish government rejected the invitation to attend the 
Paris Conference also because its initiators did not even hide 
their intentions, that what they intended above all else was the, 
rebuilding of Germany and returning Germany its lost position in 
Europe. The Polish government will never accept these intentions, 
as they point along the path of a reborn German imperialism and 
are potentially aimed at Poland's most vital interests.43
The small print of the Marshall Plan proposals was nothing if not
provocative. From the Polish communist point of view it broke the
fundamental axiom of respecting Poland's economic sovereignty. It
established a series of conditions attached to the proposed American 
credits which were more political than even economic, such as the
right of United States military bases to be established in Europe.
Other conditions such as the status of American corporations in trade 
with the Europeans were deemed to be an effort to give American
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economic factors a deciding voice in the trade of the participating 
countries. The United States was, in other words, seen to be moving to 
strengthen the capitalist system in Western Europe, entrenching its 
own links with this system, with itself as the deciding voice. The 
Marshall Plan was seen to complement the Truman Doctrine by working to 
prevent the emergence of communist or socialist power in these
countries.
Indeed, the American strategy was nothing as subtle as even this. 
From the Polish communist point of view it could not have been more 
cynical. Nothing had changed in the American position over the 
intended future of Germany. Washington policy makers were very well 
aware of the Polish and Soviet positions on this issue. The Americans, 
in other words, had played the biggest joker imaginable —  Germany. 
They had deliberately excluded the Soviet Union from the Paris
Conference before it could get even started. The Soviet Union and its 
'democratic' allies were not welcome. That was plain.
The Marshall Plan was a direct threat to Polish security. It sought 
to rebuild Germany as a barrier against further Soviet encroachment 
westward. For the Polish communist leadership, it sought to create the 
foundations for a renewed German encroachment eastward. This was no 
fantasy, something unimaginable. It had happened barely eight years 
before and the country had been left irrevocably scarred. Poland
needed to come up with an answer to the American effort to rebuild 
Germany:
To the plans to rebuild Germany before other states —  the 
victims of German aggression —  are able to heal their war
wounds, the Polish nation must reply with a greater than hereto 
work effort. We must not allow the Germans to get in front. We 
are not allowed to remain behind in the race of reconstruction. 
Our strength and the security of our borders, the consolidation 
of the nations yearning for peace must be built faster than the 
German aggression.43
The scope of the Marshall Plan left the Polish leaders undettered.
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Since no more aid was to be expected from the United States, Gomulka 
now presented the concept of the ‘Polish road’ of rebuilding the 
economy, as opposed to the ‘dollar road*. The ‘dollar road’, said 
Gomulka, meant a loss of faith in Poland’s own powers, resignation 
from the ‘patriotic soul of the Polish nation’. It would condemn 
Poland to the ‘good graces and bad graces’ of external aid. Worse, the 
‘dollar road' would have meant the loss of various essential 
attributes of independence, such as economic sovereignty. For its 
part, the ‘Polish road’ was to be based on the new three year plan for 
1947-1949. so
A basic element of the ‘Polish road’ and three year plan was export 
led growth. Coal was to continue to be the major foreign currency 
earner, but the production of other exportable goods, particularly 
mineral ores, was to be increased. Imports of consumption items would 
be cut, and export earnt hard currency would be directed toward 
investment items sorely needed for Polish heavy industry. Poland 
needed to keep its export markets open. It succeeded in doing this up 
to the end of 1948 and beyond.
In August, at the opening of the International Trade Fair in 
Gdarisk, Gomulka once more made an appeal for Europe to unite in trade: 
‘The Polish government would, like all states, especially European, on 
the basis of mutual respect for each others’ sovereignty, to be tied 
in a thick net of trade relations’. Gomulka*s conception for European 
reconstruction, in contrast to the Marshall Plan, was more modest. It 
was designed to play up Poland's strengths, consolidating the progress 
already made and keeping the door wide open to economic exchange 
across ideological borders: ‘The widest possible economic cooperation
and exchange of trade between all the states involved is necessary for 
the rebuilding of Europe on healthy, peaceful foundations’. Poland,
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said Gomulka, was proud that it was among the first to establish trade 
links with several states, notably Sweden, when the country was still 
in a desperate state of destruction. And now the Polish government 
‘will not be changing its policy of maintaining and widening trading 
links with all states to the extent of its maximum production
capabilities’.
But the Polish efforts to maintain the country's bridges to the 
West regardless of the ideological obstacles being put in the way were 
running now increasingly into ideological obstacles from the Soviet 
side. Moves were being made in Moscow to bring the new ‘people's
democratic’ states into closer line behind Soviet policy, to close 
ranks before the American economic and diplomatic offensive. Between 
September 27 and 29, nine communist parties were called together by 
the VKP(b) to discuss proposals to form a new central communist 
organisation, the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' 
Parties (Cominform). The conference took place in Poland, at the small 
Silesian resort town of Szklarska Por^ba. As well as the Soviet 
delegation, communist parties from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Jugoslavia, Poland and Rumania were represented. The French and
Italian communist parties were also invited. The communique released 
at the conclusion of the conference spoke of the consolidation of two 
political tendencies in international relations: one the policies of
the Soviet Union and ‘democratic’ countries working to weaken
‘imperialism’ and strengthen ‘democracy’; the other the policies of 
the United States and Britain working to strengthen ‘imperialism* and 
crush ‘democracy’. This could not be tolerated, the parties agreed.
Gomulka led the Polish delegation and played host at Szklarska 
Por§ba. His report back to the Central Committee was presented at the 
Committee's October Plenum. A close look at Gomulka's report shows an
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interesting mix of Polish national prestige, disenchantment with the 
West, and fallback into ideological resoluteness based on wholehearted 
support for the foreign policy efforts of the Soviet Union.
Gomulka began by quoting extensively from the United Nations 
Charter recently instituted and signed by all the parties involved in 
the ideological divide. Poland, like the other countries of the 
‘democratic bloc', had always strived to maintain good relations with 
all sides, with the United States, Britain and any other capitalist 
state, as well as with the Soviet Union. The policy of the PPR was 
based on the principle that systemic differences between states should 
not present barriers to their mutual cooperation, Gomulka insisted. 
This being as well an axiom of the UN Charter, however, it was clear 
that the governments of certain capitalist states were treating the 
Charter as a screen behind which they were conducting policies 
diametrically opposed to UN principles. ss
The Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine were two sides of the same 
coin, Gomulka continued, an attempt to conquer the world by American 
capital. In its European variant, the Truman Doctrine directly 
attacked ‘democratic forces', and in the first instance ‘Marxist 
working class parties' , such as the communist parties in France and 
Italy, forced out of their respective coalition governments in May 
1947 under pressure from the US. ‘This strategy of the American 
imperialists is calculated to create for themselves forward bases 
against the Soviet Union and people's democratic countries'. Gomulka 
goes on to compare the moves of the United States with those of Hitler 
before and after the Munich agreement in 1938. What was lacking then, 
he commented, was international resolve to halt the aggression before 
it grew stronger. The representatives of the nine communist parties 
had this resolve. But it was not to the American nation that they were
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saying 'no'. Rather, it was to specific ‘imperialist circles' of 
American politicians. And it was not under Soviet pressure that they 
had taken this stand. It was because they were all supporters of peace 
between nations; and the greatest center of world peace was Moscow. s3 
For Poland, ‘the most precious treasure' was peace. But above 
peace, Poles placed their freedom, independence and sovereignty. And 
it was these latter principles which were being threatened by the 
positions of the Anglo-Saxon states. The Anglo-Saxons were following a 
policy at odds with the Potsdam agreement; they were hiding within 
their German policies the intention to use German feelings of revenge 
against Poland. The PPR ‘all the more solidly, together with the 
entire nation, joins in the policies of the Soviet Union... as the 
Soviet Union has categorically disagreed with the Anglo-Saxon attempts 
to undermine the Polish border established at Potsdam’ . J5'4
The new communist organisation with its headquarters in Belgrade 
was not another Comintern; that it could never be, Gomulka stressed. 
There was no formal charter of the type established for the Comintern, 
and rather than sixty parties, Cominform was made up of only nine. 
Gomulka insisted on Poland's and the PPR's political sovereignty. But 
the Polish working class also needed its international allies. If 
Poland had not been able to agree to a treaty of alliance with France, 
then it had now an alliance with the French working class represented 
by the French Communist Party. In conclusion, Gomulka made the point 
that the international division between ‘imperialism’ and ‘democracy' 
was also an internal division. Increased domestic vigilance was 
required now that ‘international imperialism' had heightened its 
profile. The party needed to increase its pressure against the 
'Western or Anglo-Saxon political orientation’ within the country. The 
internal enemy could not be allowed to undermine the strength of the
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Polish nation and encourage the external enemy to aggression. ss
Gomulka's speech illustrated several significant developments in
the PPR leader's perceptions. The link between domestic and
international 'reaction* had once again grown stronger. Gone,
therefore, was the political basis on which 'democratic' Poland could
have tried for a more independent role in central Europe. Polish
prestige had been forced onto the back-foot by the aggressive
capitalist onslaught which had once again brought the issue of Polish
state and territorial security to the fore. Furthermore, this
aggression had widened the scope of the state/territorial security
linkage: the Slavic bloc, essentially a defensive concept ranged
against the threat of future German aggression eastward, had given way
to a new, also defensive, but larger grouping -—  the ‘democratic
bloc’. Defence against Germany was secondary to the goals of the
'democratic bloc*. Far more important was a defence against the threat
aimed at the heart of the new status quo in Europe —  the power of the
‘people's democracies’ and at the Soviet stake in their continuation.
Communist Poland's national prestige was damaged, but not
irreversibly. In the new conflictual international environment, Poland
would not be able to take the important place it had sought for itself
in Europe and the world at large. Polish foreign policy would be
working on a slightly different tack, Cyrankiewicz announced:
We want peace, based on the definite breaking of German 
aggression, to be stabilized on the new balance of power which 
opened the way to our independence and which is its guarantee for 
the future. We want the consolidation of new forms of 
international cooperation, forms which have risen from the post­
war system of [international] relations, based on the essential 
need for various political and economic systems to coexist.se
Three years before, the PKWN diplomats had worked mightily hard to
achieve a semblance of international recognition for the new communist
regime and the ‘democratic’ state's new borders. Nov;, Cyrankiewicz was
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announcing a re-run of that campaign, only in 1947 it was to be on a 
much broadened scale. In 1944 the argument had been that the PKWN was 
the best thing going for Poland in the circumstances of the Soviet 
advance and the need for a guarantee against future German revanchism. 
In 1947, Polish diplomacy had spread its wings and was arguing that 
'the new balance of power’, previously a concept rejected as 
reactionary, was the best thing going for the sake of peace and 
territorial stability in Europe. This was to remain the refrain of 
Poland's foreign policy in the following years. Poland's prestige as 
part of the 'democratic bloc’, its territorial security, and above 
all, the security of its regime, became firmly fixed to the mast of 
peace and stability in Europe.
For Gomulka and his supporters in the PPR, what was most at issue 
was whether the competition between the ideological systems would be 
peaceful or conflictual. Gomulka had no doubt that in peaceful 
competition the socialist system represented by the ‘Polish road’ had 
every chance of proving victorious over capitalism. ^  Others in the 
PPR had no such illusions. Their facts were that it was not in the 
nature of capitalism to peacefully coexist with communism. Peaceful 
economic competition could only condemn Poland to playing by the rules 
of the West and to being always on the defensive. Communist Poland's 
prestige demanded something better. Poland had to take its rightful 
place as moral and regional leader of the new ‘people's democracies'. 
But to do this, the party first had to complete its domestic 
programme. Communist power was still not yet complete. The ‘internal 
enemy’ could not be allowed to ‘encourage the external enemy to 
aggression’.
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9. STATE AND INTERNATIONALISM
Poland's security and prestige interests as reflected in the PKWN 
Manifesto had been at first presented by Poland's communist foreign 
policy managers in a manner relatively free of ideological content. 
These were to be broad policy goals natural to any Polish government 
in the circumstances that followed the war. From the creation of the 
common foreign policy in the summer of 1945, this situation began to 
change under the pressure of the PPR's domestic consolidation and 
continued following the elections of January 1947 notwithstanding the 
best efforts of Gomulka to maintain the PPR's pragmatic national 
interest profile internationally.
The engine behind the foreign policy ideologisation in 1947 and 
1948, just as it had been in 1945/1946, was both domestic and 
external. This duality was best exemplified by the changes that took 
place in the foreign policy interpretation process of the Polish 
socialists, allies of the PPR. Ceded the role of policy counter-point 
by the administrative repression and defeat of the PSL, and in an 
atmosphere of increasing international ideological division, PPS 
leaders began heightening the ideological profile of their party's 
foreign policy in what was deemed to be an entirely justified response 
to the ideological onslaught of the United States, while at the same 
time continuing the search for a ‘Polish road to socialism*.
PPS foreign policy proposed an international grouping of left 
socialist parties fully committed to integral cooperation with the 
communists, based on the critical premiss that such cooperation would 
encourage the continuation of a multi-party ‘national front’ system in 
Poland as well as in the other 'people's democracies’. Like the 
social-democratic parties of Western Europe, however, proposing a
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‘third force* grouping to offset the threat of a two-bloc formation in 
Europe, the PPS was seen by Soviet leaders and the ‘internationalists’ 
in the PPR to be perpetuating the traditional social-democratic role 
of splitting the international working class. The result was a Soviet 
retreat from the policies of the ‘national front’ and a return to an 
ideological consolidation on the pattern of the 1929 ‘class against 
class' policy. The ‘internationalist’ wing in the PPR now dramatically 
increased its pressure on both the PPS and its own ‘national’ wing.
The greatest impact of this newest ideological consolidation was 
felt in the area of Poland's foreign policy prestige; unlike the 
Jugoslavian example, in Poland, state and territorial security were 
already firmly ‘internationalised’. For the ‘internationalist’ wing of 
the PPR, already defining Polish prestige in terms of the ‘democratic’ 
state's place as an ideological Soviet ally, the consolidation 
required little re-adjustment. But for Gomulka, Poland’s national 
prestige was vested in its national independence and sovereignty. In 
creating a new united workers' party from both the PPR and the PPS, 
therefore, the PPR leader saw an opportunity to internalise the 
tradition of socialism with independence represented by the PPS as an 
axiom of the new enlarged communist party's foreign policy. This was 
the substance of Gomulka*s ‘nationalist deviation’. In overcoming the 
‘deviation’, the PPR ‘internationalists’ established a monopoly on the 
ideological interpretation of Polish national prestige and succeeded 
in entrenching this interpretation in the new united party's political 
creed.
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9*1 Socialist Foreign Policy
In their post-war role of principal PPR allies within the 'bloc of 
democratic parties’, the PPS saw themselves as a domestic political 
force not only strengthening the position of the new authorities 
domestically, but also internationally. The RPPS had transformed 
itself into the ‘re-born* PPS in September 1944 at a Lublin conference 
with the participation of Drobner and other socialists recently 
arrived from the USSR. Its primary domestic goal was support for the 
PPR in a political united front. The united front, like that of 
1922/1923, was intended to provide the broad church ‘national front’ 
political bloc with a working class grouping incorporating both the 
traditions of national independence and workers' internationalism. It 
also provided a counter to the national stigma of revolutionary 
communism in the PPS's initial commitment to evolutionary socialism.
Internationally, the PPS sought to underscore the viability of the 
‘national front’ policy in a Polish context. The choice of Osobka- 
Morawski as Premier and Foreign Minister during the PKWN and 
Provisional Government period said much for the authorities' 
intentions in representing themselves abroad. 0s6bka-Morawski was not 
a communist ideologue. He represented a line of moderation and 
commitment to the multi-party system he embodied. Unlike the PSL who 
were never given a leading role in foreign policy making, the PPS 
continued to be well represented even after Osobka-Morawski's 
replacement as Foreign Minister by Rzymowski. 1
Characteristically for the PPS, traditional policy concerns soon 
manifested themselves within the ‘reborn’ party. Several groups 
advocating the party's traditional national interest position became
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apparent. Drobner lead one such group, supporting a united front with 
the PPR but calling for full political independence for the PPS within 
the front. Zygmunt 2ulawski, also of the pre-war PPS, led another 
group which regarded PPS cooperation with the PPR as purely tactical, 
to be balanced with similar good relations with the PSL. At the other 
end of the spectrum, an 'internationalist* group made its appearance 
from a very early stage. Unlike the fairly even balance between the 
'internationalist* and ‘national* wings within the PPR leadership, the 
influx of traditional socialist support into the ‘re-born’ PPS during 
1945 reduced the PPS ‘internationalists’ to a relatively small and 
isolated rump. 2
The positions of the ‘internationalist* group are important for our
purposes as they show the extent to which PPS foreign policy changed
in the period after January 1947. Stefan Matuszewski, during the
v
existence of the PKWN the RPPS General Secretary, was the principal 
representative of the PPS ‘internationalists’. From 31 December 1944 
to September 1946, Matuszewski served also as Minister of Information 
and Propaganda. Matuszewski's group supported the wholesale immediate 
incorporation of the ‘re-born’ PPS into the PPR as a way of preventing 
the socialists moving to the right and eventually rejecting 
cooperation with the communists altogether. Following the creation of 
the Provisional Government of National Unity, however, Matuszewski's 
group decreased in influence as the PPR gave its support to the 
broader PPS leadership in the interests of establishing a more 
credible multi-party legitimacy, and the basis from which to 
politically defeat the PSL. Matuszewski was ejected from the PPS 
Executive Council in August 1946 only to return in April 1948 once the 
tide had turned in his favour.3
Matuszewski's foreign policy positions were indicative of the
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manner of policy interpretation the main-stream PPS leadership was
anxious to avoid in the interests of maintaining their policy
distinctions vis-a-vis the PPR. In November 1944, in the first issue
of the post-war edition of the PPS daily, Robotnik (The Worker),
Matuszewski set out the following position:
In order to be secured for the future against German aggression, 
Poland cannot stand alone —  she must move together with other 
democratic nations, among which the most realistic and the most 
powerful ally is the Soviet Union.A
No mention was made of any Western allies in Matuszewski's message. As
Minister of Propaganda, Matuszewski openly modelled his foreign policy
pitch on that of the ‘internationalist’ PPR. It was under his guidance
that the propaganda ministry undertook its campaigns first for the
transformation of the PKWN into the Provisional Government, and later
for the signing of the Polish-Soviet treaty. In May 1945, with the war
with Germany barely over, he told a conference of PPS regional
secretaries that Germany had sent its agents into certain states in
order to be in a better position to 'win the peace’ ,.s Three weeks
later, during the Moscow negotiations leading to the creation of the
Provisional Government of National Unity, Matuszewski announced that
the 'peace could be won’ by Poland if it successfully defeated the
forces of ‘reaction and fascism’ within its own borders.’5 Unhappy with
the relative docility of the PPS's own party organs, the Matuszewski
group moved to establish a more radical socialist newspaper. The first
issue of the monthly Lewy Tor (The Left Track) in September 1945 dealt
with Poland’s new democracy. Its model —  ‘The most democratic state
in the world. . . the Soviet Union’ . 7
In contrast to Matuszewski's domestic and Soviet focus, Osobka-
Morawski, in his Chairman's ideological report to the XXVI PPS
Congress (its Second Congress as the ‘reborn PPS’) on 29 June 1945,
identified four other determinants of peace in Europe, all of which
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looked beyond Poland, Germany and the USSR. Peace was to be built on 
the ‘lasting alliance of the three great powers', the United Nations 
organisation for common security, the bloc of Slavic nations in 
Europe, and last but not least, the ‘consolidation of democratic 
governments and systems in the majority of states’.0
It was in this last building block that the PPS leadership saw the 
greatest potential for its own contribution to Poland's ‘democratic’ 
foreign policy. ‘Democratic governments and systems’ meant those where 
the left had either come to power or were sharing power in a ‘national 
front’ situation. At the time of the XXVI Congress, the full momentum 
of the European swing to the left had yet to be felt. But the PPS, in 
a manner reminiscent of the European hopes of the ‘three W’ ‘national’ 
wing of the KPRP in 1922, felt that its own domestic independence now 
depended greatly on what seemed to be becoming a European prerequisite 
for communist parties to maintain their power —  cooperation with the 
socialist left. In his report to the Congress, Osobka-Morawski went on 
to warn against taking the ‘beautiful and noble international efforts 
toward socialist cooperation’ too far and losing touch with reality.0 
Unavoidably, however, as the party grew larger10 so too did its 
confidence and its efforts to carve out its own independent 
contribution to Polish foreign policy increased.
By the winter of 1945, the swing toward the left in Europe had 
taken a central position in the PPS policy platform. Its best 
expression came with the launching in November 1945 of the party's 
official monthly, Przeglgd Socjalistyczny (Socialist Review), under 
the editorial control of Julian Hochfeld, a pre-war PPS intellectual. 
In an attempt to clarify the party's policy position, Hochfeld wrote 
that the ‘re-born’ PPS:
...strongly tied the party's best traditions of half a century 
with the re-born position of the united front. Patriotism and 
internationalism, attachment to PPS tradition and a clear line of 
cooperating with the communist section of the workers' movement, 
socialist revolutionism and state realism, creating a connecting 
link between the gains of socialist construction in the USSR and 
the socialist offensive in Western Europe — ■ this is our 
programme. 11
But the first concrete efforts made by the PPS leadership were not
directed at socialist Western Europe. It was in the crisis with
Czechoslovakia that the PPS Central Executive Committee sought its
first independent foreign policy success through its contacts with the
Czechoslovakian Social-Democratic Party. The Committee went so far as
to directly criticise the PPR for its handling of the crisis in
relations between the two Slavic neighbours.12 In August 1946, the
party's supreme policy making body, the Executive Council, brought the
Czechoslovakian focus into line with its wider policy:
The PPS can play an important role in contributing to the 
realisation of the goals of Polish foreign policy by relying on 
its influence and relations amongst other friendly socialist 
parties, above all in the Slavic countries, presenting the 
situation in Poland in the required light, and striving to ensure 
that they understand the specific conditions and difficulties 
amongst which the new Polish reality is being built.13
In their encounters with Western European socialist parties, PPS 
representatives presented much the same case: Polish socialism needed
to be seen in the context of Polish post-war realities; in such a 
situation, any real socialist party would proceed in much the same 
fashion as had the PPS in its cooperation with the PPR. The PPS was 
being essentially realistic and mindful of Poland's national 
interests. The most important issue on a European-wide scale, was for 
all socialist parties to come to terms with the post-war power of the 
USSR and to work closely with this power in the interests of 
socialism.
From the conclusion of the war, various voices had been heard in
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the Western European socialist parties urging a post-war settlement in 
Europe that would prevent the continent splitting into two opposing 
political and ideological blocs. The power of the Soviet Union as much 
as that of the United States needed to be countered. This was the so- 
called 'third force* position. It contrasted directly with the PPS 
appreciation of the realities in which Poland found itself. 1,4
The immediate threat for the Polish socialists was not the as yet 
rather loose conceptions of ‘third force1. More important was the fact 
that the German Social-Democratic Party had become what they 
considered the embodiment of German nationalism. It could not, 
therefore, be admitted to a re-created Socialist International, the 
issue around which relations among the various European socialist 
parties revolved. The wounds inflicted on Poland by Germany could not 
be healed while the German social-democrats encouraged the German 
people to forget their crimes and re-establish themselves as a force 
in Europe. These were the realities and priorities that informed the 
policies of the Polish socialists.10
In PPS eyes, its complementary political role in Poland had been 
underwritten by Stalin himself. In August 1946, Stalin had told Morgan 
Philips, General Secretary of the British Labour Party, that ‘the 
Soviet road’ to socialism was certainly not the exclusive road. The 
'British road*, while longer and less difficult, was just as valid.10 
Speaking to the PPS Executive Council in August, Cyrankiewicz, now 
General Secretary after Matuszewski's demise, talked of the central 
European 'new road’ to socialism, a road which differed from the 
Soviet road as it differed from the Western road to socialism. For 
Cyrankiewicz and the PPS the 'new road’ meant above all an equal 
political alliance between the PPR and PPS, and unlike the ‘national 
communist’ road of the PPR, an ideological ‘synthesis’ of ‘communist
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revolutionism’ with what the PPS called ‘socialist democracy*.17
The principal foreign policy implications of such an alliance, 
founded on a firm commitment to the socialist transformation of 
Poland, were firstly that the enemies of the 'democratic* Polish state 
could no longer take advantage of the political differences between 
the parties of the majority working class. Poland would at long last 
cease to be a political football for the great powers that surrounded 
it. Secondly, an equal alliance meant that the popular foundation of 
the security alliance with the Soviet Union, the foundation of 
Poland's 'new track’ foreign policy, would not be limited to the PPR 
consituency within the Polish population; the new relationship with 
the USSR could depend also on the wholesale support of the broader 
membership of the PPS, thereby eliminating the rationale on which PSL 
support for the common foreign policy had been built.13
By the beginning of 1947, following the election defeat of the PSL, 
the PPS was having to come to terms with a rapid increase in its 
membership. The positions of the groups on the right of the main­
stream were strengthened. Many of the leaders of the ‘re-born’ main­
stream such as 0s6bka-Morawski, Hochfeld and Stanislaw Szwalbe, now 
also came to appreciate the possibility of a greater role for the PPS 
both domestically and internationally. Others such as Cyrankiewicz, 
understood their only option to be eventual organisational integration 
with the PPR. Any other course would allow the powerful anti-communist 
forces within the country to inevitably turn the PPS into a party 
opposing the power and policies of the PPR. In the geo-strategic 
situation in which Poland found itself, this option could only result 
in a physical defeat for the PPS on a scale similar to the defeat 
recently experienced by the PSL. The essential realism of the 
Cyrankiewicz alternative was given added force by the rapidly growing
-314-
ideological divide within the positions of the European socialist 
parties.
In the spring of 1947, the PPS came under considerable pressure 
from both domestic and international sources. Within the country, the 
PPR proposed a resolution that committed the PPS to unification with 
the communists at some unspecified stage in the future. The PPS was 
confronted with its central dilemma: cooperation or competition with
the PPR. A choice had to be made. The PPR proposal was eventually 
agreed to but it was seen by the independence-minded elements among 
the leadership and the party's rank and file as an intention for the 
relatively distant future, with no immediate bearing on the tasks 
ahead. 10
At the same time, the PPR began what was known as ‘the battle for 
trade'. This pitched the favoured PPS ‘three sector’ economic policy 
with a prominent role for the cooperative sector, against the PPR's 
conception of the dominant socialist or state sector. The cooperative 
sector was presented by Mine as being only a transitional phase which 
in certain conditions, such as then were seen to be the case, could 
contribute to the activisation of capitalist trends. Nationalisation 
was judged by the PPR to be the only method by which to proceed toward 
a socialist economy. 20
Outside Poland, the European socialist community was beginning to 
divide sharply over the international intentions of the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In April, the large pragmatic wing of the French 
socialist party, led by Leon Blum, stated its support for American 
policies in Greece and Turkey and encouraged other Western socialist 
parties to support American economic aid as an important element in 
contributing to peace and development in Europe. 21 In June, the Polish 
socialists were confronted with a meeting of the International
-315-
Conference of Socialist Parties at Zurich which for the first time 
clearly demarcated the dividing line between the cooperationist left 
and the anti-communist right. Most disagreement at Zurich was over the 
various conceptions for a re-created Socialist International, with the 
French proposing the formal re-constitutiton of the Second (Socialist) 
International, the Labour Party preferring a looser organisation, and 
the Dutch and Scandinavian parties wanting to see a firmly anti­
communist organisation. But the dominant issue once again for the PPS 
representatives, was the growing Western European support for the 
admission of the anti-communist and anti-Soviet German Social- 
Democratic Party to the forum.22
Following the conclusion of the Zurich conference, at its Executive 
Council meeting on June 30 the PPS leadership took the dramatic step 
of declaring its allegiance to a Marxist interpretation of history. 
‘The PPS road’, it declared, ‘runs only on the left. The enemy is only 
on the right*. The meeting extended the party's principal duty of 
consolidating the united front at home, to its foreign policy. 
Henceforth, the PPS's international role would revolve around working 
toward a more integrated left socialist position based on close 
cooperation with communist parties and open warfare with the 
‘opportunist’ and ‘reformist’ socialist right. The Executive Council 
stated its purpose as being to work for the creation of a United 
Workers' International, a unified communist and left socialist 
International. 23
At the same time, Osdbka-Morawski, Hochfeld and Szwalbe continued 
to identify the mechanical integration of the PPS into the PPR as a 
move to be avoided. Continued cooperation in a united front was far 
more preferable, since it gave the Polish socialists the opportunity 
to contribute their independent strength to the development of
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integrationist socialism in Poland and in Europe.
Following the Cominform inaugural meeting at Szklarska Por^ba in
September, the PPS Central Executive Committee announced that there
was no longer a foreign policy which did not consign a state to either 
one side or the other of the class struggle barricade. Zhdanov's
analysis of prevailing international relations was judged correct in 
its basic precepts. The world had polarised irrevocably; the PPS 
needed to increase its efforts to support a reconstructed
international socialism on the basis of revolutionary Marxism and left 
socialism. The Central Executive Committee charged its members with 
heightening the profile of their arguments for the acceptance of
‘genuine socialist political tenets’ within the international 
socialist movement; with increasing their efforts toward bringing 
about agreement between socialist parties and ‘sincere revolutionary 
and left groups’; with increasing their efforts toward the creation of 
an international united front of socialists and communists. At the 
same time, the Central Executive Committee took the opportunity to 
state that the ‘attitude of the PPS to the tasks and forms of
cooperation in the united workers' front in Poland as internationally 
has not changed’.24
The PPS, Hochfeld wrote, next to the Italian Socialist Party the 
greatest left-socialist party and the most experienced in the work of 
constructing a new socialist state, had an especially important role
to play in these tasks.2S Cyrankiewicz agreed. The PPS had to work to
its utmost to transplant its united front attitudes, its revolutionary 
Marxism and the Polish alliance with the USSR into the international 
socialist movement. 2S
The party's opportunity came in November with ■ the next 
International Socialist Conference held at Antwerp. Here, once again,
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the battle lines between the united front parties of Poland, Hungary 
and Italy, and those of the increasingly anti-communist West, were 
strongly defined. And once again also, the PPS was confronted with the 
strong support of the Western European parties- for the entry of the 
German social-democrats to the conference. The predictable outcome was 
a resounding defeat for the PPS. Hochfeld and Kazimierz Rusinek, PPS 
delegates to the conference, formulated a resolution that sought to 
define the united front position: ‘In the face of the danger posed by
aggressive capitalist reaction, it becomes vitally necessary to
rebuild mutual trust among the working classes of individual countries 
as well as genuinely free unity within each working class’. The 
resolution was defeated by fourteen votes to three. :S7' Notwithstanding 
this outcome, the PPS delegates decided to participate in the creation 
of a permanent socialist secretariat to be based in Paris (COMISCO) so 
as to be able to at least continue their efforts to influence the 
international body.
Hochfeld went furthest in his presentation of the party's 
international united front programme. He linked it directly to the 
‘synthesis’ on which the party's domestic concept of ‘socialist 
humanism’ was based. The PPS, wrote Hochfeld, favoured neither a 
reconstructed Comintern nor the creation of a ‘Third Force’ Socialist 
International. Both communists and socialists in all countries needed 
to work through their own domestic united fronts toward an 
international 'synthesis’, toward ‘integral socialism’, toward a 
United Workers' International:20 ‘Defending independence and fighting 
for socialism, the PPS is working for a union of free peoples, for a
free socialist republic in a Socialist States of Europe’.2-’
At the party's XXVII Congress beginning on December 17, PPS leaders 
were unanimous in stressing the need to continue the party's work
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within the international socialist movement. 30 Present at the Congress 
as an invited guest, Gomulka agreed with the PPS analysis of 
international relations but did not comment on the role the PPS sought 
for itself in the international socialist movement. Instead, he 
focused all his attention on arguing for the quickest possible 
integration between the PPS and PPR.31
By March 1948, the PPS knew it had failed to make any impact on the 
rapidly polarising European political stage. In February, France,
Britain, the United States and the Benelux countries began debating 
the future political status of Germany and its inclusion into the 
European Recovery Programme, or Marshall Plan. In Rumania, a joint 
Congress of the Rumanian Communist Party and Rumanian Socialist Party 
concluded with the unification of the two parties into the Rumanian
Workers' Party; and on March 6, the Hungarian Socialist Party convened
an Extraordinary Congress at which a resolution was passed agreeing to 
unification with the Hungarian Communist Party. But it was the 
February coup in Czechoslovakia that generated the most international 
concern. On March 18, the leaders of the Czechoslovak Social-
Democratic Party's anti-communist wing were ejected from the party.32
Talk of unification between the PPR and PPS now reached fever 
pitch. Following a visit to Moscow as head of a government delegation, 
Cyrankiewicz no longer expressed any need for the PPS to continue its 
independent policies. On March 10, at a meeting of six PPS and PPR 
leaders, it was agreed that the organic unification of the two parties 
would begin.33 Cyrankiewicz made the decision public a week later in a 
speech during which he expressed the view that the international 
socialist camp was ‘broken between left and right*. The fight with the 
socialist right internationally had to be tightly linked to the fight 
with the socialist right within Poland. There could no longer be any
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compromises. 34 Nor was there on either side. On March 19, the 
International Socialist Conference met in London. Unable to attend due 
to the failure of the British government to provide their delegates 
with visas, the Czechoslovakian and Polish parties became the focus of 
a sharp polemic following which an appeal was sent to the PPS calling 
for it to remain faithful to the international socialist movement.
The PPS leadership had little regard for such sentiments. Opponents 
of organic fusion among the leadership were already being denied 
access to the party's press organs. There remained little purpose in 
continuing to maintain an independent profile internationally. On 
March 23, in a move corresponding to similar actions undertaken by the 
Czechoslovakian, Hungarian and Italian socialist parties, the PPS 
announced it was withdrawing from COMISCO. 35 The same day, the party's 
Central Executive Committee, dominated by supporters of the 
Cyrankiewicz line, confirmed the decision of the party's General 
Secretariat 'beginning the period of preparing for the organic unity 
of both workers' parties in Poland’.3® At a joint meeting of the PPS 
Central Executive Committee and PPR Central Committee, Cyrankiewicz 
spelt out the new PPS line: from the moment when the Western partners
to the Yalta and Potsdam agreements and the UN Charter had stepped 
onto the road of international expansion, the task of the working 
class parties became to sharpen the international class struggle; 
Poland's independence, its security and territorial integrity depended 
on the support of the Soviet Union and the victory of the progressive 
camp; Poland's racja stanu was a revolutionary racja stanu. 3-7
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9*2 ‘Nationalist Deviation’
March 1948 saw Gomulka begin to emphasise the importance of an 
ideological unity between the PPS and PPR. Unification could not take 
place while the PPS membership was still greatly influenced by its 
traditional right socialist ideals. It was important also that not 
only the two parties, but also the population at large, was imbued 
with ideological consciousness, according to the PPR leader. In this 
way, the Polish ‘people's democracy’ could face the future with
optimism. Gomulka went further still: Poland's new existence as a
'people's democracy’ gave it a particular right to share its 
experiences with other countries. If other nations wished also to 
attain this higher stage of social democracy, then they too should 
join the struggle of ‘the world of labour with the world of the
capitalist exploiters and their helpers’.30 The PPR's battle with the 
PPS centre-right could not be de-coupled from the international trends 
that surrounded it. Having said this, what was evident was that
Gomulka saw Poland's ‘higher stage of social democracy’ as its own —  « 
and the PPR's —  creation. The Polish 'people's democracy’ could not 
remain isolated ,behind a Soviet wall. What was needed, Gomulka 
insisted, was a unified international working class, not British, 
Scandinavian or Russian, but truly international and Marxist. 33
From this point onward, the PPR's attention turned sharply away 
from international matters to domestic affairs. The process of
bringing the PPR and PPS together ideologically also called for the 
creation of a common political platform and agreement as to a common 
interpretation of the history of the two parties. Up till now, this 
process had been dominated by the PPR's attacks on the PPS centre-
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right. In line with the Cominforra policy of attacking the 'social- 
democratic splitters' of the international socialist right, the PPR 
had vociferously condemned the policies of Blum and At lee, identifying 
them with the pre-war anti-Soviet PPS and its leaders such as Jan 
Kwapihski, Adam Ciolkosz and Zygmunt Zar§mba, still active in London. 
The party's attention now turned to the PPS centre-left.
Gomulka had no intention of excluding any contribution from the 
're-born' PPS altogether. In May, a joint PPR/PPS commission was 
formed to direct work on the preparation of the ideological programme 
of the new united party. Its membership consisted of Gomulka, Berman, 
Biehkowski, Werfel and Franciszek Fiedler on the PPR side, and 
Cyrankiewicz, Lange, Matuszewski, Stefan Arski and Adam Rapacki from 
the PPS. Gomulka now began to look seriously at the history of the two 
parties and at the possibilities for Poland's 'national communist* 
future in the traditions of the PPS. During the course of the 
commission's work, Gomulka concluded that the new party should 
incorporate what he saw as the best of PPS tradition and exorcise the 
worst of PPR tradition in the anti-independence positions of the KPP. 
His opinions generated considerable controversy and opposition within 
the Politburo. Notwithstanding this opposition, Gomulka decided on 
presenting his views at the PPR Central Committee's Plenum in June. He 
declined to clear his speech with his Politburo colleagues prior to 
its delivery.
The significance of Gomulka's June Plenum speech for the foreign 
policy of the post-war communist Polish state lies in the consciously 
alternative future it presented. Communist state-hood had yet to be 
experienced outside the USSR for any length of time. The Soviet model 
need not apply. This was a clear refrain of the European left. But the 
processes of 'vassalisation’ taking place, as seen in the communist
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mind, throughout Western Europe, threatened to force their own
'objective' logic on Eastern Europe also. Gomulka knew well the odds 
against him. He was aware of events in Yugoslavia. Yet he sought to 
convince the party Central Committee, over the heads of the 
'internationalist' Politburo, that it was in the interests of both
state and society to have the new united workers' party pay more than 
lip-service to the concept of Polish independence. Gomulka was both a 
communist and a realist. His foreign policy attitudes had much in 
common with the work of Alfred Lampe. It was, therefore, only natural 
that the PPR should strongly assert its allegiance to its foremost
allies. There was both an ideological and a national security reason 
for this. The firm linkage between these two elements stemmed from the 
historical relationship between the Polish and Soviet states. But as 
much as this was a positive linkage for the interests of both the
Polish 'people's democracy’ and the Soviet state, it also had the
potential to be a negative linkage: the party's long-term legitimacy
was at stake. The PPR now had a golden opportunity to overcome this
handicap and institutionalise a tradition that could do more to
consolidate the party's power than the most pervasive presence of 
Soviet troops.
Gomulka proceeded to assess the policy positions of the KPP. Were 
these policies realistic then? Would they be realistic now? Gomulka's 
answer was a definite no. Any introduction of similar policies in 
1948, based on an ideological reading of history and removed from 
every day reality, would be similarly devoid of practical meaning. 
Gomulka wanted to give the party a lesson in communist pragmatism. He 
acted as though nothing had changed from the time he had helped to 
bring the party to power through his tactical manouvering and common 
sense. The June Plenum speech generated a furious polemic among the
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top echelons of the PPR. So much so that the speech itself has only 
recently been published in Poland.40
Dealing first with the SDKPiL, Gomulka made the observation that it 
had never in fact been a true Marxist party. Rather, it had been 
completely dominated by the ideas of Rosa Luxemburg which on the 
issues of revolution and nationality had diverged significantly from 
those of Marx. Luxemburg's theory of proletarian revolution had been 
predicated on the mechanical collapse of capitalism and a natural, 
irrepressible revolutionary momentum rather on than on the efforts of 
the working class itself to win social power. Luxemburg had on this 
basis completely denied the validity of any efforts on the part of the 
working class to win national independence. Because of this, the 
SDKPiL had been unable to rise to lead the working class. It had been 
condemned by the impotence of its policies on the most crucial issue 
facing Poland at the time.
The PPS, on the other hand, continued Gomulka, had a far better 
perception of realism. The PPS had been able to touch the chord that 
mattered in the Polish nation —  independence. Poland had experienced 
seven hundred years of independent existence. It was inevitable that 
this existence had shaped the mentality of the Polish people and 
Polish working class differently from those who did not have such a 
tradition. The fight for independence led by the PPS needed to be 
incorporated as part of the inheritance of the joint future party, 
Gomulka told the June Plenum.
The KPP, in contrast, seeking its inspiration in the SDKPiL, never
came to grips with this reality. Its answer to the question of Polish
independence had been to fight for a Polish Soviet Republic:
Only one thing can be said definitely on the basis of the 
political experiences of the KPP; namely, that a false analysis 
of the situation, and a lack of regard for reality and the 
position of the working class, must push a given workers' party 
onto the road of abstract revolution, expressed in slogans that
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have no basis in life experience. Abstract revolutionism and 
dogmatic Marxism leads neither to revolution nor to Marxism. The 
[KPP's] sectarian slogans about the fight for a Polish Soviet 
Republic were exploited by the Polish reaction for its own goals, 
for the fight with the movement of social-liberation. Now, as 
during the [German] occupation, the vast majority of the nation
has reservations.........only the long practice of our party has
convinced the nation that all of our slogans are sincere, that 
the PPR stands on the foundation of independence, and that we can 
best secure our independence, our national and state survival 
through an alliance with the Soviet Union. 41
The first publication of this speech in Poland has Gomulka's
statement portrayed in a different light:
The vast majority of the nation supported the slogans for social 
reform put forward by our party without reserve. However, only 
the longer term practice of our party, together with the position 
of the Soviet Union toward Poland, have convinced the nation that 
all of our slogans are sincere, that the PPR stands firmly on the 
foundation of independence, and that we can, with the most 
certainty, secure our independent national and state existence 
only through an alliance with the Soviet Union.42
Gomulka's message was clear enough without it needing to be 
corrected ‘stylistically’ for publication. The new united party could 
only lead the Polish nation from a position emphasising Polish 
independence. The support of the population could not otherwise be
guaranteed. From this standpoint, the PPR leader set out to establish
a set of theoretical constructs within which the ‘national communist’ 
future could be nurtured.
The first of these constructs dealt with the concept of
‘independence’ itself. It could only meant proletarian- independence,
or the independence of a ‘people's democratic’ state. National 
independence in the bourgeois sense of the word had completely lost 
its meaning since, as a result of the victory of socialism in Russia 
and of the outcome of the Second World War, the working class had 
taken over the banners of independence and sovereignty in the new 
socialist states. These concepts, therefore, now incorporated a deep 
revolutionary meaning. They implied the fight against exploitation, 
‘imperialism’, capitalism. They were being realised and solidified by
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Poland's alliances with the Soviet Union and the other ‘people's
democracies’. 43
The next important construct was Gomulka's concept of ‘alliance*. 
Poland's alliances with the Soviet Union and the other ‘people's
democracies’ were a new type of alliance, reasoned Gomulka. The old 
capitalist alliances had been arrangements of convenience to be 
abrogated when new circumstances arose. Now, when the world's single 
socialist state had been joined in alliance with the ‘people's
democracies’, the result was two distinct international forms of 
alliance: ‘capitalist-imperialist’ and ‘socialist-democratic’. The
essence of the ‘socialist-democratic’ alliance was that the parties to 
it had no designs on one other, were obliged to defend each other from 
aggression and, irrespective of their relative strengths, regarded 
each other as equals. No contradictions could exist between states
joined in a ‘socialist-democratic’ alliance since such states owed a 
common allegiance to the Marxist ideology. It was this very 
ideological nature of the alliances in which Poland was participating 
that formed the most important base for the country's independence and 
sovereignty, the most important factor securing the inviolability of 
its borders, and the integrity of its government. 44
In conclusion,, Gomulka reiterated his previous position on the 
‘Polish road to socialism’: the doctrine of Marxism and Leninism was
not infallible :—  it could and would change with the passage of time; 
the Polish road to working class power had been different to that of 
the Soviet Union; but without the liberation of Poland by the Red 
Army, the representatives of the Polish working class would never have 
been able to come to power. The Polish ‘people's democracy’ understood 
its debts and responsibilities, but it could never truly fulfill these 
if it was not allowed its own Polish space within which to develop.43
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Within the PPR, the ‘internationalist* majority of the Politburo 
consisting of Berman, Bierut, Mine, Radkiewicz, Zambrowski and 
Aleksander Zawadzki, were only too happy to use the wide ranging and 
highly controversial June Plenum speech as the lever with which to 
prise Gomulka from his post.4® Several days following the conclusion 
of the Plenum, the Politburo met and decided on a series of criticisms 
of the speech. Gomulka* s replies, written on June 15, give some 
indication as to what these criticisms were about.
The Politburo majority accused Gomulka of not taking into account 
the entire history of the Polish workers' movement, thereby distorting 
that history. This could only have been a provocation designed to put 
Gomulka on the defensive. No one speech could incorporate all the 
necessary history, nor could such a speech be anything but a 
distortion, if an intentional highlighting of particular aspects of 
history for the sake of discourse. The Politburo's second point was 
more substantial. Gomulka was accused of favouring the PPS over the 
SDKPiL. This was undeniable. Gomulka reiterated: if the Politburo 
thought that ‘the conceptions of the PPS [regarding independence] can 
only be termed realistic in the sense that they coincided with those 
of a section of the Polish political bourgeoisie’, then indeed, ‘the 
SDKPiL on the question of Polish independence showed less realism than 
a section of the Polish bourgeoisie’. Gomulka conceded that he had 
gone too far in saying that ‘the fight for independence belongs to the 
great traditions of the PPS which we should lay at the foundations of 
the united party', but that it could only be ill will and bias (!) on 
the part of the Politburo to accuse him on the basis of this remark of 
wanting to include in the foundations of the united party the 
‘chauvinist-bourgeois PPS conception of independence’.42
On the Politburo's third point, again on the view of the SDKPiL
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presented in the Plenum report, Gomulka went further still: ‘One must
have complete ill will in order to come to the conclusion. . . that this
view is wrong and blatantly simplified’. Nor could Gomulka agree with
the Politburo's fourth point, that his view of the pre-war PPS
constituted a factual acceptance of the PPS position of working for
Polish state independence in alliance with ‘imperialism’ and opposed
to revolutionary R u s s i a . '
On point five, concerning the position of the KPP on Polish
independence, Gomulka in desperation went through each of the KPP's
six congresses to provide a detailed rebuttal of the Politburo's
criticisms. There was little doubt in anyone's mind, wrote Gomulka,
that for the entire period from the time the party was created up till
1936, the KPP had stood on the position of incorporating Poland into
the Soviet Union. Only in 1936 did the KPP change its position on
Polish independence in the face of the threat from Germany. 43
The sixth and last criticism of the Politburo was that 'the view of
the traditions of the workers' movement in Poland given by comrade
Wieslaw (Gomulka's wartime psuedonym) represents a grave concession on
behalf of the nationalistic-bourgeois and reformist traditions
represented by the PPS’. In answering this charge, Gomulka bit back at
the Politburo. The unification of the PPR and PPS did create the
danger of the growth of a right wing in the new party, Gomulka agreed.
But another danger also existed —  that of the KPP sectarianism still
evident among PPR members:
Any return to the bad KPP traditions whose symptoms may be found 
in the position taken by the members of the Politburo laid out in 
the written response to my [Plenum] report, and which could also 
be observed in the speeches of certain comrades at the Plenum of 
the party Central Committee, all simplifications of the situation 
existing in Poland and underestimations of the attitudes existing 
in the ranks of the working class and in the nation, and 
especially looking for nationalism in places where it does not 
exist —  may undermine the great capital of trust which our party 
has gained among the working class and in the nation thanks to 
its correct policies and thanks to the use of the correct
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tactics. The person who does not want to see the fact, just as 
the KPP did not see it, that the historical development of the 
Polish nation has proceeded along a specific track unknown to any 
other European nation, the person who forgets that the attitude 
of the Polish nation is formed by the sum of its history —  that 
person is destined to commit political errors, to separate 
himself not only from the nation but also from the working 
class.so
Gomulka was intensely worried by the tendencies around him trying 
to shift Poland into a political reliance on the Soviet Union he 
personally wished to avoid. The situation in the Cominform with regard 
to the KPJ in which Gomulka and the Politburo had offered at the end 
of May to mediate, was becoming increasingly tense. And in Warsaw the 
stage was set for a meeting of the foreign ministers of all the seven 
‘people's democracies' with Molotov. Preparation for this meeting had 
been initiated in March by Poland together with the Soviet Union as a 
response to the London Conference of the three Western powers plus the 
Benelux states. The concluding communique of the London Conference was 
issued on June 7. It declared the intention of the conference
participants to create a new federal German state from the three
Western occupation zones.31 This was the final nail in the coffin of 
Poland's German policy. There could be no reversal of the process of
polarisation in Europe. Modzelewski, in a Sejm debate devoted to the
results of the London and Warsaw conferences,32 did not rein in his 
sentiments: the Anglo-Saxons wanted to put the western German economy
under the control of their cartels and trusts; the atmosphere in 
Germany —  revisionism and questioning the borders with Poland —  had 
its sources in Wall Street; the London Conference had given control of 
the Ruhr Valley to American and British financial magnates, the 
Foreign Minister told the Sejm. 3:3
The climax in the debate over Poland's future, its relations with 
the Soviet Union, the other 'people's democracies’ and the West, its 
independence and the future of its foreign policy, came in the summer
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of 1948. As well as the Warsaw Conference of Foreign Ministers, the 
latter half of June had also seen a meeting of the Cominform in 
Bucharest called by the Soviet Union to condemn the ‘insubordination* 
of the KPJ.54 Tito had his obvious counterpart in Gomulka. The Central 
Committee was convened again in July to discuss and ratify the 
Comintern's resolution on the Jugoslavian crisis. Gomulka failed to 
take part. He was evidently, according to the official version given 
by Bierut, on an enforced ‘sick leave', thinking over his attitude to 
the Politburo's criticisms. 35
Gomulka's effort to provide the new unified party with a long term 
position on Polish independence had failed. The PPR's ‘national’ wing 
now became the focus of an unmitigated ideological backlash designed 
to remove any doubt as to the total commitment of the new party to its 
internationalist roots. These roots were not those of the SDKPiL and 
Luxemburg internationalism; they were the roots provided by the 
‘internationalist’ wing of the KPP. The July Plenum proved decisive 
not only for determining the fate of the PPR General Secretary and the 
party's right wing; also decisive was the general tone on foreign 
policy adopted during the debate.
One issue dominated the July Plenum debate —  nationalism. 
Nationalism was the crime committed by the KPJ and it also ran very 
deep within the PPR. Not surprisingly, this attitude had a significant 
impact on the Central Committee's appreciation of Polish foreign 
policy in general. Ochab, for example, saw the evil of nationalism 
beginning when a national movement tied itself with ‘foreign and 
reactionary interests’, or played off one ‘imperialist’ power against 
another. This was a clear, if rather inaccurate, reference to Poland's 
pre-war foreign policy and to the policies of the PSL. The facts were, 
Ochab continued, that nationalism could not be isolated from the
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international situation, and the most important international 
phenomenon was the struggle for the liberation of the proletariat. 
Nationalism could only be one small part of this struggle. 33
In other words, nationalism was secondary to internationalism and 
internationalism meant having a correct attitude toward the Soviet 
Union: ‘If we talk of a bloc of peaceful and anti-imperialist powers
with the Soviet Union at its head, then we think of it in this way, 
that the Soviet Union plays the leading role in the anti-imperialist 
camp’.32 Berman tied this state internationalism to the party 
tradition:
...we always considered the revolutionary movement in Poland as 
an integral part of the general revolutionary movement. . . . This 
is what our strength relies on, that we are a single body, that 
we are always ready to support and give help when it is needed, 
when the common, unitary interest of the revolutionary movement 
demands it.30
On this basis, the policies and actions of the KPJ were quite 
legitimately open to criticism from the Cominform, and indeed KPJ 
rejection of this advice had now put the Jugoslavian party beyond the 
fold of the internationalist community. The Central Committee had no 
wish for the PPR to travel down the same road.
Taking up the conceptual issues raised by Gomulka in June, 
Modzelewski sought to link the nationalism/internationalism debate to 
the issue of state independence. The war had shown that the bourgois 
system had not been able to protect bourgeois states from the loss of 
their independence and sovereignty, the Foreign Minister pointed out. 
In this situation, the fight for independent statehood in Eastern 
Europe had been taken over by the working class. While in the West 
efforts were being made to limit the political and economic 
independence of individual states, among the ‘people's democratic’ 
states entirely new relations had arisen. These new relations, the 
Foreign Minister was convinced, allowed the new Polish state to defend
-331-
the interests of 99% of the nation. This conviction had to be 
inculcated into the Polish nation, he advised. 33
The Foreign Minister's inverted perspective reflected the general 
retreat of Polish foreign policy from its activist role after the 
establishment of the communist state in 1944. Up till the creation of 
the Cominform, cooperation among the ‘people's democracies’ and the 
Soviet Union had been limited to a coordinated foreign policy, trade 
and cultural exchanges. An institutionalised mechanism for inter-party 
cooperation did not exist. Now, as a result of the series of blows 
dealt the Soviet (and Polish) position on Germany by the policies of 
the Western allies, and the American and British propaganda offensive 
against the USSR and communism in general, the gap between state and 
party interests was being sharply narrowed.
It was the Jugoslavian episode that contributed the most to the 
seige mentality setting in firmly among the Polish communists. The 
Jugoslavian issue could not be treated separately from international 
politics Werfel reminded the July Plenum.30 The security of the 
‘people's democracies’ was under dire threat. ‘Imperialism’ had 
already succeeded in splitting off one of the fraternal allies, and 
this could not be allowed to continue. Nationalism, with all its 
variations, had to be eliminated, was the verdict of the July Plenum 
debate.
With regard to the Cominform's Bucharest meeting, Gomulka had made 
clear to the Politburo that he disagreed with them on the methods 
being used in the Jugoslavian dispute. He had gone so far as to 
question the authority of Berman to agree to the Cominform resolution 
on the collectivisation of agriculture on behalf of the Polish 
party.31 Having returned from his ‘sick leave’, Gomulka came under 
intense pressure from the Politburo to recant. He would have to agree
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to a resolution criticising his position being presented at the 
Central Committee's August-September Plenum, to his presenting a self- 
criticism at this Plenum, and to his resigning from his position as
General Secretary. ,
Bierut, having 'returned to active service' in the PPR immediately 
prior to the August-September Plenum, opened the proceedings with a 
keynote speech entitled: ‘On the right and nationalist deviation in the 
party leadership and on ways of overcoming it’. Bierut's speech 
signalled a fundamental change in the PPR's role in Poland. The party
would now be leading on the basis of its ideological identity. Where
this identity had previously been subdued, and the PPR under Gomulka 
had maintained its patriotic and national-state profile, communist 
orthodoxy was now being elevated to a position that overruled all 
other considerations or priorities. Gomulka's June Plenum speech, 
according to Bierut, quite simply ‘cut itself off from the foundation 
of class struggle, from the fundamental revolutionary goals of this 
struggle’ . 32
Bierut payed no attention to the situational exigencies of the
past. Instead, he used this opportunity to review the entire history
of the ‘opportunistic’ Gomulka leadership, criticising it for its lack
of regard for ideological principles:
We consider one of the main sources of the ideological 
uncertainty of comrade Wieslaw to be the lack of a deep 
understanding of the ideological principles of Marxism-Leninism, 
by which the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks has always 
been directed, and which continue to play today the leading role 
in the front for the international battle against imperialism. 33
The evident conflict of Gomulka's ‘right and nationalist deviation’
with the direction of communist consolidation in the face of
international pressure only became clearly visible with the concrete
steps taken in this direction by the Cominform, noted Bierut. Gomulka
failed to see the tight linkages ‘between national aspirations and
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internationalism’ . Nor was he correct in his interpretation of 
alliances and the liklihood of a permanent place for a bloc of 
‘people's democracies’. As Bierut saw it, this was an attempt to 
create a 'golden center* between the liberal-bourgeois democracies, 
and the socialist democracies. It showed an erroneous understanding of 
the relationship between the ‘people's democracies’ and the Soviet 
Union, based, as this relationship was, on the deepest identity of 
interests.34
The most immediate reason for Gomulka1s lack of success in defining 
a new relationship between the Soviet Union and its ‘democratic’ 
allies, was the first post-war ideological policy change in Moscow. 
The creation of the Cominform had coincided with a Soviet move away 
from the ‘national front’. In November 1947, Vyshinsky, soon to 
succeed Molotov as Soviet Foreign Minister, had begun an attack on the 
right wings within the communist parties, criticising them for their 
failure to appreciate the need for a Soviet type ‘dictatorship of the 
proletariat’. At the Cominform meeting itself, the French Communist 
Party was criticized for its ‘reformism’ and the Italian Communist 
Party accused of 'parliamentary cretinism’. By the winter of 1948, the 
‘national roads to socialism’ experiment had been officially brought 
to a close. 'According to .Marxist-Leninist principles, the Soviet 
regime and people's democracy are two forms of one and the same 
rule.... They are two forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat’, 
Dimitrov told the Bulgarian party, in a speech that was soon being 
echoed in the other ‘people's democracies’.33
In terms of foreign policy and the Polish communist state's 
national prestige, the crux of the issue revolved around the 
recognition of the Soviet party as the leading party in the bloc. 
Internationalism was a slogan meaning the acceptance of the ‘leading
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role’ of the VKP(b). The fact that with the Soviet party's ‘leading
role’ came also the usual bevy of Soviet advisers, was what the
Jugoslavians were most objecting to. Poland was not in a position to
object. Its geographical position opened it to far more direct Soviet
influence than the communist state on the Adriatic. As Bierut put it,
with the growing polarization between ‘imperialism’ and ‘anti-
imperialism’ , attitudes toward the Soviet Union were now the gauge of
sincere internationalism. 33
In presenting his ‘self-criticism’, Gomulka stated the following:
I never questioned the right of the VKP(b), gained by its
revolutionary experience and its construction of socialism, to 
provide the leading role in the international workers' 
movement.... Also beyond discussion for me is the issue of the 
closest possible cooperation and mutual trust between Poland and 
the Soviet Union, as only on this road can we secure our
country's independence and sovereignty before the lust for
conquest of imperialism, and guide the development of conditions 
in Poland on the road to socialism. 32
But this was just what the criticism of Gomulka was all about.
Gomulka's ‘closest cooperation’ was at odds with the close cooperation
envisaged by Bierut and Berman. In the August-September Plenum
resolution agreed to by the Central Committee, point two addressed
this issue directly. Gomulka's character defects, the resolution
stated, stemmed, as well as from other sources, from ‘a lack of
understanding of , the essential ideological content of the relations
between the countries of ‘people's democracy’ and the USSR, and the
leading role of the VKP(b) in the international front against
imperialism. . . . ’ 30
Gomulka had identified an important distinction between state
alliance and party internationalism, a distinction he had been
endeavouring to enshrine in his ‘national communist’ alternative. On
questions of state and territorial security Gomulka unreservedly
endorsed the Soviet Union's security guarantee in the face of the
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'imperialist’ threat to Poland's borders and Poland's socialist 
development. On questions of ideology and prestige, his position was 
far more ambiguous. Modzelewski picked up this point on the third and 
final day of the August-September Plenum proceedings. Gomulka and his 
group feared a certain divergence, the Foreign Minister said, ‘between 
the realisation of socialism in Poland and the question of Polish 
sovereignty....’30 Gomulka took up the issue in his own concluding 
comments. After having listened to three days of criticism, the PPR 
leader told the Central Committee that he had 'fallen out of the wagon 
on a historic turn’.20 It was obvious, he concluded, that the heart of 
the entire issue was his attitude towards the Soviet Union, towards 
the VKP(b):
... in practice my attitude was not so much one of party relations 
between the VKP(b) and the PPR, but rather of state relations 
between Poland and the USSR, good alliance-like and friendly 
relations, but rather only state and not party relations.... I 
understood these things, but it was difficult in practice for me 
to change my, attitude toward the Soviet Union above all to an 
ideological, party dimension. 21
Gomulka's ‘historic turn’ was a turn that saw Poland move from an 
activist self-interested communist state foreign -policy, however 
qualified it might have been, to one identified as that of an 
ideological satellite. The Plenum agreed to build its links with the 
VKP(b) even tighter, work harder for the realisation of socialism, and 
increase the ideological purity, the discipline and the principles of 
the party.22 Gomulka was forced to tender his resignation.23 
Symbolising the new symbiosis between party and state, Bierut, state 
President, became the new PPR General Secretary.
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9*3 Ideology Entrenched
The process of uniting the PPR and PPS in the next few months 
proceeded quickly, but hardly smoothly. The PPR tended to assume a 
position of authority; disagreements were ignored in the effort to 
finalise formal united positions, and whereas thousands of PPS members 
were ejected on the grounds of their ideological unsuitability, the 
PPR proceeded with its own verification rather less vigorously <29,000 
members were ejected). Instead, it undertook a recruitment drive so 
that at the time of unification the PPR could boast over a million 
members.
On December 14, the Second PPR Congress and the XXVIII PPS 
Extraordinary Congress met separately in Warsaw, each ratifying 
identical resolutions. The next day, one day short of thirty years 
from the time of the SDKPiL and PPS-Left Unification Congress, the two 
parties met in a Unification Congress with the PPS being incorporated 
organisationally into the PPR. The new Polish United Workers' Party 
(PZPR) ideological declaration was ratified on the sixth day of the
proceedings. Work on this document had been disrupted by the ‘right
and nationalist deviation’ controversy within the PPR and when 
progress resumed again in late August, the PPR leadership decided it 
was a task too sensitive to be left to a joint party commission. A PPR 
Politburo commission in charge of drawing up the declaration was 
instead created under the chairmanship of Berman. Bierut maintained a 
close oversight of the work and in the final analysis had a decisive
influence on the final shape of the declaration.23
The result was a statement of uncompromising ‘Stalinist’ orthodoxy. 
On the history of the Polish workers' movement, the declaration stated
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bluntly that the PPS represented the movement's anti-Marxist and 
nationalistic stream; the SDKPiL, in contrast, in its most valuable
contribution to the tradition of the Polish workers' movement, ‘stood 
firmly on the basis of internationalism, on the basis of a common 
battle with the Russian revolutionary movement'. On pre-war Polish 
foreign policy, the declaration presented the KPP view that the aim of 
the Sanacja regime's foreign policy had been to work together with 
Hitler's Reich for an invasion of the Soviet Union. It was this policy 
that had brought about Poland's defeat and occupation by Germany. 
Nationalism, the declaration stated, was and remained a tool of the 
exploiting classes. Nationalism led to the degeneration of the
workers' movement; its goal was to undermine the sovereignty of the 
Polish nation. All its forms had therefore to be eliminated. Real 
patriotism, in contrast, could not be separated from proletarian 
internationalism. 23
Poland's foreign policy, under the guidance of the PZPR promoted to 
being a ‘fundamental characteristic of ‘people's democracy', was put 
as follows:
The defence of Poland's sovereignty and security from the 
threat of aggression by the imperialist powers, and ensuring the
development of Poland toward socialism with the support of the
fraternal alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union, the 
leader of the great anti-imperialist democratic camp.
All tendencies aiming to loosen cooperation with the Soviet 
Union threaten the foundation of people's democracy in Poland, 
and at the same time the independence of our country.22
Close alliance and friendship with the Soviet Union had developed from
being the basis or foundation of foreign policy during Gomulka's
leadership, to, in the PZPR document, being the ‘principal
instruction* (wskazanie) of Polish foreign policy.20
A Manichean perception of the international system now dominated
the new communist party's foreign policy positions. The world, the
document stated, was divided into two camps:
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...from one side the huge, united anti-imperialist camp with the 
Soviet Union at its head, taking into its scope the Soviet 
nations, the countries of people's democracy, the revolutionary 
workers' movement in the capitalist countries as well as the 
revolutionary national-liberation movements in the colonial and 
half-colonial countries; from the other side the imperialist camp 
full of internal contradictions, the camp of conquest and 
regression, repression and ignorance, the camp in which the 
leader is American capital.20
Polish foreign policy was ranged firmly against American and British
'imperialism'. On the positive side, Poland would participate
‘actively’ in the ‘anti-imperialist camp’. The alliances that united
the Soviet Union with the 'people's democratic’ countries of this camp
were still the ‘new type’ postulated by Gomulka, but in the Bierut
version had as their focus not equal state relations but ‘the
solidarity of our countries in working towards socialism and a
classless society’. Poland's activity in the ‘anti-imperialist camp.’
would revolve around using the possibilities of the new alliance
system to quicken its economic development and to build a socialist
Poland. 30 Forty years hence, Polish communist foreign policy continues
to.seek its inspiration in these ‘Stalinist’ axioms.
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10. CONCLUSION
Communist state foreign policy must continually confront the 
paradox inherent in its character between the *universalistic- 
international* and the nationally exclusive. The purpose of this 
analysis has been to present an explanation of how this paradox came 
to be internalised in post-war Polish foreign policy. The inherent 
dualism in communist foreign policy can be identified through a 
reading of those public perceptions that seek to interpret national 
interests through a prism of ideological interests. The interpretation 
process fuses the two sets of interests; it creates a policy climate 
that legitimizes state actions abroad and explains them domestically 
as a balance between the two sets, to be adjusted according to the 
domestic or international determinants dominant at a particular time. 
The analysis above presents the particular configuration of the 
ideological/national interest balance in the case of Polish communist 
foreign policy, and shows how it operated up to 1948. The next step, 
for further research, is to show how the balance has been affected 
since this period by specific external and internal conditions.
At its broadest, the ‘universalistic-international’ is encompassed 
in the concept of internationalism, one of the firmest planks of 
Marxist theory and one that has also generated some of the most bitter 
disputes within the socialist movement. Internationalism as 
represented by Rosa Luxemburg meant a working class consciousness of 
common interests that surpassed the narrow nationalism of the 
bourgeoisie. Such consciousness was to be created through the 
leadership provided by the social-democratic parties in teaching the 
proletariat of the developed industrial nations that its common 
interest lay in the spontaneous workers' revolution and the socialist
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future in Europe and the world. This was Luxemburg's life task. It was 
a task she began first in Poland with the SDKPiL and then on the left 
of the German Social-Democratic Party. Luxemburgist internationalism 
saw its greatest defeat in the events of the First World War and the 
destruction of the Second (Socialist) International. By voting for war 
appropriations in support of their governments, the German, French and 
Austrian social-democratic parties destroyed their revolutionary 
credibility. The socialist movement split irrevocably.
In Poland and Germany, Luxemburg's contribution to Marxist theory 
was anathema to those socialists who looked first to gain national 
power and then to provide the working class with its dues. Her concept 
of a spontaneous workers' revolution met with criticism from both the 
establishment German social-democrats and the nationalist PPS. It had 
also been dismissed by the Russian social-democratic revolutionaries 
inspired by Lenin.
In Poland unlike in Germany, the Polish left had been split by the 
national question since its creation, with the internationalist SDKPiL 
seeing its greatest enemy in the nationalist agitation of the PPS. 
Socialism in Poland was not immune to the patriotic fervour of the 
repressed nation. The effect of the February Russian Revolution and 
October Bolshevik, coup d’ 6tat was not to spark off a wider European- 
wide revolution as Luxemburg had hoped. In Poland it acted instead to 
cement the national/internationalist split in the Polish left still 
further; the PPS was now faced with a powerful ideological foe as well 
as the traditional national enemy.
Internationalism took on a new meaning with the creation of the 
unitary and isolated Soviet state. Theoretical internationalism could 
now claim a practical focus, institutionalised in point 4 of the Third 
(Communist) International's articles of membership. Conscious of its
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internationalist obligations in contrast to the nationalist PPS, the 
KPRP had its idealistic Luxemburgism quickly overwhelmed by the 
practical imperatives of the war being waged against the Soviet state. 
It soon found itself under the direct authority of the Russian party. 
It could expect little else. The inter-war Polish state was in the 
unique position of lying between the newly created Soviet state and a 
Germany in which the hopes of the European revolutionary left were 
most vested. In response, the Western powers saw it as all the more 
important that the new national Poland regime play a high-profile 
anti-Soviet role. In the face of the Western and Polish threat, state 
and territorial security took on an overwhelming significance for the 
fledgling Soviet state. Caught between the European hopes of the 
Bolsheviks and their efforts to consolidate their security on the one 
hand, and the anti-communist repression of the Polish authorities and 
their efforts to undermine the Bolshevik regime on the other, Polish 
communism developed in an atmosphere unlike that affecting any other 
European communist party. Polish communists became acutely sensitive 
to the security needs of the Soviet state. For their part, the 
Bolshevik leaders soon began seeing in the Polish party a conduit for 
their wider European ambitions.
From this point on, the inter-war history of the KPRP's 
internationalist foreign policies revolved around a debate within the 
party between those whose national and ideological instincts had 
become offended by the instrumental relationship developing with the 
Russian party, and those who saw the Soviet-centred internationalist 
obligation as natural in the circumstances. Immediately following the 
conclusion of the Polish-Soviet war, the former group held sway. In 
return for a greater degree of national autonomy in domestic tactics, 
the leadership agreed to reject Luxemburg's criticisms and acceed to
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the Bolshevik line on the national and organisational questions. The 
KPRP recognised the need for a position on Polish independence and 
sought a guarantee for this independence in the European wide 
revolution —  the ‘United States of Europe’.
In contrast to the theory of spontaneous revolution developed by 
Luxemburg, the Bolshevik conception was for national communist parties 
to attain their power in much the same centralised and disciplined way 
as they themselves had in Russia. In this the KPRP (and the KPD) 
proved singularly ineffective. The European revolution, let alone the 
Polish or German revolutions, never took place and instead the 
‘national’ leadership of the KPRP was replaced at the Comintern's 
‘Bolshevisation Congress’ in June 1924. Internationalism returned to 
being an instrumental link between the Russian and Polish parties this 
time symbolised by the ‘broken bones’ metaphor used by Koszutska. In 
the years to 1929, the KPP's leaders were changed regularly according 
to the prevailing Soviet policy line and balance of power in the 
Russian Politburo. The division in the Polish party grew to the extent 
that had there not been further Soviet intervention the KPP would have 
split into two rival political parties.
By 1929, Stalin had established his predominance in the Soviet 
Politburo. Within the KPP, the ‘national’ leadership was removed from 
the Central Committee altogether and replaced with two Comintern 
‘advisers’ both close to Stalin. Little regard was now payed to Polish 
conditions. KPP foreign policy exhibited a vicarious concern for 
Soviet security and the German revolution. Once these concerns had 
been made redundant by a reorientation of Soviet foreign policy toward 
Germany, the ineffectual KPP was dissolved altogether. Stalin went on 
to oversee the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the 
partition of Poland. Polish communists were positively discouraged
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from undertaking any political activity. But with the fall of France 
and the German occupation of Rumania, members of the KPP were brought 
into the Soviet propaganda apparatus and the Comintern's schools.
This was the developmental road for KPP internationalism. From 1942 
and the creation of a new Polish communist party —  the PPR, a 
conscious state-orientated 'super— structure' was added —  Polish 
national interests. Two of these interests, ie. the internal security 
of the state and the territorial integrity of its borders, were from 
the outset presented by the PPR as needing to be vitally linked to 
Soviet power. The PPR based their case on a fundamental reality: 
Poland's historical dilemma of needing to balance between its two 
powerful and unfriendly neighbours had been simplified by the German 
aggression. Only one option remained —  the support of the USSR; and 
with its heritage of internationalism the PPR were the only domestic 
Polish political force the USSR could trust unconditionally in return 
for its support.
The PPR were also vitally aware of a third national interest: 
Polish independence and national prestige. Notwithstanding the evident 
conceptual contradiction, communist patriotism had been made official 
by the Comintern's new ‘national front' policy and Stalin's 
dissolution of the Comintern. ‘National communism’ became the basis on 
which the PPR intended building its patriotic credentials. These 
credentials were given added credibility by the ability of the party 
to re-activate its ‘national’ wing and put this wing into a position 
of leadership. Patriotism also became the theme of the Polish 
communists organising in the Soviet Union. Here, even more so than in 
the PPR which was operating away from the direct oversight of the 
Soviet party, this patriotism was built on a conscious recognition of 
the primacy of Soviet power and policies. It was in the Soviet Union
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that Poland's future state structures and territorial boundaries were 
agreed to by Poland's future communist leaders.
Polish foreign policy's national interest ‘superstructure’
continued to develop with the PPR in power after July 1944. Vital for
the PKWN's legitimacy was the recognition by the Western allies of the 
political reality now existing in Poland: only the PKWN could deliver 
the Soviet guarantee that secured Poland's political and territorial 
integrity from future German aggression. The acceptability of this
position was broadened by the accession of the PSL to what, with the 
new geo-strategic reality in place at the conclusion of the war, had 
quickly become the new foreign policy concensus. At the same time as 
the regime's security was being consolidated through the help of 
Soviet ‘advisers’, it gained the implicit recognition of the Western 
allies at the Yalta summit; and with the advance of the Red Army past 
Berlin, Western recognition of the new territorial shape of Poland, 
based on the earlier ‘Teheran Formula’, soon followed at Potsdam. The
Polish communists could now turn their attention to their state's 
prestige.
Here the national interest ‘superstructure’ relied more on ongoing 
Western recognition. After 1945, the ‘national communist’ experiment 
remained acutely . vulnerable to the withdrawal of this recognition. 
While Soviet policies remained open to the West, Polish policies were 
even more so. But in Western perceptions, these Polish initiatives 
were treated as an expression of the greater political and ideological 
authority of the Soviet leadership. Whatever the national variations 
Polish leaders attempted to introduce into their foreign policies, 
these were never substantial enough to warrant a change in Western 
perceptions. The methods used by the PPR to repress the PSL' opposition 
did little to remedy the situation. Little understanding or patience
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existed in Western policy councils in the immediate post-war years for 
the idiosyncracies of ‘national communism’. In many ways because of 
this fact, the international communist threat became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. If Stalin had been prepared to countenance a greater 
variation in socialist statehood in eastern and central Europe in 
exchange for the acceptance of the Soviet great power into the 
international state system, for their part the Western states after 
the death of Roosevelt had no intention of catering to the Soviet 
leader's understanding of his state's security.
The prestige of the national Polish communist state could not 
continue to operate along traditional patriotic lines once the split 
in the allied camp had become irrevocable. The ‘national communist’ 
experiment was brought to an end. In 1920 the theoretical 
possibilities of Marxist internationalism had been dashed for the
Polish party by the practical imperative of security for the world's 
first socialist state. In 1947, the theoretical possibilities of 
'national communism’ were ended in much the same way and for much the
same reasons. Where in 1919 and later 1923, the Polish communists had
looked to the revolution in Europe to provide their native movement 
with greater autonomy from the Soviet security imperative, in the 
immediate post-war years the ‘national’ PPR and the PPS had sought the 
same freedom in the European swing to the left. The ‘national’ PPR in 
particular saw its greatest hope in the ‘ democratisation’ of Germany 
and the elimination of the insecurity inherent in the Polish
ideological frontier syndrome. It was not to be. Instead, the Polish 
communists once again found themselves occupying point position in the 
defence of the Soviet state.
Under threat from an assertive Western response to their search for 
security in Eastern Europe, it was not difficult for the Soviet
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leadership to encourage an ideological retrenchment in the Polish 
party through the re-activisation of its weighty ‘Stalinist’
component. Poland's national prestige was simply brought into line 
with the Soviet security guarantee; after 1948, what became in effect 
an ideological form of Polish national prestige, as well as the
state's political and territorial security, came to be embodied in the 
political power and ideological prestige of the rapidly developing 
Soviet super-power.
The particular configuration between national and ideological 
interests that forms the thesis of this work has significant
implications for the manner in which Polish communist foreign policy 
has been conducted since 1948. Stalin's legacy is imbedded in the very 
foundations of the modern Polish state. In foreign policy, this legacy 
is manifest in the ideological rationalisation for the post-war 
geopolitical configuration of Eastern Europe and Poland's ‘new’ 
foreign policy, ie. the so-called ‘turn’ at the conclusion of the
Second World War. Since Stalin's death, various domestic processes of 
‘de-ideologisation’ have confronted foreign policy makers with the 
need to lessen their external ideological profile.1 Never in foreign 
policy, however, has ‘de-ideologisation’ gone further than simply 
updating the diplomatic brief and bringing it into line with current 
attitudes.^ The underlying internationalist tenets of Polish foreign 
policy cannot change. They have remained untouched.3 Instead, avoiding 
recourse to an overt ideological rationalisation, policy makers 
emphasise the state's national interests and the concept of foreign 
policy ‘realism’. 4
But internationalism remains the basis of an agenda that from the 
outset has been classified as national and realist. Polish national 
security after 1944 was established through the Soviet fait accompli
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in Poland; Poland's state and territorial security has henceforth been 
subject to Soviet oversight. Understanding and accepting this fact 
became the test of realism for all political parties wishing to 
operate in the post-war state. By 1948, the Polish communists could 
already claim their monopoly on this understanding of realism. 'De- 
ideologisation', therefore, can be seen as no more than an effect of 
this perceived monopoly.
Polish foreign policy is quickly able to redistribute its 
internationalist/national interest balance to suit its diplomacy. What 
it cannot do is separate itself from its own history or break its real 
monopoly on the fusion of inter-war communist internationalism with 
the historical national interest. Within the country, what have been 
presented as national foreign policies have always been recognised by 
the Polish population as being well within the ideological parameters 
set by the communists' internationalist commitment. As such, their 
implementation has achieved little of the popular recognition intended 
to win the Polish party its legitimization.
Notes
1. See Andrzej, Walicki, ‘The main components of the situation in 
Poland: 1980-1983’, Politics, 19 (1), May 1984, pp. 7-8, for his
comment thatj the process of ‘de-ideologisation’ within the PZPR under 
Gomulka's leadership resulted in ‘a narrowly conceived political 
realism based upon geo-political considerations’ .
2. Compare, for example, Adam Bromke's analysis of Polish foreign 
policy being subject to an erosion of ideology as a result of detente 
with the Westj 'Polish foreign policy in the 1970's’, in A. Bromke and 
J, W. Strong (eds. ), Gierek's Poland, New York, Praeger, 1973, pp. 192- 
204; and an article in the same collection by the Polish Deputy 
Foreign Minister Stanislaw Trepczyriski, ' Poland and European 
Security', pp. 205-212. In discussing the role of detente between 
ideological adversaries, the Minister concludes that only ‘a true 
recognition of existing realities’ would lead to the fulfillment of 
Poland's basic foreign goal: ‘economic stability and a secure position 
in a peaceful Europe’. See pp.206, 208.
3. Gomulka's foreign policy efforts with regard to the non­
nuclearization of West Germany and the Bundesrepublik's recognition of 
the Oder-Neisse border may have been 'genuine Polish initiatives', but 
already by 1960 Gomulka had almost entirely conceded the foreign 
policy field in a trade-off enabling him to focus the 'national' 
element of his strategy on domestic politics. By the middle of the 
decade, Gomulka had become one of the most conformist leaders of the 
Soviet alliance. Similarly with Gierek, no challenge to Soviet control 
over foreign policy was intended in his campaign for greater Western 
economic cooperation. See Peter Sumroerscale, The East European 
Predicament: Changing Patterns in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania, 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, Aldershot, Gower, 1982, 
pp. 38-40.
4. According to one authoritative commentator, not only has Polish 
security been enhanced in post-war Europe, it has indeed been 
perfected. The 'Polish question’ is taken to no longer exist. Poland's 
borders and its state security are no longer a problem. There is now 
only the ‘universal problem of... the stability and security of Europe 
as a whole’, and here ‘for the first time in centuries, Polish 
political thought is in high esteem for its realism, constructiveness 
and wisdom’. Marian Dobrosielski, ‘Thirty-five years of foreign 
policy’, Polish Perspectives, 22 (6), June 1979, p. 18.
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